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
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CHRISTIAN EXAMINER

AND

GENERAL REVIEW.

VOL. XIV.

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THE

CHRISTIAN EXAMINER.

N°. LV.

NEW SERIES — N°. XXV.

MARCH, 1833.

ART. I. — *The Apocryphal Testament, being all the Gospels, Epistles, and other Pieces now extant, attributed, in the First Four Centuries, to Jesus Christ, his Apostles, and their Companions, and not included in the New Testament by its Compilers.* Translated, and now first Collected into one volume, with Prefaces and Tables, and various Notes and References. From the last London Edition. Boston. 1832.

WE have little fault to find with this publication, except as regards the mode of getting it up. The pieces which enter into the collection, are, we suppose, perfectly harmless. No considerate reader, at least, can be injured by them, nor can the cause of Christianity suffer by their republication, provided their origin and history, so far as known, be told. But it was due, we think, from the editor, in fairness, to state the principle on which they were excluded from the number of books esteemed of authority among Christians. The language of the Preface, too, is, in some respects, exceptionable. It speaks of the writings which compose the New Testament, as selected from the "various Gospels and Epistles then in existence," by certain "compilers," a mode of expression which, as will hereafter appear, is calculated to convey an erroneous impression of the manner in which the volume of canonical Scriptures was formed.

Again, the editor of the present publication places the pieces embraced in it, in the number of those "considered

sacred by Christians during the first four centuries," after the birth of Christ. If, by this language, he means to insinuate, as it would seem (for his statement is wholly unqualified), that all, or any of the several productions, admitted into the collection, were esteemed "sacred" by Christians generally, during the period referred to, the insinuation, as we shall see, is not supported by the least shadow of evidence. The title is objectionable for a similar reason. It describes the volume as containing all the compositions now extant, which were "attributed, in the first four centuries, to Jesus Christ, his apostles, and their companions, and not included in the New Testament." Attributed by whom? Not, surely, by the great body of Christians, or by any considerable portion of them. Of this we have no proof, as regards any one of the writings in question, but conclusive evidence to the contrary.

It is not our intention, at this time, to go into any elaborate discussion of the evidence for the authority and genuineness of the several books composing the New Testament. This is not needed. Our object is simply, by a few plain remarks, to put our readers in possession of the principle upon which, according to our apprehension, those books have been received by Christians as canonical, in other words, as books claiming our reverence as containing an authentic record of a divine revelation, to the exclusion of all other writings attributed to the same period. Our statements must of necessity be very general. To fortify them at every step, by an appeal to facts, would require a volume instead of a brief essay. Those who desire further information on the subject we must refer to the very learned works already in existence, particularly those of Lardner* and Jones.† Paley's work,‡ composed chiefly of materials derived from the former, contains an admirably condensed view of the most important facts and arguments connected with the subject, and is within the reach of all.

We speak of the New Testament as a whole, and it is asked, By whom was it put together? By whom were the

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* Credibility of the Gospel History.

† New and Full Method of Settling the Canonical Authority of the New Testament. By Jeremiah Jones.

‡ View of the Evidences of Christianity.

several pieces contained in it collected into one volume? By an individual, or by a council or body of men? What authority had this supposed individual, or body of men, to decide upon the books to be received or rejected? It would be difficult to give a formal and concise reply to these questions. Nor is it important; for they do not, in our opinion, indicate the proper mode of inquiry; do not put us on the right track.

It is quite obvious that none of the ancient councils undertook to settle authoritatively the canon of the New Testament. We have better evidence of the genuineness and authenticity of the several writings which compose it, than the decisions of a council. The New Testament is a collection of pieces, written at different times, by different authors; a collection, we should say, if we except the Revelation, of occasional memoirs and letters. We have no certain evidence that any written records of our Saviour's life and instructions existed for several years after he left the earth. The Apostles were at first engaged in preaching; in relating what they had seen and heard of Jesus; recounting the history of his life and teachings, and explaining and defending the great principles of his religion. Those who enjoyed the benefit of their personal ministrations, would feel little need of any written documents. Had they doubts, or did they desire further information on any point, their wishes could be easily gratified by the opportunities they enjoyed of familiar intercourse with their teachers. But this was not a privilege they could long hope to retain. They would anxiously look forward to the time when the death of the Apostles would for ever deprive them of so precious a blessing. And even before that event, as the first preachers of Christianity, in the fulfilment of their commission, were compelled to travel over different countries, the converts of a particular city or province, would very naturally desire to possess some written accounts of what they had heard from their lips. This would give rise to such narratives of our Saviour's life as are contained in our present Gospels. Two of these Gospels, those of Matthew and Mark, are expressly said, on the authority of a most ancient tradition, to have originated in this way. Luke declares his own purpose in writing, in his preface. The aged John may, or may not, have written to preserve the memory of some incidents in

the life of his Master, and record several of his discourses, not mentioned by the other Evangelists, or to correct some false impressions which he had observed to be gaining currency among Christians. Both these motives were attributed to him in early times.

The Epistles obviously had their origin in the wants of the individuals or communities to which they were addressed. They are occasional letters, called forth by the exigencies of the times. Take the Epistles of Paul for example. It is quite natural to suppose that the converts made by him in a particular place, where he did not long remain, would need further instruction after his departure. Disorders would creep in, which would require to be corrected; false teachers would intrude, or controversies would arise, to agitate the little community, or trials and persecutions would be met, which would endanger their steadfastness in the faith. In all such cases, as he might not be able soon to revisit them in person, his obvious course would be, to address them in a letter, containing admonitions and advice adapted to their situation.

The Gospels or memoirs, and letters, thus produced, would for some time lie dispersed in the hands of those for whose use they were immediately intended. As they became known to the generality of Christians, however, as the productions of those to whom they were attributed, copies of them would be taken, and gradually collected into a volume for better preservation, or more convenient use. This collection would, from time to time increase, as the productions of different writers, commissioned to teach the new religion, became known as theirs. Some pieces, from their minuteness, or the remote situation of those to whom they were addressed, might long remain in obscurity, but as soon as ascertained to be in existence, and of acknowledged genuineness, they would be added to the collection.

Meantime accounts gathered from uncertain tradition, and mixed up with no little extravagance and falsehood, would be committed to writing, perhaps by honest but weak men. Fictitious narratives would be constructed, and letters would be composed with a good or ill design. These would be read for a time by a portion of Christians, before their true character was understood. But the forgery, in case of forgery, would be soon detected. Or if genuine, the writings

in question might not possess a title to the highest respect, because the productions of mere private Christians, who neither had, nor claimed, any supernatural illumination. They would then be gradually laid aside, or placed apart from others of a different character. Some of them would rapidly sink into oblivion, others would be preserved as useful, though uninspired documents.

Thus the writings of the Apostles, and writings regarded as having received the sanction of Apostles, would be gradually withdrawn from the multitude of forged books, or books composed by persons entitled to no more than ordinary respect, as good, but not inspired men. The former would be brought together into a volume, would be read, quoted, and commented upon, as possessing a character of sacredness; while the rest of the mass would be only occasionally alluded to, generally with some mark of disapprobation, or for the purpose of historical illustration.

That the canon of the New Testament was formed in some such way as this, we think we have abundant evidence from history.

Let us take the books which now compose our New Testament. Why were they admitted to form part of the Bible? Because, in the first place, the early Christians, who were the only proper judges in the matter, were satisfied, with certain exceptions we shall hereafter notice, that they were written by those whose names they bear. And how were they satisfied of this? Precisely as those who were contemporary with Cæsar or Cicero, or who lived near their times, were satisfied that the Historical Commentaries attributed to the one, and the Orations ascribed to the other, were their genuine productions; or just as we are satisfied of the authorship of any modern writing, as the poems of Milton or Pope, the historical works of Clarendon and Burnet, or the Letters of Franklin or Jefferson. Take the case of one of the Epistles, one of those, especially, addressed to a community of Christians, the first to the Thessalonians, for instance, supposed by many to have been the first written of all Paul's Epistles. It would be very easy to ascertain whether such a letter were ever sent. The original could be produced, if in existence; or if copies, or what purported to be such, only were found, it would not be difficult to prove whether the original from which they

were taken, were the production of Paul or not. Had a letter, purporting to have been written by the Apostle, been put into circulation among Christians, the Thessalonian converts would have had it in their power, in a short time, to expose the forgery. It is hardly possible, such was the intercourse of business or friendship between the several parts of the Roman Empire, that a forgery of this kind, had it been attempted, should have escaped detection.

These remarks apply, with little modification, to the books of the New Testament generally. It cannot be doubted that the early Christians had ample means of ascertaining whether they were really written by those under whose names they pass, and they certainly had the strongest motives for wishing to arrive at the truth on the subject. When we find those books quoted, referred to, and commented upon, by an unbroken series of writers, from that day to this, as the productions of those to whom they are attributed; when we find that as such they were treated with peculiar respect; were early collected into a distinct volume; were read in the assemblies of Christians; that the early adversaries of Christianity, some of whom were men of very acute intellects, never expressed any doubt of their genuineness; when, in addition to this, we take into view the evidence arising from the character of the writings themselves, and the multitude of apparently undesigned coincidences between the several parts of them, of a nature, as it would seem, to preclude altogether the supposition of forgery, — coincidences, for example, of the class, which it is the object of Paley, in one of the most original of all his works,* to illustrate, — surely we can ask no more. To doubt their genuineness under such circumstances, would be to proceed on a principle which would shake the credit of all history.

The above statement rather falls below, than exceeds the truth, as regards the evidence for the genuineness of most of the books of the New Testament. Take, in the first place, the five historical books, the Gospels attributed to Matthew, Mark, Luke, and John, and the Acts of the Apostles ascribed to Luke. We have not one tenth part of the evidence for the genuineness of any one of the writings attributed to

* Horæ Paulinæ.

pagan authors, who lived at or near the same period, which we possess in favor of these. We shall not be expected to exhibit this evidence in detail. We will give a few facts and references, however, simply to show the sort of testimony in their favor, derived from the old writers, who, it is to be recollected, must be regarded as uttering not their own sentiments merely, but the common sentiments of Christians of their time.

As the genuineness or integrity of the writings attributed to the Apostolic Fathers, and now extant, may be called in question, we will pass by them, simply observing that we have in Eusebius a quotation from a lost work of Papias, bishop of Hierapolis, early in the second century, in which he speaks, as from information derived from John, of the Gospels of Matthew and Mark, the former of which he says was written in Hebrew, and the latter was formed from materials derived from Peter.* We begin with Justin Martyr, a learned apologist for Christianity, who lived somewhat later, but who wrote, however, before the middle of the second century. Justin repeatedly quotes from our present Gospels, and the Acts, as from books universally known and respected by Christians of his time. He calls them "Memoirs," or "Commentaries composed by the Apostles," or by the "Apostles and their companions," and tells us that they were read in the public assemblies of Christians. Though he does not name the authors, it is obvious from the substance of his quotations, and the titles he gives to the books from which they were taken, that he, and Christians of his day, made use of our present Gospels and Acts, as of authority, and of no other.

Irenæus, bishop of Lyons, in Gaul, who in his youth was acquainted with Polycarp, the disciple of John, and who flourished about the middle of the second century, or soon after, is more distinct. For he expressly names the authors of the Gospels, the occasion on which they composed them, their purpose in writing, the order in which they wrote, and their qualifications for the work.† He speaks of four Gos-

* Euseb. Hist. L. III. c. 39.

† "We have not received," says he, "the knowledge of the way of our salvation, by any others than those by whom the gospel has been brought to us. Which gospel they first preached, and afterwards by the will of God, committed to writing, that it might be for time to come the

pels, and attempts to show a reason why there could be no more. He quotes largely from them, as also from the Acts, as an undisputed work of Luke. Clement of Alexandria, too, as also Tertullian, often quotes the same books by name, as universally received by Christians, and treated by them with a very marked respect.* Origen, who lived only a few years later, speaks of the four Gospels as "alone received without dispute by all Christians." He wrote commentaries upon them, as also upon most of the books of Scripture, books, as he observes, "not read by a few only, and those studious persons, but read by every body." The Acts he quotes as an acknowledged work of Luke. From Eusebius the historian, who wrote in the former part of the fourth century, and who was well acquainted with Christian antiquity, we learn that the four Gospels had always been received as the productions of those to whom they were then ascribed, that Matthew, Mark, Luke, and John, had always been regarded as the authors of the books which then passed under their names, and which were the same we now possess. He treats at large of the order in which they were written, and the circumstances which led to their composition; and we discover from his writings the great esteem in which they were holden, and had been holden from the first.†

We give these only as specimens of the sort of testimony which exists in favor of the genuineness of the books in question. Between the several writers just named, there

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foundation and pillar of our faith. For after that our Lord rose from the dead, and they were endowed from above with the power of the Holy Ghost coming down upon them, they received a perfect knowledge of all things. They then went forth to all the ends of the earth, declaring to men the blessings of heavenly peace, having all of them, and every one alike, the gospel of God. Matthew, then among the Jews, wrote a gospel in their own language, while Peter and Paul were preaching the gospel at Rome, and founding a church there. And after their exit, Mark also, the disciple and interpreter of Peter, delivered to us in writing the things that had been preached by Peter. And Luke, the companion of Paul, put down in a book the Gospel preached by him. Afterwards, John, the disciple of the Lord, who also leaned upon his breast, he likewise published a gospel, while he dwelt at Ephesus, in Asia."—Adv. Hær. L. III. c. 1.

* Euseb. Hist. L. VI. c. 14.

† Hist. Eccles. L. II. c. 15; L. III. c. 3, 24, 25.

are numerous others, who use similar language, thus forming an unbroken chain of evidence, from early antiquity down to the time of Constantine. It is unnecessary to proceed further. The result is, that the authorship of the historical books of the New Testament was never considered as matter of doubt. They were, from the first, universally received and read, as the genuine productions of Matthew, Mark, Luke and John.*

The same may be said of thirteen of the Epistles attributed to Paul, — that to the Romans, two to the Corinthians, those to the Galatians, Ephesians, Philippians, Colossians, two to the Thessalonians, two to Timothy, and those to Titus and Philemon. The first ascribed to Peter, and first of John, belong to the same class. That they were really the productions of Paul, Peter, and John, was never doubted by the early Christians, who had the best means of ascertaining the authors of them. As such they were read, quoted, and appealed to as authoritative documents, from the most ancient time, as since. And these, it will be recollected, were not books which existed in the hands of a few only, or concerning which little interest was felt, and the genuineness of which would not therefore be likely to be made a subject of anxious inquiry. They were, if we may so express ourselves, the public books of Christians, books about which there was always felt a very lively concern, and the history and authorship of which would, therefore, be matter of careful research and examination.

Whether the Epistle to the Hebrews is to be included in the number of Paul's Epistles, is a question which must be decided, if decided at all, chiefly from internal evidence. The external evidence belonging to the second and third centuries, it is well known, is divided. Clement, of Alexandria, is the first, we believe, who expressly ascribes it to Paul, unless we

* We purposely avoid entering into any discussion of the question concerning the Hebrew origin of Matthew's Gospel. To the inquiry, whether, if our present Gospel be a version, it is entitled to be received into the canon as a work of the Apostle, it may be sufficient to reply, that it was always received as such by the ancient Christians, whether a version or not. It is quite obvious, that it very early existed in its present form. The Gospel quoted and referred to by the Fathers, was a Greek Gospel, and their testimonies, therefore, go to support its credit in the language in which we now have it.

are to suppose, as seems to be intimated, that Pantænus, his master, was of the same opinion. Clement says that it was written in Hebrew by Paul, and translated by Luke.* But Origen, who was his pupil, and an exceedingly learned man, seems not to have regarded it as Paul's.† Eusebius tells us, that its genuineness was doubted by many, down to his time, and that it was rejected, in particular, by the Latin church. Tertullian ascribes it to Barnabas. Jerome says, that it was thought not to be Paul's, on account of the argument and style, which were different from those of St. Paul's acknowledged writings. Several modern critics, as Grotius, Le Clerc, Limborch, Calvin and others, have not been satisfied with the evidence adduced to prove it a work of Paul. Whoever was the author, it is, however, a very ancient production, written, as it appears, before the destruction of Jerusalem.‡

The opinion of Christian antiquity, too, was divided in regard to the authorship of the Epistles ascribed to James and Jude, the second of Peter, and second and third of John, as also of the Revelation, ascribed to the last. The genuineness of the above named Epistles, as Eusebius § informs us, was matter of controversy, though they were well known and approved by many, and the book of Revelation was received, by some, as John's, and rejected by others. These, some of which, it will be recollected, are very short pieces, are the only books of the New Testament, about the authorship of which there appears to have ever existed any doubt. The opinion, however, that they were rightly attributed to Paul, James, Peter, and John, seems at length to have prevailed among Christians, and hence they were classed with the other writings of the Apostles. Whether or not this decision was accurate, it is not our business at present to discuss, as we profess only to state general facts relating to the history of the New Testament, and the principle upon which the several books embodied in it, were received as parts of the sacred volume.

We have advanced one step. The first object of inquiry

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* Euseb. Hist. L. vi. c. 14. † Ib. L. vi. c. 25.

‡ See an argument on the subject of the authorship of this Epistle, in the Christian Examiner, Vol. iv. p. 495, and Vol. v. p. 37; also, New Series, Vol. i. p. 198.

§ L. iii. c. 3, 24, 25.

with the early Christians would naturally be, whether the Memoirs and Letters attributed to Matthew, Mark, and others whose names are affixed to the several books of the New Testament, were really their productions. But why, it may be asked, were the productions of these particular men admitted into the number of canonical books, to the exclusion of the productions of all other writers? What was the ground of preference? What the great and marked line of distinction between these and all contemporary writings? The reply is, the writings of the twelve Apostles would, as a matter of course, be received as parts of the canonical Scriptures, as containing the testimony of original witnesses, of the individuals chosen by our Lord to be his constant attendants, and commissioned by him to teach his religion after his death. They were with him, they saw and conversed, ate and drank with him, and could testify to the great facts of his life, death, and resurrection, as events of which they had the evidence of their own senses. To them he imparted the great truths of his religion in trust, to be by them communicated to the world. Their minds, it could not be doubted, had from time to time received the necessary illumination. They were the only medium through which a knowledge of Christian truth could be derived, and of the sufficiency of that medium there could be no question.

On this principle, that is, on the ground that the writers were among the chosen companions and Apostles of Jesus, and commissioned by him to go and preach in his name, the Gospels of Matthew and John are received as authentic reports of his acts and instructions; and had others of them left Gospels or memoirs of the life and discourses of their Master, they would, on the same principle, have been received into our present collection. On this principle too, the Epistles ascribed to John, Peter, and James, and the Revelation, attributed to John, would, as soon as ascertained upon satisfactory evidence to be their genuine productions, be admitted into the number of canonical writings. The Epistles of Paul are received upon a principle somewhat similar, that is, upon the evidence he gave of a direct commission from above to teach in the name of Jesus.

With regard to the Gospels of Mark and Luke, and the Acts of the Apostles by the latter, the case is a little different. They were not among our Lord's personal and chosen

attendants; they were not of the Twelve, nor have we any evidence that they were miraculously called to the office of evangelists. There was something, however, in the circumstances under which they wrote, which, in the opinion of all Christian antiquity, gave to their productions a title to respect, that was not possessed by any of their cotemporaries, with the exception of the twelve Apostles and Paul. It was a constant tradition, not probably without foundation, that Mark was the companion of Peter in his travels, and that his Gospel, in fact, only contains the substance of Peter's preaching, that it was written at the request of the Roman Christians, who were solicitous to have some enduring memorial of the Apostle's instructions left among them. This account is derived from different writers, as Clement * of Alexandria, Irenæus, Origen, and Eusebius, some of whom add, that after it was written it was seen and approved by Peter. Their narratives vary in one or two particulars. Thus, Irenæus says, that the Gospel was written after Peter's death. But all unite in affirming, that Mark wrote what he heard from the lips of Peter. He was called, in fact, Peter's interpreter. Such appears to be the ground upon which Mark's Gospel was received by the early Christians into the number of sacred books. It was always named with the other evangelical narratives, and treated with equal respect; and for this there must have been some reason, in the known circumstances of the writer, for the ancient Christians appear to have been scrupulous in what they received or rejected.

A similar remark may be made in regard to Luke, who was the companion of Paul, as Mark was of Peter, and who professes to have written from information derived from original witnesses. With this all tradition concurs. It may be proper to add, that Eusebius † mentions a report that

* Clement, as quoted by Eusebius, says, "Those Gospels which contain the genealogy were written first. And this was the occasion of writing Mark's Gospel. When Peter preached the word publicly at Rome, and declared the Gospel by the spirit, many who were present, entreated Mark, who had been his follower a long time, and remembered what he had said, that he would write down the things which had been spoken. When he had composed the Gospel, he delivered it to those who had requested it." — Hist. L. VI. c. 14.

† Hist. L. III. c. 24.

John, before he composed his Gospel, had seen those of Matthew, Mark, and Luke, and confirmed their truth by his testimony. On supposition of the truth of this account, the productions of Mark and Luke would be raised to a rank with the writings of the original witnesses of our Lord's life. But independently of this, the situation of Luke, which enabled him, to use his own words, to have "a perfect understanding of all things from the first," and his connexion with Paul, as a fellow traveller, would give to his Gospel, and to the Acts, which he calls his "second treatise," a more than ordinary claim to regard. One thing is certain. Both his productions, and Mark's, seem, from whatever cause, to have been understood, by those who were better judges in the case than we can pretend to be, to have received, in some way, an Apostolical sanction.

We have now done with the writings embraced in the New Testament. It remains to speak briefly of the history and claims of other writings which have been attributed, by some, to the same period, but which form no part of the sacred volume. These must be distributed into different classes. In the first we may place the writings of which the authors were known, as the productions of Clement of Rome, Ignatius, and others called Apostolical Fathers, that is, men who enjoyed personal intercourse with the Apostles. These were, by supposition, no forgeries. They were written with an honest purpose, and the authors of them never meant to pass them off as canonical books, or books having equal authority with those of the Apostles. They were, some of them, at least, in much esteem with the early Christians, as productions of very pious men, and as such were permitted to be read in the public assemblies of believers; permitted to be read as books adapted to nourish a spirit of Christian piety and virtue, much as homilies and sermons have been in later times. But they were never regarded as forming parts of the sacred writings. Of this we have abundant evidence from history. Whenever they are spoken of, or alluded to, by ancient Christian writers, it is in terms very different from those applied to the books comprising our present collection.

They were not admitted into the number of canonical books for a very obvious reason. They were not written by inspired men, by Apostles, men divinely commissioned to

teach in the name of Jesus, nor by the direction, and under sanction of those who were such, and therefore, though valued, as we have said, for the pious spirit they breathe, they were never regarded as of divine authority.

These writings, or what pass for the same, though the genuineness and integrity of all of them are much doubted, and some of them are evidently spurious, constitute the larger part of the collection, the title of which stands at the head of the present article. They occupy the latter portion of the volume, but we have named them first, as they are more considerable in bulk, and have a better claim to respect, than the other pieces included in it. They were translated into English, and published many years ago by Dr. Wake, Archbishop of Canterbury.

Besides these, numerous writings attributed to the first age, were published, relating to Jesus and his Apostles, and many of them under the names of the latter. Part of these were plain forgeries, though generally, perhaps, undertaken for a pious purpose; and part, intended to embody various traditionary accounts of our Saviour and his Apostles, were written, it would seem, by very simple-minded men, who, perhaps, believed what they wrote. Of these writings, the larger portion have long since perished. The learned Jeremiah Jones, in the work already referred to, has given a catalogue of such of them as are quoted or named by the Fathers, but which are not now extant, with critical notices and remarks, containing the testimonies of ancient writers respecting them.* Several of them bore the name of Gospels,† as the Gospel of Andrew, of Peter, of Thomas, of the Twelve Apostles, of Barnabas, and those according to the Hebrews, the Nazarenes, and Egyptians. Among them, also, are the Acts of Peter, the Preaching of Peter, the Acts of Thomas, perhaps the same as the Gospels, the Revelation of Paul, and other pieces, which it is unnecessary to enumerate. Of these, with the exception of the Gospels according to the Hebrews and Nazarenes, if not, as probably

* Vol. I.

† A catalogue of the spurious Gospels, the titles of which amount to about forty in number, with extracts from the Fathers respecting them and some short fragments preserved in their quotations, may be found in Fabricius, Codex Apocryphus Nov. Test. Vol. II. p. 335, et. seq.

they were, both one, the loss is not greatly to be regretted.* They are not quoted or alluded to by the early Fathers, with the respect due to the canonical Scriptures, either because they bore, on the face of them, evident marks of forgery, or because they were written by persons whose names were unknown, or who were authors of no credit.

We come now to the Apocryphal books of the New Testament, as they are called, which are still extant. These were, a little more than a century ago, collected and published by the learned Fabricius,† and such of them as are attributed, by any writer of the first four centuries, to Jesus Christ, his Apostles, or their companions, are inserted in the work now under notice, which is a compilation chiefly from Fabricius, Jones, and Archbishop Wake, though made in a spirit very different from that which animated them.

The first piece in the volume is called the "Gospel of the Birth of Mary." This, which is an exceedingly trifling and silly production, is traced to the second century, and is supposed to have been a forgery of Seleucus, or Lucius, a disciple of Marcion, and a noted writer of spurious books. It was esteemed by some heretics, as the Gnostics and Manicheans, who made use of it, but was never regarded by Christians generally, as of any sort of authority. It is first mentioned, we believe, by Epiphanius, a writer of the fourth century, who expressly pronounces it an impudent forgery. It is also mentioned, and condemned as spurious by Augustine and some later writers. The copy now in existence differs from the original copy. It was taken from the works of Jerome. Prefixed to it, as it there stands, is a letter purporting to have been sent by Chromatius and Heliodorus to Jerome, requesting him to translate the work from the original Hebrew. This letter is generally considered by the learned, as supposititious, as also the answer, and a third, which forms a sort of preface to the work, both of which have been attributed to Jerome. From these we learn that it had been ascribed to Matthew, the Evangelist; but the fact is, says the writer, it is the production of a certain Manichean, by the name of Seleucus, who also wrote,

* The possession of this might throw some light on the very perplexing question concerning the original language of Matthew's Gospel.
† Codex Apocr. Nov. Test.

under an assumed name, a book called the Acts of the Apostles. There must be a trifling mistake here, for the work was in existence before the Manicheans appeared as a sect. But it contained some notions afterwards adopted by the Manicheans, and, as we have said, they were fond of quoting the book, a circumstance which might very naturally lead the writer of the letter, whoever he was, to call the author a Manichean.

Next follows the "Protevangelion," or Gospel of James, a forgery, as is supposed, by the same author, and of a similar character, containing, in fact, the substance of the work just mentioned, with some additions. Jones conjectures, with some degree of probability, that they were originally one work. The remark in the prefatory notice to the "Protevangelion," or First Gospel, in the present publication, that the expressions used by the ancient Fathers, "indicate that it had obtained a very general credit in the Christian world," is unfounded. We have no evidence that it ever obtained such credit, and much to the contrary. It appears to have been always set down as a spurious book. That some alleged facts contained in it, as the perpetual virginity of Mary, and the circumstance that Joseph had been married, and had children by a former wife, called by the Evangelists the brethren of Jesus, were generally credited by the Fathers, only proves that they formed part of the current tradition. As such, they would very naturally be embodied in a fictitious writing, and would help rather to promote than to obstruct the design of the author. The work was first made known in Europe by Postellus, who "brought it from the Levant, translated it into Latin, and sent it to Oporinus, a printer at Basil, where Bibliander meeting with it, caused it to be printed in 1552." The assertion of Postellus, that it was publicly read and acknowledged as genuine in the Oriental churches in the sixteenth century, would, if true, have no weight. We must have some proof that it was generally received, and treated with respect as a production of James, by the early Christians, before we could be expected to regard it with any manner of deference, even admitting that the character of the writing itself were not sufficient to demonstrate, that it could never have been the work of an Apostle.

The "Protevangelion" is followed by the "First Gospel

of the Infancy of Jesus Christ." The origin of this is uncertain. It has been attributed to the Ebionites, to the Nestorians, among whom it is said to have been in use late in the sixteenth century, and to the Gnostics. Irenæus seems to refer to it as among the spurious and apocryphal books, and attributes it to a sect of the Gnostics called Marcosians. We believe that he is the only writer, during the first four centuries, who alludes to the work, and this fact alone would be sufficient to show that it had no claim to a place among the sacred writings.* If, as it would seem, the original existed in the second century, it must have been greatly interpolated, for parts of it bear evident marks of a later hand. Dr. Mill supposes that Lucius, before mentioned, was concerned in altering it, and in fact the book has passed with some, for his. It was translated by Henry Sike, Professor of the Oriental languages at Cambridge, and published at Utretcht in 1697.

The next piece, called the "Second Gospel of the Infancy of Jesus Christ," or, "Thomas's Gospel," is a mere fragment. Jeremiah Jones, who transcribed it, as he says, out of "Cotelerius's notes on the Constitutions of the Apostles," conjectures that it was originally the same with the preceding. The ancient Fathers mention a Gospel according to Thomas among the spurious Gospels. Whether this be a fragment of the same is uncertain. At all events, it was not a work of esteem among the ancient Christians, and if it was not a part of "Thomas's Gospel," just mentioned, no account of it has been transmitted to us.

The Letter of Abgarus, king of Edessa, to Jesus Christ, and the Letter of Jesus in reply, which follow, are not mentioned by any writer before the time of Eusebius, the historian, who professes to have obtained them from the archives of the city of Edessa.† The whole story carries, on the

* With regard to the assertion of Ahmed Ibn Idris, a Mohammedan writer, that it was "used by some Christians," of his time, "as the other four Gospels," we would simply observe, that, if true, it proves nothing as to the character and genuineness of the work. It was read, as before observed, by the Nestorians of Malabar, and these, or others of the sect, are probably the Christians referred to by this writer. The book, say the learned, was also used by the compilers of the Koran.

† Hist. Eccles. L. I. c. 13.

face of it, the air of fable, and the account of the preaching of Thaddeus, which accompanies the Letters, and which was derived from the same source, contains expressions which were not in use till long after the date assigned for their origin. They were evidently unknown to the Apostles and first Christians, and the authority of Eusebius was insufficient to procure them any thing like a general reception among Christians of the fourth century. They are expressly mentioned as apocryphal, in a decree attributed to the council holden at Rome, under Pope Gelasius, near the end of the fifth century. There can be no question of their spuriousness.

We next come to the "Gospel of Nicodemus," formerly called the "Acts of Pontius Pilate." This cannot be traced to an earlier period than the middle, or latter end of the third century, when the sect of the Tessarescaidecatites, or Quartodecimans, as Epiphanius informs us, made use of it in support of their doctrine about the time of keeping Easter. It was evidently a forgery, and the occasion of it may have been this. The earlier Christians evidently supposed, with or without reason, that Pontius Pilate conveyed to the Roman emperor, Tiberius, some account of our Saviour's crucifixion. It was customary, it seems, for the governors of the several provinces to transmit to Rome notices of remarkable occurrences and transactions within their province. These were called the Acts of the governors. The "Acts of Pilate" are repeatedly appealed to, as in existence, by the early Fathers, as Justin Martyr and Tertullian, in their Apologies for Christianity, addressed to the Roman Emperor and Senate. They are mentioned also by Eusebius. The original Acts, however, were never produced. But the supposed fact of their existence, furnished the hint to some Christian writer to forge a book under the same title. Such forgeries, miscalled pious frauds, are known to have been common at the period alluded to. The name of Nicodemus seems to have been afterwards added, because he makes a prominent figure in the book. Such is the account, or rather the conjecture of the learned, concerning the origin of the piece. It is attributed, with much appearance of probability, to Lucius, or Leucius, called also Charinus, the noted forger before mentioned. Nothing needs be added to show that it is a worthless piece.

We have next the Apostles' Creed, in two forms, as it stood in the year 600, and as it now stands in the English "Book of Common Prayer." This requires no comment, as it is well known not to have been the production of the Apostles, or of the Apostolic age, and is, consequently, of no authority. In its shorter and more ancient form it reads thus.

"I believe in God the Father Almighty; And in Jesus Christ his only begotten Son, our Lord; Who was born of the Holy Ghost and Virgin Mary, And was crucified under Pontius Pilate, and was buried; And the third day rose again from the dead, Ascended into Heaven, sitteth on the right hand of the Father; Whence he shall come to judge the quick and the dead; And in the Holy Ghost; The Holy Church; The remission of sins; And the resurrection of the flesh, Amen."

But even this form is not very ancient, for it differs somewhat from the summaries of faith left us by different writers before the council of Nice, though it resembles them in its character of very great simplicity. The most material alteration the creed has undergone, since the form just quoted was in use, it will be perceived, is the addition of the clause "descended into hell," which is not found in the more ancient copies.

Then follows an "Epistle of Paul to the Laodiceans," a short piece of only nineteen verses. It appears that there early existed a writing under this title, which is said to have been used by Marcion; but all the ancient Christians who mention it, pronounce it spurious. The present Epistle seems not to be the same, and if not, we have no account of it whatever, by any of the old writers. It is evidently a forgery, taken, for the most part, from St. Paul's genuine Epistles. What has served greatly to embarrass critics on the subject, is, that St. Paul himself, Col. iv. 16, appears to allude to a letter written by him to the Laodiceans; and several learned men among the moderns have supposed, that the "Epistle to the Ephesians" was known also by the title of the "Epistle to the Laodiceans." We cannot at present enter into a discussion of these points. However they may be disposed of, it is obvious, as we have said, that the short piece under consideration has no claims to be regarded as a genuine production of the Apostle. It would be difficult to explain the ground of the esteem in which it

has been holden by the Quakers, who, it seems, once caused a translation of it to be printed.

The Epistles of Paul to Seneca and of Seneca to Paul, which come next in order, are mentioned by no writers earlier than Jerome and Augustine, and it would be mere waste of words to enter into any argument to prove them a clumsy forgery.

We have next the "Acts of Paul and Thecla." This is mentioned by Tertullian as an apocryphal book, forged by a certain Presbyter of Asia, who, when convicted of the offence, alleged, in apology for himself, that he was influenced by no other motive than "affection for Paul," upon whom, as he seems to suppose, the book would reflect honor. Jerome, too, places it among the apocryphal books. This is sufficient evidence of the repute in which it was holden by the ancient Christians, who certainly never regarded it as sacred or canonical, though they may have believed some part of the narrative to have been founded in truth. The piece, as we have said, originally of no authority, and entitled to no respect, has, as the learned observe, been evidently interpolated, since it contains allusions to usages known not to have existed at the period to which its origin seems to be fairly attributed.

We have now done. The remainder of the volume consists of the writings attributed to the Apostolic Fathers, of which we have already spoken.

From the foregoing brief historical notices, it will appear, if we mistake not, that there is a broad and marked line of distinction between the writings admitted into the New Testament, and the mass which was left, as having no claim to be considered as sacred or canonical books. The latter class were either forgeries, or the productions of men who had no title to credit, and were known to be such, and as such were rejected by the generality of Christians, who were best qualified to judge of their pretensions; or they were the effusions of honest men, but of men who never claimed to be inspired, who were neither Apostles, nor wrote under the sanction and superintendence of Apostles, and whose works, therefore, admitting that we possess them in their original integrity, must be regarded as only the productions of private and fallible Christians.

That a multitude of books were forged, and attempted to

be palmed upon the world as the productions of the Apostles and Evangelists, affects not in the least the credit of their writings. They only prove the esteem in which those writings were generally holden, and thus in some sort afford evidence of the truth of Christianity. That they were detected to be forgeries, and as such treated with neglect or contempt, shows the care and discrimination used by the early Christians, in judging of the claims of the several productions which were from time to time sent abroad, under the hallowed names of the Apostles and first preachers of Christianity.

What happened to the writers of the several books of the New Testament has often happened to others. The same fate attended the early Fathers of the church. Writings were forged, and thrown into circulation, under sanction of their names, but those forgeries are not considered as in the smallest degree impairing the value of their acknowledged remains. The apologies of Justin, the Martyr, are just as precious now, as they would have been, had not the Epistle to Zenas, the Questions and Responses to the Orthodox, and other suppositious writings, been sent out in his name. Forgeries, too, were attempted under the name of Origen, in his own life time. But does that prove that he did not write the Books against Celsus, now found among his works, or tend in any manner to modify our opinion of their merits? Or, to take a more modern example, in what way is the genuine literature of the fifteenth century affected by the attempts of Chatterton, sixty or seventy years ago, to impose upon the public certain poems of his own manufacture, as the remains of Rowley? Just as much, and no more, than the credit of our present Gospels is affected by the forgeries of Seleucus, or whoever he was, who wrote the "Gospel of the Birth of Mary," or the "Protevangelion" of James. The genuineness of the poems ascribed to Rowley, we venture to say, may be defended by arguments quite as good, as can be brought in support of the Apostolic origin of these and other writings of the same class.

The compiler of the "Apocryphal Testament," who is evidently hostile to Christianity, designs to convey the impression, that the books now composing our New Testament were arbitrarily selected from a mass of writings possessing the same or similar claims to respect. This is the object of the prefatory notices to the several pieces, in

constructing which he has drawn largely on Jones, often taking from him whole sentences, or fragments of sentences, without acknowledgment. But these are so adroitly strung together, with the help of a little coloring, and a dexterous use of the arts of insinuation and suppression, that they can hardly fail to perplex and mislead the unlearned reader. Such disingenuous artifice requires to be exposed. We cannot too strongly protest against its use. It is difficult to believe that any real lover of truth can ever resort to it. Such wisdom cometh not from above.

ART. II. — *Dermot Mac Morrogh, or the Conquest of Ireland; an Historical Tale of the Twelfth Century.* In four Cantos. By JOHN QUINCY ADAMS. Boston. Carter, Hendee, & Co. 1832. 8vo. pp. 108.

THE best and wisest of mortals are liable to mistakes. We have too much respect for truth to consider this Tale as any thing better than a mistake, and too much respect for its author, to treat it as any thing worse. It is an error of the head, or of the press, but not of the heart. If it had not been the production of one, lately president of these United States, it would not have been noticed as it has been. If one large edition of it had not been exhausted, and another called for, we should not have noticed it ourselves. As it is, we feel obliged to express our opinion of it, which we shall do in a few words.

The poetry of this "Historical Tale," is not very good, nor very bad, but, we are bound to say, very indifferent. The rhymes are tolerably correct. The flow of the verse is, with now and then a serious interruption, even and regular. But if the reader looks for any sparklings in the river, any wellings up from deep fountains, any striking thoughts, or beautiful images, or signs of what is termed poetical inspiration, he will look in vain. The Tale consists of four cantos. Curiosity carried us through the first, a sense of duty through the remaining three. Though we were not sorry that we had finished it, yet the prevailing impression which it left upon our mind was that of regret, — the kind of regret which every one feels, when an unadvised step, which will inevi-

tably be attacked and misinterpreted and ridiculed, has been taken by a friend.

The morality of this "Historical Tale" is negative, if there be such a thing as negative morality. We ought rather to say, that, with regard to morality, or moral influence, the Tale is negative. Charges have been made against its character in this respect, but we are convinced they are without foundation. That it was written with a good and moral intention, we have no doubt; and so far as a knowledge of this the writer's purpose produces any effect, the effect is good. But the Tale itself is neither moral nor immoral. There are, it is true, some passages in it which we should not like to read aloud to a lady; and so there are in many excellent books and poems. But there is nothing in it which we should be sorry to have a lady read to herself. If any one, after an unprejudiced perusal, should think that there was a stanza in it which could be of the least injury or advantage to the morals of man, woman, or child, we should be astonished at the opinion. There is nothing exciting in it, one way or the other. Its principal deficiency is not want of good morals, but of good poetry and good taste. The chief objection we should have to the reading aloud of this "Historical Tale," with the exception of those few passages, would be, that we should much prefer to read something else.

It is said that this Tale has a political meaning. Whether it has or has not, is a question which we shall leave to be settled by others, as it is one in which we feel no interest ourselves.

We will now extract one or two stanzas which we consider to be among the best in this publication. The second of the two following has some force.

"For sturdy Becket, Canterbury's saint,
Had turned the realm of Albion upside down:
Because, regardless of his just complaint,
And in defiance of the triple crown,
Henry had dared the primate's rights to taint;
And cast his mitre's bold pretensions down:
And at some pageant (who can give it credence?)
To York's archbishop had assigned precedence.

"Oh! love of place; is there in earth's wide span,
To sway the human heart, a fiercer passion;

Saint Becket was a meek and humble man;
To prayer devoted as was then the fashion —
And whensoever into sin he ran,
Prepared himself smartly to lay the lash on.
But sooner than resign one inch of place,
In ruin would have sunk the human race." — pp. 49, 50.

Here is a pretty strong character of the Augustine friars.

"In Dermot's time they were a potent order;
Whose vows of poverty, large wealth repaid;
Whose vows of chastity, cost much disorder:
And of obedience, princes of them made.
O'er every hill and valley, plain and border
Of Christendom they drove their gainful trade:
And soon received from Innocent the Third
Powers to crush heresies, and preach the word." — p. 59.

This "Historical Tale" will be circulated, not only at home, but abroad, as the production of one of our presidents. We are sorry for this, because it will give him no reputation any where. Happily, his name is united with higher associations, and his fame rests on a worthier and more durable basis. We respect him as an upright and religious man. As a diplomatist and statesman, though not as a poet, he has gained for himself an honorable place in the history of our country; and as a diplomatist and statesman he will be remembered, when this "Historical Tale" shall be, as its hero himself has long been, by the kindness of posterity, forgotten.

ART. III. — *Argument against the Manufacture of Ardent Spirits. Addressed to the Distiller and the Furnisher of the Materials.* By Rev. EDWARD HITCHCOCK. Tract No. 242 of the American Tract Society.

WE wish to call the attention of our readers, at this time, to a single branch of the temperance question, viz. the production and sale of ardent spirits as a drink. We think the period has arrived, when a free and full discussion of this point is necessary. The evils resulting from the moderate, the misery and crime consequent upon the immoderate use

of alcohol, have been strongly portrayed and satisfactorily proved. The decanter has been banished from the sideboard and the dinner-table; the attention of the well disposed has been aroused, and some progress has been made, in promoting among temperate drinkers the doctrine of total abstinence. These, unquestionably, were objects requiring our earliest attention. The strong and unfavorable pressure of habit and custom was to be counteracted in the very outset of the efforts to cleanse the land from the sin of drunkenness. But, although, in this respect, great things have been done, and much good effected, the struggle is scarcely more than commenced. We have something to contend with, besides the love and use of ardent spirits. We have its production and sale to do away; and it is now time to enter in earnest upon this part of our duty. We deem it expedient to address most plainly all concerned in making and vending alcohol as a drink, and to do what we can to convince our readers that this business is neither right nor justifiable. There is no question, in our minds, about the prudence and propriety of this step; and therefore we are prepared to take it.

But in what manner shall our discussion be conducted? Here is the difficulty, and here, we freely confess, the friends of temperance have sometimes failed. They have not always handled this delicate subject judiciously. They have been somewhat too ready to denounce men, and thus have excited anger, where it was their business to convince reason. We have, but too frequently, seen and heard language applied to dealers in ardent spirits, as a class, altogether too strong, unqualified, and unwarrantable. Generous and ardent men, contemplating the manifold evils of drunkenness, and seeing them flow so directly from the manufacture and sale of alcohol, have been moved to speak of all those employed in this business, as if they were voluntary and criminal agents of sin. Now this we admit to be altogether wrong. Many, although we hope and believe not so many as formerly, many respectable men are engaged in the different branches of the trade in ardent spirits. They are not convinced that the employment is immoral. They can excuse it, as they think, by sound arguments. Their consciences, even now, remain quiet, and allow them, without reproach, to pursue this business. These men are not to be

denounced and held up to abhorrence as criminals. Such a course is not merely bad policy it is wrong, and savors more of over-zealous fanaticism, than of rational philanthropy. The friends of temperance, therefore, should be careful, not to cast indiscriminate odium upon the persons or characters of all who manufacture and sell ardent spirits. Of the trade, let them express their honest opinions; but, while doing this, let them remember, that it is not, at the present day at least, their province to judge the motives of the trader. Here, as in other cases, the correctness and effect of principles and practices are fair topics of animadversion; but the characters, so far as is consistent with the public safety, of those who are conscientiously influenced by these principles, or engaged in these practices, are sacred.

With these explanatory remarks, as to the manner in which the subject before us should be treated, we proceed to our main purpose, which is to convince our readers that the production and sale of ardent spirits, as a drink, is wrong, and inconsistent with man's duty to man. In executing this purpose, we shall, in the first place, show why we think this business wrong; and then endeavour to answer the various excuses or arguments by which it is supposed to be justified.

Every man will admit that its effect upon society must be an important element, in estimating the character of any occupation. To prove an employment or profession lucrative to those engaged in it, is not enough to justify it. On the contrary, the very existence of social order depends upon the practical recognition of the doctrine, that no man has a right to elevate himself upon the ruin of his fellowmen, either by destroying their morals, or trampling upon their rights. Consequently, if it can be clearly made out, that any trade is directly or indirectly an injury to the community, then that trade is wrong, and ought to be abandoned. This is a plain principle, one we every day admit and act upon, one which we can easily illustrate. Suppose, for instance, the plague to be raging at Smyrna, to such an extent that merchants find it almost impracticable to hire crews to navigate their vessels to that port; and that, in consequence of this there is an immense rise upon the goods usually imported from that place. Suppose an individual, tempted by this state of the market to great exertions, to succeed at last

in sending a ship to the infected country, and in getting for her a cargo; suppose that ship to be entering our harbour, to be coming directly up to the wharf, bearing the pestilence in her hold, ready to spread desolation through the city. What, in this case, should we do? Let her come? No. We should send her into quarantine. We should purify her; if need be, we should scuttle and sink her. But the owner of the ship complains. We are destroying his property; taking away his profits; robbing him of a fortune. What would be our answer to him? Would it not be this?—True we are destroying your property, we are putting an end to this speculation of yours; but it is because you have no right to live at the expense of the lives of others; you have no right to get gold, by any process, which brings desolation and death upon your fellow-citizens. Again, suppose an individual should set up a gambling-house in one of the most public of our streets; and hold out every inducement to the inhabitants to visit it; should entice our young men into it, and ruin them; or, suppose another individual should make it his business to promote licentiousness and debauchery, to minister to the worst appetites and passions of man. Both these individuals might make money by these establishments. If they were broken up, they might be reduced to poverty. Still they would be broken up; and why? Because no man has a right to live by destroying the morals of his fellow-men. In cases like these, the principle we have laid down, is fully recognised and constantly acted upon. Indeed, it is too self-evident to need even thus much illustration. It is that upon which the whole of social happiness directly depends. Without it man would be preying upon man, and the only law would be the will of the strongest and most unprincipled. We repeat, then, if any trade is shown to be injurious to society, it is shown to be wrong.

Now, we say the production and sale of ardent spirits, as a drink, is such a trade, and therefore wrong; and we say this, in the first place, because this traffic in alcohol is *useless* to the community. Ardent spirits, as a drink, are not necessary. The testimony of all of our best physicians; the united voice of students, merchants, mechanics, farmers, seamen, and day-laborers, who have tried the experiment, declares that they are not needed to refresh and invigorate

the physical system, or to preserve it from the injurious effects of heat or cold. Every man, who has made proper inquiries on this subject, has found abundant proof on this point. At this day, no one, we should think, can, for a moment, seriously maintain the contrary. The opponents of temperance measures, may sneer at temperance tracts, doubt the declarations of temperance agents, complain of the exaggeration of temperance reports, to get away from the fact that ardent spirits, as a drink, are never necessary. But it will not do. For there is not, we believe, an individual who cannot satisfy himself of its literal truth, by inquiries made among his acquaintances, we had almost said, in less than forty-eight hours. We do not make this assertion carelessly. We rest it on our own experience. We have never made a very extensive investigation on this point, — we have never gone out of our way to seek facts, — and yet we know enough, (at least, so it seems to us,) to convince any reasonable and unprejudiced man, that ardent spirits are never necessary as a drink. When one stage-driver tells us he has been exposed to the heat and cold and wet, day and night, more or less, for twenty years, without using a drop, or having felt the need of a drop of ardent spirits, and that he has, notwithstanding, been in as good general health, as able to bear exposure, as others who have taken a contrary course; — when another stage-driver tells us, that for several years he was an habitual user of alcohol, as his drink, that for several years he has abandoned it altogether, and that he never was so well, never so indifferent to the severity of our climate, as he has been since he gave up the use of stimulants; — when these men tell us these results of experience, we are forced to believe that the class to which they belong, laborious and fatiguing as their employment is, have no need of ardent spirits; nay, are better without them. When we learn, from the owners and commanders of ships of every description, from the proprietors of furnaces, from farmers, and from mechanics of all kinds, that the men in their employment, do more work, enjoy better health, bear extreme fatigue longer, and are every way happier, without ardent spirits than with them, we are forced to believe they speak words of truth. And where, in addition to all this, almost every physician of our acquaintance declares that ardent spirits are a slow poison, act upon the system like a

slow poison, and are never needed by men in health, we cannot, if we would, resist the conclusion that alcohol, as a drink, is entirely useless. It is true we meet, now and then, with men who say that a little spirit is beneficial; they have tried it, and therefore know that it is. But we cannot credit these persons, because they are not impartial witnesses, because we never heard of a temperate drinker who suffered by conversion to the doctrine of total abstinence, and, above all and more than all, because we never heard an individual, who did not sometimes use stimulants himself, say that he thought them of any benefit to others. We repeat, then, ardent spirits, as a drink, are not necessary. Whoever, therefore, produces and sells them as such, produces and sells that which the community does not require, — that which is useless.

But we go much further than this. We would have the trader in alcohol abandon his business, not only because it is useless, but because it is positively injurious to society. To establish this point, we have only to set forth the bad effects inevitably resulting from the use of ardent spirits. The evils direct and indirect of intemperance, have been stated in almost every form, in almost every place; and it has been proved, conclusively proved, that these evils can be done away, only by total abstinence on the part both of the consumer and the producer of the cause of intemperance. Still there are men, so blind, so selfish, or so unconsciously swayed by self-interest, as yet to resist all the evidence which has been adduced on this subject. And whilst there are such men, we must continue to repeat the long catalogue of woes and crimes brought upon us by the use of ardent spirits. For upon this repetition depends our success. These woes and crimes must be proclaimed, till every ship, distillery, ware-house, dram-shop, and bar-room, engaged in the manufacture and sale of alcohol, becomes, as it were, vocal with them.

The statistics on this subject are full and clear. The calculations have been made with minuteness and accuracy; and no one who attends to them can, for a moment, doubt the fact that intemperance is the source of most of the crime, poverty, and misery with which mankind here and in England are afflicted. To go into a few details, thirty millions of dollars are expended, annually, in the United States, for

ardent spirits. Two-thirds of all the expence of pauperism (which in Massachusetts alone amounts to six hundred thousand dollars per annum) is caused by ardent spirits. Two-thirds of all the crimes committed, originate in the use of ardent spirits. In one of our large cities, out of one thousand prosecutions for crime, more than eight hundred were found to have sprung from this source. Of seven hundred and eighty-one maniacs in two hospitals in Great Britain, three hundred and ninety-two were made such by intemperance. "Judge Hall, after twenty years' observation and experience, declared, that if all the murders and manslaughters and burglaries and robberies and riots and tumults, the adulteries, fornications, rapes, and other great enormities, which had been committed within that time, were divided into five parts, four of them would be found to have been the result of intemperance." "At the close of the first half-century of our existence as a nation," says the "Fourth Report of the American Temperance Society," "this diseased appetite for ardent spirits had become so prevalent, as to demand, annually, for its gratification, more than sixty million gallons of liquid fire. And while it cost the consumers more than thirty million dollars, it caused more than three-fourths of all the pauperism, crimes, and wretchedness of the community. It also greatly increased the number and frequency and violence of diseases; and, according to the testimony of the most intelligent and judicious physicians, occasioned, annually, the loss of more than thirty thousand lives; and the loss of property, occasioned by the consumption of ardent spirits in forty years, amounted to more than the value of all the houses and lands in the United States forty years ago."

Such are some of the evils of intemperance. Such are some of the dreadful woes, which the dealer in ardent spirits, as a drink, helps to bring upon his fellow-men. This conclusion cannot be evaded. He who imports, manufactures, or sells alcohol, as a beverage, imports, manufactures, and sells that which does no good; that which does positive harm; that which is not beneficial to the preservation of health, or to the endurance of fatigue and exposure; that which produces and increases disease; that which feeds the pestilence; that which causes almost all the poverty and crime in the community; that, in fine, which sweeps thou-

sands and tens of thousands into a premature grave. In the face af these awful facts, we solemnly ask, can this traffic be right? Ought we to avoid speaking of it? Ought we to hesitate about denouncing it? Shall the voice of the patriot, the philanthropist, the Christian be silent, because some respectable men are engaged in this sad and dreadful trade? "Has not," to use the strength and eloquence of another, "has not God connected with all lawful avocations the welfare of the life that now is, and of that which is to come? And can we lawfully amass property by a course of trade which fills the land with beggars, and widows, and orphans, and crimes; which peoples the grave-yard with premature mortality, and the world of woe with the victims of despair? Could all the forms of evil produced in the land by intemperance come upon us in one horrid array, it would appall the nation, and put an end to the traffic in ardent spirits. If in every dwelling built by blood, the stone from the wall should utter all the cries which the bloody traffic extorts, and the beam out of the timber should echo them back, who would build such a house? — and who would dwell in it? What if, in every part of the dwelling, from the cellar upward, through all the halls and chambers, babblings and contentions and voices and groans and shrieks and wailings were heard, day and night? What if the cold blood oozed out, and stood in drops upon the walls, and, by preternatural art, all the ghastly skulls and bones of the victims destroyed by intemperance, should stand upon the walls, in horrid sculpture, within and without the building? Who would rear such a building? What if, at eventide, and at midnight, the airy forms of men destroyed by intemperance, were dimly seen haunting the distilleries and stores, where they received their bane — following the track of the ship engaged in the commerce — walking upon the waves — flitting athwart the deck — sitting upon the rigging — and sending up from the hold within, and from the waves without, groans, and loud laments, and wailings? Who would attend such stores? Who would labor in such distilleries? Who would navigate such ships? Oh! were the sky over our heads one great whispering gallery, bringing down about us all the lamentation and woe which intemperance creates, and the firm earth one sonorous medium of sound, bringing up around us, from beneath, the wailings of the damned, whom the

commerce in ardent spirits had sent thither; — these tremendous realities, assailing our sense, would invigorate our conscience, and give decision to our purpose of reformation. But these evils are as real as if the stone did cry out of the wall, and the beam answered it; as real, as if, day and night, wailings were heard in every part of the dwelling, and blood and skeletons were seen upon every wall; as real as if the ghostly forms of departed victims flitted about the ship as she passed over the billows, and showed themselves nightly about stores and distilleries, and, with unearthly voices, screamed in our ears their loud lament. They are as real as if the sky over our heads collected and brought down about us all the notes of sorrow in the land; and the firm earth should open a passage for the wailings of despair to come up from beneath." *

This powerful conception, this vigorous and startling array of the evils produced by ardent spirits, is no exaggeration. Language can hardly be used with too much strength on this subject. The picture of intemperance cannot be crowded with too many horrors; the reality will exceed them all. If the daily effects of drunkenness were assembled upon one spot, mortal eye could not bear the sight. There would be seen desolate poverty, wailing affliction, wasting disease, raging delirium, hideous lust, furious murder, every horrible form of destruction, despair, and death. And yet, strange though it be, many men who would shrink from being directly instrumental in executing the smallest cruelty, are daily and hourly swelling the number of these horrors, by producing and selling ardent spirits. They do not, or they will not see the inevitable consequences of this business. They feel injured, when they are told that they live upon life-blood, — and by the destruction of their fellow-men. And they offer what they deem sound excuses for their continuance in this traffic. But these excuses are proofs of the ease with which men interested in self-delusion may accomplish their purpose. For, what are some of the apologies commonly offered in justification of the trade in ardent spirits? Let us look at them, and see if they are not weak and unsound.

Dealers in ardent spirits sometimes endeavour to excuse their business, on the ground that it is lawful, and, therefore,

* Beecher's Sermons on Intemperance.

they are not to be blamed for being engaged in it. Now, not to quote here the applicable words of the Apostle Paul with regard to things lawful not always being things expedient, let us see to what this excuse really amounts. The statute-book, it is true, does not expressly and entirely forbid the production and sale of ardent spirits; but neither does it countenance it. On the contrary, as far as the statute-book, in this matter, goes, it is poor authority for the dealer in alcohol. Interpret the spirit of the license laws, and you have this for their meaning. "Though it is not perhaps quite equitable, certainly not best, at this time, to forbid altogether the manufacture of ardent spirits; still this is a branch of trade so questionable and dangerous, that we must watch over and regulate it most carefully." This is the spirit of these laws, and this certainly is not very strong testimony to the lawfulness of the traffic in intoxicating liquors. But further; it must be recollected that the statute-book, on such points, is always a little behind public opinion — the real legislator. The slave-trade was legally right after it was generally admitted by the community to be morally wrong. Good men frowned upon the wholesale gambling of lotteries, in this state, before the law put an end to their existence, as a permitted branch of business. Thus it is evident, from the history of these cases, that the best way to decide upon the lawfulness, or, what is the same thing in this discussion, the morality of the trade in ardent spirits, is to consult public sentiment. If those engaged in this trade will but do this, their opinion as to its propriety will soon be changed. They will find the thousand societies, the lawyers, judges, statesmen and divines, men of every name and profession, of every political party and every religious sect, throughout our land, who have given their names and influence to the cause of temperance, declaring that their trade is a great evil, a trade in blood; that every dollar gained by it is the price of human happiness, and that God will not hold him guiltless, who, with his eyes open and his understanding convinced of the evils it has produced, and is producing, still continues to be engaged in it. So much for the lawfulness of this traffic.

Again, dealers in ardent spirits frequently hope to excuse their vocation by this mode of reasoning: "We do not create, we only supply the demand for alcohol. And if men

will have this article, why may not we get the profit as well as others,"—that is to say, admitting the fact implied in this statement to be true, because our fellow-men are determined to ruin themselves, we may aid and abet them, and be blameless. Gamblers create a demand for gambling-houses, therefore we will forthwith open gambling-houses. Here is the horrible principle, on which this apology is based. It will be said, we suppose, that this is stating an extreme, and not at all parallel case, and therefore our argument is unfair. But is it so? If the use of ardent spirits is the cause of most of the murders, of a great proportion of the misery and poverty in the land; and if this use is kept up, in part, certainly, by the trade in alcohol, is it unfair to compare this trade and this excuse brought to justify it, with the direct promotion of crime? But this is not all. We do not admit the fact, assumed in this apology. It is not true, that dealers do not create, or help to create, the demand for ardent spirits. Formerly, it might have been so; though, were history read aright, we suspect that we should find that the distillation of spirit preceded the demand for the article. The market was opened, and the stock ready, before the customers had made their appearance. At any rate, whatever may have been the case in times past, now, there is no natural demand for alcohol,—unless the thirst of drunkards, and the loud calls of vice, are supposed to indicate a true want of society. The fact is, and it must not be concealed, the fact is, dealers in ardent spirits are keeping up an artificial and injurious appetite, which the best part of the community are striving to put down. A wound has been made in the body politic, through which its life's blood is flowing out,—and they are opposed to its being healed. If, to put a knife into the hands of a mad man, bent on self-destruction, be supplying a real want of society, then is the sale of alcohol, as a drink, so likewise. There is no necessity for intoxicating liquors. The call for them is the voice of depravity. And, were every distillery in the land closed, the contents of every rum-hogshead and brandy-cask emptied into the sea, no real want of society would be left unsupplied. Far otherwise. This apparent destruction of property would, so far as the community is concerned, be an excellent investment of capital. We should be vastly more rich, virtuous, and happy on account of it.

Once more. Many justify their continuance in the trade in ardent spirits, by the belief that if they abandoned it, worse men would take it up; and therefore they had better continue, and sell with care, and only to sober men. Now the first part of this plausible argument proves too much, and of course is inadmissible. It supposes that good men may continue engaged in any traffic, however hurtful, which bad men might conduct in a more improper manner. A supposition full of danger; a supposition which would excuse us in the commission of any crime or fraud, whenever we could bring ourselves to believe that some villain would commit this crime or fraud, if we did not. Thus, if we were in a crowd, near a gang of pick-pockets, we might steal our neighbour's purse, because if we did not, some of these rogues would. In a word, this doctrine would justify a man in doing wrong whenever there is a strong probability that the wrong will be done; that is, a good man may innocently anticipate the wickedness of a bad man. The first part of this argument, then, will not answer; and the rest of it is founded on a mistaken view of the whole temperance movement. It is not because ardent spirits are sold to drunkards only, or chiefly, that we wish the traffic in them ended. Were they alone concerned, this trade would soon purge the community of its worst members, and then die for want of customers. The great evil is not the satisfaction of the thirst of the intemperate, it is the continuance of the sin of drunkenness, — its existence in another generation, — that we would prevent by putting a stop to the production and sale of alcohol. So long as this traffic is continued, new victims to intemperance will be made, new forms of wretchedness created. Our only hope is in total abstinence on the part both of producer and consumer. There is, then, no regulation about this matter; no degree of care which will suit the exigency of this case. The use of ardent spirits, is inseparable from the abuse of ardent spirits. This is the great fact. This pronounces the entire and everlasting banishment of alcohol. This excites the wish, and induces to the endeavour to drive it out of the commercial world; to expel it from distillery after distillery, warehouse after warehouse, shop after shop, until no respectable man will think of dealing in it, and it is sunk down among the hated things of earth.

The last excuse of those who deal in ardent spirits, which

we can now examine, is that upon which they probably lay the greatest stress, and which, without doubt, discloses the reason why those already considered, seem to them so weighty. This excuse is, that to give up their trade would be to subject themselves to pecuniary loss. Our capital, say they, is embarked in a business, with which this trade is connected; if, therefore, we abandon it, we make a great sacrifice, we throw away our means of subsistence. If this is true, it certainly is a very strong apology. It is expecting much of men to ask them to give up large profits, to abandon an employment hitherto reputable, to promote the welfare of their fellow-men. Still, this must be done. This strong excuse is of no avail in the sight of Christian benevolence. Were it otherwise, we should be weighing human happiness against pecuniary gain. And is the dealer in ardent spirits prepared to do this? Is he prepared to say that the peace and comfort of one immortal soul, of one happy family, shall be sacrificed to his profits, be they ever so great? Suppose we should go to the distiller, the importer, the vender of intoxicating drinks, and show them conclusively, as has been done again and again, that their business is productive of evil, and evil only, to their fellow-men, and therefore they ought to abandon it, — would it be any answer to tell us that to do this would be to lose money? Certainly not. Yet many seem to argue as if it would. In this money-getting world, some men consider every question of morality, as a question of dollars and cents. But so it must not be. We would not be extravagant, we would not be fanatical, we would not cant. Religion does not clog the social system. It does not forbid any honest employment. It does not wish to diminish, in the least, the energy and activity of the merchant. It rejoices in commercial prosperity, so long as that prosperity is the result of right principles, and obtained by strict obedience to the law of God. Let us not be looked upon, then, as gloomy ascetics, as preaching a morality inapplicable to this world, when we say that it is the solemn duty of every man to abandon any trade which is deleterious to the community, be the personal sacrifice what it may. This, we think, is clear. Any loss, any suffering, any thing but the continuance of a business which is at war with the peace of man, the welfare of society. If it must be so, let poverty come. The

duty is plain. The right hand must be cut off, and the right eye plucked out, — to save the whole body. Unless, then, the dealer in ardent spirits is ready avowedly to make merchandise of the health and morals of his fellow-men, he is bound to give up his traffic, though it be true, as he says, that this will subject him to great pecuniary loss.

But is this true? Did such a course ever have this effect? We think not. Of the hundreds who have abandoned this business, not one individual has been produced, who has been reduced to penury, made a bankrupt, or even lost very large profits by this act. And had there been one such case, the enemies of the temperance movements would have brought it forward. The strong language, the rash assertions sometimes made upon this point, are quite unwarrantable. The trade in alcohol can be given up without great sacrifices. We suspect, that, with reference to some departments of this trade, it is not because their livelihoods depend upon it, that men are unwilling to turn their capital into other channels; but because the great profits in this business promise the speedy accumulation of a fortune. There may, now and then, occur peculiar cases, where positive loss of property would follow the giving up of the sale of alcohol. But such instances are rare, and we may apply to the sufferers, with slight variation, the words of Scripture, "Better is a dinner of herbs, with peace of conscience, than a stalled ox, and sin therewith." At any rate, such instances are rare. The dealers themselves, for the most part, and the community always, would be benefited by the abandonment of this traffic. In the first place, the dealers would be benefited, because, we suspect that our examination of the day-book of any grocer's shop, where there has been dram-drinking for a long time, would show that two-thirds, at least, of the bad debts were incurred by those who bought and used ardent spirits; and further, that an account of the profits and loss on the whole custom of the dram-drinking patronage would show, that in twenty years the latter far outbalance the former. In the second place, the community would be benefited, because it would be saved two-thirds of the sum now paid for the support of pauperism, for the maintenance of criminals, and have a large portion of its members transformed from bills of expense into productive laborers. This, then, the most plausible of all the

excuses for the trade in ardent spirits, will not answer; for if we grant the fact assumed in it, the duty is not changed; it only requires a greater sacrifice to perform it; and this fact we cannot grant, since the further we carry our calculations, the nearer should we probably come to a demonstration of the truth, that godliness, in this matter, is literally great pecuniary gain, and that more money would, in the end, be made than lost, by the complete extinction of the traffic in ardent spirits.

We have now noticed, and, as we hope, answered some of the most common apologies for the traffic in ardent spirits. If they are as weak and sophistical as we have supposed them to be, how remarkable it is, that they should be considered powerful and conclusive by so many respectable and intelligent men. This fact is worth investigating; for the discovery of the causes of it, would seem to promise valuable assistance in our efforts to do away the trade in alcohol. Some of these causes appear to us very evident, and we will therefore endeavour to point them out.

One of the first of these causes, is, without doubt, to be found in the fact, that dealers in ardent spirits are blind to the full effects of their trade. They make very little personal inquiry on the subject. Self-interest naturally renders them averse to it. Were they to enter upon the investigations, which the friends of temperance have so industriously conducted, they would end in their own condemnation. We do not think it, then, judging harshly of human nature to suppose, that in some cases they are almost unconsciously kept from the inquiry, by the fear lest this should be its result. At any rate, we consider this explanation of their conduct, decidedly the most charitable. We are not willing to believe, that so many respectable men are engaged in the production and sale of ardent spirits, fully aware of all their horrible consequences. This cannot be. An individual may stand behind his counter and sell the poison to this or that man whilst he is sober, or he may sell casks of it out of his warehouse, and not think of the evil he is doing, because it is not immediate and palpable. But could the history of one rum-hogshead, the destination and effects of every drop it contains be plainly told, and strongly brought home to his heart, much would be done, we are persuaded, to induce him to give up his trade. And such a thing might be easily

done. As the hogshead is set up in the dram-shop, and made ready for sale, imagination might easily picture its work of destruction. There would be the generous-hearted sailor purchasing madness and disgrace with his hard earnings; there the miserable mechanic, leaving his starving family, his sorrowing wife, and half-clad children, and getting credit for rum, where he could not get it for bread; and there the little child, sent by its brutal mother, to buy the destroyer of her body and soul. These would be visible scenes, but these would feebly represent the whole misery. There are things that the pencil cannot draw. The broken heart, the deep hate, the burning revenge, the going out of the intellect, the crushing of all good and generous feelings, the moral desolation of the soul, these cannot be made evident to the eye of man. But they may be imagined. A slight acquaintance with the annals of intemperance, a few visits to the house or the death-bed of the drunkard, will but too soon lead us to associate all that is dreadful with the distillery and the rum-hogshead.

But even thus much inquiry, this little exertion of the imagination, is not necessary. A short arithmetical calculation will bring out the effects of ardent spirits in too strong a light to be resisted. Every hogshead of rum contains eight hundred and eighty pints. Now, assuming that every customer buys one pint, and that one out of six gets intoxicated with his purchase, and what is the melancholy result? It is this; — that every hogshead of this liquid fire causes one hundred and forty-six cases of drunkenness, and that every distillery which turns out five hundred such hogsheads, causes seventy-three thousand, three hundred and thirty-three cases of drunkenness per annum; i. e. about twenty-one cases every day. When, with this calculation before us, we remember how many distilleries there are in the land, and how much importation there is of ardent spirits, what an immense, overwhelming amount of sin and misery, is brought to view, as the inevitable result of the trade in alcohol. But producers and sellers do not carry out these calculations, nor trace thus the effects of intoxicating liquors. They confine themselves to their own stores and manufactories. They treat ardent spirits merely as an article of merchandise, without thinking about its effects on the community; and it is not until the friends of temperance

have gained their attention, and opened their eyes to its tremendous evils, that they will be willing to give up the traffic in it.

Another cause why dealers in ardent spirits consider their excuses strong and conclusive, is to be found in their false graduation of the morality of the various branches of their trade. It has been very common to attribute intemperance and the causes of it, entirely to the lower classes, and to dram-shops. Some dealers in intoxicating liquor by the gallon, commend themselves for not selling it by the glass. And others again, rejoice because they are wholesale merchants, and do not retail at all; whilst the importer of molasses, with his eye fixed upon the trucks which are carrying away the cargo he has just sold to the distiller, lays, as a "flattering unction to his soul," the reflection that he has nothing to do with the manufacture of poison. So easily do men deceive themselves. So readily can they shut out the obvious fact, that dram-shops could not exist a day without grocers, nor grocers without merchants, nor merchants without distillers, nor distillers without importers of molasses. The truth is, there are no degrees of morality in this business. It is all wrong, and equally wrong. The man that sells annually twenty thousand hogsheads of rum, either as owner or on commission, is in the same condemnation with the man who sells twenty thousand glasses. Both help to keep up the trade, and it is the trade, every part and portion of it, which is the evil. No matter at what part of the poisonous stream we stand; if we are increasing or hastening its current, then we are in part the cause of its deleterious effects. We make drunkards, increase the amount of misery in the world, and assist in crowding the prison, the hospital, and the grave-yard. It matters not whether we deal out rum by the gill, sell it by the gallon, roll it out of our stores in barrels, send away ship-loads of it to make drunkards on the other side of the ocean, or employ our vessels in bringing home the raw material. But to this truth, the producers and sellers of ardent spirits must be blind, or else they would not, they could not, continue to carry on any branch of their destructive trade.

The prevalence and force of the excuses we have been noticing, are somewhat accounted for, in the third place, by the consideration that until within a few years, the traffic

in ardent spirits was universally looked upon as reputable. The dealer in this article does not readily see why the reputation of his employment should be so suddenly changed. He is, perhaps, unconscious of the progress of the temperance movement, and is astonished at its entrance into his warehouse, with its strong appeals to his benevolent feelings, his patriotism, his sense of accountableness to God for the influence of his business upon the community. And yet this condition of ignorance or inattention is so strange that nothing but a knowledge of the existence of numerous instances of men, who, on being enlightened with regard to the evils of intemperance, have given up the trade in alcohol immediately, would induce us to believe in its existence. But such unquestionably is the fact. There are men, apparently altogether insensible to the great change that has been going on. Though thousands have given up the business they continue to pursue, and tens of thousands have pledged themselves to abstain for ever from the use of the article in which they traffic, their curiosity does not seem excited on the subject. The community has made a discovery, but they do not appear to be aware of it. It has found out that their business causes great harm, but they are unconscious of this alteration in public opinion. There is a voice in the land, such as St. Paul's to the Athenians. "The times of this ignorance God winked at; but now commandeth all men, every where, to repent." But to this voice they are deaf. It will not be so always. The successful crusade against the slave-trade, bids the friends of temperance not to despair. Inquiry is constantly excited. The attention of men is more and more aroused; and we confidently expect the day to arrive when men would as soon steal their fellow-men from their native land, to make of them an article of commerce, as deal in that liquid fire, which spreads sorrow and ruin wherever it goes.

There is one other reason for the factitious power, which the excuses of those who produce and sell ardent spirits have over their minds, which is worthy of notice. It is the tendency there is among many to undervalue the efforts and example of individuals in the cause of temperance. If all who profess themselves the friends of this cause, with their lips, were its practical supporters, and if their abundant good wishes, could be exchanged for energetic action and

vigorous coöperation, it would go on, achieving far greater victories than it now does. But there is too much humility among some men on this subject. They are rather remarkable for thinking meanly of their personal influence, whenever they are asked to join a temperance society, or to abstain from the traffic in ardent spirits. This false modesty is sadly out of place. In carrying on the temperance reformation, individuals are every thing; and they are every thing for the plain reason, that they make up the public for whose welfare this reformation is commenced. "I am but one man and cannot do much;" we can hear some person say. "You are but one man," (we would almost indignantly reply,) "you are but one man and cannot do much!" Suppose every man should say this, where would our cause, our country, the souls of our brethren be? "But one man!" Know you not that it is only by moving one man at a time, that the community is ever moved? Feelings and opinions may rush through society like an electric shock, it is true, — but even then they pass distinctly from individual to individual, and occupy time in their progress. "But one man, and you cannot do much!" Look into history and see how it has been. How was Christianity introduced and spread, — did the world rise up like one man to receive it? Or did its beautiful truths take the multitude captive, by impressing heart after heart? How was the reformation commenced and carried on? By an unconcerted and simultaneous movement among the disaffected in the Romish church; or by the boldness and zeal of Luther, and the awakening of one mind after another? How, too, was our revolution effected? By all the colonies, lifting themselves like a mass, and throwing off the yoke of bondage? Or was the army of patriots enlisted man by man? Every one can answer these questions. And as it was in these great reformations, as they may all be called, so must it be with the temperance movement. Each individual must be interested and active in it. The cup is not full, if a drop be wanting. The friends of temperance cannot spare a single man, because the excuse which will justify the desertion or lukewarmness of one, will as well justify that of a thousand. It is as one drunkard reforms, as one temperate drinker abstains, as one producer gives up his distillery, one vender ceases to sell, that the work goes on prosperously. Let it then never

be forgotten, that the cause is prospered or retarded by individuals; and let every man feel that the progress of temperance depends, in part, upon him.

We have thus, as we proposed, discussed the question as to the morality of the production and sale of ardent spirits, as a drink. We have also examined the arguments, commonly urged in the justification of this traffic, and endeavoured to account for the continuance in it of so many respectable, intelligent, and virtuous men. We have spoken plainly, — but we trust not in such a manner as to wound the feelings of any. We know that kind and true words are the proper weapons for the friends of temperance; and we would not intentionally use any other. We ask for our remarks a candid perusal, and if they shall do any thing to break up the trade in that which is the source of so much misery and crime, we shall have had our reward.

ART. IV. — *Inquiries concerning the Intellectual Powers, and the Investigation of Truth.* By JOHN ABERCROMBIE, M. D., F. R. S. New York. J. & J. Harper. 1832. 18mo. pp. 349.

IT could hardly have been dreamed one hundred years ago, that metaphysics would ever become fit "Knowledge for the People," — a matter to be applied to the common concerns of life, and made intelligible to the common reader. For, as the old philosophers must have looked upon modern simplification in the light of degeneracy, all who counted upon the progressive improvement of the race, must have been quite astonished on being informed that, instead of a successful hunting after the "essences," and "species," and other favorites of theirs, we had altogether given up the chase, called ourselves but children in the school of philosophy, and had drawn little else from our studies than a conviction of the errors of past ages. With much pains we have laid the foundation, and the superstructure has already commenced. In the mean while, as other parts of the circle have been successively shown to the now inquiring many, it was not meet that the centre should be long kept from

public view. At the same time it was most important that it should be seen in a clear light. It was necessary that all the discoveries of modern science should be applied to it, for the better removing of those errors, which the sanction of antiquity had made so venerable. Still another character was wanting besides simplicity and clearness, viz., a practical character, — as contrasted with the curious speculations of former times, that had no foundation in fact, and no useful application, "ad bene beateque vivendum." Much has indeed been said against applying the standard of utility to mental science; but if the subject be rightly looked into, it will be found, we think, that the dispute is merely verbal. No one of modern days will undertake seriously to affirm, that utility is not the proper test of all science; but care will be taken that the word be used in its very broadest, which is at the same time its truest sense. The sciences are all useful in two ways, directly and indirectly. In most of them, the former is the more important. With metaphysics, it is the reverse. The study of intellectual philosophy is of far greater moment as affecting our habits and modes of thinking, than as having any immediate bearing upon our daily actions. It is true, however, that beginners in the science put but little value upon this indirect influence, for experience only can show us its full extent. In times like ours, then, it is specially needful, in order to make the science attractive, that we exhibit it to the world as an agent for bettering our condition — giving us rules, which all may understand, for improving our mental powers, and thereby enlarging our means of well-being.

We have spoken of what was wanting in the literary world; and come now to that which has supplied, in some measure, this deficiency, — the admirable work before us. Dr. Abercombie's book does not purport to be a treatise. Its modest title is, "*Inquiries* concerning the Intellectual Powers"; and these inquiries we may judge that he is amply fitted to pursue, even from his medical character alone. For the important office of bringing together authentic facts, especially in that most interesting branch of the subject, the effect of cerebral and other diseases upon the mental action, — a physician, as Dr. Abercrombie well remarks, is peculiarly qualified; and the observation would seem to be borne out by the fact that so many acute metaphysicians

have been of the healing profession. The inquiries are confined to that branch of mental science, which Dr. Brown has called the physiology of the mind. Ethics, politics, and natural religion are not touched upon. After some observations on the objects of science, and on the different sciences considered as certain and uncertain, he proceeds to consider in the first part, "the nature and extent of our knowledge of mind." The second part treats of the origin of our information in respect of mind and matter. Part third treats of the intellectual operations; part fourth of the application of the rules of philosophical inquiry to medical science, and part fifth contains some remarks on the conditions necessary to a well-regulated mind. It is not our purpose to examine the conduct of the work in all these parts. The author needs not our praise, even were it wanting from other quarters. In going over the book, our attention dwelt especially on that division of it, which treats of the investigation of truth; and as no subject can be more important to us as intelligent beings, we shall say a few words concerning it in this place, suggested by the remarks of Dr. Abercrombie.

When one has reached that period of life, at which self-exertion begins, some curious and most weighty questions offer themselves. Those who have gone on farther towards maturity, are seen for ever striving with each other about opinions. Time and toil and trouble are spent on these. The heat of controversy is burning all around, and in the devouring flame are swallowed up all private feelings however tender. The world is cut up into parties, and the party bond is found to be stronger than the tie of friends and kindred, — and all this is for opinions. Opinions, then, one concludes, must be a most serious matter, if the cause of such serious consequences; and it is naturally asked, how far man is responsible in forming his opinions — a question of such high interest, and in our view so little understood or examined, that we may be pardoned for dwelling on it at some length.

Our author has discussed this subject in much fewer words than its importance seemed to demand. His remarks are all within the compass of one page, and that little is not very satisfactory.

"Upon the grounds," says he, "which have been briefly referred to in the above observations, it will appear, that the

principles on which a man should form his opinions, are essentially the same with those by which he ought to regulate his conduct. If this conclusion be admitted, it will enable us to perceive the fallacy of a dogma which has often been brought forward with much confidence, — that a man is not responsible for his belief. When taken abstractly, this is true; but in the practical application of it, there is a great and dangerous fallacy." — p. 153.

Now there is this essential difference between forming our opinions, and regulating our conduct. In the latter case, we have set before us what we are to shun, and what we are to pursue. Ignorance of duty, we all know, is one of the rarest excuses that can be pleaded for crime. But when opinions are to be formed, we have no one standard which all must follow; for this were to suppose infallibility on one side, and prejudice on the other. Nor can we see any "dangerous fallacy" in the "practical application" of the principle which he condemns. If terms be rightly understood, and the result of inquiry be not mistaken for the process of investigation, the doctrine seems to us practically useful. This we hope to show in the course of the following remarks.

Is belief, then, we would inquire, independent of the will? The question may appear to some quite unnecessary, because so often asked. But men are yet far from being agreed on this point; and to us the affirmative seems so clear, that we are inclined to think some circumstances foreign to the question must have been taken into view by those who doubt it. Thus some of the infidels and free-thinkers happen to have decided rightly upon this subject, and certain zealous Christians in consequence formed an opposite opinion; forgetting in their indignation that wise precept, "fas est et ab hoste doceri." Again, the doctrine that belief is involuntary, has been thought to contradict what is found in the Bible. We shall attempt hereafter to show the falsity of this notion. In the mean time we may remark, that it is at least unwise to inquire into the supposed tendency of a principle, before we have ascertained its truth. Moreover, much dispute on this question, as on many others, has doubtless arisen from a misapprehension of terms. When we declare belief to be involuntary, we mean that the conclusion which we draw from contemplating the relations of certain

facts, is beyond our control. This is allowed in demonstrative reasoning, but is often denied of moral or probable reasoning. Let us see wherein consists their difference, and we shall then be better able to decide on the grounds of this distinction. All reasoning, both mathematical and moral, is made up of certain propositions united by certain relations, in such a manner as to lead to some new proposition differing from all the foregoing, which is called the conclusion or inference. Mathematical is distinguished from moral evidence, first, in that each step of the reasoning is perceived intuitively; secondly, it is hypothetical, whereas moral reasoning is employed about absolute existences; thirdly, the language of mathematics is peculiar, being signs of things, not of words, and of such a nature, that there is no possibility of mistaking its meaning. These are the distinctive marks of demonstrative reasoning, and are the circumstances that give it its character of certainty. Other reasoning has a different character, and is hence called uncertain. But let us again consider what is the peculiar state of the mind in investigation and conclusion, before we rashly infer any thing from this distinctive characteristic. Take the simplest possible case of demonstration in the syllogistic form, thus —if A be equal to B, and if B be equal to C, then A must be equal to C. This is hypothetical in the two first terms, but the third term or inference is certain; and none will deny that here the mind cannot but believe. Now let us take away the hypothesis, and it becomes a case of probable reasoning; but except for the removal of the hypothesis, the cases are precisely the same. For we now say, A is equal to B, and B is equal to C. These are statements whose truth is to be found out like that of other statements of the kind; but being once admitted to be true, it is plain that the conclusion, viz. that A is equal to C, follows with the same certainty as in the first case, and of course is equally independent of the will. If the facts are not allowed, then the opposite conclusion follows with equal force; and if they are considered doubtful, still this state of doubt must be equally as necessary and involuntary as the state of certainty; since the only difference between the two states is, that in the latter the evidence is complete, in the former it is imperfect. If, then, the evidence be allowed in one case to produce a *certain* conclusion, want of sufficient evidence

must, for the same reason, be allowed to produce a *doubtful* conclusion; and the will in both cases has nothing to do with the mind's decision.

But the evidence of consciousness, it is thought, contradicts all that we have attempted to prove, and this is often confidently appealed to. In our opinion here is the whole cause of the fallacy, and the ground of the popular maxim, "Men easily believe what they wish to be true." In all moral reasoning there are two sides; and the inquirer may direct his attention to either one in preference to the other, knowing that the one preferred will lead to a desired conclusion. This preference, however, is often imperceptible; and hence, when the wished-for end has been reached, it is naturally said that the will alone influenced the belief, by those who lose sight of the mind's partiality before arriving at the result.

It were hardly worth the while to spend words on such a discussion, if it were no more than a barren speculation. But unless we are mistaken, its fruit is profitable for daily use. For, first, it decides the momentous question we have before remarked upon, how far man is responsible for his belief. And, second, it shows the folly (to give it no worse name) of setting up any doctrine or doctrines as necessary to be believed.

I. Our conclusions on this point are cheering, because they are plain and decisive. We are to set out in the pursuit of truth, with minds steadily fixed on the end which we would accomplish; devoid, as far as may be, of prejudice and passion; diligent in seeking out every thing that would throw light on either side. Here we are happy to agree with our author.

"A man is undoubtedly responsible for the care with which he has informed himself of the facts and evidences, by which his belief on these subjects ought to be influenced; and for the care and anxiety with which he gives to each of these facts and evidences its due weight in the momentous inquiry. He is further responsible for any degree of that vitiated and corrupted state of the moral feelings, by which his judgment may have been biassed, so as to prevent him from approaching the subject with the sincere desire for truth of a pure and uncontaminated mind." — p. 153.

It is sometimes, however, as important to point out what is not, as what is, required of us; and this happens to be a case of this sort. We are not responsible for the result of the investigation, when it has been conducted with all possible fairness; unless one shall show that any but voluntary acts come under moral cognizance. But who, it will be asked, does employ all possible candor in investigation? Perhaps no one; and what is the inference? That they are most praiseworthy who have made greatest endeavours to root out prejudice; not they, who, in spite of prejudice and corrupt morals, have accidentally come nearest to the truth. There is a "fair-weather virtue" that is uninjured, because never tried. Is there not a faith of like character, which is yet firm, only because it has never been shaken by inquiry?

II. There have been found in every age of the Christian church, sects who have denied that future salvation can be hoped for by any who do not concur in their belief. Each of them has set up a standard of their own, and all are called upon to follow it, as they value their eternal welfare. In the earlier and darker periods, we may suppose this was done, in some measure, to gain proselytes. If threats of temporal punishment had done much, yet more was to be expected from threats of spiritual danger; and this was found to be a more convenient and efficacious way, than the more troublesome and less decisive method of argument. But it were unfair to charge the followers of the doctrine, at the present day, with such culpable motives. Common candor demands that we should take their sincerity for granted; but having made this concession, we find little else to say for the doctrine. For, first, it rests on the ground of infallibility; and this is plain, beyond contradiction. To say that we have certainly discovered truth without any mixture of error, is surely to say, in other words, that we are by nature infallible; for, had we been liable in any instance to err, how can we be confident that we have now escaped? But, it may be asked, would you then conclude that a firm faith is inconsistent with a belief in our own fallibility? By no means; for there is a wide difference between confidence in the results of our own inquiries, and disparagement of those, which lead to opposite conclusions. And here we cannot forbear quoting from an able writer on

this subject, who explains this point to our entire satisfaction.

"When a man reflects on any particular doctrine, he may be impressed with a thorough conviction of the improbability, or even impossibility of its being false; and so he may feel with regard to all his other opinions, when he makes them objects of separate contemplations. And yet, when he views them in the aggregate, when he reflects that not a single being on the earth holds collectively the same, when he looks at the past history and present state of mankind, and observes the various creeds of different ages and nations, the peculiar modes of thinking of sects, and bodies, and individuals, the notions once firmly held which have been exploded, the prejudices once universally prevalent which have been removed, and the endless controversies which have distracted those, who have made it the business of their lives to arrive at the truth; and when he further dwells on the consideration, that many of these his fellow-creatures have had a conviction of the justness of their respective sentiments equal to his own, he cannot help the obvious inference, that in his own opinions it is next to impossible that there is not an admixture of error; that there is an infinitely greater probability of his being wrong in some, than right in all."*

The assumption of infallibility, however, is of far less importance, than the second more serious objection which we would make to this doctrine, — that it renders all inquiry useless. What one point is, more than any other, essential to sound examination? Is it not strict impartiality? Yet here the inquirer is told at his first setting out, that he cannot be held guiltless except he arrive at certain prescribed conclusions. All his prejudices will then be in favor of one side; his views will be distorted; and unless some gross error should open his eyes, he must inevitably reach the desired end. What, then, has inquiry profited him? It were better for him, had he trusted implicitly to others' statements; for in that case he would at least have escaped the erroneous notion, that his opinions have been founded on thorough inquiry. The advocates of the doctrine in question must therefore hold one of two things, — either that inquiry is in fact useless, or that prejudices of a particu-

* Essay on the Formation and Publication of Opinions, pp. 108, 109.

lar kind may be lawfully entertained in favor of certain tenets. Now of the advantages of inquiry we trust there are few doubters in our age. Unless our boast of intellectual freedom be altogether unmeaning, there is surely reason to suppose, that inquiry is generally thought to have been productive of great good among us. Are we not for ever dwelling with satisfaction on that in which we are better than our fathers, — the enjoyment of the right of public discussion; and do we not every day see this justly valued right bringing forth fruits that are to profit the whole intellectual world, throwing down long-established errors, and laying the foundation for juster systems? Truly, "having eyes, we see not," if we have not discerned these signs of the times. But we are answered from another quarter: and strict impartiality is no longer thought essential to sound examination. Of course the only prejudice, which the followers of this opinion will allow, is that in favor of virtue; and then the opinion will be stated thus: An inquirer may, with perfect propriety, suffer his judgment to be influenced in favor of a doctrine, if its tendency seem to him better than that of any other. If this be correct, it of course precludes the necessity of other arguments. The doctrine must be true, it is said, because it is best fitted to make man happy. There is this to be said in favor of the opinion, — its practical effect would be to make men cease striving with each other in controversy, and endeavour to exhibit the truth of their respective tenets, in the purity of their lives. But, considered as an argument for opinions, it is altogether fallacious; and this will be made manifest by a glance at the moral progress of our race. Here let us not be misunderstood; we make one great exception in favor of Christianity. We should indeed be unworthy the name of Christians, could we look slightingly or indifferently even on the power which our religion has exerted in refining the character of society, introducing a sounder system of morals, in short, making such a wide difference between the Christian and the Heathen world in respect of social improvement alone. Nearly two thousand years have gone by since the first planting of our faith. It has been spread among every variety of people; its power has been felt among every class and condition of men. In all, we have seen in it the same peculiar marks that distinguish it from other religions, and

have been able distinctly to trace its effects to their real causes. With such a character for its founder, with such length of time and varied situation, the experiment must be convincing to every impartial mind. But of which of the various sects among Christians can this be said? Perhaps however it will be asked, if the principle in question be allowed of one doctrine, why not of all others. Because we do allow it to be theoretically true, but in practice fallacious. If it were possible to ascertain in all cases the full influence of opinions on their professors, there would be no objection to the principle. But that this is far from being possible, will be seen, when we consider the following sources of error. Opinions are often professed without being believed; they are often believed in the abstract, without being followed as a rule of action; and, moreover, the causes of human conduct are so various, that even granting certain tenets to be in some measure efficacious in practice, we cannot say with certainty that they alone have been in operation: so that it is next to impossible for us to determine of a single individual, whether his opinions on a particular subject have been the sole reason for his conduct.

It remains for us to remark on the very common opinion, that the principles here stated contradict the authority of Scripture. What, then, is this authority? and what sanction does it give to the common notion? In answer to these questions, it will not be denied that a saving power is attributed to faith in Christ; but it will be our object to ascertain the true meaning of the terms here used. Faith in its simplest and strictest sense seems to imply nothing more than belief. In the New Testament it evidently extends farther, including the effect of belief on the heart and life; and sometimes by that frequent form of metonymy, the cause being put for the effect, faith seems to be put for the moral conduct that it produces. Again, faith probably often refers in the New Testament to that serious, candid, and unbiassed disposition, with which all should undertake religious inquiry. The duties enjoined upon us in the Christian revelation are, as we all know, many of them, opposed to those feelings which the majority of mankind are so much disposed to indulge, to our wordly interests and pleasures. To resist these last, and strive to keep ourselves from prejudice, is sometimes called in the Christian Scriptures, faith; and this

by a very natural change of speech, since it is the true course of preparation for a sound and well established faith. This is a voluntary act, attended oftentimes with much difficulty; and hence its merit, though differing perhaps in degree, is the same in kind with that arising from any other discharge of duty, and equally efficient in preparing us for future happiness. The revelation which God has been pleased to bestow on man, is a gift we can never prize too highly. It has opened to us new views of duty, it has set before us new motives of action, it has given us, in short, light, and hope, and consolation. Belief in Christian truth may, therefore, be well called saving, since it gives us such inestimable advantages for escaping the dominion of sin. But it does not appear to us to be implied in the New Testament, that all who do not use these opportunities are worthy of moral censure. For to some the word has never been preached; and others who have heard it, have not had sufficient means for inquiring into its truth. A third class indeed deserve our reproof, who will not look into its merits, because they fear lest they should be obliged to give up many of their past gratifications; but let us be careful to ascertain why they are blameworthy; — not, strictly speaking, because they have rejected Christianity, but because they have refused to open their mind to a fair examination of its doctrines. In so far, then, as unbelief proceeds from moral obliquity, we agree in pronouncing it criminal, and are countenanced in our opinion by Scriptural authority. In those instances (few indeed, but not altogether wanting) in which it springs from other and unavoidable causes, it may be lamented as unfortunate, but ought not to be accounted worthy of censure.

Our subject is a most extensive one, and we have, therefore, only attempted here to glance at its most prominent divisions. Yet if we shall seem to any to have said too much, we can only give Cicero's excuse: "Si longior fuerit oratio, cum magnitudine utilitatis comparetur: ita fortassis etiam brevior videbitur." *

* De Officiis, II. 6.

ART. V. — 1. *Discourses, Reviews, and Miscellanies.* By WILLIAM ELLERY CHANNING. Boston. Carter & Hendee. 1830. 8vo. pp. 603.

2. *Discourses.* By WILLIAM ELLERY CHANNING. Boston. Charles Bowen. 1832. 12mo. pp. 280.

IT is striking to observe what a change preaching has passed through among us, even since the time of Buckminster; we mean, practical preaching. Then it was a preaching of the obvious truths and principles of morality and piety. And of these, there was never, perhaps, an exhibition in the pulpit, more faultless, more perfect in the balance of its parts, more dignified at once, and more graceful, more thorough, and at the same time more beautiful, than in the discourses of that admirable preacher, that *young* "man eloquent," whose moulded periods and thrilling tones still sound, in the ears of many, as a strain, and a requiem too, of rich and solemn music. We do not undertake to decide whether Buckminster was a man of the very highest powers of eloquence or of thought; but there is something in his writings — we scarcely know what — that assemblage and proportion, perhaps it is, of the parts that make up the perfect whole — which has always made us rise up from one of his discourses, more in despair about writing sermons, than from any others we have ever read. We do not assert his preëminence over all other distinguished preachers in their particular walk, nor his equality with some of them, in the points of their greatest strength. But, after all, we have felt that, as an effort of mental labor, we had rather attempt the elegant, but frigid style of Blair and Alison, or the pithy sense, and polished and sometimes scarcely grave irony of South, or the swelling and richly laden sentences of Barrow and Jeremy Taylor, or the studiously wrought paragraphs of Massillon, Bossuet, and Bourdaloue, and even the oftentimes commanding majesty of their periods, — that we had rather, we say, attempt any of these, than to bring together, and blend, and harmonize, so many of these traits, as appear in the discourses of Buckminster.

Indeed, — if we may venture to express our thought, though it be a bold one, — we cannot regard the preachers of the old French or English school, as the models that they are

often represented to be. There is always something about the French preachers a great deal too artificial for us; a sort of jesuitical policy about truth, if we may speak so; a disposition, that is to say, to make the most of every argument, and something more; to push every consideration, whether bearing upon doctrine or duty, whether addressing fear or hope, to extravagance. There is too much of the art of the rhetorician in their sermons, and the vaunted unction of the French pulpit, though oftentimes touching, seems to us to lack something of sound, strong, and sterling sensibility. Of the high intellectual merit of the old English pulpit, and especially of the splendor of that constellation of divines, which rose in the seventeenth century, consisting of Barrow and Jeremy Taylor, Owen and Baxter, Tillotson and Bishop Burnet, Sherlock and South, and like to which nothing has since shone on England, — of these lights that beam upon us from the past, we do not want, as we think, any measure of just admiration. There is a hale, strong, "large, sound, round-about sense," in the English sermons of one and two centuries ago, there is an expansive and generous view of things, a wise and liberal philosophy of life, and of providence, and of revelation, and of religion, natural as well as revealed, that makes us turn to them with delight and refreshment from the metaphysical divines of our own country. And yet the names of Davies and Strong, of Bellamy and Hopkins, and the Wests, * and, above all, of Edwards, must not suffer us to forget, that very powerful and acute minds have been employed in the pulpit of our own country. Indeed, intellect has not been wanting in the pulpit, on either side of the water. Barrow's wonderful amplitude

* Dr. Stephen West of Stockbridge, whose writings are well known, and Dr. Samuel West, of New Bedford (formerly Dartmouth), whose writings have drawn less attention, though perhaps equally deserving of it. He published two treatises against Edwards on the Will; and had his talents as a writer been equal to his powers as a thinker, had he possessed skill in unfolding his thoughts, equal to the strength and originality of his mind, he would have compelled, what he certainly deserved, the attention of the great New-England necessitarian. Dr. West of Stockbridge the writer of this article knew, and he cannot help adding, that although his contemplations of religion were shaped by the dry and hard metaphysics of the Hopkinsian school, there were, in his conversation and manners, a dignity and amenity, a courtly grace and sweetness, which it is impossible ever to forget.

and minuteness of discussion, "the exhaustive process" in the last place where we could expect it, in the pulpit, and Taylor's learning, his profound and varied observation of life, and the play of his most luxuriant fancy, have always been, and always must continue to be, the delight of scholars and men of reading. Still, their discourses do not satisfy us, as sermons. They are too unwieldy; they are too various and profuse in their topics; they want unity and point; they do not strike home. They do not, to make our objection more specific, enter into a sufficiently close grapple with the mind of the hearer; they do not come into a sufficiently near contact and intimacy with the heart, speaking to its wants, eliciting its tenderness, and awakening to life the slumbering images of power and beauty that lie within. Leighton and Bishop Butler seem to us to go deeper. But still our feeling is, after all that the fathers of the English pulpit have taught us, that there are yet unsearched depths of the human heart, which it is the very province of the preacher to explore, that there are chords to be struck, whose vibration, strong as ever eloquence awakened, will be, not passionate emotion, but grave and deep-toned sensibility, that there are feelings of the soul to be approached, — feelings intimate, secret, and unworn by ordinary pulpit exhortation, — to be approached by avenues not yet found out, and to be addressed with appeals of yet unknown power. Human nature is the very being addressed in the pulpit; and human nature is the very subject about which he is mainly addressed, and yet how little is known of this nature! The simple philosophy of a good heart, followed out through all the mazes and mysteries of human experience; the philosophy, too, that is to explain a bad heart; the terrible conflict of good and evil, not only in the virtuous, but in the vicious; the tremendous loss, as well as suffering, incurred by sin; the cruel wrong which it does to human nature; the mournfulness, as well as indignation, with which it should be contemplated; the quick and tender sympathy for all that is human, even like the compassion of Jesus; the consciousness of the glorious capacities of the soul; the sense of its original and intrinsic dignity; how beautiful and blessed is its natural accordance with rectitude, though it is sadly fallen from it; how dear and precious is the first breathing of virtuous emotion even in the most debased mind; how majestic and enrapturing is the prospect which,

through God's mercy, opens to it beyond the dark clouds of sin and sorrow, — all this, we believe, that preachers are to understand and feel, as they never yet have done.

And all this, it appears to us, is understood more than by any other preacher of past or present times, by the author whose writings are before us. We regard these writings as a new manifestation of the human intellect on the subject of religion. There is nothing in the English language on this subject like them; and it is our deliberate judgment, that there are no popular English writings, on morals and religion, that are equal to them. We say, popular writings. There is no attempt in these volumes at a comprehensive view of the philosophy of religion; though there is much that throws light upon this great theme, many a chord struck, whose notes will be brought into that sublime harmony of morals and piety, of natural and revealed religion, of physical and moral science, of life and duty, of temptation and virtue, of suffering and triumph, of the present world and the future, which is yet to sound out through the church and through the world. But the writings before us do not aim at any such achievement of high philosophy. They are a collection of independent productions, many of them occasional, and "written," as the author informs us, "to place what he deems great truths, within reach of the multitude of men." Most of them were written, too, in ill health, and with an often avowed consciousness, on the part of the author, however little occasion his readers may see for it, that they bear the marks of that physical infirmity, which, to such a mind, must enter as "iron into the soul." But, fragments though they are — spheres of light, should we not rather say?—they will live; they will long revolve in the moral system, and will shed their light upon other times. We are conscious that we say this with no sectarian bias. We believe that a suspicion of this tendency is more likely to keep us and many around us, from a just and due estimation of these writings. We know that they have been much praised. But we believe that there is such a thing as losing a discrimination of *excellencies*, as well as of defects, in abundant praise; such a thing as losing a just sense of universally acknowledged merit. When the Athenian citizen gave as a reason for voting against Aristides, that he was always called "the Just," we suppose that he was not only perverse and ill-na-

tured, but that he had a very imperfect idea of what justice was. We believe, then, for every reason, that Dr. Channing is not "over-estimated" here, however confident Blackwood's Tory Magazine may be, that he is, abroad. We are sure that we could not fail to admire these writings, though we were "of another parish," and we know that there are many who are, who yet do themselves, as well as our author, that justice. If we did not agree with his creed, we could not help sympathizing with his spirit, and thanking him for the attractive light which he has shed upon the paths of religion; upon the perfections of God, upon the ways of heaven, and upon the capacities, duties, and prospects of man.

But we must check ourselves. We have spoken already with a freedom quite upon the verge of our American decorum. Indeed, the task we have undertaken is obviously one of great delicacy, not to say difficulty; otherwise it would not have been left so long unattempted. The same delicacy must still restrain our pen, from giving full expansion to the views we entertain, concerning the very peculiar and preëminent interest that belongs to these writings.

Let us rather place before the reader some passages, taken from the mass of them, and illustrative of their general character. We feel bound to make our extracts brief, because the volumes probably are or will be, in the hands of most of our readers. Yet to those who may not have them, we would present a few specimens of what they may find in the perusal of the whole: specimens, we say, for we scarcely know of any writings of a character, more equal and sustained throughout.

The following passages are of such wholesome political tendency, that they are well worthy of being recalled to the attention of our readers.

"It is the distinction of republican institutions, that whilst they compel the passion for power to moderate its pretensions, and to satisfy itself with more limited gratifications, they tend to spread it more widely through the community, and to make it a universal principle. The doors of office being opened to all, crowds burn to rush in. A thousand hands are stretched out to grasp the reins which are denied to none. Perhaps in this boasted and boasting land of liberty, not a few, if called to state the chief good of a republic, would place it in this; that every man is eligible to every office, and that the

highest places of power and trust are prizes for universal competition. The superiority attributed by many to our institutions, is, not that they secure the greatest freedom, but give every man a chance of ruling; not that they reduce the power of government within the narrowest limits which the safety of the state admits, but throw it into as many hands as possible. The despot's great crime is thought to be, that he keeps the delight of dominion to himself, that he makes a monopoly of it, whilst our more generous institutions, by breaking it into parcels, and inviting the multitude to scramble for it, spread this joy more widely. The result is, that political ambition infects our country, and generates a feverish restlessness and discontent, which, to the monarchist, may seem more than a balance for our forms of liberty. The spirit of intrigue, which in absolute governments is confined to courts, walks abroad through the land; and as individuals can accomplish no political purpose single-handed, they band themselves into parties, ostensibly framed for public ends, but aiming only at the acquisition of power. The nominal sovereign, that is, the people, like all other sovereigns, is courted and flattered, and told that it can do no wrong. Its pride is pampered, its passions inflamed, its prejudices made inveterate. Such are the processes, by which other republics have been subverted, and he must be blind who cannot trace them among ourselves. We mean not to exaggerate our dangers. We rejoice to know, that the improvements of society oppose many checks to the love of power. But every wise man, who sees its workings, must dread it as our chief foe." —8vo vol. pp. 152, 153.

"Government, then, does little to advance the chief interest of human nature by its direct agency; and what shall we say of its indirect? Here we wish not to offend; but we must be allowed to use that plainness of speech which becomes Christians and freemen. We do fear, then, that the indirect influence of government is on the whole adverse to virtue; and in saying this, we do not speak of other countries, or of different political institutions from our own. We do not mean to say, what all around us would echo, that monarchy corrupts a state, that the air of a court reeks with infection, and taints the higher classes with a licentiousness which descends to their inferiors. We speak of government at home; and we ask wise men to say, whether it ministers most to vice or virtue. We fear, that here, as elsewhere, political power is of corrupting tendency; and that, generally speaking, public men are not the most effectual teachers of truth, disinterestedness, and incorruptible integrity to the people. An error prevails in relation

to political concerns, which necessarily makes civil institutions demoralizing. It is deeply rooted, the growth of ages. We refer to the belief, that public men are absolved in a measure from the everlasting and immutable obligations of morality; that political power is a prize, which justifies arts and compliances that would be scorned in private life; that management, intrigue, hollow pretensions, and appeals to base passions, deserve slight rebuke when employed to compass political ends. Accordingly, the laws of truth, justice, and philanthropy, have seldom been applied to public as to private concerns. Even those individuals, who have come to frown indignantly on the machinations, the office-seeking, and the sacrifices to popularity, which disgrace our internal condition, are disposed to acquiesce in a crooked or ungenerous policy towards foreign nations, by which great advantages may accrue to their own country. Now the great truth on which the cause of virtue rests, is, that rectitude is an eternal, unalterable, and universal law, binding at once heaven and earth, the perfection of God's character, and the harmony and happiness of the rational creation; and in proportion as political institutions unsettle this great conviction, — in proportion as they teach that truth, justice, and philanthropy are local, partial obligations, claiming homage from the weak, but shrinking before the powerful, — in proportion as they thus insult the awful and inviolable majesty of the Eternal Law, — in the same proportion they undermine the very foundation of a people's virtue." — 8vo vol. pp. 157 — 159.

We will take one or two extracts from the article on the character and writings of Fenelon, in the first published volume.

"We have urged these remarks on the narrow sense often given to the word *self*, because we are persuaded, that it leads to degrading ideas of human nature, and to the pernicious notion, that we practise a virtuous self-sacrifice in holding it in contempt. We would have it understood, that high faculties form this despised self, as truly as low desires; and we would add, that when these are faithfully unfolded, this self takes rank among the noblest beings in the universe. To illustrate this thought, we ask the reader's attention to an important, but much neglected view of virtue and religion. These are commonly spoken of in an abstract manner, as if they were distinct from ourselves, as if they were foreign existences, which enter the human mind, and dwell there in a kind of separation from itself. Now religion and virtue, wherever they exist, are the

mind itself and nothing else. They are human nature, and nothing else. A good man's piety and virtue are not distinct possessions; they are himself, and all the glory which belongs to them belongs to himself. What is religion? Not a foreign inhabitant, not something alien to our nature, which comes and takes up its abode in the soul. It is the soul itself, lifting itself up to its Maker. What is virtue? It is the soul, listening to, and revering, and obeying a law which belongs to its very essence, the law of duty. We sometimes smile, when we hear men decrying human nature, and in the same breath exalting religion to the skies; as if religion were any thing more than human nature, acting in obedience to its chief law. Religion and virtue, as far as we possess them, are ourselves; and the homage which is paid to these attributes, is in truth a tribute to the soul of man. Self-crucifixion then, should it exclude self-reverence, would be any thing but virtue."—8vo vol. pp. 193, 194.

The next is on Fenelon's idea of "peace."

"This state," says Dr. Channing, "is any thing but negative. It is the highest and most strenuous action of the soul, but an entirely harmonious action, in which all our powers and affections are blended in a beautiful proportion, and sustain and perfect one another. It is more than silence after storms. It is as the concord of all melodious sounds. Has the reader never known a season, when, in the fullest flow of thought and feeling, in the universal action of the soul, an inward calm, profound as midnight silence, yet bright as the still summer noon, full of joy, but unbroken by one throb of tumultuous passion, has been breathed through his spirit, and given him a glimpse and presage of the serenity of a happier world? Of this character is the peace of religion. It is a conscious harmony with God and the creation, an alliance of love with all beings, a sympathy with all that is pure and happy, a surrender of every separate will and interest, a participation of the spirit and life of the universe, an entire concord of purpose with its Infinite Original. This is peace, and the true happiness of man; and we think that human nature has never entirely lost sight of this its great end. It has always sighed for a repose, in which energy of thought and will might be tempered with an all-pervading tranquillity. We seem to discover aspirations after this good, a dim consciousness of it, in all ages of the world. We think we see it in those systems of Oriental and Grecian philosophy, which proposed, as the consummation of present virtue, a release from all disquiet, and an intimate

union and harmony with the Divine Mind. We even think, that we trace this consciousness, this aspiration, in the works of ancient art which time has spared to us, in which the sculptor, aiming to embody his deepest thoughts of human perfection, has joined with the fulness of life and strength, a repose, which breathes into the spectator an admiration as calm as it is exalted. Man, we believe, never wholly loses the sentiment of his true good. There are yearnings, sighings which he does not himself comprehend, which break forth alike in his prosperous and adverse seasons, which betray a deep, indestructible faith in a good that he has not found, and which, in proportion as they grow distinct, rise to God, and concentrate the soul in him, as at once its life and rest, the foundation at once of energy and peace." — 8vo vol. pp. 203, 204.

We open the new volume to select three or four extracts for our pages. We have no common-place praise to give to any of these passages, and are very willing that they should pass from our hands without an epithet, satisfied that they should make their own impression.

In the first Discourse, "on the Evidences of Christianity," is the following summary view of one part of the argument.

"Christianity, I maintain, was not the growth of any of the circumstances, principles, or feelings of the age in which it appeared. In truth, one of the great distinctions of the gospel is, that it did not *grow*. The conception, which filled the mind of Jesus, of a religion more spiritual, generous, comprehensive, and unworldly than Judaism, and destined to take its place, was not of gradual formation. We detect no signs of it, and no efforts to realize it, before his time; nor is there an appearance of its having been gradually matured by Jesus himself. Christianity was delivered from the first in its full proportions, in a style of singular freedom and boldness, and without a mark of painful elaboration. This suddenness with which this religion broke forth, this maturity of the system at the very moment of its birth, this absence of gradual developement, seems to me a strong mark of its divine original. If Christianity be a human invention, then I can be pointed to something in the history of the age which impelled and fitted the mind of its author to its production; then I shall be able to find some germ of it, some approximation to it, in the state of things amidst which it first appeared. How was it, that from thick darkness there burst forth at once meridian light? Were I told that the sciences of the civilized world had sprung up to perfection at once, amidst a barbarous horde, I should pronounce it incredible.

Nor can I easily believe, that Christianity, the religion of unbounded love, a religion which broke down the barrier between Jew and Gentile, and the barriers between nations, which proclaimed one Universal Father, which abolished forms, and substituted the worship of the soul, which condemned alike the false greatness of the Roman and the false holiness of the Jew, and which taught an elevation of virtue, that the growing knowledge of succeeding ages has made more admirable; — I say I cannot easily believe, that such a religion was suddenly, immediately struck out by human ingenuity among a people, distinguished by bigotry and narrowness of spirit, by superstitious reliance on outward worship, by hatred and scorn of other nations, and by the proud, impatient hope of soon bending all nations to their sway.

"Christianity, I repeat it, was not the growth of the age in which it appeared. It had no sympathy with that age. It was the echo of no sect or people. It stood alone at the moment of its birth. It used not a word of conciliation. It stooped to no error or passion. It had its own tone, the tone of authority and superiority to the world. It struck at the root of what was every where called glory, reversed the judgments of all former ages, passed a condemning sentence on the idols of this world's admiration, and held forth, as the perfection of human nature, a spirit of love, so pure and divine, so free and full, so mild and forgiving, so invincible in fortitude yet so tender in its sympathies, that even now few comprehend it in its extent and elevation. Such a religion had not its origin in this world." — 12mo vol. pp. 49, 50.

On the passive virtues:

"I fear, that the importance of strength in the Christian character has been in some degree obscured, by the habit of calling certain Christian graces of singular worth, by the name of *passive* virtues. This name has been given to humility, patience, resignation; and I fear, that the phrase has led some to regard these noble qualities as allied to inaction, as wanting energy and determination. Now the truth is, that the mind never puts forth greater power over itself, than when, in great trials, it yields up calmly its desires, affections, interests to God. There are seasons, when to be *still* demands immeasurably higher strength than to act. Composure is often the highest result of power. Think you it demands no power to calm the stormy elements of passion, to moderate the vehemence of desire, to throw off the load of dejection, to suppress every repining thought, when the dearest hopes are withered,

and to turn the wounded spirit from dangerous reveries and wasting grief, to the quiet discharge of ordinary duties? Is there no power put forth, when a man, stripped of his property, of the fruits of a life's labors, quells discontent and gloomy forebodings, and serenely and patiently returns to the tasks which Providence assigns? I doubt not, that the all-seeing eye of God sometimes discerns the sublimest human energy under a form and countenance, which by their composure and tranquillity indicate to the human spectator only passive virtues." — 12mo vol. pp. 192, 193.

On future retribution:

"I know, indeed, that this doctrine is sometimes questioned. It is maintained by some among us, that punishment is confined to the present state; that in changing worlds we shall change our characters; that moral evil is to be buried with the body in the grave. As this opinion is spread industriously, and as it tends to diminish the dread of sin, it deserves some notice. To my mind, a more irrational doctrine was never broached. In the first place, it contradicts all our experience of the nature and laws of the mind. There is nothing more striking in the mind, than the connexion of its successive states. Our present knowledge, thoughts, feelings, characters, are the results of former impressions, passions, and pursuits. We are this moment what the past has made us; and to suppose, that, at death, the influences of our whole past course are to cease on our minds, and that a character is to spring up altogether at war with what has preceded it, is to suppose the most important law or principle of the mind to be violated, is to destroy all analogy between the present and future, and to substitute for experience the wildest dreams of fancy. In truth, such a sudden revolution in the character, as is here supposed, seems to destroy a man's identity. The individual thus transformed, can hardly seem to himself or to others the same being. It is equivalent to the creation of a new soul.

"Let me next ask, what fact can be adduced in proof or illustration of the power ascribed to death, of changing and purifying the mind. What is death? It is the dissolution of certain limbs and organs by which the soul now acts. But these, however closely connected with the mind, are entirely distinct from its powers, from thought and will, from conscience and affection. Why should the last grow pure from the dissolution of the first? Why shall the mind put on a new character, by laying aside the gross instruments through which it now operates? At death, the hands, the feet, the eye, and

the ear perish. But they often perish during life; and does character change with them? It is true that our animal appetites are weakened and sometimes destroyed by the decay of the bodily organs on which they depend. But our deeper principles of action, and the moral complexion of the mind, are not therefore reversed. It often happens, that the sensualist, broken down by disease, which excess has induced, comes to loathe the luxuries to which he was once enslaved; but do his selfishness, his low habits of thought, his insensibility to God, decline and perish with his animal desires? Lop off the criminal's hands; does the disposition to do mischief vanish with them? When the feet mortify, do we see a corresponding mortification of the will to go astray? The loss of sight or hearing is a partial death; but is a single vice plucked from the mind, or one of its strong passions palsied, by this destruction of its chief corporeal instruments?" — 12mo vol. pp. 221 - 223.

On the love of Jesus Christ. We cannot help commending the two Sermons on this subject to our readers, and confessing, at the same time, that we take an extract because it is short, which is a very inadequate sample of the whole.

"Others may love Christ for mysterious attributes; I love him for the rectitude of his soul and his life. I love him for that benevolence, which went through Judea, instructing the ignorant, healing the sick, giving sight to the blind. I love him for that universal charity, which comprehended the despised publican, the hated Samaritan, the benighted heathen, and sought to bring a world to God and to happiness. I love him for that gentle, mild, forbearing spirit, which no insult, outrage, injury could overpower; and which desired as earnestly the repentance and happiness of its foes, as the happiness of its friends. I love him for the spirit of magnanimity, constancy, and fearless rectitude, with which, amidst peril and opposition, he devoted himself to the work which God gave him to do. I love him for the wise and enlightened zeal with which he espoused the true, the spiritual interests of mankind, and through which he lived and died to redeem them from every sin, to frame them after his own godlike virtue. I love him, I have said, for his moral excellence; I know nothing else to love. I know nothing so glorious in the Creator or his creatures. This is the greatest gift which God bestows, the greatest to be derived from his Son." — 12mo vol. p. 260.

While these extracts are under the eye of the reader, we may as well, perhaps, say a word or two of the style. It is

a very peculiar style, and yet there is not a particle of mannerism about it. It results from no effort, but the simple effort to convey thoughts and feelings. There is none of that cleverness about it, that extreme adroitness in the construction of sentences, that appears in the writings of two reverend gentlemen abroad, — we mean Croly and Sidney Smith. There is none of "the linked sweetness" of our own Irving. And yet the style of Dr. Channing is singularly smooth, harmonious, and classical. But it is yet more remarkably simple, and sparing of words. It is almost as simple in this respect as the style of Dean Swift; and yet how different! Dean Swift's thoughts lie on his page like pebbles on the sea-shore, with nothing but dearth and barrenness around them. You see them clearly enough, you cannot help seeing them, but there is nothing to give them relief or grace to the eye. But there is every where breathing through the pages before us, an imagination, a kindling warmth, an intense fervor often, which gives the reader any impression, but that of a dry and barren style. The thought that shines through, is bright enough to irradiate the dress it wears, and does not need a gorgeous clothing of words to make it splendid. The thoughts are often themselves bright images, flashing upon us the light, unobstructed and unbroken by any frame-work of ornament, or setting of gems and precious stones. Dr. Channing makes very little use of enfeebling expletives, — adjectives or interjections. He deals very much with strong, substantial nouns. And yet he contrives, in a very uncommon degree, to endow abstractions with life. Let us take an instance or two. The following brief sentence will illustrate our meaning. "I believe and rejoice to believe, that a ray from heaven descends upon the path of every fellow-creature." An ordinary writer might have said something about the light being diffused and spread through the world, or shining upon all mankind. But the sentence before us, consists, every word of it, of distinct and living images. "A ray," — not light in general — "a ray from heaven descends," — not 'falls,' that would make the ray a material atom merely, whereas 'descends' applies to a being — something that has life and intelligence — "a ray from heaven descends upon the path" — not upon the broad surface of the world, not upon the mass of mankind — but "upon the path of every

fellow-creature." But we cannot spend time to cull out sentences. Let us take a page, and it is full of illustration. Speaking of the guilt of ambition, the author says:

"And is it light guilt, to array man against his brother; to make murder the trade of thousands; to drench the earth with human blood; to turn it into a desert; to scatter families like chaff; to make mothers widows, and children orphans; and to do all this for the purpose of spreading a still gloomier desolation, for the purpose of subjugating men's souls, turning them into base parasites, extorting from them a degrading homage, humbling them in their own eyes, and breaking them to servility as the chief duty of life? When the passion for power succeeds, as it generally has done, in establishing despotism, it seems to make even civilization a doubtful good. Whilst the monarch and his court are abandoned to a wasteful luxury, the peasantry, rooted to the soil and doomed to a perpetual round of labors, are raised but little above the brute. There are parts of Europe, Christian Europe, in which the peasant, through whose sweat kings and nobles riot in plenty, seems to enjoy less, on the whole, than the untamed Indian of our forests. Chained to one spot, living on the cheapest vegetables, sometimes unable to buy salt to season his coarse fare, seldom or never tasting animal food, having for his shelter a mud-walled hut floored with earth or stone, and subjected equally with the brute to the rule of a superior, he seems to us to partake less of animal, intellectual, and moral pleasures, than the free wanderer of the woods, whose steps no man fetters; whose wigwam no tyrant violates; whose chief toil is hunting, that noblest of sports; who feasts on the deer, that most luxurious of viands; to whom streams, as well as woods, pay tribute; whose adventurous life gives sagacity; and in whom peril nourishes courage and self-command. We are no advocates for savage life. We know that its boasted freedom is a delusion. The single fact that human nature in this wild state makes no progress, is proof enough that it wants true liberty. We mean only to say, that man in the hands of despotism, is sometimes degraded below the savage; that it were better for him to be lawless, than to live under lawless sway." — 8vo vol. pp. 149, 150.

If we had any fault to find with Dr. Channing's style, it would be with the *extreme* of simplicity to which it is sometimes carried. Its brevity is sometimes, as we think, a faulty ellipsis, as when he says, p. 243 (12mo. vol.), "the proofs of an Infinite Father," for proofs of the being and perfection of an Infinite Father." And, p. 180, "Scripture

says, it was God who made me, not Adam." So also, the manner of introducing the tree in the ninth Discourse: "my meaning may be best conveyed by reverting to the tree," p. 234, &c.; "I return to the tree," p. 238. That adroitness in the formation of sentences of which we have spoken, and of which, indeed, we cannot regret the want in the pages before us, might still, we think, be well used to give something more of variety to the style, and especially to the phrases of transition from paragraph to paragraph, and from topic to topic. "I proceed to another view," is a very common phrase of transition with Dr. Channing, and this will be repeated several times, in the course of a hundred pages, and sometimes in the same piece. We suppose that he has never bestowed a thought upon matters so small, and we certainly do not suggest them for *his* consideration; but as we think his style is really worth the study of younger writers, we have noted these things to give the weight of impartiality to our opinion. If our opinion could be supposed by us to have any other weight, we would recommend to such writers, as containing specimens of the most easy and graceful transitions we have ever observed, the writings of Lord Kames.

There is another kind of simplicity in Dr. Channing's writings which may be less easily understood, and therefore, by many, may be less easily accounted for. We allude to the manner in which he sometimes speaks of his own views as great or interesting. He says, "I have stated a great truth." "I proceed now to an important and solemn remark." "I invite your attention to another view, and I am not sure but it is still more striking." We suppose that a man who was conscious of great pride of opinion, would take care to avoid such expressions as these. They are to our minds, proofs, though they are far from being the only proofs, of entire freedom from such pride. But our observation is designed to go farther. Dr. Channing seems to stand before the majesty of truth as a simple spectator. He does not seem to regard any truth he advances as *his* truth, but as God's truth, and truth for all mankind. "Reason," says M. Cousin, "is not a property of individuals; it is not our own, it belongs not to us, it is not human;" and a conception like this, though without extravagance, seems to pervade the writings of Dr. Channing. The sense of exclusive pos-

session in this great interest, and almost of personal merit, seems to be far from his thoughts. "This is a great truth," he says, "let me strive to unfold it," p. 203, (12mo vol.) Truth is his subject, not his boast.

But, to leave matters of mere style, — the great question is, and it is the question which we have constantly put to ourselves, as one after another of these productions has appeared before the public, — Is it true? In short, we have felt the sort of distrust for which we have our author's own authority when he says, Fenelon "needs to be read with caution, as do all who write from their own deeply excited minds." Another question, too, we have heard from others, and heard it put with an air of doubt, namely, Is it useful? This, we suppose, was the purport of Captain Hall's question, after hearing the preacher — "Can the people understand this?"

But our first question presses before all others, — Is it true? "Very interesting, very fine, very striking," were phrases which we could at once apply to the matter in hand, — scarcely less beautiful, we have been ready to say, than Fenelon, and far more powerful; with a wealth of thought, too, sometimes accumulated on a single page, that reminds us of the best old English writers; with a power of amplification that might have satisfied the Roman orator himself, and a power it is, very distinct from that of heaping up words, though some may confound them; but, after all, is it true? Is there nothing presumptuous or unauthorized in the views which are here presented of the moral perfection of God, of his paternal interest in his creatures, of his greatness, as consisting in an immensity of knowledge and love, that embraces the lowliest thing with the loftiest, in the universe? Is there nothing visionary in the views which are here given of human nature and life, of human capacities and prospects? Is there nothing extravagant or impracticable, in these splendid speculations about literature and society, about power and government? We must tell our author that we have pushed the matter hard with some of his paragraphs. Something there has been in them that has led us to soliloquize about them after this manner. "Is not this eloquent, a little somewhat at the expense of truth? Is not a favorite idea sometimes swelled beyond its due measure and proportion? Is this really a sound induction?

Does it proceed upon the real principle of the inductive philosophy? Does not imagination sometimes break the bonds of logic? Is there not, here and there, a touch of Platonic mysticism? Ay, we have it!" we said, when we came across a passage like this:

"We believe," says Dr. Channing, "that the human mind is akin to that intellectual energy which gave birth to nature, and consequently that it contains within itself the seminal and prolific principles from which nature sprung." — 8vo vol. p. 189.

That is to say; the human mind is creative, not in the poetic and figurative sense, but literally; as M. Cousin also seriously contends. We suppose that some of Dr. Channing's friends will think that this is very bold questioning; *he* will not.

But, in truth, we are compelled, after all, to make amends for all this presumptuous doubting. We must confess that we have hardly found a paragraph of Dr. Channing's that did not prove too hard for us, before we got through with it. We have seldom come off without defeat. We think that things are strongly put in his pages, but we think, too, that they are strongly sustained. We suppose that every man who presents new views, views evolved from his own mind, and that mind an earnest one, will seem to many, at first, to urge things a little too far. The fault is, not in the truth presented, nor in the medium through which it is transmitted, but in the eye, unaccustomed to the contemplation of it. The first publishers of Christianity were accounted mad. And many illustrious preachers of it since, Luther, Wickliffe, Wesley, Penn, Baxter, have been, for a time, accounted wild and extravagant. And, in these days, a man can hardly speak the highest and most advanced truth, about government, politics, society, human nature, and religion, without rendering himself liable to a similar imputation. Is not the reform party in Europe, at this moment, deemed, by its adversaries, the defenders of the old order of things, absolutely insane? So every great cause must advance. The first rays of its full-orbed splendor, as they strike into the regions of darkness, — the first vague sounds of its coming on, seem to multitudes like thunderings and lightenings in the distant and dim horizon, — bringing, not a

brighter day, but night and tempest, disaster and strange mischance.

But we are wandering from the point. We have asked, if these writings are true; true, we mean, in that healthful wisdom, and that fair proportion that belong to truth. And we must express our conviction in reply. We believe that they *are* true,—singularly true,—strikingly true,—gloriously true. We think, indeed, that there is an extraordinary union in them of sobriety with enthusiasm. We never saw more truth with less alloy. A secret fire is burning through these pages; but it is a pure, ethereal fire; the mass is penetrated and pervaded with that internal and intense heat, which gives off neither flame nor smoke.

We do not say that we never see occasion to dissent from any of the views advanced by Dr. Channing. His views of Bonaparte's intellectual character, we must say, did not quite satisfy us, though the exception we have to take to the general merit, truth, and power of this article, is very slight. We have founded our judgment of Bonaparte, we confess, more upon what he said, than upon what he did. The conversations at St. Helena, have given us the most distinct, if not the greatest opinion we have had, of the talents of that extraordinary man. These conversations, in fact, seem to us to have done more for Bonaparte's fame, even than his battles. We certainly have more felt his power at St. Helena, than in Egypt or Italy, at Austerlitz or Marengo. We do not exactly understand, and we suspect that many of our readers have felt the same incapacity to understand, how much talent is required to plan a campaign, or to order the array of battle, and to manage its evolutions. It certainly does not strike our minds as requiring the highest kind, or as demanding the highest exercise of talents. It is, as Dr. Channing has said, directing physical forces; it is acting on matter. For, divisions and platoons are, after all, nothing but so much machinery; they differ but little from steam-engines; and the spirit, the enthusiasm, the courage of an army may be raised about as certainly as steam, and they may be, and have been a thousand times raised, without any great talent in the commander,—raised by a popular cause, by success, by circumstances distinct enough from the exertion of great talent. But conversations we do understand. And those which are recorded of Bonaparte show, we must

say, a reach of mind, a comprehension in his views, which we had not before imputed to him. They show that he had thought about more things than we had supposed, and had thought more ably. Of the same character is the part he took in framing his celebrated Code. Bonaparte was not a great man as a philosopher, as an abstract thinker; and a really great philosopher is, to us, a greater man than he. Still less was he a great man in any moral traits; he seems scarcely to have had any. And this, Dr. Channing would say, perhaps, settles the whole question. Such an answer, we suppose, we might deduce from several passages in his writings. And in the *beau idéal* of complete human greatness, moral qualities are doubtless to be included. This view of the subject, obviously of great importance, is powerfully urged, and beautifully developed in Dr. Channing's writings; and it is perhaps capable of still greater expansion. That is to say, it may be easily shown that the mind, working without the moral qualities, or against them, works at an immense disadvantage. But still it may work without them, certainly, and that powerfully; and so, we suppose, the mind of Bonaparte wrought. He was not a great man, in the full and complete sense in which a man ought to be, to bear that title, and we could not apply that title to him, without some qualifying phrase, or qualifying tone. But we should say, nevertheless, that he was a man of great powers, of great genius; and capable, under the right direction of his powers, of being great in any thing. We cannot leave this subject without expressing our gratification and gratitude for what Dr. Channing has done for the cause of peace. His splendid article on the character and career of Bonaparte, and his Sermon on War, before the Massachusetts Convention, have done more to strip off from the grim and ghastly image of war, its gorgeous decorations, and its dazzling veil, like that of "the veiled prophet of Khorassan," than any writings, in an equal compass, with which we are acquainted. We cannot resist the inclination to quote here a sentence or two from the very powerfully written novel, entitled "Henry Masterton." The hero is passing over dead bodies in the field of battle, and his soliloquy runs in a strain like this. "Was it glory, I asked myself, to make such things as that! Was he the most honorable, who could devise the quickest means of changing the

godlike human form, with all the mighty beauty of life and energy, to the cold, meaningless, leaden things that lay cumbering the bloody earth, over which they had lately moved in hope and expectation?" Let Romance speak thus, and she will fast scatter the illusions, which she has herself spread over the scenes of war.

But to return to our author: his views of the power, the glorious energy of human nature, seem to us to need a qualifying acknowledgment of human weakness too, and of its need of divine aid, which we have no doubt that he will be ready enough to make, when the occasion shall offer. We do not complain that his eloquence is of that sort, that goes "onward, right onward to its object." We do not wish that he should wrap up the point he is urging, with twenty folds of qualification, — till it is completely blunted and makes no impression. It is true, too, that there are divine and powerful energies in human nature. But truth, commonly, has too sides, — ay, and more than two. There is a weak side, as well as a strong side, to human nature. We admit, however, at the same time, that human weakness has been taught in such disproportion to human strength, that it was highly necessary to make some decided impression at this point; to do something effectual, to reduce the swelling error. Truth, in human hands, is like a rough and disproportioned mass, which is to be wrought and beaten into shape. One man strikes on one side, and perchance he strikes too hard; but anon comes another man, and, with a blow at another point, he not only makes some impression, but he partly effaces the former impression. Thus friends and foes, as they account themselves, conspire together; advocates and adversaries unwittingly work to the same end, so that with many hard and conflicting blows, the mass is brought continually nearer to the full and rounded orb of perfection.

We have another comment to offer, and that is upon a discourse in the newly published volume. It is on the third discourse, entitled "Christianity a Rational Religion." The object of this discourse is twofold; first, to show "that revelation is founded on the authority of reason," and, secondly, to show "its accordance with reason." We regret that the statements in this discourse were not made with a little more care. Our views of the office of reason in religion form the grand point of misapprehension, and of objection against us,

on the part of our Orthodox neighbours; and in looking at certain detached passages of this discourse, they will be very certain to think themselves confirmed in their objections. With thinking men of all parties, indeed, — clamor aside, — we believe that there can be but one opinion; and it is evident enough from the whole discourse taken together, that that is Dr. Channing's opinion. That is to say, revelation is founded on human nature. This is the basis. Take away this from the world, — leave nothing but a brute nature, — and there could be no revelation to this world. Take away that basis, — take away reason and conscience, that is to say, — and there could be no revelation to any world. This is evidently Dr. Channing's view. In the course of the discussion, he embraces the whole intellectual and moral nature of man in his view. But in the premises, where he defines reason, he does not embrace so much. He defines reason to be a purely intellectual quality. Is not the conclusion, then, too broad for the premises? *Is* reason a sufficient basis for revelation to rest upon? Can reason, in fact, — pure reason, simple intellect, — can it receive the revelation, understand it, interpret it, make any use of it, — sustain any such superstructure as the Christian revelation? This, to be sure, is a mere matter of criticism upon the structure of the discourse; and one which we should not probably have thought of making, if it had not been for the peculiar relation which the subject bears to the controversies of the day. We suppose that Dr. Channing was led to put forward reason into the prominent place which it holds in this discourse, from causes very obvious to those who understand the state of religious discussions among us.

But these strictures, in which we have ventured to indulge, are matters of small account, and really they are about all that we have to offer in the shape of qualifying criticism. We might add, to be sure, as another slight criticism, that we thought the figure of the gallows, which has given so much offence, in the New York Dedication Sermon, was introduced without sufficient preparation; and that it is this abruptness which has shocked the minds of many, quite as much as the general justness of the illustration has offended them. It would seem, indeed, — since the comparison is founded on a mode of punishment most closely resembling the cross, — it would seem from the public sensibility about

this matter, that the offence of the cross had not yet ceased. But we cannot dwell upon it. — Our general sympathy with Dr. Channing's writings is strong, — is stronger than we can well express. His singular habit of introversion has led him, no doubt, to give to his views the distinct cast and coloring of his own mind. His conclusions, it may be objected, are sometimes deductions from his own experience, rather than from the general experience of mankind. But when was it otherwise with moral and practical writings, that are fitted to exert a commanding and permanent influence? How is truth to advance, if it is never to swell beyond the mould of common experience and opinion? Dr. Channing appears to us, as one who has sat at the shrine of the mind within, and waited in deep silence for its revealings, and who has brought forth inspiring responses from those secret oracles; as one, too, who has sat at the feet of Jesus, who has gained from thence a penetrating insight into the spirit of Christianity, and a power of communicating it, which sets him apart from all other preachers.

The great question is, — and it is not about Dr. Channing's writings only, though it will materially influence the judgment that is formed of them, — whether any deeper insight into Christianity is to be sought or expected, whether religion, in the developement of its true principles, is to advance, whether the vision of moral truth and beauty is to be brightened, whether the perfection of God, the glory of Jesus Christ, and the intrinsic and original worth of human nature, are to be better understood. As a man judges on these points, he will probably judge of many of the religious writings of the day, and especially of Dr. Channing's writings. If he takes the negative side in these questions, he will probably think, that, in the pages before us, there is a good deal of pretension, and over-refining, and visionary and chimerical speculation. If he takes the affirmative side, we see not how he can fail to be deeply interested in them, and, we were ready to say, we see not how he is to resist them.

Now we know that there are many who hold that there is little or nothing more to be learnt in religion; that things have long ago come to that point, a point ascertained and laid down in definite creeds and standards, beyond which they are not much to advance; that conscience has already

told them, or the Bible has already taught them, all that they are to know; that the whole meaning of Christianity is already extracted from its records; that its spirit is mainly very well understood; that its applications to duty and human life and human nature are mostly unfolded; and that all we have to desire, and all we have to do, for the mass of the people, is, to give them a deeper impression of those religious ideas that are already received among them. If any such person should chance to cast his eye on our own humble pages, we can explain to him in one word, why it is that he has so little sympathy, perchance, in many things that we have been saying in this article, and especially on the principal subject of it. We differ from him entirely on the subject of moral progress; and that is the explanation. We believe that the world is to advance. There is nothing, no subject, or science, in which there is such room for advancement, such need of advancement, such urgent demand for it, as in religion. It was among the visions of our earlier studies that there would be such a progress. It is among the strongest convictions of our maturer judgment that there *is* such a progress, and must be more of it. This is, with us, no sectarian feeling. Long before we felt any sympathy with the religious body to which we now belong (we speak, it will be obvious, in a personal rather than an official character), we felt all this, just as much as we feel it now. We felt that there were stumbling-blocks in the ways of piety, that there were many difficulties of human device besetting the path, that there were clouds upon it, — clouds of superstition and error: and it was among the very longings and passions of our hearts to see them removed. We had suffered from these difficulties, — not unusually perhaps, — but we had suffered from them, all our lives long. We had seen others suffer. We had seen hundreds of intelligent and interesting men, of fine natural powers, and generally irreproachable lives, turning away from religion as from a matter with which they had nothing to do, — suffering, in passive and hopeless acquiesence, the inexpressible and irreparable loss of all its precious blessings and joys and hopes, — looking upon it, perhaps, as the resort of weak and vulgar minds, — and descending sometimes to low and evil courses, to slake, in the streams of pleasure, the burning thirst for happiness; and all this, we were persuaded, not only because they had

natures prone to err and sin, but also because the just claims of religion, its true dignity and nobleness, its reasonableness and wisdom, its beneficence and beauty, had never been fairly spread before them. We saw this, and we felt it. We felt that it was a case to be mourned over, with all the sensibility that ever was given to the condition of the uninstructed heathen; and we felt bound by every prompting of experience, and by every sympathy of humanity as well as of Christian love, to devote our lives to the religious and moral progress of the human mind, — to the relief of spiritual sorrow and darkness, to the awakening of the soul to its intrinsic wants and immortal destinies; and we felt that this great aim ought to be more, and we thank God, was more, to us, than ever was the vision of glory to the eye of young ambition.

Is it possible that we were alone in this? Is it possible, that the intelligent young men of our colleges, and especially of our theological institutions, see nothing for them to do but to grave deeper and yet deeper upon the public mind, all the religious ideas that are now traced upon it? Is it possible that their reflections have brought with them no conviction that religion needs to be better understood; that it is now lamentably misunderstood by the mass of mankind; that its simplicity and reasonableness, and beauty and power, are as yet but faintly perceived and feebly experienced? Is it possible that the very idea of religious progress obtains from them no attention but what is implied in a shrug or a sneer? What! is science to advance, — is literature to advance, — are the arts to advance, — and is there to be no progress in the great subject of subjects, in the knowledge of the infinite theme, — of the theme that is to engage the meditations of eternity! Is the great idea of God, exhausted, and is there no more light to be shed upon his ineffable perfections? Are the awful depths of this nature within us searched out? do mankind yet know themselves? Are all the relations of happiness to duty, and of duty to life, and of life to immortality, fully explored? and is the whole sublime philosophy of religion laid down in a creed of a page long?

Why, the simplest truths in religion are but half comprehended, — are held but in a weak and wavering confidence, by multitudes. That honesty is the best policy, that the way of wisdom is pleasantness, that the severity of the

Christian discipline sits gently upon the soul accustomed to it, that true repentance is relief and joy to the heart, that self-denial is, in the highest degree, self-gratification, — the gratification of the soul and only the denial of sense, — that obedience is liberty, the service of God perfect freedom, and suffering often the source of the most unbounded gratitude, — how many do not understand even these things! How many suppose, that, in the very constitution of things, — not as human folly and wickedness have made it, but in the very constitution of things, — there is a warfare between the interests of the present life, and the future! How many have dark questionings in their minds about vice and virtue, about pleasure and a warning conscience, — and wish, in their folly, — wish, as if it were a blessed fortune, that they could give free indulgence to all their passions, and then go to heaven at last, — which is, as if a man should wish he could go through hell to heaven! How many feebly desire to be religious, and negligently attend to it, and because they are negligent, are suffering under a dreadful apathy all their lives, are hasting to hear one preacher and another that may arouse them, are saying "Lo! here, and lo! there," and ever wishing that they could feel, that they could only feel the the power of religion, when the way to religious sensibility is in the deep places of their own hearts, if they would but look for it, and is as plain as the way to any other emotion! How many make their prayers a forced, reluctant, and inconstant service; and this because they resolve it all into a slavish action of the soul, because they have distrustful and repulsive conceptions of the Divine, Being, because they have never known the joy of a generous and disinterested contemplation of Infinite glory and goodness! In short, how much is there of that dreadful moral skepticism, which goes almost to the point of wishing, that the work of religion could be wrought out by some machinery; which would be glad to do the work as a definite task, if it then might have freedom and indulgence; which would be willing to labor in any way for ten hours of every Sunday, if so it could be made sure of heaven, and be dismissed from any further care or anxiety about it! — nay, and how much religion is there that *is* little better than machinery, that is measured out by forms, that is confined to the dimensions of a ritual, or that is summed up, in certain scarcely moral,

— half animal, half enthusiastic, — frames of mind! And do men know, then, all that they are to know, of this mighty power — a power designed to renew, exalt, and fill with beatitude, their whole nature? Do they know what it is to give the whole soul to religion, to live in it, as their life; to walk in it, as their path; to pursue in that path their supreme and sublimest interest, and in that pursuit to account duty their pleasure, and humiliation their glory, and suffering a welcome minister to their improvement, — a gracious dispensation of God, to obtain for them "a far more exceeding and eternal weight of glory"?

We have dwelt a little on this topic of religious progress, of progress, we mean, in the very ideas of religion, because the whole character and spirit of Dr. Channing's writings urge it upon our notice, and because we were willing to bear our testimony, conscious we are how feeble it is, to their truth and importance. But are they fitted to be useful? — is also a question which has been raised; and upon the question, what consitutes useful preaching, we have something to say, which we can hardly expect, perhaps, a more fit occasion for saying, than the present.

We have chanced to hear a good deal of discussion, and somewhat earnest at times, about practical preaching and plain preaching, and the doubtful utility of lofty and intellectual discussion in the pulpit. Now it appears to us, that this is one of those cases where dispute must end, the moment that a reasonable plan of proceeding is laid down, and reasonable concessions are made on both sides. Our idea of practical or useful preaching is, that it is of a very diversified character, — a bringing of "things new and old from the treasure." We are perfectly willing to admit, that the useful preacher must not only lay out great schemes of truth, and open up glorious views and visions of moral beauty, but that he must set the steps in the paths in which they should go; that he must make fixtures in moral discussion, and drive home the nail to the very spot where sentiment may take hold on practice; that he must say, "Do this, and do that," and point out the first step, and the second step in the way; and this he must consent to do, though he may think it a very simple business to do so, — which it is not, however; this he must consent to do, though in so doing he is obliged to come down from the lofty stride of dignity, or the

lofty strain of sentiment. But surely, it will be conceded to us, on the other hand, that in the wide range of topics that offer themselves to the preacher, there is a place for lofty and intellectual discussion. That Paul thought so, is quite evident; whether we look at the testimony of his writings, or at the testimony of his express declarations upon this point. He had instructions for the strong and the weak, for the wise and the ignorant.

Surely, if there is any subject, or sphere in the world that admits or demands the highest efforts of the intellect, that subject is religion, that sphere is the pulpit. If a man is to speak on a great question in one of our legislative assemblies, or, in an important case, at the bar, he prepares himself to deliver an able argument. He does not think it enough to exhort his hearers to do right. He does not think it enough to make a pathetic and moving appeal to their feelings. He wishes to address their judgment also. He is not satisfied without an attempt to convince them. There are great questions before them; there are great interests at stake; and he would address their whole mind, he would awaken all their powers, he would call up every consideration, from the humblest to the highest, to enlighten and to move them. He lays out his whole soul upon the effort. Shall a man do less in preaching? There never were interests involved in legislation, or in a process of law, more comprehensive and vast, or deserving to be more deeply weighed, than those which are involved in the solemn moral questioning of the soul with itself. There never were interests, encompassed with greater difficulties, or exposed to greater peril. That world within, — with all its unfathomed depths, and with all its specious disguises, with all its conflicting interests and passions, with its struggling elements of good and evil, and its minglings of light and darkness, — what subject ever called for profounder discussion, or sublimer eloquence? And yet, in *intellectual* power and dignity, the pulpit appears to be regarded by many as occupying a place, quite inferior to the forum and the senate-chamber! They seem to think, when they come down from the high debates of senates and conventions, and cross the threshold of our churches, that they have left the field of lofty, intense, and powerful thinking, for the sphere of mere feeling. They regard religion itself, as a matter, not of deep thought, though it goes to the

depths of eternity, and of eternal truth, but as a matter of mere feeling. They say, "Give us the preacher that will move us! we want no intellectual discussions!" as if intellect were not the very thing to move rational beings, as if true feeling could be supported in any mind, but upon the basis of truth, and of truth well reasoned and discriminated too, — as if the structure of eternal happiness needed no foundation, but might be put upon the unstable waves.

It is an idea, bearing the same unfriendly aspect to the dignity of the pulpit, that this favorite practical preaching is a very easy kind of preaching. "All that is necessary," we are told, "is just to feel and just to say what you feel; we do not want any great discussion; just give a simple exhortation that will move the hearts of the people; that is better than all reasoning." Now there is something in all this, that is true, and yet against its general tendency we protest. It is true, indeed, that the feelings are to be awakened, and that is the best intellectual preaching which does awaken feeling. But it is equally true, that the thoughts are to be aroused, and that is the best practical preaching which arouses the thoughts, — which, in other words, is intellectual. So much we concede, so much we ask. We ask especially that intellect in religion may not be divorced from feeling, — no, not by any innuendo, nor by any careless phrase, nor by any tendency of public opinion; for the disunion would be fatal to the depth and permanence of all religious sentiment! It is true, indeed, that an intellectual discussion is sometimes heard in the pulpit, which is subtile, attenuated, and chilling, like the thin, cold atmosphere, far up above the regions of vital existence; and it is true that such preaching ought to be reprobated. But all deep preaching, nevertheless, must come from deep thinking. It requires keen discrimination, a well-considered order of thought, and a fertile imagination, as well as deep feeling. It is no vague exhortation; it is no rambling, pointless, impromptu address. The *prevailing and specific* idea, however, of practical preaching, we suppose is, that it is taken up with obvious and specific duties and sins. Its business is, directly and definitely, to discuss duties, — the duties of religious veneration, fear, trust, love, and hope, of prayer, and submission, and gratitude, of repentance, humility, temperance, self-government, and self-examination, of benevolence, truth,

honesty, charity, and forgiveness of injuries; and to discuss also the vices and sins opposite to these virtues. It is to go into the scenes of business, and to teach plainly what is to be done and what is to be avoided, — into the scenes of social life, and to show what affections are to be cherished and what to be guarded against, — into the scenes of recreation, and to draw the line between what is healthful and what is noxious and dangerous. It is to go round and round in this track, from month to month and from year to year. This, we say, with many is the only idea they have of practical preaching. If any one leaves this beaten track, if he goes beyond the range of simple and received ideas, — though he strikes perhaps to the deepest foundations of the soul, though he flashes the light of some awful and unsuspected truth into its darkest recesses, though he kindles up to the brightest splendor, the whole horizon around them, — they say, perhaps, that it is very fine, and very delightful, but they are afraid it is not practical enough. In short, their idea of practical preaching is, that it is something that can be immediately reduced to practice, — to definite, visible, tangible practice.

Now we shall not be suspected, surely, of any intention to discredit this kind of public instruction. It is the very staple of preaching. But is this the only kind of practical preaching?

What, let us ask, is, from the very nature of the case, the preaching that is practical? And having admitted that the public judgment gives one good answer, let us be permitted to give another of our own. It is that preaching, we answer then, which goes to the deep thoughts, — to thoughts that lie deeper than any common-places, or truisms, or ordinary arguments for virtue, are likely to reach. Men want basis thoughts, — we must not always be talking about the superstructure, — and basis thoughts lie deep in every soul. Men want broad, large, comprehensive thoughts, — thoughts that, by their generalization, go through and through with the whole subject of religion and virtue. A mind earnest about religion has profound, unuttered, and anxious inquiries, about the principles of piety and duty, about the laws of Providence, about, not the endurance only, but, so to speak, the very theory of temptations and trials. Why does it suffer? Why is it tempted? Why was it made such as it

is? What is its end? These grand inquiries about which the human soul is for ever lingering, must be met. Men want thoughts which are the ultimate reasons of things; they want not only rules to go by, but the principles on which those rules are founded. You may preach about business, for instance, and all the details and discriminations of honesty; and it is very well. But you must sometimes send a thought deeper, — that will rise up to the mind amidst the busy cares of life, like an awful admonition, like a solemn memento, like a penetrating tone, from some other world, than the world of merchandise. You may preach about truth, and equity, and justice, and all the dangers to which the soul is exposed in the affairs of trade, and it is very well and very practical. But suppose you should go farther, and advance and unfold the proposition, that the very end, — the ultimate end for which God ordained the business of life, — is, not acquisition, not supply, but the cultivation of a high moral uprightness: would not that be practical too? And would it not penetrate, too, with awful meaning and with prolific inference, the whole sphere of active life?

What then, we still ask, is practical preaching? And still we answer, it is that preaching which arrests the mind and arouses it to moral action, whether by the discussion of duties or of doctrines. It is that preaching which recalls the mind to the deep, long-buried, and almost forgotten knowledge of itself; which penetrates it with the soul-amazing consciousness of its profound, unutterable want, of its transcendent power, of its awful destiny to good or evil; which breathes upon the faded images of moral grandeur and beauty in the soul, and spreads life and freshness through all its dull and desponding affections. It is that preaching which not merely descants upon the wants and vicissitudes of life, but which unfolds the sublime, the Christian philosophy of life, and creates, to the eye of reason and of faith, a new world, and makes it the habitation, not of fear, sorrow, and discontent, but of filial confidence, of pious joy, of cheerful patience, of victorious virtue, of all-conquering love, and immortal hope. It is that preaching which not only sets the feet in the path in which they should go, but which fills that path with winning examples of virtue, with bright and beckoning images of godlike beauty, with good angels, cheering and encouraging,

and bearing on the soul to heaven. It is that preaching which calls to repentance and humility, not with a mournful tone, but with a voice like that of Jesus, full of rebuke and love, — full, not of a solitary and reproachful indignation, but of that indignation in which the erring and sinful are invited nobly to take part against themselves; that "preaching of repentance" which is like "the voice of one in the wilderness," saying, "Go forth go, unhappy ones, to the bright and blessed country; travel in the path of humiliation to the seats of glory!" In fine, it is that preaching which speaks of God — how shall we say that it speaks of Him? how shall we "express it unblamed!" — which speaks of God, not familiarly, not presumptuously, not as if that awful name were an expletive to fill up the discourse, or an instrument to enforce terror, not professionally, not in the mere technical phrase of the pulpit, not with the tone of cold decorum or of dread superstition, — but which speaks of God, with ever fresh and renewed wonder, with holy and all-subduing awe and tenderness in the mind, with the deep intuition of an inexpressible love to him, with filial, but not familiar freedom, with mingled adoration and confidence, with delight, with joy "unspeakable and full of glory."

Such to our apprehension is the preaching of which we have an example and a model in the volumes before us. And, to our minds, this preaching is emphatically true, and eminently useful and practical. We cannot take our leave of these volumes, without expressing our hope that they are the first fruits, — we will not be so unreasonable as to say concerning *such* volumes, of *many* more yet to come, — but of *as* many as it may be given to renewed strength and a long life to produce.

ART. VI. — *Remarks on the Unitarian Belief: with a Letter to a Unitarian Friend on the Lord's Supper.* By NEHEMIAH ADAMS, Pastor of the First Church of Christ in Cambridge. Boston. Peirce & Parker. 1832. 18mo. pp. 175.

THIS book consists of three parts. The first is a review of a Treatise "On the Formation of the Christian Charac-

ter; addressed to those who are seeking to lead a religious life. By Rev. Henry Ware, Jr., Professor in the Divinity School, Cambridge." This part is reprinted, with some alterations, from "The Spirit of the Pilgrims." The second part consists of Remarks upon a Tract by the same author, called an "Outline of Scripture Testimony against the Trinity"; and the third is a "Letter to a Unitarian Friend on the Lord's Supper." The chapters devoted to the Trinity contain the usual arguments for that doctrine, and need not be examined. If they present any original or unusual views, they are not of a character to require special notice.

We take up this volume for the purpose of remarking upon the manner in which the work "On the Formation of the Christian Character" is attacked,—not however with a view to eulogize or defend that work.* If our author had only written a *critique* on the work he was reviewing, or had suffered his production to repose in that amiable organ of Christian criticism, "The Spirit of the Pilgrims," we probably should not have called the attention of our readers to it. But as he regards and treats Mr. Ware's book as the representation and practical exhibition of Unitarianism, developing its enormities, and disclosing the weakness and corruption of our whole system, and as he, uniting his review with other matters, has raised it into the dignity of an elaborate assault upon the "Unitarian Belief," we shall doubtless hear the old cry that we are again "annihilated," and the requiem will be chanted triumphantly over our grave, if we do not just protest that we yet survive.

Mr. Adams, after a somewhat far-fetched, but not inelegant compliment, comparing his author's work with "The Pilgrim's Progress" (except on the points of its piety, interest, and usefulness,) proceeds to state his own reasons for noticing it.

"It is intended," he says, "to be placed in the hands of one, at the time when he is interested in the salvation of his soul, and everlasting consequences are depending upon the direction which may then be given to his feelings. Those who have themselves been in such a state, and have seen what awful interests are in suspense during those hours when the soul is susceptible of the slightest influence, and those of us who are conversant with minds in this turning of the tide which

* It has received the notice of this Journal. See No. for July, 1831.

flows through eternity, can feel that a book for such a purpose should contain nothing but the eternal truth."

We are here given to understand that a dangerous book, and one likely to give a fatal direction to the feelings at the crisis described, is finding favor with the community, and that there is reason to fear that serious inquirers will mistake it for a truly Christian work; the reviewer accordingly feels bound in conscience to raise the alarm, expose the real character of the work, and so, with a timely hand, spring the fatal snare which he saw was craftily laid for souls.

Another reason why it attracted his attention we have already alluded to. It was because "such a book presents the best possible means of judgment, in regard to the religious system which forms its basis." He proposes, therefore, to show the fallacy of the system by the deficiencies of this book. This one little practical volume is to become, under his hands, a dead weight of sufficient momentum to bear down a whole system. Its alleged heathenism is to seal the doom of Unitarianism. We think it rather hard, to be sure, to be solemnly called upon to renounce the doctrines which we believe were revealed from heaven by Jesus Christ, and which we cherish as the precious truth of God, — to renounce these because a book has proceeded from our ranks, which, in this reviewer's judgment, "contains no Saviour," "can never turn an inquirer into the way of life," gives directions which "it chills the soul to think of," leads "only to sentimentality, and a cold, lofty, philosophical pride," prescribes a course which gives "no rest to the soul, except when conscience has become stupefied with worldliness, and the reasonable fears of a destitution of meetness for heaven are lulled to sleep," "directs the inquirer's eyes away from the sinner's hope," and, finally, was written by one who "spake that which he knew, and testified those things which he had seen; while there are other things, *essential to salvation*, which, judging from this book, he did not know and had not seen." If the book be indeed so deplorably destitute of all Christian qualities and uses, we will disclaim and renounce it; but we shall not therefore give up the faith which does give us an all-sufficient Saviour, which seems to us to be the way and the life, which does give warmth, humility, and holy rest to the soul that truly embraces it, and which,

we believe, includes all that God has revealed, and therefore all, probably, which he has made essential to salvation. We will, however, in justice to our author, admit, that a book coming out under such a title, professing such objects, and written too by one who holds an important office in our Theological School, ought not to be so defective, unchristian, and pernicious as he represents this to be; and if it should be discovered to be so bad, it will, no doubt, tend to bring into disrepute the whole system of the writer and his friends, and to injure the cause of religion in general.

Having thus prepared the way for his strictures, the reviewer sets out with the broad conclusion, that, "however the book may abound in excellent prudential maxims, it can never turn an inquirer into the way of life." The first general objection is, that it is "defective upon the great and fundamental subject of the natural character of man." "The disease of the soul is overlooked," and therefore "its directions will be found inefficacious to the cure and salvation of the soul." We will specify some of the objections under this head, because they afford an illustration of the manner in which our preaching and writing are usually objected to.

Mr. Ware, writing for new inquirers, those who have lived hitherto "without permanent religious impressions," speaks of them as having "wandered from duty, and been unfaithful to God. They have gone far from him, like the unwise prodigal, and wasted the portion he gave them in vicious or unprofitable pursuits. They have cultivated the animal life, they have lived according to the flesh." Of the inquirer he says:

"Deep religious impressions are always accompanied by a sense of personal unworthiness, and not unfrequently commence with it. It is man's acquaintance with himself, which leads him most earnestly to seek the acquaintance of God, and to perceive the need of his favor. The sense of sin, the feeling that his life has not been right, that his heart is not pure, that his thoughts, dispositions, appetites, passions, have not been duly regulated, that he has lived according to his own will and not that of God, that if taken from his worldly possessions, he has no other object of desire and affection to which his heart could cling, if called to judgment for the use of his powers and privileges he must be speechless and hopeless; all this rises solemnly to his mind, and sinks him low under a sense of ill

desert and shame. He cannot excuse himself to himself. Every effort to palliate his guilt, only shows him its aggravation."

The reviewer does not overlook this account of sin. He very fairly quotes a part of it, and notices the application which is made of it to every one on first awaking to a sense of his religious wants and interests. Still it is not enough. "The disease of the soul is overlooked," "The alienation of the soul from God is not recognised." The account is wholly "unsatisfactory." And why? Why must all this pass for nothing? Just because, "*how it happens* that every one comes into a condition which forms so sad a contrast to his early and innocent days, we are not informed!" —because the deep *philosophy* of sin is not unfolded in the luminous language of the Assembly's Confession. It is not enough that the sinner is warned of his sin; but he must be informed what causes, in addition to those of his own folly and guilt, first made him a sinner. Truly, our more philosophic brethren ought to feel some charity for us, if in our mental shallowness and imbecility, we rest content with proclaiming the existence, enormity, and infinite danger and evil of sin, and declare ourselves unable to penetrate the mysteries of a corrupt nature, and define its philosophical connexion with the sin of Adam. In compassion to the poor and ignorant to whom the gospel is to be preached, questions concerning the *why* and *how* of human nature ought not to be insisted on as vital. They are too "scholastic and subtile," and men generally get bewildered when they attempt to answer such questions with respect to any department of nature, spiritual or material. At least, a book written for the uneducated as well as others, ought not to be very harshly condemned on account of such an omission, or such a superficial treatment of a very obscure subject. But one would suppose from what follows, that all differences between the two writers on this point might easily be adjusted; for the reviewer congratulates himself on at last convicting his author of an unguarded assent to a doctrine, the omission of which was so heinous. After quoting a passage from Mr. Ware on the prevalence of sin, he says, "It is interesting to see how candid men will frequently admit the *fact*, while at the same time they deny the *doctrine* of universal depravity." This appears as if it might be in some degree

satisfactory. But the truth is, our author essentially changes his ground, without giving us any warning of it. He sets out with objecting to the work before him, that it did not recognise the *corrupt nature* of man; we next find him insisting combatively upon *total depravity;* and, lastly, he comes down to *universal depravity* (as if that were all he had been contending about), and charges his author with the obstinate inconsistency of admitting the fact and denying the doctrine. This interchangeable use of very different phrases betrays the reviewer into considerable obscurity and some unfairness. It is to such an indiscriminate use of words of very different meaning, that a great deal of the obscureness in which discussions on these subjects are involved, is to be attributed.

On the subject of Religious Anxiety, Mr. Ware writes thus:

"In the beginning of the Christian life this feeling assumes the form of anxiety, as it afterwards leads to watchfulness. This word may, perhaps, as well as any, describe the state of those for whom I am writing. They are anxious about themselves, about their characters, their condition, their prospects. They are anxious to know what they shall do to be saved, and to gain satifactory assurance that they shall be pardoned and accepted of God. This is a most reasonable solicitude. What can be more reasonable than such a solicitude for the greatest and most lasting good of man? What more becoming a rational creature, whose eternal welfare is dependent on his own choice between good and evil, than this desire to know and pursue the right? this earnest thoughtfulness respecting his condition? and this inquiry for the true end of his being? If a person, hitherto thoughtless, is in this state of mind, he is to be congratulated upon it. We are to be thankful to God in his behalf, that another immortal soul is awake to its responsibility, and seeking real happiness. We would urge him to cherish the feelings which possess him; not with melancholy despondency; not with superstitious gloom; not with unmanly and unmeaning debasement; but with thoughtful, self-distrusting concern, with deliberate study for the path of duty, and a resolute purpose not to swerve from it. Remember that much depends, I might say every thing depends, on the use you make of this your present disposition. Be faithful to it, obey its promptings, let it form in you the habit of devout reflection, and religious action, and all must be well. The issue will be the Christian character and the soul's salvation. But, refuse to

cherish this disposition, drive it from you, smother and silence it, and you will probably do yourself an everlasting injury. It is like putting out a fire which has just been lighted, and which may with difficulty be kindled again. It is trifling with the sensibility of conscience, it is bringing hardness upon your heart; and there is less prospect that you will afterward arrive at an habitual and controlling regard for your religious interests. This it is to 'quench the spirit.'"

Again:

"They [inquirers] must strongly feel that a state of indifference is a state of danger; that they are on the brink of ruin, so long as they are alienated from God, governed by passion, appetite, and inclination, rather than a sense of duty. And such is the power of habit, that they in vain hope to be delivered from its bondage, and to become consistent followers of Christ, unless a strong feeling shall lead them to make a resolute, energetic effort. If they allow themselves to fancy that it will be time enough by and by; that, after all, the case is not very desperate, but can be remedied at any time; and that it would be a pity yet to abandon their pleasant vices; — then there is no hope for them. They are cherishing the most dangerous of all states of mind; a state, which prevents all real desire for improvement, is continually weakening their power of change, and absolutely destroys the prospect of amendment. They must begin the remedy by a persuasion of its necessity. They must feel it so strongly, that they cannot rest content without immediately subjecting themselves to the dominion of religion, — as a starving man feels the necessity of immediately applying to the search of food." . . . . . "Cherish therefore the conviction of this necessity."

But all this is nothing to the purpose, it seems. "The manner," we are told by the reviewer, "in which the whole subject of religious anxiety is treated, is well adapted to allay the fears of the inquirer." "No one could receive conviction of sin from reading this book," (nor, accordingly, from the system on which it is based.) Our reviewer, it appears, was much puzzled to know how persons whose reading and preaching were like this book, could ever become anxious, or be described or addressed as in a state of anxiety, and he was not relieved from his wonderment, till he remembered, as he says, "that we had seen members of other congregations than our own in this state, in consequence of occasionally listening to Evangelical instructions, or the

faithful admonitions of Evangelical friends." So then, as desperate as our case is, there is some hope of us, seeing we are under the influence of such pious, humble, and faithful neighbours.

Our reviewer's criticisms upon his author's views of the nature, necessity, and means of regeneration, we are utterly unable to comprehend. Mr. Ware speaks in the following manner of the nature and necessity of the great Christian change.

He calls it "a surrender of the whole man, and the entire life, to the will of God, in faith, affection, and action; by a thorough imitation of Jesus in the devout and humble temper of his mind, in the spirituality of his affection, and in the purity and loveliness of his conduct. Any thing less than this, any partial, external, superficial conformity to a rule of decent living or ritual observance, must be wholly insufficient." . . . . "You are to feel that nothing is of such consequence to you as the Christian character; that to form this is the very work for which you were sent into the world; that if this be not done, you do nothing, — you had better never have been born; for your life is wasted without effecting its object, and your soul enters on eternity without having secured its salvation. The provisions of God's mercy are slighted, and for you the Saviour has lived and died in vain." . . . . . "They [awakened inquirers] feel that there is a great work to be done, a great change to be effected." . . . . . "This is a renovation of principle and purpose through which every one must pass. Every one must thus turn from his natural devotion to things earthly, to a devotion to things heavenly. This change it is the object of the gospel to effect; and we seek no less than this, when we seek the influence of the gospel on our souls." . . . . . "Let them first be persuaded of its absolute necessity. Until this is effected nothing can be done."

Mr. Adams perceives that his author is "compelled to acknowledge the necessity of a change," and compliments him upon his candor in admitting the fact of that depravity which renders the change necessary. But soon after, recollecting that he had known some persons who had thought they had loved God and been religious, but afterwards found they had been mistaken (a very probable and common case certainly), he says, "It is evident that the respected author of the book before us disbelieves in the necessity of such a change," namely, such a change as is "necessary to establish the

soul in holiness." "It is not strange," he says again, "that the book before us, having failed to give the reader a true and Scriptural account of his wretched and lost condition as a sinner, should omit to speak of this change as a necessary part of religious experience." We distrust our ability to clear away the obscurity that hangs over this part of the review, and shall not attempt it.

We find some difficulty, likewise, in perceiving the force of the objections made by the reviewer to his author's remarks and directions respecting the *means* of becoming and continuing religious. Mr. Ware employs the greater part of his volume in pointing out and recommending what he considers the necessary means of grace (or means of *improvement*, if the reviewer pleases, he having stigmatized that Unitarian word with italics); namely, reading, especially the Bible, meditation, prayer, hearing the word, and the Lord's Supper. We had supposed that these were the appointed and adequate means of grace, and that being faithfully used, they might be expected to be followed by the promised blessing of God, and so be efficacious for the renewal and sanctification of the soul. And we flattered ourselves that we were sustained in this supposition by Mr. Adams himself; for we found him speaking with satisfaction of a young friend, in whom "prayer and the serious perusal of the Scriptures, accompanied with an earnest desire to know the truth" (a course not unlike that prescribed by Mr. Ware), "soon produced a most pungent conviction of sin"; and a little farther on we are given to understand that such conviction secures a person against all misleading influences, being told that, "if conviction of sin has taken deep hold of an inquirer, there is no danger to be apprehended from his perusing these directions." We felt encouraged by these admissions, for we are here presented by the reviewer with a satisfactory illustration of the efficacy of the means recommended by Mr. Ware. But we were encouraged only to be disappointed; for "Oh!" exclaims Mr. Adams in another place, after enumerating his author's directions as to reading, prayer, &c., "Oh, how insufficient they are to the wants of an awakened sinner!" "The book can never turn an inquirer into the way of life." The same course that proved quite sufficient to put his young friend securely in the way of salvation, he finds to be wholly inadequate to the same purpose

when recommended in the book before him. How unfortunate that that book was not published anonymously, that it might not have been made worthless and pernicious by being based upon our fatal system!

Mr. Ware makes much depend upon the sinner's own exertions after a renewed and holy life. He says, that, though "man's utmost virtue does nothing towards purchasing or meriting salvation," and though "the ability to attain the happiness of an eternal state is a provision of pure grace," yet that "a man's own labors are essential to his salvation," that "the work given him to do is proportioned to his powers, and his trials to his strength," that "while the spirit helpeth his infirmities, nothing but his own fault can bar him out of heaven, or cause him to fail of eternal life." He urges his reader to humble but vigorous efforts, to hard conflict, to watchfulness, and the diligent and constant use of all the religious means within his reach. Any man writing a religious book upon this system, would have said the same. The doctrine of personal exertion and responsibility is *fundamental* with us. We should not expect, however, that any thing that Mr. Ware, or any of his theological friends, should say on this subject, would meet the approbation of this reviewer, or any Calvinistic writer. The spirit of Calvanism must, in consistency, frown upon and rebuke such Pelagian teaching as this. And we do not complain of it; it is perfectly fair. We were accordingly prepared to hear such personal efforts styled a "bruised reed," mere "moral culture," "a wearisome, fruitless, unsatisfying, painful strife," "the climbing of a sandy way to the feet of the aged." We were not surprised at all this; but we confess we were not a little surprised and staggered, when we found our reviewer saying, almost in the same breath, that "the soul is *active*, and not passive, when regeneration takes place," and that "the change is a voluntary exercise of the faculties, in turning from sin to holiness." Such being his views upon the subject, it occurred to us, that however it might have injured his reputation for Orthodoxy, it would not have lessened his credit for consistency, and critical forbearance, to have omitted the epithets of the "bruised reed," "the sandy way," &c., quoted above.

We pass to another of this reviewer's objections to the work before him, and the system with which he identifies it.

"In order," says the reviewer, "to a faithful discharge of the duty which we have undertaken in reviewing the book before us, we are obliged to refer to another circumstance which makes it, in our opinion, of an injurious tendency. The author by interweaving Orthodox terms into his composition, gives it a savour of Evangelical piety. Having attended upon Unitarian preaching for a period of four years, we have several times listened to sermons, in which terms and phrases such as we all know to be peculiar to another denomination of Christians were so frequent, that there was often an interchange of significant looks amongst a portion of the hearers during the service; and the inquiry was made more than once, in a very serious manner, whether the preacher was changing his sentiments. From all we have heard, we have no doubt that such a manner of writing does injury as well as good; the first, by deceiving (we do not say *intentionally*) those who cannot discriminate, and infusing error into their minds with a seasoning of truth; and the second, by unconsciously awakening so much solemnity and fear in the minds of hearers, that a greater number of them have been compelled to leave their place of worship, and seek relief to their disturbed consciences from Evangelical ministers, than has been the case under the more liberal and tasteful exhibitions of the gospel."

We do not wonder at all, that persons who had never heard Unitarian preaching in their lives, had avoided it or been kept from it as worse than open atheism, and had derived all their notions about it from Orthodox pulpits and Orthodox publications,—we do not wonder that a number of such persons, finding themselves for the first time listening to Unitarian preachers, as in the University Chapel at Cambridge for instance, should be filled with astonishment, and interchange significant looks, when they found these supposed infidels actually preaching from a text of the Bible, using some good words, and really manifesting some decent show of seriousness and piety. Well might they, in their youthful simplicity, suppose that Unitarianism was at an end, and that its ministers were changing their sentiments and becoming Christians. We presume there are hundreds in this community, who, if they dared so far to hazard the salvation of their souls as to go for once into a Unitarian church, would be as much surprised and puzzled, as were our author and his friends, to hear gospel expressions and Christian prayers, seriously uttered by such bad men, "men

whose system" they are told *ex cathedrâ*, "is nothing less than a total denial and subversion of the Christian religion, who blaspheme the ever-blessed Redeemer, and who so far as they gain an influence, it is like that of the fabled syrens of old, who allure but to destroy."

With regard to the paragraph just quoted, we must pronounce it extremely arrogant and illiberal. It is unfair, then, and injurious, for us to use any holy words, because they all belong to "another denomination"! We have no right to give our composition any savour of piety, because that, forsooth, is the hoisting of Orthodox colors! We have no right to say any thing that shall imply that we profess to be Christians, because that is "deceiving those who cannot discriminate"! We have no right to say any thing that is true, because that is to "infuse error into the mind with a seasoning of truth"! Truly this is cutting us down at a single blow. This is stripping off our sheep's clothing, and exposing our wolfish persons, in a very unceremonious and disagreeable manner. It is having our mouths stopped rather too abruptly, that while we profess the Christian faith, we should be denied the use of any Christian word, either for a prayer, a sermon, or a book. Seriously, we must assure this reviewer that we cannot renounce all Christian phraseology. We think we have a property in it in common with other Christians. If we use any expressions *peculiar* to the Athanasian creed, the Five Points of Calvin, or the Westminster Confession, so as to imply that we believe in the peculiarities of those Formularies, we are wrong, and ought to forbear; but beyond this we cannot give up any thing. As Christians, resting our faith and our hopes upon the Bible, we know of no words in that volume, or in the common phraseology of religion, to which we are not entitled. We claim them as our right. And more than this, we must insist upon our claim for our conscience' sake. As preachers, we have high and solemn duties to discharge. We must proclaim the everlasting gospel, we must declare the whole counsel of God, we must employ our humble instrumentality to the utmost, in awakening the indifferent, reclaiming the wandering, in saving sinners from ruin, and fitting them for the blessedness of heaven; and while these bonds are upon us, we may not omit any thing that is adapted to con-

vey the truth of God to the souls of our charge, or promote penitence, piety, and a holy life.

"We come now," says our author, "to state our great objection to this book, and to the system of religion upon which it is based, viz. that *it contains no Saviour.* We feel it to be *without Christ.* We were astonished to find how few allusions there were in this book to the Saviour."

"Our system contains no Saviour." Here we have at least the satisfaction of finding a tangible and serious objection, a substantial charge. It admits of, and deserves, a serious and complete discussion. We would gladly devote many pages to it, but we cannot undertake to do justice to the subject without occupying too much space. This article is obviously of too miscellaneous a character to admit of an elaborate discussion on so vital a point. We must aver, however, that our system does contain a Saviour, inasmuch as the New Testament contains one. We believe in the New Testament. We build upon it; and we receive Jesus as a Saviour, because that volume presents him as such, and because we feel our need of a Saviour. All Christians, we believe, agree with us as to the nature of the salvation of which Christ is the author, namely, that it is salvation from sin and its dreadful consequences. There is a difference of opinion, however, as to the manner in which that salvation is effected. We believe it is effected by the renewing and sanctifying influence which Christ exerts upon the soul, by means of his instructions, example, sufferings and death, and by his spirit, the spirit of truth, the spirit of God. We think we *preach* Christ the Saviour, when we endeavour to unfold these means, to impress them upon men's minds and hearts, and to give them their saving influence upon the soul. We think we preach Christ the Saviour, when we preach as He preached, and as his Apostles preached. Christ, the inspired teacher, the perfect exemplar, the disinterested sufferer and martyr, is, with us, Christ the Saviour. When he is understood, believed in, loved, obeyed, and his holy spirit imbibed, we think the sinner's salvation is effected, and the atonement or reconciliation accomplished. Others believe, that the same salvation is procured by an influence exerted upon the *divine counsels* through the vicarious sufferings of Christ; and their strain of preaching must accordingly

be somewhat different. They wish to change the sinner's heart by affecting him powerfully with a sense of what Christ has done by his sufferings to procure for them the forgiving mercy of God. They of course dwell more exclusively upon some prominent points in his personal history, and upon his official titles. They speak more of those mysterious relations which connect him with God in the grand scheme of Redemption, than those which connect him with man, as the teacher, sanctifier, and guide to heaven. Such is the difference between us. We both believe in the Saviour and the salvation. We differ in our respective views of the *manner* in which the salvation is effected, and there is a corresponding difference in our style of preaching and writing. But we cannot perceive how this speculative disagreement authorizes either class to denounce the system of the other as containing no Saviour, as "a cold abstraction," "Aristotelian philosophy," "disguised infidelity," or to put it on the same footing with the "Theory of moral Sentiments, Alison on Taste, and Burke on the Sublime and Beautiful." We dare not deal out such sarcasms and anathemas against those who, however we may think them fallible, and mistaken in some of their speculative views, do yet profess to believe in, and love, the Lord Jesus, and according to the light and the ability that is in them, preach of righteousness, temperance, and a judgment to come. We dare not take the responsibility of thus judging our brethren and neighbours; and it seems to us like an unwarrantable arrogance, and a lamentable misapprehension of the charitable spirit of the gospel, in those who do.

We have next to notice our reviewer's remarks upon Mr. Ware's treatment of the subject of Prayer. Mr. Ware, amongst many other directions on this subject, gives the following:

"First of all, when the hour has arrived, seek to excite in your mind a sense of the divine presence, and of the greatness of the act in which you are engaging. Summon up the whole energy of your mind. Put all your powers upon the stretch. Do not allow yourself to utter a word, to use an expression thoughtlessly, nor without setting before yourself in a distinct form, its full meaning. Remember the words of Ecclesiasticus: 'When you glorify the Lord, exalt him as much as you can; for even yet will he far exceed: and when you exalt him, put

forth all your strength, and be not weary; for you can never go far enough.' Pour your whole soul, the utmost intensity of your feelings, into your words. One sentence uttered thus is better than the cold repetition of an entire liturgy. For this reason, let your prayer be preceded by meditation. In this way make an earnest effort after a devout temper. While you thus muse, the fire of your devotion will kindle, and then you may speak with your tongue; then you may breathe out the adoring sentiments of praise and thanksgiving, the holy aspirations after excellence and grace, the humble confessions of your contrite spirit, the glowing emotions of Christian faith. As you proceed you will probably find yourself increasing in warmth and energy; especially if you give way to the impulse of your feelings, and do not check them by watching them too closely. To do this chills the current of devotion, and changes your prayer from the simple expression of desire and affection, into an exercise of mental philosophy. Wherefore, having warmed your mind, give it free way, and let its religious ardor flow on. But if, as will often be the case, you find your thoughts wander and your feelings cool, then pause, and by silent thought bring back the mind to its duty; and thus intermix meditation with prayer, in such manner that you shall never fall into the mechanical, unmeaning repetition of mere words."

Our reviewer, it appears, is much scandalized by these directions, and thus remarks upon them:

"The next thing which we observe in this book, is the very peculiar manner in which the subject of prayer is treated. There are directions given such as we had never seen before. The very nature of prayer requires that it should be spontaneous. But the sentences which follow made us feel that the religion which this book teaches does not inspire the soul with such emotions as David expresses when he says, 'As the heart *panteth* for the water-brooks, so pants my soul after thee, O God.'"

Our author here quotes a sentence or two for illustration, from the paragraph just cited, and then proceeds:

"We need nothing more to convince us of the insufficiency of this system, as it regards the life of piety in the soul. These rules will be in vain so long as the soul is destitute of the love of God; and where the love of God exists, they will be useless. We conceive it to be easy for a minister of this religion, and for a few of the more serious amongst its followers, who spend their lives in sober contemplation, to practise secret prayer;

but the very fact that such prescriptions as those above quoted are given, shows, we should fear, that as a general thing, those who embrace this religion, find prayer a toilsome exercise."

"We should never give such rules to young Christians in our congregations."

We were not prepared, we confess, to see the directions quoted above brought forward from any quarter as proof of the falsehood and insufficiency of our system. We did not suppose they were either new, or peculiar, or so totally useless and inapplicable to Christians. We thought we had seen very similar directions in the Treatise of the pious Dr. Watts on this subject. We knew that Jeremy Taylor was regarded by all denominations, as one of the most spiritually minded and fervently devout men that ever adorned the Christian profession; and we had read in his "Holy Living" (a work which we presumed was familiar to most Christian ministers) the following directions: "In all prayers we must be careful to attend to our present work, having a present mind, not wandering upon impertinent things, not distant from our words, much less contrary to them: and if our thoughts do at any time wander, and divert upon other objects, bring them back again by prudent and severe arts; by all means striving to obtain a diligent, a sober, an untroubled, and a composed spirit." We had supposed that the best Christians, surrounded as they are by the chilling and unspiritual influences of a misleading world, sometimes felt the necessity of strenuous inward efforts, in order to bring their minds into a devotional and proper frame, before they took upon their lips the dread name of the Most High. We knew that Orthodox ministers, as well as others, often found occasion to lament and reprove the spiritual coldness and indifference even of professors, and to urge and arouse them to more habitual and importunate prayer. Some of our nearest and dearest friends are of that persuasion, and they are persons from whose truly humble and warm piety we rejoice in our opportunities of deriving some aid and incitement to our own. Yet they lament their frequent coldness and want of a devotional temper, the trials and severe exercises they have often to undergo, in bringing their wayward thoughts and affections into a fit and holy communion with God. We had thus been brought to the painful conclusion, that there was too much foundation for the humiliating question of Han-

nah More in her excellent little work on "Practical Piety." "Where is the favored being whose attention never wanders, whose heart accompanies his lips in every sentence? Is there no absence of mind in the petitioner, no wandering of the thoughts, no inconstancy of the heart, which these repetitions [in the Church Liturgy] are wisely calculated to correct, to rouse the dead attention, to bring back the strayed affections?" We were accordingly not a little surprised to learn, from one whose office gives him good opportunities for observation, that these infirmities did not exist in Evangelical congregations, that the directions designed to help such infirmities were therefore useless, and were enough to convince him of the insufficiency of the system under the influence of which they were written. We certainly rejoice, if so desirable and glorious an era is dawning upon the church. We wait anxiously for confirmation; and we shall feel more confidence in its reality, if we shall receive such confirmation from our author, in some work in which he is in no danger of being carried away by overmuch zeal against what he deems heresy. But we suspect, that, if our author should acquaint himself more familiarly with standard devotional works, he would find that the same reason which convinces him of the insufficiency of our system, would compel him to pronounce the same sentence upon every system that was ever drawn, or that professed to be drawn, from the gospel of Christ. At any rate, we and our friends must confess, though for this confession our author should say that we know not Christ, that our spiritual condition is yet imperfect, that we have still a struggle to maintain with the world and with passion, that we are still mournfully liable to religious coldness and indifference, and that we feel the need of every aid and incitement within our reach, that we may be moved to give due diligence to make our calling and election sure. We will confess, too, that we consider it a suitable and needful direction, that "when the hour of prayer has arrived, we seek to excite in our minds a sense of the Divine presence, and the greatness of the act in which we are engaging, to summon up the whole energy of our mind, put all our powers upon the stretch, and make an effort after a devout temper;" for we would not turn from our worldly duties and distractions to the throne of grace, without an effort to purify and elevate our affections; we would not rush into

the presence of the Holy One with unprepared or listless minds.

We must pass over several minor points in the review before us, and conclude our notice of it with a few remarks upon a single topic. Our author, in various parts of his volume, sometimes asserts, and frequently insinuates, that our faith cannot, and does not, excite any truly religious feelings, or produce any Christian influence, in the hearts of its disciples.

"We defy an angel from heaven," he says, "so to preach this system to a poor man scripturally convinced of his sins, as to dry one tear, light up one ray of hope on his face, or put the new song in his mouth. It is a cold abstraction." . . . . . "If any one says it has made him happy, we will engage to produce the same sensations, which he calls happiness, by reading to him from 'The Theory of Moral Sentiments,' or from 'The Excursion,' or by showing him the sunset, or procuring the performance of his favorite music."

The following passage is modest enough, certainly. It is a rather singular passage however. It is taken from the chapters on the Trinity.

"There is a grandeur in the conceptions to which it [the Trinity] gives birth, unequalled in the contemplations of any other system. We have these *in addition* to the feelings which arise in thinking of the Unity of God; for this still remains to us in all its appropriate grandeur, whilst the thought of *society* and *intercommunion* in the godhead is inexpressibly delightful. When some of our friends, who occasionally attend our worship, turn away their faces, or keep their seats during the Majestic Ascription [to the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost], we cannot but wish we could impart to them feelings, which perhaps they would call mysticism, but which are as much superior to their own feelings (we know *them* by experience) as the emotions occasioned by the sight of a Gothic cathedral are to those from looking upon a beautiful but solitary shaft."

We wonder what reply our author would make to a pious Catholic (if he were to meet with one inclined to make a boast of the superiority of his devotional feelings), who should assure him that Protestants knew comparatively nothing of the fervor and grandeur of religious worship, because they could not enter into the feelings with which, in Catholic churches, the service of the Mass is offered, with pealing organ, chanting choir, and prostrate congregation,

confessedly the sublimest part of their worship. And what would he say when told that Catholics had these feelings *in addition* to those which arise in thinking of the Trinity, that their feelings were therefore as much superior to those of Calvinists (he knows *them by experience*, having once been so unfortunately situated as to have occasion to attend Protestant worship and listen to the "cold abstractions" of Calvinism) as the emotions occasioned by the sight of a Gothic cathedral were to those from a solitary shaft." What reply could be made? We think our author would be dumb to such an appeal; so are we to our author's. It is perfectly unanswerable. We cannot meet argument with argument here. We cannot rest our defence upon experience; for though it has been our lot to attend upon Trinitarian ministrations several years of our life, we do not pretend to have experienced the devotional feelings *peculiar* to Trinitarian worship, seeing that we did not believe the doctrine, and the preaching was not particularly to our taste; neither have we the inclination or the ability to make a comparison between the devotional feelings of different individuals or congregations, — our author it seems has, and we must abide by his decision. Not that we are quite satisfied with it, but because we cannot meet him on his own ground. We will, however, just enter our protest against such a summary method of putting down our system by declaring, that under its influence we have no properly religious emotions or affections, — a method familiar with this writer, and standing out so conspicuously in this volume, that it may be fairly called the leading characteristic of its argument, style, and spirit. We have said we cannot argue this point; but this having the secret and sacred recesses of our bosoms entered and surveyed by a fallible fellow-sinner; this passing of public judgment upon the coldness and hollowness which he professes to find there; this subtle arguing and insinuating that though we assume the posture of worship, and pray, and sing praises, we have no genuine and humble devotional feeling; that though we profess a faith in Christ, we feel nothing but a "philosophical admiration for him"; that though we use solemn and holy words, they are merely "inserted to make the style pathetic and impressive"; that though we preach moral righteousness, our love of virtue might be "more properly called pride of character"; that

though we inculcate humble piety, it is only that "sentimentality which is a popular substitute for true religion"; that though we commemorate the Saviour in the way which he has appointed, "it must of necessity be a disproportionate and overacted representation,"—all this would severely try our patience, were it not for the manifest absurdity and impotency of such a style of attack upon our belief.

Nor does it seem to us to vindicate the delicacy of this scrutinizing of our hearts, or furnish any force or justification to this species of assault, that our author professes to know our religious feelings "*by experience.*" The argument from experience is often a very strong one, and very difficult to meet; but the force of the argument depends so much upon the circumstances and nature of the experience, that it should be well weighed before it is yielded to as conclusive. Our author says, "We know *them* [the devotional feelings of Unitarians] by experience." "We tried the course prescribed in this book through weary years"; and again, "We have ourselves proved its [this system's] inability to bless the soul." This is plausible, but let us see to what it amounts. It is painful in such a discussion as this, to refer to the personal history of living individuals; but, as in this case we draw the facts and inferences from the individual's own book, the book before us, it is less disagreeable. Our author tells us that the "holy sign of consecration to the TRINITY" was sprinkled upon him by Dr. Samuel Worcester, Pastor of the Tabernacle Church, Salem. He also tells us, with deep filial emotions bursting upon him at the recollection of that lamented divine, that he traces to his instructions some of his most delightful views of God and religion. We may suppose that he remained in the fold of the Tabernacle Church during his childhood and early youth. He afterwards "attended upon Unitarian preaching for a period of four years," which, we may presume, were those of his collegiate course. To this period, then, we must look for his Unitarian experience. In order to admit the force of his argument from experience, that Unitarianism has not power to bless the soul with piety, devotion, joy, and peace, we must of course suppose that he was, for the time, a decided, settled, satisfied Unitarian. He cannot be said to have experienced the influence of any system upon the heart, unless he has fully and firmly believed in its doctrines and

principles, and so given them an opportunity to affect the heart. And did our author thus believe in the doctrines of Unitarianism? Oh no, by no means. It is not asserted, it is not pretended. He heard Unitarianism preached, he says, four years; but we should judge from this book, what we well knew before to be the case, that he was all the time chilled, dissatisfied, and disgusted. He calls them "*weary years.*" The only memorial which he appears to have brought away from that place of worship, is the "interchange of significant looks amongst a portion of the hearers," whenever the preacher used Evangelical terms. For four years he heard the prayers of Unitarians. But then it was "like feeding on dew" to him; they were offered agreeably to directions which "it chills the soul to think of." At the usual intervals he saw the communion-table spread for a Unitarian church, but he says elsewhere, speaking of the communion, that with Unitarian views of Christ, "the awful consciousness of a mysterious meaning in it [the blood of Christ] which he did not believe, but which ever and anon would wake up in the soul, would fill him with agony," and that "the communion season would always be anticipated with feelings of no pleasant nature till he had seared himself against the love of Christ." "He tried the course prescribed in this book." The book however was not written till some years after, and moreover, when it did appear, contained some things which seemed to our author "very peculiar," some directions "such as he had never before seen," and some things which he "wonders could have been written." But he tried the course here prescribed, — and with what results? "Except when conscience had become stupefied by worldliness, and the reasonable fears of a destitution of meetness for heaven were lulled to sleep, he found no rest." We would remind our author that Mr. Ware's directions were not written for persons stupefied by worldliness, with their reasonable fears of a destitution of meetness for heaven lulled to sleep; but for those who are awakened, inquiring, and earnest, and anxious for the salvation of their souls. He had not reached the state in which this book is expected to be useful to any one.

Such is the account of our author's Unitarianism. It consists of four weary years, occupied, so far as respects their religious history, with hearing fraudulent and predatory

preaching, followed by significant glances among a portion of the hearers, with chilling prayers, with a communion service, which he cannot conceive can be approached by a Unitarian except with unpleasant feelings or a heart seared against the love of Christ, with total indifference or a heart full of agony; and occupied, lastly, with an inconstant and unsuccessful struggle against the stupefaction of worldliness, and a reckless disregard respecting meetness for heaven. Such was this writer's Unitarianism, and such the grounds on which he claims to have experienced the inward influence of a system which he never embraced, and which it seems to have been one of the greatest trials of his life to have heard preached so long. This it is that enables him to say, "We have ourselves proved the inability of this system to bless the soul," and to judge by *experience* between one man's religious feelings and another's. We need not say how much force we attribute to an argument against our belief, founded on such experience as this.

We should not have dwelt so long upon the foregoing topic, if this species of attack had been original with our author, or peculiar to the book under review. We should not have been apprehensive that the reading public would have ascribed undue weight to it. But this judging from pretended experience is the common and favorite mode of argument, frequently resorted to, and much relied on. No sooner does a man of education or notoriety, awaken from indifference, or become dissatisfied with a life of irreligion, or throw off the mask of hypocrisy, and enter upon a Christian course of life, than, if in this change he chance to embrace an Orthodox creed, he publishes to the world that he is converted from the death-like chills and horrors, the sentimental fancies, the soothing appliances, and the scholastic subtilties of Unitarianism. As his present piety and zeal are identified with Orthodoxy, so his former indifference and sinfulness are identified with "the opposite system." The difference between his former and present character is asserted to be just the difference between the two systems. Deism, atheism, abandonment to sin, a total disregard to all religion, any thing, in short, that is not acknowledged as Orthodoxy, is all, with great convenience and satisfaction, declared to have been Unitarianism, the true spirit, the genuine fruits, the legitimate profession of Unitarianism.

And such a convert is entitled to judge conclusively, from the infallible test of personal experience, between the merits of the two systems. He *knows* Unitarianism, he knows from weary and bitter but sure experience, that its disciples have no piety, or devotion, or Christian virtue, and that their system furnishes nothing to bless the soul. It is as if a thorough atheist should enter a Christian temple, and hear and see the congregation worshipping a God in whom he did not believe, and then should go away and declare that Christians had no devotional feeling, for he had been amongst them and knew all about pretended Christian emotions from *experience*. We are heartily sick of this solemn jugglery. We hope, for the honor of human logic, modesty, discernment, and fairness, and of the cause of religion in general, that this kind of argument has finished its run, and spent its force, and will be given up. We should have more respect for a cause whose advocates would be content to take the fair and manly ground of Scriptural interpretation and substantial discussion, and leave off this searching of hearts, confounding of distinctions, and miscalling of names.

We are sorry that this book should have been published. We regret it upon principle. We think it is calculated to injure the cause of religion in general. We think our author's zeal for truth and holiness has been misdirected and worse than lost. His review is a severe and unprovoked attack upon an exclusively *practical book*, — a book in which no disputed doctrines are discussed, no vexed questions started, no sect aggrieved; but which is intended merely as a guide and help to those inquirers who could find no better one to direct and assist them. Now we are not so hostile as some of our friends are to all religious controversy. All other subjects, which afford matter for difference, are discussed. It is the way to elicit truth, and we see not why religious differences of doctrine should not be discussed also. It cannot be otherwise, and we do not wish it to be otherwise. We believe that when the storm of debate has subsided, controversy will be found to dissipate error, bring out the truth, and draw men nearer together in the Christian faith. We are willing, therefore, to have our doctrines fairly and fully canvassed, and tried ever so closely by Scripture and reason. Neither have we so great a horror as some, of sectarian divisions in the church. Such is the constitution of

the human mind, and the character of the Christian revelation, that we should expect and quietly submit to them, rather than aggravate a division into a quarrel, by deprecating it and vainly attempting to heal it. It is perfectly proper and expedient, certainly in cities and large villages, that persons holding particular doctrines should associate and worship together. They ought of course to choose a minister who agrees with them, and it is folly rather than charity to force upon them, by way of exchanges, preachers who are disagreeable and cannot edify them. There need not on this account be any rupture of Christian harmony and brotherly love. Paul was evidently the fittest Apostle for the Gentile ministry, and Peter for that of the Jews, and they divided their work accordingly. For conscience' sake, for the love of peace, and the better edification of Christians, let it be so now. All this is well. Controversy and peaceable division we do not object to. Let sects exist as they must. The evil is not in that; but in their so treating each other as to make the word *sect* significant of malice, envy, hatred, and all uncharitableness. Let sects exist, and let discussion go on. But this denying and disparaging of the personal religion of individuals or classes, this laboring to beget in the minds of a sect a distrust and disaffection towards those preachers and writers in whom they are accustomed to feel confidence, and to whom they look for religious aid and edification, this harsh and exterminating warfare against unpretending and inoffensive books, designed for the religious improvement and direction of persons who have embraced the system of faith on which the books are known to be based, — this miserable and petty skirmishing we utterly deprecate. The review we have been examining is a specimen of what we mean and object to. We cannot see any good end it can accomplish, either for Christianity in general, or the interests of Orthodoxy in particular. Its author undoubtedly saw, that, according to his doctrinal views, there were great deficiencies in Mr. Ware's book. He could not in consistency be quite satisfied with it; it was not to be expected. But then if it exhibits the practical excellency of our system, as he says, better than any other book, why should he labor so earnestly to destroy it? Why should he be so extremely unwilling that our system should exert upon its adherents whatever religious or moral influence it is

capable of exerting? He knows that a large portion of this community are satisfied, and are likely to be satisfied, with the Liberal system; why then should he be so anxious to deprive them of a book, which he acknowledges must be, with their views, one of the most profitable volumes they can read? Does he prefer that men should renounce all religious faith, rather than be Unitarians, and deny or disregard all moral duties and graces, rather than practise them under the guidance and incitement of a Unitarian book? We are unwilling to believe this, and are accordingly at a loss for the motives with which the review was printed and reprinted. When our author saw that Mr. Ware's volume was not such as would meet the wants of Orthodox Christians, he should have remembered that it was not designed for them, and that the writer's name on the title-page would be a sufficient guaranty against its undue circulation and influence among them; and we are confident that he would have spent his time more profitably by leaving that work to its quiet and limited sphere, and employing his ready pen in preparing a practical work, the demand for which he perceives to be great, a work that would meet the religious necessities of those to whom Mr. Ware's could not be useful.

We intended to have noticed the chapters on the Communion, but the ample discussion of that subject in our last number but one, renders it unnecessary.

Art. VII. — 1. *Biographia Literaria; or Biographical Sketches of my Literary Life and Opinions.* By S. T. Coleridge, Esq. New York. 1817.

2. *The Poetical Works of S. T. Coleridge, including the Tragedies, Remorse, Zapolya, and Wallenstein.* 3 vols. 12mo. London. 1829.

3. *Aids to Reflection in the Formation of a Manly Character, on the several Grounds of Prudence, Morality, and Religion. Illustrated by Select Passages from our Elder Divines, especially from Archbishop Leighton.* By S. T. Coleridge. *First American, from the First London Edition; with an Appendix, and Illustrations*

from other Works of the same Author; together with a Preliminary Essay, and Additional Notes. By JAMES MARSH, President of the University of Vermont. Burlington. 1829. 8vo. pp. 469.

4. *The Friend: A series of Essays, to aid in the Formation of fixed Principles in Politics, Morals, and Religion, with Literary Amusements interspersed.* By S. T. COLERIDGE, Esq. First American, from the Second London Edition. Complete in one volume. Burlington. Chauncey Goodrich. 1831. 8vo. pp. 510.

THERE is no writer of our times whose literary rank appears so ill-defined as that of Mr. Coleridge. Perhaps there is no one whose true standing in the literary world it is so difficult to determine. For ourselves we know not a more doubtful problem in criticism than this author and his works present. If it were lawful to judge men by what they are, rather than by what they have done, by the evidence they give of what they might accomplish, rather than by the value of that which they have accomplished, few would stand higher than Mr. Coleridge. His talents and acquirements, the original powers, and the exceeding rich cultivation of his mind, place him among the foremost of this generation. But this method of estimating a man's merit will hardly be thought righteous judgment in an age which is peculiarly prone to try every man by his works. Tried by his works, Mr. Coleridge, we fear, must ultimately fall, not only below the rank which nature and education had fitted him to maintain, but even below that which he now actually holds in the estimation of literary men.

As a prose-writer he has never been popular, though skilled beyond most men in the use of language, and writing on subjects of the deepest interest. As a poet, though gifted in no common degree with the essentials of the poetic character, he has not been successful. As a philosopher, though at once both subtile and profound, and deeply versed in all the mysteries of the inner man, he has gained little else than smiles of compassion and ominous shaking of heads by his metaphysical speculations. For a reconciliation of these several antitheses we must have recourse to the history of the man. In the "Biographia Literaria," by far the most entertaining, and in our opinion the most instructive of

his works, we have that history in part; the influences which operated most powerfully on our author's youth, and the elements both of thought and feeling which entered most largely into the formation of his literary character, are there set before us with great clearness and precision; and from the data which this book furnishes we are enabled to account for much that would otherwise be unintelligible in the doings and not-doings of this remarkable man. Nature, it would seem, had endowed Mr. Coleridge with a singularly fertile and creative mind, — a mind which, if left to itself with no other training than opportunity might supply, would have enriched the world with manifold and pleasing productions. The marks of this creative tendency are still visible in some of his poetical productions; we would mention in particular the "Ancient Mariner," and the tragedies.

But at an early period of his education, our author's mind acquired a bias which proved injurious to its productive faculty, and which, by changing the tendency of his intellect from the creative to the reflective, in process of time seduced him from the open highway of literary fame, into more devious and darksome paths. We refer to the discipline which he received at the grammar school at Christ's-Hospital, as described in his life.* Such a discipline, though admirably adapted to invigorate the understanding, and to strengthen the judgment, was ill-suited to unfold a poet's talent, or to nourish creative genius of any kind. It was precisely the training to make a critic; and although we are unwilling to ascribe any irresistible influence to education alone, we cannot help believing that the strong tendency to criticism which has ever marked Mr Coleridge's literary pursuits, is in part the effect of early discipline. We do not mean that Mr. Coleridge has at any period of his life been a writer of critiques, as that business is generally understood, but that he has ever inclined to comment upon the sayings and doings of others, rather than to say and do himself. This propensity, however, has not been exercised on literary subjects alone; it has found a wider scope and a freer field in deep and comprehensive speculations on topics of national and universal interest, particularly those which agitated Europe at the commencement of the present century. It has been

* See Biographia Literaria, Chapter 1.

employed on knotty questions in politics, philosophy, and religion, it has canvassed the rights and duties of civil government, criticized the movements of nations, and passed judgment on the tendencies and characteristics of the age. The results of these speculations were first given to the world in "The Morning Post," and afterwards in "The Friend," a collection of original essays, which for depth of thought, clearness of judgment, sound reasoning, and forcible expression, have few rivals in the English language. For the American edition of this work, as also for the republication of the "Aids to Reflection," and "The Statesman's Manual," we take this opportunity of expressing our obligations to President Marsh. Next to the writer of a good book, he most deserves our gratitude, who in any way helps to increase its circulation. This praise is due, in an eminent degree, to Mr. Marsh; nor does this comprise the whole of his claims to our regard and good wishes; in the valuable dissertation which accompanies the "Aids to Reflection," he has done much to illustrate Mr. Coleridge's philosophical opinions, and has evinced a philosophical talent of his own, which we cannot but hope will some day be employed in more extensive undertakings.

To return to our author. After finding him engaged in the desultory and patch-work business of journal composition and essay writing, we are no longer surprised that he should have produced nothing of a more lofty and epic character. Whether the habit of small writing (under which name we include essays, reviews, and critiques of all kinds) be cause or effect, we shall not undertake to say; but certain we are, that this habit is always connected with an indisposition for more dignified and sustained efforts. From a skilful essayist we might expect excellence in small matters, — a spirited ode or a pointed epigram, — but never should we expect from such a one a well sustained epic poem, or perfect drama, a complete history, or system of philosophy. That species of talent which leads to fragmentary composition, will generally be found to be the offspring of a mind which loves rather to dwell on particulars than to contemplate universals, and is more accustomed to consider things in their special relations and minutest bearings, than to expatiate in large and comprehensive views. In such minds the centrifugal force is out of all proportion to the

centripetal; they are ever losing themselves in endless diffusion, without the ability to recover themselves in systematic results, or to concentrate their powers into regular and definite forms. Such a habit of mind is decidedly anti-creative, and therefore fatal to success in the higher departments of literary production. In proportion as the mind accustoms itself to dwell on particulars, it loses sight of unity and totality, and becomes incapable of contemplating or producing a whole. And herein, we conceive, lies the secret of Mr. Coleridge's failures. Here we have the answer to the oft repeated question, why a mind of such copious resources, so filled and overflowing with various and rich material, should have produced so little, and that little so loose and desultory.

Something more than abundance of material is wanted to constitute a perfect literary production. In every intellectual, as well as in every material creation, there are two essential elements, substance and form. Of substance Mr. Coleridge has enough, but in respect to form he is strikingly deficient, and being deficient in this, he wants that which constitutes the perfection of genius.

The characteristics of genius have been variously defined. To us it has always seemed, that, as there are two degrees of this mental quality, so there are also two characteristics, the one common to both degrees, the other peculiar to, and, indeed, constituting the highest. The first characteristic is originality. By this we mean not merely a disposition to think and act differently from the rest of mankind, but the power of imparting novelty, and a sense of freshness to common thoughts and familiar objects. In poetry this faculty constitutes what is called the poetical feeling; it is that which distinguishes genuine poetry, whether metrical or unmetrical, from mere eloquence. In this quality Mr. Coleridge is by no means deficient. The following quotation may serve to illustrate our meaning; it is from the story of an orphan girl, contained in "The Friend."

"Maria followed Harlin, for that was the name of her guardian angel, to her home hard by. The moment she entered the door she sank down and lay at her full length, as if only to be motionless in a place of rest had been the fulness of delight. *As when a withered leaf that has long been whirled about by the gusts of autumn is blown into a cave or the hollow of a tree, it stops*

suddenly, and all at once looks the very image of quiet. Such might this poor orphan girl appear to the eye of a meditative imagination."

In the words which are here marked with Italics we have a plain but accurate description of an incident familiar to all of us. Nothing can be simpler, — perhaps some will think nothing could be less indicative of genius than the mention of such a circumstance. And yet it is this faculty of seizing upon a natural incident, of presenting it exactly as it is, without embellishment or emotion, yet at the same time making it impressive by gently emphasizing its most distinctive feature, and by diffusing over the whole a kind of ideality, — it is this faculty which gives life to poetry; it is this which gives to the poetry of the ancients in particular, its strange and peculiar charm. Who has not seen a leaf whirled about by the wind, and then lodged in the hollow of a tree? but who except a poet would have recalled the circumstance? who but a poet would have found in it an analogy to any thing in the moral world? This is to look upon nature with a poet's eye, and to interpret nature with a poet's sense. This is to clothe with new beauty, and as it were to sanctify, a common sight, so that it can never more seem common, nor pass unnoticed again. An incident thus selected from the daily spectacle of nature, and associated with a particular state of mortal being, becomes thenceforward and for ever a poetical image; by the poet's magic synthesis a natural object has become inseparably linked with a human feeling, so that the one must thenceforth always suggest the other. We feel assured that after reading this passage we shall never again behold the thing there described without a new sensation. We shall add a few extracts from Mr. Coleridge's poetry for the purpose of further illustrating what we mean by the *poetical feeling*.

The first is a description of nocturnal silence from the "Frost at Midnight."

> "'T is calm indeed, so calm that it disturbs
> And vexes meditation with its strange
> And extreme silentness.
> Sea, hill, and wood,
> With all the numberless goings-on of life
> Inaudible as dreams,

Only that film which fluttered on the grate
Still flutters there, the sole unquiet thing.
Methinks its motion in this hush of nature
Gives it dim sympathies with me, who live
Making it a companionable form."

The following is from the same piece:

"Therefore all seasons shall be sweet to thee,
Whether the summer clothe the general earth
With greenness, or the redbreast sit and sing
Betwixt the tufts of snow on the bare branch
Of mossy apple-tree, while the nigh-thatch
Smokes in the sun-thaw. Whether the eave-drops fall
Heard only in the trances of the blast,
Or if the secret ministry of frost
Shall hang them up in silent icicles,
Quietly shining to the quiet moon."

How aptly is a well known state of mind described in the following passage from the ode, entitled "Dejection."

"A grief without a pang, void, dark, and drear,
A stifled, drowsy, unimpassioned grief,
Which finds no natural outlet, no relief
In word or sigh or tear.

"The Ancient Mariner" is so full of beauties that we find it difficult to make a selection. The description of a vessel becalmed near the equator is probably familiar to many of our readers.

"All in a hot and copper sky
The bloody sun at noon
Right up above the mast did stand
No bigger than the moon.
Day after day, day after day
We stuck, nor breath nor motion,
As idle as a painted ship
Upon a painted ocean."

The effects of a sudden breeze are set forth with the same nervous and graphic power.

"But in a minute she 'gan stir
With a short uneasy motion,
Backwards and forwards half her length
With a short uneasy motion:

Then, like a pawing horse let go,
She made a sudden bound."

The influence of superstitious fears is portrayed with great truth.

"Like one who on a lonesome road
Doth walk in fear and dread,
And having once turned round, walks on
And turns no more his head,
Because he knows a frightful fiend
Doth close behind him tread."

Sometimes the poetical merit consists solely in a happy choice of epithets.

"The moonlight *steeped* in *silentness*
The *steady* weathercock."

In the following passage from "Christabel," the poetical feeling is equally diffused over the whole.

"There is not wind enough to twirl
The one red leaf, the last of its clan
That dances as often as dance it can,
Hanging so light and hanging so high
On the topmost twig that looks up at the sky."

The second characteristic of genius, that which distinguishes its highest degree, relates to form. It may be termed completeness, or the power of producing a well-proportioned whole. By a well-proportioned whole, we mean a work of art in which one central idea pervades, connects, and determines all the parts; where the greatest diversity of matter is nicely balanced by unity of purpose; where the same leading thought shines visibly through every variety of attitude and scene;—a work which, originating in a happy conception, and grounded upon a rational plan, has all its parts proportioned to that plan, pursues a consistent course, has beginning, middle, and end, moulds itself, as it were, by the self-determining power of its subject, into a compact and pleasing form, and produces, when finished, a simple and undivided impression. Thus a good literary composition may be known by the same test by which we judge of an architectural work, unity of design and totality of effect. Some of Shakspeare's plays, "Othello," for example, or "Romeo and Juliet," will illustrate our meaning,

Indeed, the greatest literary productions of ancient and modern times, whether dramatic, epic, or didactic, whether they be histories, orations, or systems of philosophy, all are marked with this characteristic. And not only literary productions, but all that is great in every department of intellectual exertion, a good painting, a masterpiece of sculpture, or in active life a masterpiece of policy, or in mechanics a useful invention, a well-contrived machine, any and every creation of the human mind, so far as it conforms to this standard, — unity and completeness, — is a work of genius. Genius then, in its most perfect state, is known by its "*perfect work.*" A writer in whom this quality is wanting, betrays the defect in the loose and disjointed character of his composition. The difference between such a writer and one who possesses the quality we have described, is like the contrast we may suppose between the *coup d'œil* of an eagle who surveys whole landscapes from his perch amid the clouds, and the vision of an insect to whose microscopic eye the minutest object divides itself into numberless fragments. The difference in the productions of these men resembles that which distinguishes the growth of an organic from that of a mineral product; — the one developes itself into determinate forms by the evolution of a single germinal principle, the other irregularly swells its bulk by heterogeneous accretions. Mr. Coleridge is one of those in whom this quality of completeness, the power of producing a whole, is entirely wanting. We have never met with a writer whose works are so patched and ill made up. There does not occur to us at this moment a single production of his, which has the least pretensions to shape.

As to the charge of obscurity, so often and obstinately urged against Mr. Coleridge's prose writings, we cannot admit it in any thing like the extent in which it has been applied. So far as there is *any* ground for this complaint, it is owing to the author's excessive anxiety to make himself intelligible, an anxiety which leads him to present a subject in so many points of view, that we are sometimes in danger of losing the main topic amid the variety of collateral and illustrative matter which he gathers round it. We are inclined, however, to suspect that the greater part of this alleged obscurity exists in the mind of the reader, and not in the author. In an age when all classes read, and when a consequent demand

for popular works has rendered every thing superficial that could be made superficial, and excluded almost every thing that could not, when the best books in the language are the least read, when such works as Butler's Analogy and others of the same stamp are confined within the narrow circle of professional reading, — while at the same time complaints are heard that we have no good books to put into the hands of infidels, — when in religion and philosophy superficial treatises and books of amusement have almost supplanted scientific inquiry, — when, even in the department of taste, novels and tales supersede Shakspeare and Milton; — in such an age, we are not surprised to hear the charge of obscurity preferred against books whose only fault is that they deserve, and therefore require, a little more study than we are compelled to bestow upon a novel or a tract. It is to be feared that the men of this generation have been spoiled by the indulgence shown to their natural indolence, and made tender by the excessive pains which have been taken to render every thing easy and smooth. Our intellects are dwarfed and stunted by the constant stimulus of amusement which is mixed up with all our literary food. There is no taste for hardy application, no capacity for vigorous and manly efforts of the understanding. Whatever taxes the mind, instead of exciting it, is deemed a burthen. A hard word scares us; a proposition, which does not explain itself at first glance, troubles us; whatever is *supersensual* and cannot be made plain by images addressed to the senses, is denounced as obscure, or beckoned away as mystical and extravagant. Whatever lies beyond the limits of ordinary and outward experience, is regarded as the ancient geographers regarded the greater portion of the globe, — as a land of shadows and chimæras. In a treatise on mechanics or astronomy, many things would be unintelligible to one who is ignorant of mathematics; but would it be fair in such a one to charge the author with a difficulty which arises from his own ignorance? Some writers are clear because they are shallow. If it be complained that Mr. Coleridge is not one of these, we shall not deny a charge which is applicable also, and in a much greater degree to much wiser men. He is certainly not a shallow writer, but, as we think, a very profound one, and his style is for the most part as clear as the nature of his thoughts will admit. To those only is he

obscure who have no depths within themselves corresponding to his depths, and such will do well to consider, as Bishop Butler has said in reference to his own work, — "that the question is not whether a more intelligible book might have been written, but whether the subjects which he handles will admit of greater perspicuity in the treatment of them."

In a review of Mr. Coleridge's literary life, we must not omit to notice that marked fondness for metaphysics, and particularly for German metaphysics, which has exercised so decisive an influence over all his writings. Had it been given to him to interpret German metaphysics to his countrymen, as Mr. Cousin has interpreted them to the French nation, or had it been possible for him to have constructed a system of his own, we should not have regretted his indulgence of a passion which we must now condemn as a source of morbid dissatisfaction with received opinions, unjustified by any serious attempt to introduce others and better. From his vigorous understanding, his acute dialectic powers, his complete knowledge of the subject, his historical research, and power of expression, something more might have been expected than the meagre sketch contained in his autobiography.* That Mr. Coleridge has done so little in the way of original production in this department, we ascribe to the same mental defect which has already been remarked upon, namely, the preponderance of the reflective over the creative faculty, and the consequent inability to collect, and embody in systematic forms, the results of his inquiries. But though so ill-qualified for the work of production, one would think the translator of Wallenstein might have interpreted for us all that is most valuable in the speculations of Kant and his followers. It has been said that these works are untranslatable, but without sufficient grounds. That they are not translatable by one who has not an intimate acquaintance with the transcendental philosophy, is abundantly evident from the recent attempt which has been made in England to translate Tenneman. But in this respect, and indeed in every respect, Mr. Coleridge is eminently fitted for such a task; and it is the more to be regretted that he has not undertaken it, as the number of those who are thus fitted

* See Biographia Literaria, Chapter 12.

is exceedingly small, while the demand for information on this subject is constantly increasing. We are well aware that a mere translation, however perfect, would be inadequate to convey a definite notion of transcendentalism to one who has not the metaphysical talent necessary to conceive and reproduce in himself a system whose only value to us must depend upon our power to construct it for ourselves from the materials of our own consciousness, and which in fact exists to us only on this condition.

While we are on this ground, we beg leave to offer a few explanatory remarks respecting German metaphysics,* which seem to us to be called for by the present state of feeling among literary men in relation to this subject. We believe it impossible to understand fully the design of Kant and his followers, without being endowed to a certain extent with the same powers of abstraction and synthetic generalization which they possess in so eminent a degree. In order to become fully master of their meaning, one must be able to find it in himself. Not all are born to be philosophers, or are capable of becoming philosophers, any more than all are capable of becoming poets or musicians. The works of the transcendental philosophers may be translated word for word, but still it will be impossible to get a clear idea of their philosophy, unless we raise ourselves at once to a transcendental point of view. Unless we take our station with the philosopher and proceed from his ground as our starting-point, the whole system will appear to us an inextricable puzzle. As in astronomy the motions of the heavenly bodies seem confused to the geocentric observer, and are intelligible only when referred to their heliocentric place, so there is only one point from which we can clearly understand and decide upon the speculations of Kant and his followers; that point is the interior consciousness, distinguished from the common consciousness, by its being an active and not a passive state. In the language of the school, it is a free intuition, and can only be attained by a vigorous effort of the will. It is from an ignorance of this primary condition, that the writings of these men have been denounced as vague and mystical.

*When we speak of *German* metaphysics we wish to be understood as referring to the systems of intellectual philosophy which have prevailed in Germany since Kant. Our remarks do not apply to Leibnitz, Wolf, or any of Kant's predecessors.

Viewing them from the distance we do, their discussions seem to us like objects half enveloped in mist; the little we can distinguish seems most portentously magnified and distorted by the unnatural refraction through which we behold it, and the point where they touch the earth is altogether lost. The effect of such writing upon the uninitiated, is like being in the company of one who has inhaled an exhilarating gas. We witness the inspiration, and are astounded at the effects, but we can form no conception of the feeling until we ourselves have experienced it. To those who are without the veil, then, any *exposé* of transcendental views must needs be unsatisfactory. Now if any one chooses to deny the point which these writers assume, if any one chooses to call in question the metaphysical existence of this interior consciousness, and to pronounce the whole system a mere fabrication, or a gross self-delusion, — to such a one the disciples of this school have nothing further to say; for him their system was not conceived. Let him content himself, if he can, with "that compendious philosophy which talking of mind, but thinking of brick and mortar, or other images equally abstracted from body, contrives a theory of spirit, by nicknaming matter, and in a few hours can qualify the dullest of its disciples to explain the *omne scibile* by reducing all things to impressions, ideas, and sensations." The disciples of Kant wrote for minds of quite another stamp, they wrote for minds that seek with faith and hope a solution of questions which that philosophy meddles not with, — questions which relate to spirit and form, substance and life, free will and fate, God and eternity. Let those who feel no interest in these questions, or who believe not in the possibility of our approaching any nearer to a solution of them, abstain for ever from a department of inquiry for which they have neither talent nor call. There are certain periods in the history of society, when, passing from a state of spontaneous production to a state of reflection, mankind are particularly disposed to inquire concerning themselves and their destination, the nature of their being, the evidence of their knowledge, and the grounds of their faith. Such a tendency is one of the characteristics of the present age, and the German philosophy is the strongest expression of that tendency; it is a striving after information on subjects which have been usually considered as beyond the reach of human intelligence,

an attempt to penetrate into the most hidden mysteries of our being. In every philosophy there are three things to be considered, the object, the method, and the result. In the transcendental system, the *object* is to discover in every form of finite existence, an infinite and unconditioned as the ground of its existence, or rather as the ground of our knowledge of its existence, to refer all phenomena to certain *noumena*,* or laws of cognition. It is not a *ratio essendi*, but a *ratio cognoscendi*; it seeks not to explain the existence of God and creation, objectively considered, but to explain our knowledge of their existence. It is not a skeptical philosophy; † it seeks not to overthrow, but to build up; it wars not with the common opinions and general experience of mankind, but aims to place these on a scientific basis, and to verify them by scientific demonstrations.

The method is synthetical, proceeding from a given point, the lowest that can be found in our consciousness, and deducing from that point "the whole world of intelligences, with the whole system of their representations." The correctness or philosophical propriety of the construction which is to be based upon this given point, this absolute thesis, must be assumed for a while, until proved by the successful completion of the system which it is designed to establish. The test by which we are to know that the system is complete, and the method correct, is the same as that by which we judge of the correct construction of the material arch, — continuity and self-dependence. The last step in the process, the keystone of the fabric, is the deduction of time, space, and variety, or, in other words, (as time, space, and variety include the elements of all empiric knowledge) the establishing of a coincidence between the facts of ordinary experience and those which we have discovered within ourselves, and scientifically derived from our first fundamental position. When this step is accomplished, the system is complete, the hypothetical frame-work may then fall, and the structure will support itself. ‡

* Kant, Kritik der renen Vernunft.

† Perhaps the writings of Fichte may be considered as an exception to this statement.

‡ We give the *ideal* of the method proposed; we are by no means prepared to say that this idea has been realized, or that it can be realized.

We have called the method synthetical; we should rather say that it is an alternation of synthesis and antithesis. Every synthesis, according to Fichte in the "Wissenschaftslehre," * presupposes an antithesis; every antithesis, by limitation of the terms opposed, must be reconciled into a synthesis; in every new synthesis thus obtained, new antitheses are found; these again must be reconciled, and so on, till we come to a stand. The first proposition in the "Wissenschaftslehre" is stated thus, A = A. In this proposition the first term is a something, A unconditionally proposed; the second term is the same A reflected upon. I propose A, and then, reflecting upon it, find that it is A. This identity arises not from any quality in the thing proposed; it exists solely in my own consciousness. A = A, because I, the being who proposed it, am the same with I, the being who reflects upon it. Consequently the proposition, A = A, is equivalent to the proposition, I = I. Again, I propose — A = — A, or A unconditionally denied not equal to A unconditionally proposed; consequently not equal to A, the object of reflection in the former proposition. Now the possibility of my denying A presupposes and depends upon my power of proposing or affirming A. — A is relative, and can exist only so far as A exists in my consciousness. Consequently, I, the being who now denies A, must be the same with I, the being who first proposed or affirmed A, otherwise — A might be equal to A. This is what is meant by identity of consciousness. I find then in consciousness, two opposites apparently incompatible with each other, absolute affirmation, and absolute negation. Here then is the first antithesis. Now how can these two things exist together? Why does not the one exclude the other? They can be reconciled only by the introduction of a new term. † This new term is the idea of divisibility or limitation. It is then no longer absolute, but partial affirmation and negation. What was first unconditionally affirmed to exist, and if allowed uncon-

* Coleridge translates this word, "lore of ultimate science;" it means the science of knowing.

† It was found necessary to abridge the process so much, that perhaps the conclusions may not appear strictly consequential. Let it be understood, then, that affirmation and negation stand for existence and non-existence, — the *I* and *not-I*, — which, of course, when absolute must eventually exclude each other.

ditional existence must of course exclude its opposite, is now allowed to exist only so far as its opposite does not exist, and the opposite exists only so far as this does not exist, i. e. they coexist by mutual limitation; they define and determine each other. The *I* proposes itself as divisible or limitable, and determined by the *not-I*, and it proposes the *not-I* as divisible and determined by the *I*, and here we have the first synthesis. In this synthesis we find new antitheses, which, by further qualification must be reconciled as the first was reconciled into new syntheses, and so on till we arrive at absolute unity, or absolute contradiction.

This mode of proceeding is peculiar to Fichte, but it is a form of the method used to a greater or less extent by all the philosophers of that school. Defining it by that which is common to all its forms, we may call it the method of synthetic conclusions from opposite terms. Kant first suggested this method in his treatise entitled "The use of Negative Quantities in Metaphysics." To *him*, the father of the critical philosophy, we are indebted for the successful cultivation of the preparatory, or, to use his own expression, the "propaideutic" branches of the science. He did not himself create a system, but he furnished the hints and materials from which all the systems of his followers have been framed. In his preface to the second edition of the "Critique of pure Reason," he makes us acquainted with the train of reasoning which led to the course he has adopted in his metaphysical inquiries. "He had been struck with the fact, that, while other departments of knowledge, availing themselves of scientific method, were constantly and regularly advancing, intellectual philosophy alone, although the most ancient of all sciences, and the one which would remain, though all the rest should be swallowed up in the vortex of an all-ingulphing barbarism, — intellectual philosophy alone, appears to be still groping in the dark, sometimes advancing and sometimes receding, but making on the whole little actual progress. How are we to account for this fact? Is a science of metaphysics impossible? Why then has nature implanted within us this ardent longing after certain and progressive knowledge on subjects of all others the most interesting to the human soul; or how can we place any confidence in our reason, when it fails us in the investigation of such topics as these? But perhaps the fault lies with us.

May not our want of success be owing to a wrong method? The science of geometry was probably for some time in the same condition that metaphysical inquiry is now; but ever since the demonstration of the equilateral triangle commonly ascribed to Thales, it has advanced in regular and rapid progression. Physical science has done the same since Bacon. It is evident that both these branches of knowledge are indebted for the success with which they have been cultivated, to the fortunate discovery of a right method. May not the want of such a method constitute the sole obstacle to the progress of metaphysical science? Hitherto philosophers have assumed that our cognitions are determined by the objects they represent. On this assumption it is evident that every attempt to establish any thing *a priori* concerning them (the objects) must be vain. Let us therefore try whether, in metaphysical problems, we may not succeed better by assuming that the objects without us are determined by our cognitions. Copernicus, when he found that he could not explain the motions of the heavenly bodies on the supposition that the starry host revolves around the observer, changed his theory and made the observer revolve, and the stars stand still. Reversing this process, let us, since the supposition that our intuitions depend on the nature of the world without, will not answer, assume that the world without depends on the nature of our intuitions. Thus perhaps we shall be enabled to realize that great desideratum.—*a priori* knowledge."

We have here the key to the whole critical philosophy, the very essence of which consists in proposing an absolute self as unconditionally existing, incapable of being determined by any thing higher than itself, but determining all things through itself. On this fundamental position, Fichte, in his "Wissenschaftslehre," endeavoured to found a system of consequential deductions, explanatory of the grounds of all human belief; a system which should serve as a foundation-science for all other sciences. With whatever success this attempt was attended in the author's own estimation, it has never been generally satisfactory to others. The system is altogether too subjective. The possibility of any knowledge of the absolute or self-existing, is denied; we can know only concerning our knowledge; man's personal freedom is the basis of all reality; with many other assertions of like character.

Next to Fichte in the order of time, but differing widely from him as it respects the tendency of their respective systems, appears Schelling, the projector of the "natural philosophy" so called; a branch of transcendentalism which was afterwards more fully developed, and reduced to a system by Oken. If Fichte confined himself too exclusively to the subjective, Schelling on the other hand treats principally of the object, and endeavours to show that the outward world is of the same essence with the thinking mind, both being different manifestations of the same divine principle. He is the ontologist of the Kantian school. All knowledge, according to him,* consists in an agreement between an object and a subject. In all science, therefore, there are these two elements or poles, subject and object, or nature and intelligence; and corresponding to these two poles there are two fundamental sciences, the one beginning with nature and proceeding upward to intelligence, the other beginning with intelligence and ending in nature. The first is natural philosophy, the second transcendental philosophy. Of all the Germans who have trod the path of metaphysical inquiry under the guidance of Kant, Schelling is the most satisfactory. In him intellectual philosophy is more ripe, more substantial, more promising, and, if we may apply such a term to such speculations, more practical than in any of the others. Though in one sense a follower of Kant, he begins a new period, and may be considered as the founder of a new school. Of the other successors of Kant, Hegel, Oken, Fries, Reinhold, Krug, Plattner and others, our information would not enable us to say much, and our limits forbid us to say any thing. The three whom we have particularized are the only ones who appear to us to possess much individuality, or to have exercised much influence in the philosophical world. In designating these, we have done all that this brief sketch requires. We need only add, that the best histories of philosophy, and, with the exception of Cousin's, the only good ones we have, are productions of German philosophers.

If now it be asked, as probably it will be asked, whether any definite and substantial good has resulted from the labors of Kant and his followers, we answer, Much. More

*Schelling. Transcendentaler Idealismus.

than metaphysics ever before accomplished, these men have done for the advancement of the human intellect. It is true the immediate, and if we may so speak, the calculable results of their speculations are not so numerous nor so evident as might have been expected: these are chiefly comprised under the head of method. Yet even here we have enough to make us rejoice that such men have been, and that they have lived and spoken in our day. We need mention only the sharp and rightly dividing lines that have been drawn within and around the kingdom of human knowledge; the strongly marked distinctions of subject and object, reason and understanding, phenomena and noumena; — the categories established by Kant; the moral liberty proclaimed by him as it had never been proclaimed by any before; the authority and evidence of law and duty set forth by Fichte; the universal harmony illustrated by Schelling. But in mentioning these things, which are the direct results of the critical philosophy, we have by no means exhausted all that that philosophy has done for liberty and truth. The pre-eminence of Germany among the nations of our day in respect of intellectual culture, is universally acknowledged; and we do fully believe that whatever excellence that nation has attained in science, in history, or poetry is mainly owing to the influence of her philosophy, to the faculty which that philosophy has imparted of seizing on the spirit of every question, and determining at once the point of view from which each subject should be regarded, — in one word, to the transcendental method. In theology this influence has been most conspicuous. We are indebted to it for that dauntless spirit of inquiry which has investigated, and for that amazing erudition which has illustrated, every corner of biblical lore. Twice it has saved the religion of Germany, — once from the extreme of fanatic extravagance, and again, from the verge of speculative infidelity. But, though most conspicuous in theology, this influence has been visible in every department of intellectual exertion to which the Germans have applied themselves for the last thirty years. It has characterized each science and each art, and all bear witness to its quickening power. A philosophy which has given such an impulse to mental culture and scientific research, which has done so much to establish and to extend the spiritual in man, and the ideal in nature, needs no

apology; it commends itself by its fruits, it lives in its fruits; and must ever live, though the name of its founder be forgotten, and not one of its doctrines survive.

We have wandered far from the subject of our critique. It is time we should return and take our final leave. It was not our intention in this brief review of Mr. Coleridge's literary merits to criticize in particular any one of the works whose titles stand at the head of this article. But the "Aids to Reflection," as containing an account of the author's religious views, demand a passing notice in a work like this. In his biography, Mr. Coleridge describes the state of his mind, with respect to religion, previous to his leaving England, by saying that his head was with Spinoza, and his heart with Paul and John; which means, we presume, that he found it impossible to reconcile his religion with his philosophy. In another passage, he tells us that he was at this time a Unitarian, "or more accurately a *Psilanthropist*," which term he chooses to consider as synonymous with the former. We understand it very differently. Psilanthropism, according to our definition, means Humanitarianism,—a doctrine which has no more necessary connexion with the Unitarian faith than with the Roman Catholic. In the "Aids to Reflection," our author would have us believe that he has accomplished at last the wished for reconciliation between his head and his heart. To us the breach seems as wide as ever. In this work he appears as a zealous Trinitarian, and a warm defender of the doctrines of the English church. We have no doubt of his sincerity; but unless we err greatly, he has either misunderstood his own views, or grossly misinterpreted the doctrines of his church. His view of the Trinity, as far as we can understand it, is as consistent with Unitarianism, to say the least, as his former psilanthropic scheme. His opinion of the atonement is far from Orthodox; the idea of vicarious suffering he rejects with disdain. The strong expressions used by St. Paul in reference to this subject, he tells us are not intended to designate the *act* of redemption, but are only figurative expressions descriptive of its effects. The *act* of redemption he calls a "mystery," which term, as it may mean any thing, means, in reality, nothing. The other doctrines fare in the same way. Every thing is first mystified into a sort of imposing indistinctness, and then pronounced to be genuine Orthodoxy.

The truth is, Mr. Coleridge, though a great scholar, was not qualified in point of biblical learning for an undertaking like this. Many of his assertions, we are persuaded, would not have been hazarded, had he not taken his understanding of the New Testament for granted, but studied that book with the same diligence and perseverance which he appears to have bestowed upon other works. With these exceptions, however, we consider the "Aids to Reflection" as a very valuable work. The distinctions between prudence and morality, and between natural and spiritual religion, are sound and important.

On the whole, in summing up Mr. Coleridge's merits, we cannot but regard him as endowed with an intellect of the highest order, as a profound thinker, and a powerful writer, though not a successful poet or an amiable critic. As a translator, he has no equal in English literature. His prejudices are strong,* his tastes confined, his pedantry often oppressive, his egotism unbounded. Yet we can never read a chapter in any one of his prose works, without feeling ourselves intellectually exalted and refined. Never can we sufficiently admire the depth and richness of his thoughts, the beauty of his illustrations, the exceeding fitness and force of all his words. If he is too minute in details to shine in the higher walks of literature, too anxious in the elaboration of single parts, to succeed in the total effect, it must be allowed that few compositions will bear so close an inspection, and still maintain their color and their gloss so well as his. If he divides nature and life and human art into too many particulars, it cannot be denied that his divisions, like those of the prism, give to each particular an individuality and a glory, which it did not possess while merged and lost in the whole to which it belonged. If he has produced far less than might have been expected from a mind so ready and so rich, we will nevertheless cheerfully accord to him the credit which he claims in his own appeal against a similar charge. "Would

* Mr. Coleridge's prejudices against the French nation, and all that belongs to them, are unreasonable and absurd in the extreme. He is said, upon one occasion, during the delivery of a public lecture, in the presence of a numerous assembly, to have thanked God in the most serious manner for so ordering events, "that he was entirely ignorant of a single word of that frightful jargon, the French language."

that the criterion of a scholar's utility were the number and moral value of the truths which he has been the means of throwing into the general circulation, or the number and value of the minds whom by his conversation or letters he has excited into activity, and supplied with the germs of their after-growth. A distinguished rank might not even then be awarded to my exertions, but I should dare look forward with confidence to an honorable acquittal." *

ART. VIII. — *Remarks on the Influence of Mental Cultivation upon Health.* By AMARIAH BRIGHAM. Hartford. F. J. Huntington. 1832. 12mo. pp. 116.

THOUGH it has a grave title, this is a lively book, abounding in curious illustration, and occasionally seasoned with a spice of pleasant satire. Let no one, therefore, forbear to read it, under the impression that it is a dry disquisition, for it is as far from being so as possible. There is, moreover, a plenty of good sense in these "Remarks," and though we cannot always give our full assent to the propositions which are advanced by their writer, we are of opinion that he has spoken on an important subject seasonably and well.

Mr., or Dr. Brigham, — if he is a physician, he ought to have told us so on his title-page, — is not afraid to express his disapprobation of the way in which instruction is too apt to be forced and crowded upon the mind in these very busy times; nor are we afraid of declaring that to a considerable extent we agree with him. He is of opinion that it is all wrong to be undermining the physical constitution of children, by making them puny prodigies of learning, — and we are of the same opinion. He insists that the brain may be overworked and overloaded as well as the stomach; and that by an injudicious fatigue of the mental faculties, the stomach is deranged, and people get the dyspepsia, — and we think so too. These positions we regard as perfectly sound, and supported by facts which are before our daily observation. Some of the reasonings of Dr. Brigham which

* Biographia Literaria, Chapter 10.

wear a phrenological aspect, may be wrong; some of his conclusions may admit of exception and modification; but the practices against which he contends, we deem to be great evils, and the notions from which they spring to be palpable errors; and he has done battle against them like a worthy knight.

The summary of the results established in the first two Sections of this book, is thus stated. "*The brain is the material organ by which all the mental faculties are manifested; it is exceedingly delicate, and but partially developed in childhood; over-excitement of it, when in this state, is extremely hazardous.*" Dr. Brigham goes on in his third Section, to show some of the evil consequences which have resulted from inattention to the connexion between the mind and the body, and is not sparing of his ridicule of the floods of books which have been prepared for very young children. Nor does he treat infant schools with the utmost respect. The following account of the character of early education, as it is practised by many of our sciolists, is not at all too severe.

"The method of teaching little children, varies in different schools, but that is every where considered the *best*, which forces the infant mind the *fastest*. In some schools, the *memory* is chiefly cultivated, and children are taught innumerable facts. Here we see those who are scarcely able to talk, exhibited as wonderful children. They are declared to be deserving of the highest praise, and prophesied about as giving promise of great distinction in future, because they are able to tell us who was the oldest man, and many other equally useful and important facts. They are also able to tell us many truths in Astronomy, Geometry, Chemistry, &c. &c., of which the innocent beings know about as much, as do parrots of the jargon they deliver. In other schools, teachers are opposed to such practice; and say that a child should learn nothing but what he understands; that the memory should not alone be cultivated; therefore they teach children that Methusaleh was not only the oldest man, and nine hundred and sixty-nine years of age, but that he was the son of Enoch, and the grandfather of Noah, and that a year means three hundred and sixty-five days, and a day twenty-four hours, and all this they teach in order, as they say, that a child may *fully understand* what he learns. Other teachers say, that it is very wrong to *compel* a child to learn; very wrong indeed; and that he should learn no more than he

will cheerfully; but though they do not gain their purpose by exciting *fear*, they awaken other passions of the strongest kind in the child, by a system of *rewards* and of *praise*. Now of all these methods, if there is any preference, it should be given to the first; for that is the least objectionable which has the least tendency to develope the mind, and awaken the passions prematurely. They must all, however, be wrong, if they call into action an organ which is but partially formed; for they do not conform to the requirements of the laws of nature, and wait for organs to be developed, before they are tasked.

"I beseech parents, therefore, to pause before they attempt to make prodigies of their own children. Though they may not destroy them, by the measures they adopt to effect this purpose, yet they will surely enfeeble their bodies, and greatly dispose them to nervous affections. Early mental excitement will serve only to bring forth beautiful but premature flowers, which are destined soon to wither away, without producing fruit." — pp. 49, 50.

In the fourth Section, we are presented with the "opinions of celebrated physicians respecting early mental cultivation." After reading these authorities, no one, we think, can fail of being impressed with the danger of forcing or even encouraging great mental application in the tender years of childhood. And yet we are disposed to believe that Dr. Brigham is urging his side of the question too far, as is apt to be the case with all zealous advocates. In spite of all the great names of physicians and phrenologists which can be brought against us, we must pronounce it to be a decided error to permit children to run wild without any regular instruction, and without any habits of application, till they are seven years old. We insist upon it, that a child may be taught much which is worth his knowing, and habits of docility and attention beside, before he is seven years old, without impairing his health in the least, if his education is conducted with any regard to the principles of common sense, and to the constitution and capacities of the subject; and that the difference between a child so brought up, and one who is taught nothing till his years have amounted to the magic number seven, will be the difference between a fine healthy child, and a fine healthy colt, — or calf. Accordingly we subscribe not to the truth of the following table of M. Friedlander, introduced into this section of Dr. Brigham's work:

Age.	Hours of sleep.	Hours of exercise.	Hours of occupation	Hours of repose.
7	9 to 10	10	1	4
8	9	9	2	4
9	9	8	3	4
10	8 to 9	8	4	4
11	8	7	5	4
12	8	6	6	4
13	8	5	7	4
14	7	5	8	4
15	7	4	9	4

For our own part, we should begin with the one hour of occupation at the age of four instead of seven, perhaps dividing this hour into two portions; and if any man, however learned, should tell us that half an hour in the morning and half an hour in the afternoon spent in application of mind, would be likely to injure the health of a child of four years, who was allowed to give the other twenty-three hours to sleep, exercise, and doing nothing, which we suppose is meant by the word "repose," we should be apt to tell him in reply that he was too pertinacious a theorist for us to deal with. Neither do we see any reason why the term of occupation should be regularly increased an hour a year. This increase, with many other things, should be left to the discretion of parents and instructers, if they have discretion, to be determined by circumstances. If parents and instructers have not discretion, Heaven help the poor children! for we much doubt whether M. Friedlander's tables will.

It will be seen that our system, so far as we have one, is neither the forcing and brain-inflaming system, nor the let-alone-and-run-wild-till-seven system. We shudder when we see a pale-faced boy or girl who bends over the study-table hour after hour, and whose head is crammed with all the *ologies* and *ographies* which are in fashion; and we shudder, though with different feelings, at the sight of a seven years old human being, who cannot read a simple story, nor spell its own name.

The fifth Section of Dr. Brigham's work is on the "influence of mental cultivation and mental excitement, in producing insanity and nervous affections." This is a subject of deep interest, and the following results of the author's observation, deserve serious attention.

"In view of these few brief facts respecting *insanity*, we are forced to believe, that among the causes of the great prevalence of this disease in this country, are the following:

"First, Too constant and too powerful excitement of the mind, which the strife for wealth, office, political distinction, and party success, produces in this free country.

"Second, The predominance given to the nervous system, by too early cultivating the mind and exciting the feelings of children.

"Third, Neglect of physical education, or the equal and proper developement of all the organs of the body.

"Fourth, The general and powerful excitement of the female mind. Little attention is given in the education of females, to the physiological differences of the sexes. Teachers seldom reflect that in them the nervous system naturally predominates; that they are endowed with quicker sensibilities than men, and have imaginations far more active, that their emotions are more intense, and their senses alive to more delicate impressions; and therefore require great attention; lest this exquisite sensibility, which, when properly and naturally developed, constitutes the greatest excellence of woman, should either become *excessive* by too strong excitement, or suppressed by misdirected education. If here was the proper place, it would be easy to show that efforts to make females excel in certain qualities of mind which in men are considered most desirable, — to make them as capable as men, of long continued attention to abstract truths, would be to act contrary to the dictates of nature as manifested by their organization, and would tend to suppress all those finer sensibilities, which render them in every thing that relates to sentiment and affection far superior to man." — pp. 73, 74.

In Section seventh the writer ably maintains the truth, that "the cultivation of the mind at a proper time of life, is not injurious but beneficial to health." The following passages from this portion of the work contain some very curious facts, particularly with regard to the antiquity of temperance societies, which we presume will be new to most of our readers, and the tendency of which is to encourage us concerning the condition and prospects of our own age of the world.

"Notwithstanding the still great prevalence of sensuality in civilized countries, history shows that formerly it was far greater, and more general; and has decreased as civilization has advanced. For proof of this, examine historically the

prevalence of almost any sensual and vicious propensity, the indulgence of which tends to shorten life, and it will be found to have been formerly far greater than now. Take the vice of drunkenness, which, as every one knows, has destroyed innumerable human beings; and history will show, that in proportion as men and nations have become enlightened, they have regarded this vice as more odious. Savages are generally prone to intoxication. They regard drunkenness as bliss, and will part with any thing they have for rum.

"The ancient Greeks worshipped Bacchus, the God of Wine, and in Silenus we see the image of drunkenness, and in many of their statues we observe representations of most beastly intoxication. So great for a while, were the evils from intemperance in Greece, that some rulers condemned those found intoxicated to death. Lycurgus destroyed all the vines of the country, and made slaves drunk, and then exhibited them in this state, in order to deter youth from intemperance. The Romans had more than two hundred different kinds of intoxicating liquors, and drank them to excess. The ancient Germans, and the former inhabitants of all the northern countries were greatly addicted to drunkenness. For centuries no one thought of the impropriety of drinking to excess; the only concern respecting intoxicating liquors, was how to procure them; and for this purpose they roamed about like the beasts of the forests, and even invaded Italy to procure them by force.

"On the revival of literature, after the dark ages, intemperance in drinking was universally prevalent, but as men became more enlightened, they had recourse to measures calculated to prevent it. And it is a curious fact, that in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, *Temperance Societies* were formed by the most intelligent and influential men, for the purpose of stopping intemperance in drinking. One was called the Society of St. Christopher, others were called Temperance Societies, and the members of one took the appropriate name of the *Golden band.* These societies were productive of great good; they augmented industry, and contributed to the improvement of manners, and the establishment of good order.

"As respects intemperance in England, if we go back but one hundred years, we shall find it far more general than at present. One hundred years ago there was not a store in London where intoxicating liquors were not kept for sale. The physicians of London, at that time stated to parliament, that the victims of intemperance were exceedingly numerous, and this caused the number of dram-shops to be limited by law. The French were once exceedingly addicted to intoxication; their rulers enacted many and severe laws to repress the habit;

destroying all the vines of the country, — imprisonment, — whipping, — cutting off the ears of those found intoxicated, were successively resorted to, but with little effect towards arresting the evil. The age of Louis XIV., by creating a taste for intellectual, and more refined pleasures, did more to arrest intemperance in France, than all the laws of former rulers.

"It is to the influence which a taste for intellectual pursuits exerts, that we must look to effect and perpetuate a reform from sensuality. It was, in fact, increased intelligence and a growing love for intellectual enjoyment that enabled the people of this country to produce the reform they have produced, in the use of intoxicating drink. Temperance Societies, to be sure, did much good, but they were an *effect* themselves, of the more general diffusion and love of knowledge, and could not have been sustained thirty years ago, nor by a people less intelligent." — pp. 86 – 89.

In the eighth Section Dr. Brigham advances the doctrine, that mental cultivation, when it irritates the brain, is a cause of dyspepsia; and, in fact, that irritation of the brain is the most frequent cause of that common and formidable disease. There is much truth, and conveyed in a pleasantly satirical manner, which will make the most careful dyspeptic smile, in the following paragraph; and yet it requires much modification in order to make it unexceptionable.

"*Good living* is said to cause dyspepsia, but the most healthy people I have ever known have been among those who lived well, — who eat freely several times a day of the most nutritious food. By some it is said that tobacco, snuff, tea, coffee, butter, and even *bread*, cause this complaint; but whoever will make inquiries on this subject throughout the community, will find that this is seldom true. In fact, dyspepsia prevails, according to my experience, altogether the most among the very temperate and careful, — among those who are temperate and careful as regards what they eat and drink, and the labor they put upon the stomach; but exceedingly careless how much labor they put upon that more delicate organ, the brain. Such people often eat nothing but by the advice of the Doctor, or some Treatise on Dyspepsia, or by weight; nor drink any thing that is not certainly harmless; they chew every mouthful until they are confident, on mature reflection, that it cannot hurt the stomach. Why then are they dyspeptics? Because, with all their carefulness, they pay no regard to the excitation of the brain. They continue to write two or three sermons or essays in a week, besides reading a volume or two, and magazines,

reviews, newspapers, &c., and attending to much other business calculated to excite the mind." — pp. 104, 105.

It is very true that anxiety and over-application of mind, such as the perpetual production of sermons, joined with other perpetual occupations of a sedentary and thoughtful nature, tend to produce dyspepsia, in some of its varieties, nay, do almost infallibly produce it; — and let ministers and parishioners look to this well; — but is not carelessness of living, eating too much and of too many things, a frequent concomitant cause? And after a man has made himself ill of dyspepsia by studying too much and eating too much and exercising too little, is it not better that he should live carefully than carelessly, in order to bring himself back to a healthy state? We agree with Dr. Brigham, however, entirely, that if the patient does not leave off his excessive study, abstinence from food will avail him nothing. He never will get well, unless he gives due rest to his brain and nerves as well as to his stomach. Let such a patient hear the experience of our author.

"The most instances of cure which I recollect, have been in those individuals whose *minds* have been permitted to rest from accustomed labors, or have been directed to new pursuits, or relieved from anxiety and care. Some have travelled far, and have recovered; voyages have restored others. Some have become husbands and forgotten their stomach complaints; some have succeeded in business and are well; some are in, or out of office, and thus their minds are freed from long-continued anxiety; while others remain as they were several years since, having just discovered, for the twentieth time, some new, and as they believe, an effectual remedy for their indigestion; but which will assuredly disappoint them, if they do not cease from mental toil, and for a while let the excited brain be quiet." — p. 109.

We presume that our readers have been entertained and instructed by the extracts which we have set before them from this book; and will agree with us, that the interesting style in which its author presents and illustrates his views, is well calculated to obtain for them a favourable consideration.

THE

CHRISTIAN EXAMINER

No. LVI.

NEW SERIES — No. XXVI.

MAY, 1833.

ART. I. — *Communicant's Manual. Devotional Exercises, Prayers, and Hymns, more particularly designed for the use of Communicants. With a short Introduction on the Origin, Nature, and Obligation of the Lord's Supper.*

WE have not yet quite done with the subject of religious institutions. We have given considerable space to this subject for a year or two past in our pages; but we have still some supplementary remarks to offer, before we can feel that we have fully discharged our humble duty to this important department of religious influences.

There are, in particular, certain mistakes which we wish to notice. The present is considered by many as the age of spirituality in religion; and it is somewhat too carelessly alleged, that the natural and necessary tendency of this spirit of the age, is to break away from what is called the bondage of forms and usages. It is true, indeed, that religious observances are justly held to be less essential in some respects, than they were in former days, and in less enlightened ages. That is to say, they are justly held to be, not the very essence of religion; not to possess any absolute and independent value as mere forms; not to be substitutes for practical virtue; not to be methods of appeasing a guilty conscience, or of procuring the favor of Heaven. But there are respects, on the other hand, in which we undertake to say, that religious observances are not a whit less essential, than they were held to be in the most superstitious ages. They are not a whit less essential, *as means of religious knowledge and impression.* Their importance, as means, in

fact, was never overrated. Nay, it was the very error of former times to regard them too much as ends, and therefore too little as means. And if the spirituality of the present day is tending to whelm all ideas, good and bad, of religious usages, in undistinguishing reprobation, then is this spirituality not what it should be, a discreet and sound judgment, but a rash and blind impulse. The truth is, there is to be, and there must be, a growing appreciation of the utility of religious observances. The public mind is yet, to some degree, mystified about this matter, but it will yet come to see and estimate things more clearly and rationally. It confounds together, at present, things which it will yet see to be totally distinct. Superstition about forms is one thing; an intelligent use of them is another. But superstition, like a cloud, has overspread the whole field of religious institutions, so that many see nothing there but the cloud, — no work to do, no soil to cultivate, no productions to be reared. When they do come to see distinctly, they will perceive that religious forms are not to be neglected, not to be shrunk from, or coldly passed by, as some of them now are, because too solemn or awful, not to be disused, in fine, but only to be used in a new manner, and that they are to be used, — we shall not hesitate to say it, — more heartily and devoutly than they ever were before. A spiritual age, as we sometimes hear it said, outgrowing forms and usages! We might as well say, that an intelligent age is outgrowing books and reading, and all fixed times of study, all fixed application of mind.

Indeed, a religious observance is but a form, mode, or season of *attention* to the subject of religion; and therefore has most especial claims upon an intelligent and spiritual age. A religious observance, we repeat, is a mode of attention; and although there are other views of its utility which might be urged, this seems to us to be the leading one, and it is, at any rate, the view which we wish at present to offer and illustrate.

The mistakes to be corrected by this view of the subject, are, — first, that which has been already adverted to, that an interest in forms must decline amidst the growing spirituality of the age; — secondly, the idea closely analogous to the first, that forms are but poor and puerile things in religion, "weak and beggarly elements"; — and thirdly, the notion that

the obligation to be constantly religious, to be religious at all times, conflicts with the obligation to devote particular times and seasons to the offices of piety. With this statement of the objects we have in view, let us proceed to the illustration of the particular argument, which we have advanced, for religious institutions.

Religious institutions or observances, then, are forms, modes, or seasons of *attention to religion.* The Sabbath is a time of attention to religion. It is not to be regarded as a day for being more religious, more conscientious, more under the guidance of a principle of duty than we are required to be on other days; but as a day for giving more attention to religion than we can give at other seasons of life. Religious worship, again, whether public or private, is an act of contemplation. It has other characteristics and uses indeed; it is prayer, and as prayer it may be answered; but it is, also, the contemplation of God, and it has its most obvious and direct use, as contemplation, impressing, as it naturally does, a deeper sense of the perfection and presence of God. So also the service of the Communion is a mode of attention. It is true, that it is likewise a commemorative act, and an act of avowal or profession; and in these views it has its advantages. But its greatest advantage, perhaps, lies in its direct effect upon the mind, and this is the effect of attention. It is a fixed and solemn meditation upon Jesus Christ, as a meek, patient, forgiving, redeeming, triumphant Sufferer. In the same manner infant baptism, with those who practise it, is designed to fix attention on the parental obligations and duties.

Now, attention is the grand instrument of impression. It is such in every thing else, as well as in religion. It is such by the very law of our nature. It is such by the appointment of God. All the means of grace,—consideration, meditation, reading, prayer, the ordinances of religion,—may be resolved into this one direction, "attend; give heed." There is no other conceivable method by which a rational being can attain to the knowledge or feeling of any truth, doctrine, or duty, but attention.

This attention to religion, then, it is a matter of the last consequence that men should give. They cannot be religious without it. And it is of this that they are most exposed to fail. "The cares of this life," the tasks of labor, the occu-

pations of business, preclude, from the hours which they occupy, the necessary degree of attention. Worldly engagements, even when they are turned to the best moral account, when they are made a useful discipline for the soul, when they are made as they may and should be, to minister to all our virtues, still prevent, for the time being, that fixed attention to religion which is needful. We say, needful, — for no knowledge of whatever subject will be deep, no sentiment of whatever kind will be profound, unless it springs from intense contemplation. The business of this world cannot be thoroughly understood, the sciences and arts cannot be completely mastered, and, what is more to the purpose, their power and beauty cannot be deeply and habitually felt, but upon this condition. Religion exacts no less; and this is not an arbitrary demand, for, from the nature of things, it can exact no less. Whoever expects to be a confirmed, consistent, and happy Christian without devoted attention to the subject, without frequent and fixed contemplation of the virtues of Christianity, will as certainly fail of success, as the negligent artist, student, or man of business will fail. This, indeed, is the secret of the failure of thousands in religion. They think to go on, upon the strength of one grand season of attention at the commencement of their career; or they think that by the glare of spiritual beacon-lights kindled up from time to time over the land, they shall be enabled to walk in the path that shineth brighter and brighter. Or, rejecting all impulses, paroxysms, and *revivals* in religion, they neglect to adopt in their place regular, appointed, and solemn weekly and daily meditations. They wonder that they cannot be happy in their religion, they wonder that they cannot habitually feel its power and reality, when they give not half the earnest heed to it that they give to every other interest of life. Would they understand a foreign language; they do not think it enough occasionally to turn over the leaves of a book written in that language, and carelessly to sigh, and wish that they understood it. They do not think it enough to employ teachers. But they take daily lessons and study them; and they keep up a regular attention to the subject for years. And yet they expect to understand the language of heaven, a language which treats of things far and widely foreign to their worldly apprehensions; a language whose sublime meanings eternity will be

for ever unfolding, — they expect to understand it all by carelessly wishing that they understood it. The truth is, that there is a great, prevailing, public, and almost authorized mistake in this matter; and the result is, that the principle of religion, in its prevailing forms, has by no means come to its full strength, or to its full satisfaction. It is in the breasts of thousands a weak, wavering, hesitating, half painful, and more than half useless and unproductive principle. Oh! where are the Christians, — where, in any considerable numbers, are they, who are cultivating the great science of religion, and the glorious art of holy living, with half the steadiness and zeal, with which artists are bodying forth the beautiful creations of genius, with which poets are laboring to perfect their immortal productions, with which the learned are sounding the depths of philosophy and science, or with which the industrious and enterprising are toiling to build up the splendid, but perishing fabrics of worldly fortune! Never, till we see labors like these in the service of religion, shall we see *Christians*, well and fully worthy of the name!

Here, then, comes in the needful ministry of religious forms and observances. They are not the only modes of attention to religion, but they are modes of attention, of which we should avail ourselves the more eagerly and gladly, and to which we should address ourselves the more earnestly and devotedly, just in proportion as the cares of this life are apt to draw away our thoughts from heavenly objects. Hours of deep religious meditation, not only create a deep sense of religion for the time which nothing else can create, but they spread a savour over the hours of business and pleasure, and they tend gradually in proportion as they are faithfully used, to hallow the whole scene of our daily labors and enjoyments. They are the cool, and silent, and shaded fountains, whose waters spread freshness and verdure as they flow onward through the vale of life. The traveller gains rest and refreshment in these still retreats; and such retreats should the traveller to eternity find, lest he grow weary in the way, or forget to press onward in the great moral pilgrimage. The Sabbath season should be joyfully welcomed and sacredly cherished, as a season for recollection, for prayer, for gathering up anew the energies of the spiritual life. Then is it sanctified indeed, and then only, when it is used not for its own sake, not for the sake of satisfying any super-

stitious feeling, but when it is used to spread sanctity over all the other days of the week.

The propriety, as well as necessity of such definite seasons and modes of attention to religion, may be further argued from the manner in which all other subjects and interests are pursued in life. If an object is worth any thing, it is worth attention; and if it is worth attention, it is worth the time necessary to that end. We can give nothing less, and nothing else, to any valuable personal interest; and we do give this perpetually, periodically, weekly, daily. If we would cultivate our minds, or spread a general intelligence among the people, we have "set times" appointed for it; we have schools, lessons, tasks; lyceums, libraries, and definite pursuits of science and literature. If we would cultivate reason, we do not think it enough to let it take its chance with the events of life as they rise, though it is indeed to make the utmost use of them; but we also distinctly apply ourselves to the cultivation of this faculty; we read, we study. We have "set times" also for business, and when the opportunities for acquisition are unusually favorable, we give special attention to it. The merchant is obliged often to think deeply; he spends many hours in this way,—some portion perhaps of every evening; and if he cannot say as the Psalmist did concerning religion, "I meditate in the night-watches; I prevented the dawning of the morning," yet concerning business, he can often say this: he must study the legislation of his own country, and acquaint himself with foreign affairs, and upon a knowledge of these he must found his plans. It will not do for him, without any foresight or calculation, to take hold of one thing and another, as it offers; such irregularity would be fatal to him. He must, indeed, be industrious and active; but his industry and activity must be pervaded by large and well-considered views and principles. So, also, the proprietor of an estate must proceed upon a comprehensive and well studied view of its situation and capabilities. If the laborers were to take the implements of husbandry, and go forth into the fields to strike a blow here and there, as they saw cause at the moment, nothing would be accomplished. Instead of this, one field after another is to be thoroughly cultivated, and this, too, upon some good plan, upon some good general understanding of the business of agriculture. Again,—to take another

illustration, — the immediate end of labor is subsistence. In order to sustain the body we must have food. Now, there are "set times" for taking food: the process of digestion is going on continually; but there must be "set times" for receiving the nutriment. And we believe, if the homeliness of the illustration may be excused by its pertinency, that it is just as necessary to have "set times," or some times, in other words, for the reception of spiritual food, — for the reception, that is to say, of those ideas and views on which the soul lives. They can be received *only* by attention; and attention, if it is not perpetual, which it cannot be, must be given at some time or other, and that time, to secure the object with the body of mankind, must be a "set time."

Let us offer one more illustration, and we will take it from a sphere of human exertion more congenial, more kindred to religion perhaps than any other, — we mean that of the fine arts, poetry, painting, sculpture. The ideal, the perfection of beauty, is here the object; and the perfection of excellence is the object in religion. Other things being equal, every man's advancement in moral excellence will keep pace with his conceptions of that excellence. And with the same qualification, every man's attainments in poetry, painting, and sculpture will keep pace with the strength and accuracy of his conceptions of the true and beautiful in art. Now, how is the artist to improve and exalt his conceptions of those lovely forms and of those glorious ideas which it is his object to body forth? Is it enough for him to pass among men, and to take an impression here and there, as it may offer itself to his observation? This he is to do indeed; but is this all? Is it enough to make him a great poet, like Milton, or a great painter, like Raphael? Surely not. He must study. He must spend hours in deep contemplation. He must strive with distinct and fixed effort to perfect his conceptions of whatsoever is fair and majestic, in form, in manner, and mind. So must the religious man labor. If he would rise to any lofty point of excellence, if he would feel the transcendent power and loveliness of that which he professes to love, and to pursue as his great end, he must meditate; he must pray; he must steadily contemplate the perfection of God; he must ponder upon the vision of goodness till he is enraptured with its beauty; he must muse till the fire burns.

We anticipate the objection to all this. We know it will be said, that religion is a different thing from intelligence, business, or art. A vague idea of some vague thing, — is, indeed, about all the conception that multitudes have of religion. What! a quality, like reason, to be cultivated, — a plan of proceeding to be settled, — a field to be tilled, — a science to be studied, — an art to be perfected, — they never thought of it in this light! No, it is a set of vague impressions with them, made, they scarcely know how, communicated, they scarcely know from whence, whether from the heavens above, or from the earth beneath, and left to take such chance as events, circumstances, and some occasional thoughts may give it. And yet there are some who strangely think, that, under this negligent tuition, the religious principle promises to make such progress as to be able, by and by, to take care of itself: nay, and they have visions of a time when churches will be no longer needed, and the ministry may be laid aside, and the ordinances of meditation and prayer may be abolished.

Now, that religion is a different thing from other things, may be admitted; but in what is it different? Is it different in its demands upon attention, care, cultivation? This is the point in question. And we answer, that it does indeed differ from other things and themes; but it differs precisely and especially in this, that it demands *more* attention, care, cultivation, than any thing else. It is the very end and consummation of all human inquiries and attainments. Is the knowledge of God, — is the knowledge of virtue easier to be fathomed, than the knowledge of any science or occupation? Who can be so presumptuous, or so thoughtless rather, as to say this? What are the themes that are to exhaust, and yet for ever to overpower the faculties of all intelligent souls, if not divine truth and virtue, and the perfection of the divine and Infinite Being!

But it may be asked, "What then are the weak and ignorant to do in religion?" We answer; As they are to do in other things, poorly. They may act according to their light; but does it follow that they need no more light? And, especially, does it follow that those who have ability and opportunity to seek for further light, should forego their privilege and neglect their duty? Do men reason so about other things? Because the ignorant can get along in their igno-

rance, do others say, that they will seek no knowledge? Because the poor can get along in their poverty, do others say that they will not seek riches?

But we must press the point of our illustrations a little further. We are endeavouring to demonstrate the propriety, utility, and therefore, we might say, the duty of religious observances. For this purpose, we have adduced some illustrations from other branches of human pursuits; and there are some ideas and maxims to which we now wish to apply this principle of comparison.

One of these is the idea which some appear to entertain that there is something mechanical, contracted, and almost puerile in a zealous and conscientious attendance upon religious observances. They would be rather ashamed to have it supposed that any part of their reason for a regular attendance at Church was a conscientious feeling of obligation. They say, moreover, that this concentration of religious attention upon certain points is adverse to the generous and wide diffusion of the religious principle through the whole of life. But do they think or feel thus about other things? Are they ashamed to study other subjects, and to appoint hours of study, from a sense of duty? Or do they think that deep study is adverse to good common sense and general intelligence. Misdirected application, indeed, may be; the scholastic learning of the dark ages, was. But is it necessarily so? Is it actually so, at the present day? Is the studious lawyer, physician, or clergyman, the man who least understands the general duties of his profession? Upon whom does the community rely in these professions? — upon the shallow and careless, or upon the studious and deep-thinking?

There is a maxim, too, about attendance at church, not often expressed, perhaps, but often felt by the negligent, — which is this, "that they can go to church any time." The opportunity recurs weekly, and the neglecter of public worship says, "if he does not go to-day, he can go next Sabbath, he can go any time." This plea, that they can go any time, amounts, with some, to an argument for their going to church seldom or never. They have the excellent consideration that they can go always, for never going. But not to dwell upon the inconsistency of this reasoning, nor upon so extreme a case, — when the Sabbath morning finds a man,

from indolence, or the apprehension of inclement weather, averse to attendance at church, and, he says, "it is no great matter; he shall go next Sabbath"; or he says, "he believes he shall not go out to-day," and there lurks in the very emphasis with which he says it, the apology that there are other days, and enough of them, for public worship,— let us ask him if he reasons thus about other things. Business may be done *every* day. Is that a reason with a man of business for sitting indolently by his fireside *any* day? Amusements in most populous places are of regular recurrence. Does inclement weather, or do dark and stormy nights even, prevent an attendance upon them? Are not means found to relieve all difficulties and remove all objections? Who avoids the inconvenience or expense, with saying, that he can just as well have the pleasure at another time? No; the rule in worldly affairs is, to have the pleasure, the profit, the advantage *now*, and at another time *too*. And yet this is the state of society, the state of social habits and usages, — all in favor of secular, all against religious interests, — in which, nevertheless, religion is making such progress, it is thought, as to be outgrowing the need of all special helps and institutions!

Once more, and with regard not to public worship on the Sabbath, but with regard to the employment of the whole day, — a man says, "he does not intend to spend the Sabbath in a particularly religious manner; he would be religious every day: he does not mean to attend to religion more at one time than another; his is not a religion of hours and minutes, but a religion of the spirit." And once more we ask, if he reasons thus about other things. A favorable conjuncture arises in business; a grand opportunity for acquisition offers itself. Such, surely, is the Sabbath for the acquisition of religious knowledge, — it is time, and time which, whether hallowed by divine authority or not, may be turned to great account. Now, concerning the first, does this man, or any man say, — does he say, when a grand chance for a moneyed speculation presents itself, "no, he shall do nothing about it, — he intends to do business every day, and no more one day than another?" Far enough from it. His attention is aroused and fixed; he seizes the opportunity; and if it should slip by him unimproved, he is exceedingly vexed with himself, that he should have ne-

glected it. Why should he not do thus, only the more earnestly, — why should he not feel thus, only the more gravely, in the matters of religion? To illustrate this point still farther, let us remark, that there are two ways of observing nature, — that of ignorance, seeing only what is obvious, and that of science, contemplating the connexions, dependencies, and uses of things. Now suppose a man were to say, that he intended to be a constantly scientific observer, and, therefore, he should not give more attention to the subject at one time than another. Would this be a sensible or successful course with science? Should we not say that there must be definite studies to prepare for this scientific observation of nature? And on what principle can we say less than this of religion? Does not religious action proceed on definite perceptions and principles, as much as scientific observation? Some say, that they would make every day religious, — every day a Sabbath. Let us tell them that they never will do this, till they begin to make the Sabbath different from other days. They may come at length to that happy and hallowed state of mind and of life; but they never will come to it, but through seasons of fixed and deep attention, through the holy Sabbath seasons of meditation and prayer. Nothing else, we repeat and repeat it, — nothing else, but *attention*, is to grave upon their souls the deep and indelible impressions of truth, virtue, and piety!

Here, perhaps, we ought to stop, from a just fear of wearying the patience of our readers. But amidst the growing tendency to the neglect of religious ordinances and observances, which is seen in the legislation, sentiments, and habits, general, domestic, and private, of our people, we deem the subject of such importance that we are unwilling to leave any thing unsaid, which may confirm and enforce the conclusions to which we have come in the foregoing discussion. They are conclusions, it appears to us, which not only commend themselves to the reflecting mind, but which are binding upon the conscience; and yet in both views, whether, that is to say, as reasonable or obligatory, we fear that something may be wanting to their full and practical reception.

The minds of some of our readers may not be entirely satisfied. They may say, that we make religion something too profound and intellectual, and that men have not time

to give so much attention to it; and moreover, that it is not necessary to a man's being a good man that he should think so much. "Religion," they will probably say, — "practical religion is nothing else but constantly doing right; and for doing right we have conscience, or the remembered word of Scripture, or its well known spirit, always present with us; so that we have only to follow the plain rule, to obey the obvious law, from step to step, as we go on; and, therefore, we can be good, virtuous, pious men, without any deep meditations, without any daily prayers, domestic or private, without attending upon any solemn ordinances."

Now, we sustain our conclusions against this view of religion, simply by saying that the view is partial. It is correct, we admit, as far as it goes, but it does not go far enough. This same conscience that is to guide us, is not always clear and certain in its indications. It is, indeed, the needle by which we are to shape our course, but it is constantly liable to be swayed from the true point. Conscience, then, is liable to err; and it asks the aid of reflection. Conscience, moreover, has difficult cases to solve, deep questions to settle. And in the intricacy and complexity of these questions, oftentimes, the very strength of temptation lies. If conscience told us precisely and definitely how far we might go, we might be comparatively safe; but uncertainty, as well as illusion, is a lure to excess. The office of conscience, therefore, cannot be faithfully discharged, without the aid of reason. Indeed, a good man must think. He who would do right, must consider what is right. Conscience is not a passive suggestion, nor a mechanical impulse, but an active, thinking, electing, discriminating power.

Besides, the aim of religion is not confined to the little round of obvious and daily duties. It is designed to be a principle of boundless expansion and improvement in the mind; of unlimited application too; the business is, not merely to do that which presents itself as right, but to seek out the right; not merely to perform obvious duties, but, with a generous, fervent, and philanthropic impulse, to inquire for duties that are not obvious; not merely to see what good it ought to do, but to seek what good it can do. As well should reason do nothing but judge of what falls immediately in its path, and never go out from its work-day toil to the wide regions of discovery, never penetrate the depths of

philosophy. Religion, we repeat, was designed to be a principle of boundless improvement. It seeks to expand its conceptions of every thing divine, true, beautiful, and glorious. It seeks, if haply it may find, the great knowledge of God. And in such exercises and attainments only can it fill to overflowing the deep fountains of the soul. But, for the accomplishment of this great end of religion, meditation is necessary. And if we cannot spend our whole lives in meditation, it is so much the more important that we should appropriate certain seasons to it. Religious institutions are the very dispensation for the industrious and active. If our constant thoughts cannot be devoted to the themes of religion, special observances, special seasons of attention, are the least that we can reasonably give. Instead of being regarded as burdens and tasks, they should be eagerly embraced as welcome resorts, as needful helps.

But reasonable and important as the ordinances of religious meditation are and must be allowed to be, it may still be denied that they are binding upon the conscience. We suppose, the very circumstance that they are usually represented as appointed and binding services, and not as voluntary acts, is unfavorable to the hearty reception and use of them. If all religious institutions were abolished, and if, in the urgent sense of their importance, men were met together to agree upon some usages and ordinances for themselves, we suppose, although they should frame the very ordinances that now exist, that they would engage far more willingly in the observance of them, than they now do. Let them be regarded then, we would say, as voluntary; let every man go back in his reflections to the beginning of things, and conceive himself, as every serious and thoughtful man may, that he *would* have some ordinances of worship and meditation. Let him do this. And yet what good reason can there be, with a reasonable man, why he should not superadd the idea of obligation? Is not that idea involved in the views already taken? If religious observances of some kind are useful, important, and necessary, are they not binding on the conscience? This is the point which we are to examine.

There are those, we conceive, whose minds have been so much occupied with the letter of Scripture, or the rules of discipline, or the requisitions of custom, that they have lost sight of other obligations. They have become convinced,

perhaps, that some act or institution, which they once thought obligatory, is not enjoined by Scripture, or that catechisms, and books of discipline, and public customs are of no binding obligation at all upon the conscience, and they are ready to conclude that what has no express warrant from these sources, is no law. They do not perceive, for instance, that domestic or daily worship, or that the special consecration of the Sabbath, is required in the New Testament, and they hold themselves absolved from all obligation to hallow such times and seasons. But what is the reason that lies at the foundation of every positive institution? It is utility, and utility alone. If, then, any observance is useful, if it promotes our virtue and piety, and is necessary to our improvement, it bears, in this very character, the impress of law. God wills that we should be devout and pure, that we should grow in grace and virtue; and that which we are convinced is necessary to these ends, is as much, and as manifestly, his will to us, as if it had been divinely written on tables of stone, or miraculously uttered amidst the thunders of Sinai. The beneficent universe around us echoes, with all its voices, and confirms by all its spiritual ministrations, the great law, that whatever is good for us, is right, — that improvement, —improvement by all possible means put into our hands, — is our bounden duty.

Now there are freedoms taken, even by sober and conscientious men, with some religious institutions which we can explain into nothing else, but a neglect of this weighty and binding consideration. We know those who do not hesitate to travel on the Sabbath, as often as it suits their convenience, and who, we are certain, would not do this if they were convinced it was wrong. We pray leave to ask such persons one single question. We ask them if they think that the Sabbath is a *useful* institution, — and we would confine attention to that point. Is it useful to themselves? Is it useful to the community? Is it so useful that its neglect or its abolition would be an evil greatly to be deprecated? We may be mistaken, but we do not believe that any man of sense or virtue would deny us either of these positions. Can they be denied? Will any one stake the credit of his common sense and reflection upon a denial of them?

What then is the aspect of this practice, in which so many

indulge themselves? It is plainly this. So often as they causelessly and recklessly ride forth, or sail forth, on the Sabbath, to begin, to continue, or to end a journey, they do just as much as they can to destroy a confessedly useful, an invaluable institution. Their example but requires a general imitation, and the work of its destruction is done, — is more effectually done than it was in France by law, — and as truly done by *them*, as if they had held up their hands in the profane assembly of the French atheists. Example speaks louder than words, or votes. The imitation, indeed, may not follow soon; it may never follow; the Institution may stand. But it will not be upholden by their aid; it will stand in spite of them. And if they are responsible at all, they are just as responsible in the court of conscience, as if the tremendous consequences should follow. If the institution ever falls in this country, the first and fatal blow will be given by the example of respectable and influential men.

Now we will not be told by such persons as we are arguing with, that this is a matter with which conscience has nothing to do. They know very well that conscience is not tied down to the letter of a text. Let the text be as it may, or let their thoughts of it be what they may, — here is the broad fact before them, that the cultivation of piety, and the welfare of society and of their country, are concerned in the support or prostration of the Sabbath; and this fact as distinctly announces to them the command of God, as if it were visibly inscribed on the very path in which they journey, or imprinted upon the very waters on which they sail.

We wish to speak temperately; we wish to speak wisely; we would urge nothing beyond the point, to which the sober judgment of every man will go with us. But really, this is a case where every thoughtful man must make an election. If he maintains that the Sabbath is not useful, and that its abolition is desirable, we have at present not another word to say. But if he does not admit this, as we are almost sure he cannot, — if he believes that it is useful, then he cannot be justified to his conscience, in the neglect or abuse of it. We say again, it is a matter of conscience. If he believes, he must obey. And if he violates the dictates of that belief, — we keep to this point, — we are not reasoning with a man who denies the utility of the institution, — if he

believes it is useful, and violates the dictates of that belief, we see not how he can answer it, either to his conscience, or to his country, or to his God.

We have now touched upon the additional matters that seemed to us to require further notice; but we cannot leave the subject, without saying a word or two more, upon the main point discussed in this article, that is, *attention* to religion. We are persuaded, that the great defect in the religious experience of thousands around us, lies here, and nowhere but here.

At the risk of tediousness in repetition, we will bring forward again, a comparison which we have, in another view, before referred to. Let us suppose that there are two persons equally susceptible of impression from the works of art. The one, let us suppose, remains at home, engaged in the ordinary pursuits of life; the other is placed in Rome, for the cultivation of those powers which both possess alike. The first will feel an occasional admiration for the works of genius, as they are thrown in his way, and that is all. He is very much such a man in relation to the arts, as thousands are in relation to religion. He feels an occasional emotion, an evanescent admiration, but no actuating and governing principle. The other in process of time comes to feel a love of the arts as the grand passion of his being. It influences him in his plans, and actions, and whole life. It thrills through his whole heart, at every contemplation of his favorite pursuits. He converses in private, or he discourses in public, upon models of beauty and grandeur, with familiarity, with delight, with enthusiasm, and often with overpowering emotion. Now, what is it, we ask, that has made the difference between these two persons? And we answer, it is attention, and nothing else but attention.

And attention it is, we say, and nothing else but attention, that will make upon the mind that vivid impression of religion which thousands profess to desire. It is one of the most fixed and familiar laws in mental philosophy, that impression on every subject, other things being equal, depends on the attention given to it. But in religion, men have striven to find out some other and easier way. Frames, experiences, influences, — conversions, excitements, hopes, have they looked to: any thing but attention. This is a process for obtaining religion, too slow, too painful, too thorough. It

has nothing in it, to flatter pride, or to indulge indolence, or to favor the almost incorrigible reluctance of the human heart to *work out* its own salvation. But nothing short of this will suffice. For a fervent and happy experience of religion, attention is the least price that man can pay, or ought to pay. Let him who will not give this, be assured, that no costly offerings, nor prayers substituted for effort, — no, nor repentant tears, can purchase the unspeakable boon. And the attention, too, must be intellectual, active, and faithful. It is not enough negligently to go to church, and passively to listen, either to moving or to dull discourses. It is not enough to wait upon ordinances as mere prescribed forms, as services that must be discharged to satisfy the conscience. There may be a world of formality, and very little fixed and earnest attention. The very modes of attention may be an escape from the act. There must be the act, strong, resolved, patient, persevering; and then, with God's blessing, there will be success. Then will religion be reality, beyond all other realities; and power, beyond all other powers; and joy, beyond all other joys.

We know not who will give this; but we know that they who will not give it, should not complain of their ill success. They should not tell us of their dulness, of their want of feeling and of comfort. They should not tell us, with a tone as if they distrusted the power and truth of religion, that they cannot make it a reality to themselves; that they cannot find its inexhaustible fountains of refreshment and healing and consolation; that they cannot feel its transcendent might, its transporting loveliness, and its blessed victory. They should not tell us this, nor utter a word of complaint; for the way is open, the path is plain, and the end is certain.

We will only say in closing, that we feel greatly obliged to the Compiler of the little volume which we have named at the head of this article. Such books, and many more of the same practical and devotional character, are needed, and greatly needed among us. We seize the present occasion, also, to offer our hearty commendation of the first volume of this new series of "The Christian Monitor," — a commendation which we more fully expressed in preparing our last article on religious institutions, but which, with other matter, we found ourselves obliged to exclude, as that Number was drawing to a close, from the want of space.

ART. II.— *The Life of Samuel Johnson*, LL. D., *including a Journal of a Tour to the Hebrides;* by JAMES BOSWELL, Esq. A new Edition, with numerous Additions and Notes, by J. W. CROKER, LL. D., F. R. S. Boston, [Stereotype Edition,] 1832. [New Impression, New York, George Dearborn, 1833.] 2 vols. 8vo.

WHILE the new Boswell was passing through the press, it was current in conversation, that the errors which "The Edinburgh Review" had so minutely traced out, would be investigated and corrected on this side the water. But, with a trifling exception or two, we see nothing of the kind done. And whatever may be thought of the temper of that article (which is altogether an irrelevant point), their corrections of errors, mainly chronological, are, it is vain to deny it, for the most part just. For instance, the dates pertaining to Sir William Forbes, Allan Ramsay (the painter), Lord Mansfield, and Mr. Derrick ("Master of Ceremonies" at Bath), the three several and contradictory assertions or implications in regard to Mrs. Piozzi's birth and age, the inaccuracy as to Goldsmith's "Traveller," — for it is not worth while to name any more, — remain untouched as they stand in the London edition.

There are also liberties taken by Mr. Croker in his work, on the propriety of which, we cannot hesitate to say, it would not have been at all out of place for an intelligent editor here, to have sat in judgment again. We have now in mind some to which the Scotch critic, finding so much else to do in the work of animadversion, has not referred. Mr. Croker, as an attentive examination will show, has discarded from the margin, in a few instances, not only notes of his predecessor Malone, but what is hardly more devoid of apology, of Mr. Boswell himself. Perhaps some one may surmise, they were not of the highest importance. But any person having a due sense of typographical integrity well knows, that the culpability is affected scarcely at all by this circumstance. It may on the other hand be urged, that they were generally so brief, that, take them all together, not a page, perhaps, has been saved by their rejection; several of them being of that useful class of memoranda as to individuals introduced into the text, which it is so pleasant to recur to

in a work that is such an exhibition of the contemporaneous world, as that in question. What is the gain, then, of such unwarranted assumptions? And where shall such license stop, if it be taken without the most palpable necessity, or, when taken, it receive the tacit consent of the reading public? Of these rejected notes, we shall take the liberty to give an example at length; both because it is short, though it be the longest, probably, and, — be it remembered, — from Mr. Boswell himself. It has also the additional merit of being one of the most pleasant anecdotes in the whole work.

The story is told of Richardson, under the year 1780 (near the close), as illustrative of his vanity.

"A literary lady has favored me with a characteristic anecdote of Richardson. One day, at his country-house at Northend, where a large company was assembled at dinner, a gentleman, just returned from Paris, willing to please Mr. Richardson, mentioned to him a very flattering circumstance, — that he had seen his Clarissa lying on the king's brother's table. Richardson observing that part of the company were engaged in talking to each other, affected then not to attend to it. But by and by, when there was a general silence, and he thought that the flattery might be fully heard, he addressed himself to the gentleman, — 'I think, sir, you were saying something about — ' pausing in a high flutter of expectation. The gentleman, provoked at his inordinate vanity, resolved not to indulge it, and with an exquisitely sly air of indifference, answered, 'A mere trifle, sir, not worth repeating.' The mortification of Richardson was visible, and he did not speak ten words more the whole day. Dr. Johnson was present, and appeared to enjoy it much."

Now we simply ask, if it might not be expected from an editor among ourselves, if himself a man of letters, still more if he have that true love of the Boswellian record, cherished by so many, that he do not, in republishing any classical work, confide so implicitly in the fidelity of his transatlantic brother, as to think he may be spared a careful comparison of the new work with preceding editions, — especially, when they are easy of access; and may not one claim from him the restoration of passages, for whose omission no imaginable cause can be found? Even had the authenticity of such an anecdote come to be doubted since its first insertion, to discard it was not Mr. Croker's business. It was to remain, with his queries or comments, if he chose to make them,

subjoined. Nobody understands this matter better than he; and his editorial execution of the great work throughout, shows, in numerous instances, that the principle here asserted was also his. There was not, indeed, probably any ground for questioning the anecdote, though there might be no absolute certainty of its truth.

Mr. Croker, it should be remembered, says in his Preface, speaking of his own undertaking, "The additions are carefully discriminated, *and hardly a syllable of Mr. Boswell's text, or of the notes in Mr. Malone's editions, have been omitted*"; — adding in the margin, "In two or three places, an indelicate expression has been omitted, and, in half a dozen instances, (*always, however, stated in the notes*), [mark this!] the insertion of new matter has occasioned the omission or alteration of a few words in the text." After the most minute examination and careful collation, we are compelled to say, that Mr. Croker has falsified the above statements. What says he to the anecdote already specified, not to mention minor notes? Beside these, we have detected, almost while writing the present paragraph, the unnoticed omission of a note which can in no sense be called *minor*. We refer to some pleasant notices which Malone had inserted of Mrs. Johnson (the wife), with an anecdote or two of the Doctor subjoined, — given by a Lady Knight from Rome. He who is curious to verify for himself, will find it in the Malone editions under the year 1735, which would occupy, even in the fine type of the edition before us, about *half a column!* This was surely not so trifling as to be thus uncivilly slurred over; and as little could it have been called irrelevant, had that been any part of the present editor's province to settle. And now with what confidence can we accompany an author, thus careless of his deliberate pledges?

So much for the correction of Mr. Croker's errors, and the restoration of his omissions, we could wish to have seen. But other amendments on the English work there was room for, and while upon the subject, we will take the liberty to suggest some of them. It was a part of Mr. Malone's editorial praise, that he furnished to a large extent numerous brief memoranda of the *dramatis personæ* who come upon the scene, more or less, in these pages. Mr. Boswell, as is not perhaps strange, did himself very little in this way. He did

not himself, perhaps, foresee, with all his vanity, the full celebrity that his narrative was to gather from time; and the succession of years alone would gradually show the utility of such notices. They are, however, particularly pleasant in regard to such persons, as have too little consequence to find a place in a biographical dictionary, and yet have so much from their recurrence in this essentially dramatic work, that the reader is not indifferent what became of them, after the curtain has fallen on the hero. But attentive as Mr. Malone was to this part of his task, he left, after all, many deficiencies which Mr. Croker has supplied in part; and we cannot say more than this. We are glad that he has given us some slight minutes, — too slight in a part of these references, — of General Oglethorpe, Dr. Brocklesby, Dr. Lawrence, George Stevens, Sir Alexander Dick, Lord Hailes, Lord Monboddo, Mr. Boswell's friend George Dempster, Sir William Forbes, Rt. Hon. William Wyndham, and perhaps others. But why do such names still seem to be overlooked, as Dr. Percy, Dr. Burney and his family, General Paoli, the Dillys, the Dodsleys, Thomas Davies, John Wilkes, George Colman (the elder), Miss Seward, Mrs. Garrick, not to add, indeed, Mrs. Piozzi herself? As is known to every one with whom Boswell's pages are as household words, there is no one of the above who does not make something of a figure there; and as to such of them as may without impropriety be called public characters, the important events and periods are not so familiar to the memory, as to make such memoranda as we speak of, undesirable. How small an expense of trouble or space would the supplying of them, if timely thought of, have required.

The Edinburgh critic counts it as a manifest injury to the new edition, that the selections from Hawkins and Piozzi are given, or rather, ushered in, in the third person. We heartily respond to his stricture. The vivacity of the narrative inevitably suffers hereby; and, besides, some two or three words or more of Mr. Croker are of necessity foisted into the text, at the opening of each extract, introduced from those biographers. And all this, too, without the slightest occasion. Here again a very slender measure of judgment in an editor of the reprint might have sufficed to set all right; and the change of a word or two would have restored the selections to the shape in which they stood in the original authors, and which they should retain.

All-comprehensive (as respects Johnson) as this new edition of his life no doubt seems to many to be, we shall surprise them by saying, though no very hazardous assertion, that other articles are yet unincorporated with it, which have every way as good a title to be included as many things that are so, and whose omission we cannot but esteem a loss. As an example of what we mean, take the account of Dr. (as he was called) Levett, in "The Gentleman's Magazine" soon after his death, in 1782, which Malone, who refers to it in a note, ascribes to the pen of George Stevens, Esq. Old Levett was for very many years one of Johnson's household, and almost as closely identified with him as any individual of his time. Stevens's account is exceedingly lively and pleasant, — for as Johnson himself said, many things in Levett's life made romance, in comparison, tame; and among the various articles, not more closely pertinent to the subject, transferred from the journal just mentioned, to the new edition, what, we cannot forbear to ask, could more fitly have found a place? Its limits would not greatly exceed a page.

Mr. Croker again, though to specify all the professed or casual notices of Johnson on which he has levied contributions would make a long list, scarcely hints at such a Life as that of Dr. Anderson (the editor of the British Poets); the most impartial, we rather suspect, of all the Doctor's principal biographers. There is not much in its contents, that may not be found elsewhere, it is confessed; but the notes, we think, might have contributed something to a labor like that under notice; those of Dr. Percy (Bishop of Dromore) especially, one of Johnson's earliest friends, and one of the most familiar names in Boswell, were certainly worthy of something better than the neglect they have received. From a few of Beattie's letters, in his Life by Sir William Forbes, some things amusing, and to the purpose, might have been derived; both the biographer and his hero are often met with in the Johnsonian circle. Numerous as are Mr. Croker's notes, it is quite unaccountable to us how he happened to leave untouched one of the most important circumstances of Johnson's childhood, — his early malady, the king's evil, and his presentation to Queen Anne for the royal touch. The subject very properly gives occasion, with Sir John Hawkins, and the editor, also, of Pickering's Oxford edition of 1826, to extended notes.

We have, in the foregoing remarks, hinted at improvements, of which even the London edition of this most popular classic, complete and thorough as it may seem, was yet susceptible at the hands of an accomplished republisher in our own region. Such an advantage we were certainly predisposed to think that this work enjoyed; and are sorry that the actual reprint should at all undeceive us.

To close what we had to offer on the Boston edition, a word or two must be added as respects the Index. If we have not been very unfortunate in the references to which the preparation of these remarks has led us to turn, it stands grievously in need of revision. There is one sad sort of blunder, in particular, of which the instances are so many, that we must beg leave and room to specify; to wit, the confounding of individuals, having in part the same name. Thus John Dyer, the poet, is merged in Samuel Dyer, Esq., Johnson's eminent contemporary, and one of the Club (ii. 39.); and Dr. Henry King, Bishop of Chicester (in James and Charles the First's time) in Dr. William King, Principal of St. Mary Hall, Oxford, when Johnson received his first degree from that University (i. 526). In like manner, the Rev. Archibald Campbell of St. Andrews University, Scotland, is strangely blended with Dr. John Campbell, the voluminous writer (i. 156). Dr. Robert Watson, the historian of Philip the Second, is confounded with the late Bishop of Llandaff (i. 340, 343, 344); and a long series of references meant for Mr. Thomas Sheridan, the teacher of elocution, are given to his son, Richard Brinsley.

But we cannot pass from so pleasing a subject of contemplation as Boswell's great work, without seizing so favorable an opportunity of adverting more at length to the merits of the new English editor; the rather, as it is but an act of justice to recant our first impressions respecting him. We have already touched upon some of the mistakes and blunders adduced by the Edinburgh reviewer; and though it must be conceded there are many such, we are, upon second thoughts, more inclined to wonder at their fewness, when we look at the extent of the work, its infinite variety of matter, and singular minuteness of detail. His must be a jaundiced eye indeed, who, surveying the whole extent of his labor, can pronounce upon Mr. Croker so sweeping a sentence of condemnation as the one fulminated from that distinguished

journal. On the contrary, few, very few classical works have been favored with editors so accomplished for their task, who have entered into it more truly *con amore*, or whom their love for it has led patiently to submit to greater nicety and exactness of research. Mr. Croker tells us, with some apparent satisfaction, that his notes amount to twenty-five hundred. He must of course include in such a statement a great number which contain only the briefest possible references. But, all deductions made, what an example does it present of editorial devotedness and interest! They so swallow up the labors of his predecessors, that we were not surprised to hear from one of our literary friends, after perusing it, the confident conclusion, that Mr. Croker must have discarded most of the notes of Malone; and, we remember, these strike the eye, as pretty frequent in the previous editions. But he who makes a *comparative* examination, will find that he has done so but seldom; though it would be better still, if we could say, he had not at all. With all this profuseness of annotation, we are free to say, that the proportion is very small of such as one could wish either curtailed or dispensed with; having had so much curiosity as to turn over a number of pages by way of experiment as to this very point. Mr. Croker has done however in several instances,—what strikes us as a matter of questionable courtesy, at least, if not propriety,—affixed his own name to notes, *in substance*, Boswell's or Malone's, to which he has superadded little, in some cases (if our discernment be not of the dullest) nothing whatever.

To Mr. Croker,—delicate and ticklish as was the office before him,—the praise of independence and impartiality, in our judgment, well belongs. His notes, as to Johnson himself, are what the paragraph in relation to him in the Preface prepares us to find them. It seems to us he has held an even-handed balance; not wanting in that due admiration for his hero, which, it is a critical axiom, is essential to a good editor; and, on the other hand, ever prompt to set forth, without scruple or fear, his failings, when the partiality of Boswell was too blind to see, or diligent to cover them.

Mrs. Piozzi, of all persons, is under obligation to Mr. Croker for her rescue, times without number, from the critical talons of Boswell and Malone. That this springs not from a spirit of gallantry, but a sense of wrong, is apparent

in this, that he is not an indiscriminate champion. One point of her history there is, on which he not only resigns her to her adversaries, but makes common cause with them,— her unhappy *mésalliance*. Mr. Croker speaks of it as a sort of insanity; and it is curious enough to notice the consent of Johnson and all the biographers and editors on this topic, although at swords' points on every other. Even Boswell and Hawkins here unite their forces. But, for ourselves, we confess it would be pleasant to be a little more enlightened on this matter than we are now. There is some reason to complain of these biographers, that they say little more of this lady's second husband than to give his name, country, and occupation; while yet, by the strength of their expressions, they leave on every reader's mind a vague impression of the extreme meanness of Signor Piozzi, which, when he sets about to analyze, he finds himself at a loss.

However Sir John Hawkins may stand in point of general popularity,—and he does not stand high, we apprehend,— we scruple not to thank Mr. Croker for generously interposing, in what seems almost going on a forlorn hope, the defence of that much abused writer. The knight's "malignity" has long been a sort of watch-word among the Johnsonian biographers. This has been the favorite term of Malone, Alexander Chalmers, and we may add, in the way of slight allusion, Arthur Murphy, they deeming it their duty, as legitimate successors of Mr. Boswell, to take up and renew the cry which he began. It has been rung so long, and with so little contradiction, that to many this may be tantamount to a proof. All readers remember how often Mr. Boswell is leaving the text in order to bring his antagonist before the public bar in the notes. These betray, in numerous instances, the mere humor of contradiction, a fretful endeavour to insult by insinuations of ignorance or stupidity; in others, this captiousness of temper is so at a loss for ways in which to vent itself, as to border on the ludicrous, and provoke a smile. Thus, adverting to the rival Life, he calls it, "Sir John's *bulky* tome"! A volume of scarcely more than six hundred pages was something of a monster in literature, we infer. They are no rarities certainly in our day. What other effect is such an impotent expression of the splenetic spirit likely to have, than a recoil on the writer? Sir John's biography, it is frankly owned, betrays in many parts of it

a mind soured with mankind, and a judgment plainly distorted, in respect to Johnson in particular; but of malignity we can see no trace. Indeed, we appeal to any intelligent reader, if, after a careful comparison of both books, the lights and shadows in which the Doctor's more prominent traits appear on Hawkins's page, are not as true to nature, as the unmixed and glaring brightness with which he is invested by his overweeningly fond companion. And we cannot but observe here, that, aware as Sir John must doubtless have been of the extreme antipathy of his fellow-biographer, this, if secretly returned, at least was not repaid in kind. He allows not the reader to see it. So dignified is he in this respect, that the contrast is striking. While Mr. Boswell was preparing for him a place so conspicuous in his own work, the knight, forgetting the etiquette of politeness, mentions the other but once; and this is, as the Doctor's companion in the Hebridean Tour,—where he speaks of Mr. Boswell as *one who highly valued him.* Very likely indeed is it, that in this oversight the secret sore had its origin. *Hinc illæ lachrymæ!*

Sir John's principal weakness as a writer is, without dispute, that on which the wits and satirists have bestowed so liberally their ridicule,—his continual aberrations from his subject. He flies away at a tangent, whenever an agreeable opportunity for excursion offers, and for some twenty or thirty pages together, as it may chance, shows a most amusing forgetfulness of having any other subject in hand. We do not at this instant recollect so strong a case of rambling biography; yet it seems to us rather too much to say (as it is somewhere said), that Johnson is quite lost in the pages of the writer. The above quality of Sir John's book, with other vulnerable points, was very pleasantly and keenly satirized in three successive papers in "The Gentleman's Magazine" for 1787, (entitled "Hawkins *versus* Johnson,") which, it has since appeared, came from the pen of Professor Porson.

If an exception were taken to the specific editorial qualities we began with claiming for Mr. Croker, it is natural to expect it might be by Mr. Boswell himself, or those who are partial to him. Mr. Croker's prejudice towards him whom he was mainly to illustrate, steals forth in numberless instances. We confess ourselves unable to divine its cause. Those particulars concerning distant individuals which can be most easily

traced, furnish no clue, — political sympathies, for example. Herein we suppose them to be substantially alike; — true sons of the church, and, in affairs of the state, tories *imo pectore*. Johnson himself, indeed, could he have dictated and arranged this point while living, it may be thought, could not have found men more after his own heart, to rear the monument to his memory. There is just that fitness and proportion between the hero and his biographers and editors, which, whether their principles agree with our own or not, we like to see: all being thorough-paced tories, Johnson, Boswell, Malone, Alexander Chalmers (who conducted the edition of 1822, intervening between Malone's and Croker's), and last, though not least, John Wilson Croker; — the last certainly as yet, and if we make bold to call him so prospectively, it is because to his successors, if he shall have them, nothing, so to speak, is left to perform.

ART. III. — *Woman, in her Social and Domestic Character.* By Mrs. JOHN SANDFORD. From the London Edition. Boston. Leonard C. Bowles. 1833. 12mo. pp. 180.

WITHOUT believing that woman needs to be reminded of her duty more frequently and directly than man, but being ready to welcome any good book of advice addressed to either sex, we recommend this volume to those for whose benefit it was intended, and whose happiness and usefulness we think it well adapted to promote. It does not discuss the question, nor is it one which we shall discuss, whether sons or daughters, brothers or sisters, husbands or wives, fathers or mothers, best discharge their respective duties, but it aims to teach woman how to fulfill, in the best manner, her several callings and stations, whether man fulfills his own well or ill; — assuming the principle as a truth, which doubtless is a truth, that the good conduct of the one sex will have a favorable and not injurious effect on the behaviour of the other. A wise person will never refuse wholesome counsel, on the plea that it is as much or more needed by another. On the contrary, it will generally be found, that they who least require, are the most willing to receive it, and act upon it. This very circumstance, in fact, has had

no small influence in raising them to their moral superiority. They have always been accustomed to prófit by instruction, rather than lose their time in curiously, or perhaps captiously, inquiring why it is particularly offered to them. Convinced that they are not perfect, they desire to go on toward perfection, and are thankful for every help by the way.

On this ground it is, that Mrs. Sandford, though she refers to the greater neglect of religion by men, urges a still increased attention to it on women, in two excellent chapters, the one entitled, "Importance of Religion to Woman," and the other, "Female Influence on Religion." It is as hard to deny the truth, as it is to be blind to the beauty, of the following paragraphs.

"Christian ethics are the only true morality; for they are the only morality which is both universal and minute. They are not a code, but a charter; not an institute, but a principle. They give to woman precisely that dignity which is consistent with her dependence: a dignity not of station, but of feeling, which makes her morally great, but practically subordinate.

"All that the world can offer her is, in fact, of little value. Neither the blaze of rank, the triumph of coquetry, nor the *éclat* of beauty or fashion, can really elevate her. They may all impart a mock lustre, but confer no true dignity.

"Religion is her only elevating principle. It identifies itself with the movement of her heart, and with the action of her life, spiritualizing the one, and ennobling the other. Duties, however subordinate, are to the religious woman never degrading; their principle is their apology. She does not live amidst the clouds, or abandon herself to mystic excitement: she is raised above the sordidness, but not above the concerns of earth; above its disquietudes, but not above its cares.

"Religion is just what woman needs. Without it she is ever restless or unhappy; ever wishing to be relieved from duty, or from time. She is either ambitious of display, or greedy of pleasure, or sinks into a listless apathy, useless to others, and unworthy of herself. But when the light from heaven shines upon her path, it invests every object with a reflected radiance. Duties, occupations, nay, even trials, are seen through a bright medium; and the sunshine, which gilds her course on earth, is but the dawning of a far clearer day." — pp. 50 – 52.

Mrs. Sandford always speaks of *home* as if her own heart was there, and as of the place where every woman's heart

should be. It is this deep domestic tone pervading her little work, which constitutes one of its principal charms. We perceive it especially, as might have been expected, in the chapters on religion. Take, for instance, these passages.

"A woman's virtues must be genuine. They are to expand, not in the sunshine, but in the shade. And, therefore, they need some vital principle to supply the place of foreign excitement. Religion is this influence, — this germ of every grace, this sap which finds its way through every fibre, and emits the fairest blossoms without the aid of artificial heat.

"The pious woman courts retirement. She seeks not the inertness of quietism, but the calmness and regularity of domestic duty. And though she may sometimes be called to less congenial scenes, she will neither refuse the summons, nor show a peevish reluctance to obey it; yet her taste is *home!* for there she feels she is most useful, most happy, and has most communion with her God.

"And it is the domesticating tendency of religion that especially prepossesses men in its favor, and makes them, even if indifferent to it themselves, desire it, at least, in their nearest female connexions. They can securely confide in one, who is under its sober influence, and whose duties and pleasures lie within the same sphere. They feel no jealousy of a sentiment, which, however intense, interferes with no legitimate affection, but which makes a woman more tender, more considerate, and more sympathizing, than the most ardent passion of romance would do, or the most studied polish of the world." — pp. 52, 53.

Though most earnestly recommending religion to her sex, it is a practical, heartfelt religion, full of humility, gentleness, and charity which our author recommends, and not a spurious kind, full of bustle and words. She thus advises them on the subject of controversy.

"There is a great difference between being religious and affecting the theologian. Yet these are too often confounded; and women who, perhaps, are not remarkable for intellectual endowment, imagine, that because they are in earnest about spiritual concerns, they are qualified to enter the thorny path of controversy. This is, however, a great mistake. Not only is controversy, for the most part, unedifying, and very inappropriate to the gentler sex, but it often diverts them from profitable contemplation, and important duties. Besides, it is apt to make them opinionative and dogmatical, and to lead them to

throw their influence rather into the scale of party than into that of true religion." — pp. 61, 62.

We cannot forbear making one further extract from this volume. It is from the last chapter, on "Female Duties," and towards the close of the book. The author has been speaking of that important duty of a mother, the instruction and care of her children.

"And well is her care repaid. On whom does the infant smile so sweetly as on its mother? To whom do the little boy and girl fly so naturally for sympathy, as to their mother? And often, in after life, does not youth repose its confidence securely on a mother, and seek the counsel of a mother's faithful heart, and hide its griefs in a mother's tender bosom? It is a delightful relationship; and if mothers would secure the love and respect of their children, they must not grudge their attentions to them in their earliest years. They must be willing to sacrifice a little amusement, or a little company, or a little repose for the sake of nursing their infants, or teaching their children, or fulfilling, themselves, offices which, too frequently, they devolve on servants.

"To accomplish, however, these duties, a woman must be domestic. Her heart must be at home. She must not be on the look-out for excitement of any kind, but must find her pleasure, as well as her occupation, in the sphere which is assigned to her.

"St. Paul knew what was best for woman when he advised her to be domestic. He knew that home was her safest place; home her appropriate station. He knew, especially, the dangers to which young women are exposed, when, under any pretence, they fly from home. There is composure at home; there is something sedative in the duties which home involves. It affords security not only from the world, but from delusions and errors of every kind. A woman who lives much at home, hears the rumors merely of conflicts which perplex and agitate all who are involved in them. Opinions are presented to her, not dressed up with all the witchery of eloquence, and fresh from the mouth of their propounder, but divested of extrinsic attractions, and in their true garb. She entertains them with a mind not fevered by excitement, nor athirst for stimulus, but prepared to weigh every thing impartially, and preöccupied by important themes." — pp. 176 – 178.

The reader will think, after perusing the above, that whatever the subject of the song may be, "Home, sweet Home,"

is still its burden. And it is so. If there are any ladies, therefore, who are determined to find their chief happiness, or any very large proportion of it, elsewhere than at home, they had better not read this book, for it cannot please them; — or rather let them read it, and its soft words may win their way into their hearts, and prevail on them to change their determination.

Mrs. Sandford's style is studied, and, though never pedantic or turgid, is, perhaps, a little too ambitious. But this very care which she has taken with it, has rendered it pleasing to the ear, and forms an inducement to the reader to go forward, which a simple style too often fails to furnish. We think the gentleman to whom we are indebted for this American edition of her work, entirely right in following the English copy "without the slightest alteration." We see not that it needs any, and we are glad to have it as it came from her own hands. If there is any thing exclusively local in it, it can easily be separated by the discerning reader from what is generally applicable, and we are sure is no more than marks it for what it is, the work of an English lady.

ART. IV. — *Illustrations of Political Economy.* By HARRIET MARTINEAU.

No. 1. *Life in the Wilds, a Tale.*
No. 2. *The Hill and the Valley, a Tale.*
No. 3. *Brooke and Brooke Farm, a Tale.*
No. 4. *Demerara, a Tale.*

Boston. Leonard C. Bowles. 4 vols. 18mo.

MISS MARTINEAU, in her Preface to these little volumes, sets forth the plan and objects of her work in a clear and animated manner. The reader can form some opinion of her design from the following extract:

"The works already written on political economy almost all bear a reference to books which have preceded, or consist in part of discussions of disputed points. Such references and such discussions are very interesting to those whom they concern, but offer a poor introduction to those to whom the subject is new. There are a few, a very few, which teach the science systematically as far as it is yet understood. These too are

very valuable, but they do not give us what we want, — the science in a familiar practical form. They give us its history; they give us its philosophy; but we want its *picture*. They give us truths, and leave us to look about us, and go hither and thither in search of illustrations of those truths. Some who have a wide range in society and plenty of leisure, find this all-sufficient; but there are many more who have neither time nor opportunity for such an application of what they learn. We cannot see why the truth and its application should not go together, — why an explanation of the principles which regulate society should not be made more clear and interesting at the same time by pictures of what those principles are actually doing in communities.

"For instance: if we want to teach that security of property is necessary to the prosperity of a people, and to show how and in what proportion wealth increases where there is that security, and dwindles away where there is not, we may make the fact and the reasons very well understood by stating them in a dry, plain way: but the same thing will be quite as evident, and far more interesting, and better remembered, if we confirm our doctrine by accounts of the hardships suffered by individuals, and the injuries by society, in such a country as Turkey, which remains in a state of barbarism chiefly through the insecurity of property. The story of a merchant in Turkey, in contrast with one of an English merchant, will convey as much truth as any set of propositions on the subject, and will impress the memory and engage the interest in a much greater degree. This method of teaching political economy has never yet been tried, except in the instances of a short story or separate passage here and there.

"This is the method in which we propose to convey the leading truths of political economy, as soundly, as systematically, as clearly, and faithfully, as the utmost pains-taking, and the strongest attachment to the subject will enable us to do. We trust we shall not be supposed to countenance the practice of making use of narrative as a trap to catch idle readers, and make them learn something they are afraid of. We detest the practice, and feel ourselves insulted whenever a book of the *trap* kind is put into our hands. It is many years since we grew sick of works that pretend to be stories, and turn out to be catechisms of some kind of knowledge which we had much rather become acquainted with in its genuine form. The reason why we choose the form of narrative is, that we really think it the best in which political economy can be taught, as we should say of nearly every kind of moral science. Once more we must apply the old proverb, 'Example is better than pre-

cept.' We take this proverb as the motto of our design. We declare frankly that our object is to teach political economy, and that we have chosen this method not only because it is new, not only because it is entertaining, but because we think it the most faithful, and the most complete. There is no doubt that all that is true and important about any virtue, — integrity, for instance, — may be said in the form of a lecture, or written in a chapter of moral philosophy; but the faithful historian of an upright man, his sayings and doings, his trials, his sorrows, his triumphs and rewards, teaches the same truth in a more effectual as well as more popular form. In like manner, the great principle of Freedom of Trade may be perfectly established by a very dry argument; but a tale of the troubles, and difficulties, and changes of good and evil fortune in a manufacturer and his operatives, or in the body of a manufacturing population, will display the same principle, and may be made very interesting besides; to say nothing of getting rid of the excuse that these subjects cannot be understood.

"We do not dedicate our series to any particular class of society, because we are sure that all classes bear an equal relation to the science, and we much fear that it is as little familiar to the bulk of one as of another." — pp. x–xii.

Miss Martineau does not exaggerate the importance of her subject, when she says, —

"If we were to dedicate our work to all whom it may concern, it would be the same thing as appealing to the total population of the empire. We say this, of course, in reference to the subject, and not to our peculiar method of treating it. Is there any one breathing to whom it is of no concern whether the production of food and clothing, and the million articles of human consumption, goes on or ceases? whether that production is proportioned to those who live? whether all obtain a fair proportion? whether the crimes of oppression and excess on the one hand, and violence and theft on the other, are encouraged or checked by the mode of distribution? Is there any one living to whom it matters not whether the improvement of the temporal condition of the race shall go on, or whether it shall relapse into barbarism? whether the supports of life, the comforts of home, and the pleasures of society, shall become more scanty or more abundant? whether there shall be increased facilities for the attainment of intellectual good, or whether the old times of slavery and hardship shall return? Is any one indifferent whether famine stalks through the land, laying low the helpless, and humbling the proud; or whether,

by a wise policy, the nations of the earth benefit one another, and secure peace and abundance at home by an exchange of advantages abroad? Is there any one living, in short, to whom it matters not whether the aggregate of human life is cheerful and virtuous, or mournful and depraved? The question comes to this: for none will doubt whether a perpetuity of ease or hardship is the more favorable to virtue. If it concerns rulers that their measures should be wise, if it concerns the wealthy that their property should be secure, the middling classes that their industry should be rewarded, the poor that their hardships should be redressed, it concerns all that political economy should be understood. If it concerns all that the advantages of a social state should be preserved and improved, it concerns them likewise that political economy should be understood *by all.*" —pp. xiii, xiv.

Each volume of the work contains, besides the story, a summary of the principles illustrated in it.

Although we doubt very much whether political economy can be so thoroughly taught to the educated and enlightened by stories, as by systematic treatises, yet we are satisfied that some of the most important and practical principles of this science may be conveyed by fictitious narratives to persons who would not acquire them from any other source, and may by the same means be impressed upon many others with a vividness and force which the most elaborate arguments could not produce. Such stories, also, in addition to the information which they directly impart, are obviously calculated to excite and increase a taste for the scene which they illustrate. For these reasons we heartily approve the plan of our author.

But the execution of works of this kind is at least as important as their plan. In this respect also we think our author has been successful. It is evident that she is not only familiar with previous writers on political economy, but that she has investigated the subject for herself by patient thought and careful observation. She usually states her opinions with great perspicuity; and her arguments, in general, are sound and convincing, and presented with logical point and discrimination. Though her volumes sometimes give definitions, and lay down principles to which we cannot assent, and which we would gladly have corrected, yet they contain a store of information which to many of her readers

will be new, useful, and impressive. The truths, for instance, that the poor are more benefited than the rich by improvements in machinery, and that laborers who destroy machines are often injuring themselves, immediately and irreparably, are exhibited in "The Hill and the Valley," in a manner likely to make an impression even on the most obtuse. This story teaches a lesson which was much needed in England, by the lower classes, and perhaps by some among the higher, and can scarcely fail to dispel the prejudice against machinery in many minds which formal scientific principles could never have reached.

Some of the conversations in which questions relating to political economy are discussed, will, particularly in the earlier tales in the series, strike some readers as rather stiff and formal, and, in a few instances, as a little tedious. This may be a fault regarding the stories merely as works of fiction, but perhaps it is one which could scarcely be avoided consistently with their didactic object.

Miss Martineau's tales, however, have other merits besides conveying instruction in regard to political economy. Some honey is mixed with the bitter drug. The stories deserve praise, regarded merely as works of fiction. They are full of spirit and interest. Many of the characters that appear in them, especially the children and females, are drawn with dramatic force and fidelity, and the scenes in which they appear as actors are frequently well conceived and sustained. The scenery, too, glimpses of which are now and then shown to the reader, is sketched with life and truth. Pathetic incidents are occasionally introduced, and then with such simplicity and fidelity to nature, as to affect even the most philosophic reader. Such incidents coming unexpectedly across the cheerful and lively current of her narrative, produce a deep and startling impression, like the occurrence of an unforeseen calamity in real life. The scenes of the death of George, in "Life in the Wilds," and that of Willie, in "Demerara," exhibit pathetic powers scarcely surpassed by Scott or Shakspeare.

Perhaps we may seem extravagant in our praise of Miss Martineau, yet we have not adverted to what forms, in our estimation, the highest merit of these little volumes. It is the moral spirit and the moral purpose which pervade them. The reader everywhere feels that he is associating with a

pure and benevolent mind, to whom the most elevated morality is habitual. He can hardly fail to be impressed with the belief that the writer is animated in her exertions by an ardent and devoted desire to do good to her fellow creatures. This conviction gives a charm to these little volumes, which all the graces of composition without it could not impart.

It would scarcely be just to such of our readers as have not seen Miss Martineau's tales, to send forth our dull criticisms, without accompanying them with some extracts. These we shall take entirely from "Demerara," both because its subject, *slavery*, has a more direct and important application in this country, than that of any one of the other stories; and because it is superior to the others in its execution, combining a greater variety of character and incident in a more sustained and powerful narrative. It seems, indeed, as if the solemn and melancholy interest of the subject had imparted a deeper inspiration to the author. The very titles of the chapters are so contrived that they sound to the ear like the words of a melancholy song; and impress themselves at once and for ever on the memory as the essence of many arguments against slavery. These are the titles:

"Sunrise brings sorrow in Demerara: Law endangers property in Demerara: Prosperity impoverishes in Demerara: Childhood is wintry in Demerara: No haste to the wedding in Demerara: Man worth less than beast in Demerara: Christianity difficult in Demerara: The proud covet pauperism in Demerara: Calamity welcome in Demerara: Protection is oppression in Demerara: Beasts hunt men in Demerara: No master knows his man in Demerara." pp. 5, 6.

The following is an extract from the summary of principles at the end of the volume.

"This volume, like the last, enlarges on principles already laid down. It treats of the respective values of different kinds of labor, and of a particular mode of investing capital. The truths illustrated may be arranged as follows:

"Property is held by conventional, not natural right.

"As the agreement to hold man in property never took place between the parties concerned, *i. e.*, is not conventional, Man has no right to hold Man in property.

"Law, *i. e.*, the sanctioned agreement of the parties concerned, secures property.

"Where the parties are not agreed, therefore, law does not secure property.

"Where one of the parties under the law is held as property by another party, the law injures the one or the other as often as they are opposed. Moreover, its very protection injures the protected party, — as when a rebellious slave is hanged.

"Human labor is more valuable than brute labor, only because actuated by reason; for human strength is inferior to brute strength.

"The origin of labor, human and brute, is the will.

"The reason of slaves is not subjected to exercise, nor their will to more than a few weak motives.

"The labor of slaves is, therefore, less valuable than that of brutes, inasmuch as their strength is inferior; and less valuable than that of free laborers, inasmuch at their reason and will are feeble and alienated.

"Free and slave labor are equally owned by the capitalist.

"Where the laborer is not held as capital, the capitalist pays for labor only.

"Where the laborer is held as capital, the capitalist not only pays a much higher price for an equal quantity of labor, but also for waste, negligence and theft, on the part of the laborer.

"Capital is thus sunk which ought to be reproduced.

"As the supply of slave-labor does not rise and fall with the wants of the capitalist, like that of free labor, he employs his occasional surplus on works which could be better done by brute labor or machinery.

"By rejecting brute labor, he refuses facilities for convertible husbandry, and for improving the labor of his slaves, by giving them animal food.

"By rejecting machinery, he declines the most direct and complete method of saving labor.

"Thus, again, capital is sunk which ought to be reproduced." — pp. 196, 197.

We might, if so inclined, dispute the position that property is held by conventional, not natural right. But we shall not do it, as the conclusion which our author draws, "that man has no right to hold man as property," is impregnable. There can be no property more certain than that which every man has in his own person, by the gift of his Creator. However property in general originates, this seems indisputable; and to deprive a sane man who has not been

guilty, and is not suspected of any crime against society, of his power over his own person, against his consent, is a gross violation of his natural rights. We even question, whether by his own consent a man could rightfully be made a slave, since, by entering into this relation, he subjects his will absolutely to another person's, and binds himself to commit crimes, if such are his master's orders.

We wish it were in our power to place "Demerara" in the hands of every slave-holder in our country. The practical form in which it presents the arguments against slavery, renders it difficult to resist them. The reader can scarcely fail to be impressed with the conviction that the system of compulsory labor, wherever it is adopted, operates like a curse upon the soil, checks improved and labor-saving methods of cultivation, paralyzes enterprise and exertion, debases and brutifies the minds of the slaves, and, while it renders the masters indolent, tyrannical, and unfeeling, by a just retribution, subjects them to constant fear of the victims of their oppression. We do not recollect any work which places the moral and economical evils of slavery, and their intimate connexion, in a light more likely to make them generally perceived, than "Demerara." A tale of this kind is, in our opinion, far better calculated to act on the minds of slave-holders than mere argument or declamation, however logical or eloquent.

But our purpose is rather to give extracts from this tale, than to comment upon it. In order to render the following extract intelligible, it may be well to mention, that Hester is a little negro girl who is living with two old slaves by whom she is treated with great cruelty, being emphatically the slave of slaves; and that Cassius is a slave whose provision-ground, by the cultivation of which he was seeking to earn money to purchase his freedom, had been plundered during his absence from his hut.

"It was moonlight when she returned from delivering her bundle of cattle-feed. As she passed slowly before the fence of Cassius's ground it seemed to her that it was not in its usual order. Another look showed her that the soil was as rough in some parts as if it had been dug up, and that the green crop was trampled and the leaves strewn about as if a herd of oxen had made their way through it. This might have been the case, as the gate stood open; and Hester stepped in to see.

She started when she saw that some body was there. Cassius stood, leaning his forehead against his low threshold, his arms folded on his breast. The child remained beside him for some minutes, hoping he would turn round, but as he did not, she gently pulled his jacket. He still took no notice. At last, a long deep sob broke from him, and the child, terrified at his agitation, ran away. He strode after her, and caught her at the gate. He held her with a strong grasp, as he cried, —

"'Who robbed my ground? You know, and you shall tell me. Don't dare to tell me a lie. Who robbed me?'

"'Indeed, indeed, I don't know. I did not know you had been robbed.'

"'You did, you did. Why, don't you see?' he cried, as he dragged her from one plot to another, 'here is not a potato left, the yams are all gone, and look at the plantain-boughs torn down. Every thing is spoiled. I have nothing to feed my pigs with. I have nothing to carry to market. I have no more money than I had a year ago. I shall not be free this year, — nor the next, — nor the next, — nor —— I wish I was dead. I shall never be free till then.'

"Hester did not understand what all this meant, so she remained silent and quiet.

"'Child!' Cassius broke forth again, 'do you want to be free? Do you know any body that wants to be free?'

"'I don't know what it is to be free,' said the child innocently.

"'No, nor ever will,' muttered Cassius. 'It was not you that helped to rob me then. It is somebody else who wants a ransom by fair means or foul.'

"'You always gave me fruit when I asked,' said the child, 'so why should I steal it? And I have been in the fields ever since dinner time.'

"'And where have Robert and Sukey been?'

"Instead of answering, Hester looked round for a way of escape. Her impatient companion shook an answer out of her.

"'They beat me sometimes when I say where they are.'

"'I will beat you if you don't. No, no, I won't,' said Cassius, relenting at the child's tears; 'I never beat you, did I?'

"'No, never; and I had rather any body beat me than you; but you won't say that I saw you?'

"'Not if you tell me all you know.'

"'Well; I don't know any thing about your ground being robbed; but my master can tell you, I suppose, because he was watchman this afternoon, and I think my mistress stayed from work to help him, for she said she was ill.'

"'And is she ill?'

"'Only the same as she always is, when she does not like to go to the field.'"—pp. 75–78.

The superiority of paid over unpaid labor, is shown to great advantage in "Demerara," in incidents to which a parallel can readily be found in real life. The mill-dam of Mr. Mitchelson, one of the personages of the story, bursts. He is in great agitation, in consequence, supposing that it will take three months to repair it with his slaves, at a very critical season of the year. Alfred, a young man who believes that slave-labor is the very worst that can be employed for any purpose, upon consulting the contractor, undertakes to do the work in twenty days, provided he is allowed to employ the slaves as much as possible like free laborers. The men are accordingly taken from the overseer, and put under his care.

"The main feature of Alfred's plan was to pay wages. He collected the men, told them what they had to do and expect, promised them warm clothing in case of their working early and late, showed them the ample provisions of meat, bread, and vegetables he had stored at hand, marched them off, only staying behind to forbid the overseer to come within sight of the mill-dam, and from that time never left the spot till the work was finished. Horner was very angry, and full of scorn and evil prognostications; but nobody cared except the poor women and children, upon whom he vented his ill humor as long as he was deprived of his dominion over the able-bodied laborers.

"Mr. Bruce arrived when the work was half done, to see how his son's speculation was likely to succeed. As he approached, he was struck with the appearance of activity so unusual in that region. The first sound he heard was a hum of voices, some singing, some talking, some laughing; for negroes have none of the gravity of English laborers. When they are not sullen they are merry: and now they showed that talk and mirth were no hindrance to working with might and main. Cassius toiled the hardest of all, and was the gravest; but he was happy; for this was an opportunity of increasing the fund for his ransom which he had little dreamed of. Alfred was talking with him, and lending a hand, as he did continually to one or another, when his father appeared.

"'Bravo! son,' cried Mr. Bruce, as Alfred ran to meet him. 'You and your partner are doing wonders, I see. Will you fulfill your contract?'

"'Very easily, sir, if weather remains favorable, — (O! I forgot there was no fear of bad weather) — and if Mr. Mitchelson keeps out of the way, so that I may keep Horner and his whip out of the way also till we have done. The family are all absent, you see; but I will step in with you while you rest yourself. I was surprised to find the ladies gone too when I arrived.'

"'Mitchelson always takes them with him when he is absent for more than a few hours.'

"Alfred thought within himself that he should not have suspected the gentleman of being so very domestic.

"'But come,' said Mr. Bruce, dismounting and fastening up his horse, 'show me the secrets of your management. What are these barrels, and whence comes this savoury smell?'

"'These barrels hold beef and pork, sir; and the savour is from the cooking in yonder hut.'

"'And what is your allowance per man?'

"'As much as he chooses to eat. We should get little work done if we gave each laborer weekly no more than two pounds of herrings and eight pounds of flour, with the vegetables they grow themselves.'

"'The law pronounces that to be enough.'

"'But what says the law of nature? You and I do no hard work; and could we keep ourselves sleek and strong on such a supply of food?'

"'Negroes do not want so much as whites.'

"'That is a good reason for their having as much as they do want. Our people here are not troubled with indigestion, as far as I can perceive. What do you think of our warm jackets?'

"'I cannot imagine how they can support the heat in such clothing. No wonder they throw them aside.'

"'They are only for morning and evening. The people scarcely seem to heed the morning fogs while they wear their woollens; and we make them put them on again when the sun sets ——'

"'Do you mean that they work after sunset of their own accord.'

"'We have difficulty in making them leave off at nine o'clock. They like to sing to the moon as they work; and when they have done, they are not too tired for a dance. Father, you would more than pay for a double suit of clothing to your slaves by the improvement in their morning's work; and yet I believe you give them more than the law orders.'

"'Yes. One hat, shirt, jacket, and trousers, cannot be

made to last a year; and the clothing that the slaves buy for themselves is more for ornament than warmth. I do not know how the overseer clothes them, but I have always desired that they should have whatever was necessary.'

"Alfred said to himself that the overseer's notions of what was necessary might not be the best rule to go by.

"Mr. Bruce meanwhile was looking alternately at two gangs of slaves at work after a rather different manner. He was standing on the confines of two estates; and, in a field at a little distance, a company of slaves was occupied as usual; that is, bending over the ground, but to all appearance scarcely moving, silent, listless, and dull. At hand, the whole gang, from Cassius down to the youngest and weakest, were as busy as bees, and from them came as cheerful a hum, though the nature of their work rather resembled the occupation of beavers.

"'Task-work, with wages,' said Alfred, pointing to his own gang; 'eternal labor, without wages,' pointing to the other. 'It is not often that we have an example of the two systems before our eyes at the same moment. I need not put it to you which plan works the best.'" — pp. 94–99.

The dam, we scarcely need add, is finished in the twenty days.

One of the most striking scenes in this volume is the following. A hurricane occurs in crop-time. During the storm the slaves collect together for safety in an open space.

"Their black forms flitting in the mixed light, — now in the glare of the lightning, and now in the rapid gleams which the full moon cast as the clouds were swept away for a moment, might have seemed to a stranger like imps of the storm collecting to give tidings of its ravages. Like such imps they spoke and acted.

"'The mill is down!' cried one.

"'No crop next year, for the canes are blown away!' shouted another.

"'The hills are bare as a rock, — no coffee, no spice, no cotton! Hurra!'

"'But our huts are gone: our plantation grounds are buried,' cried the wailing voice of a woman.

"'Hurra! for the white man's are gone too!' answered many mingled tones. Just then a burst of moonlight showed to each the exulting countenances of the rest, and there went up a shout, louder than thunder, — 'Hurra! hurra! how ugly is the land!'

"The sound was hushed, and the warring lights were quenched for a time by the deluge which poured down from the clouds. The slaves crouched together in the middle of the field, supporting one another as well as they could against the fury of the gusts which still blew, and of the tropical rains. An inquiry now went round,—where was Horner? It was his duty to be in the field as soon as the gong had sounded, but no one had seen him. There was a stern hope in every heart that his roof had fallen in and buried him and his whip together. It was not so, however.

"After a while, the roaring of water was heard very near, and some of the blacks separated from the rest to see in what direction the irregular torrents which usually attend a hurricane were taking their course. There was a strip of low ground between the sloping field where the negroes were collected and the opposite hill, and through the middle of this ground a river rushed along where a river had never been seen before. A tree was still standing here and there in the midst of the foaming waters, and what had a few minutes ago been a hillock with a few shrubs growing out of it, was now an island. The negroes thought they heard a shout from this island, and then supposed it must be fancy; but when the cloudy rack was swept away and allowed the moon to look down for a moment, they saw that some one was certainly there, clinging to the shrubs, and in imminent peril of being carried away if the stream should continue to rise. It was Horner, who was making his way to the field when the waters overtook him in the low ground, and drove him to the hillock to seek a safety which was likely to be short enough. The waters rose every moment: and though the distance was not above thirty feet from the hillock to the sloping bank on which the negroes had now ranged themselves to watch his fate, the waves dashed through in so furious a current that he did not dare to commit himself to them. He called, he shouted, he screamed for help, his agony growing more intense, as inch after inch, foot after foot, of his little shore disappeared. The negroes answered his shouts very punctually; but whether the impatience of peril prompted the thought, or an evil conscience, or whether it were really so, the shouts seemed to him to have more of triumph than sympathy in them; and cruel as would have been his situation had all the world been looking on with a desire to help, it was dreadfully aggravated by the belief that the wretches whom he had so utterly despised were watching his struggles, and standing with folded arms to see how he would help himself when there was none to help him. He

turned and looked to the other shore; but it was far too distant to be reached. If he was to be saved, it must be by crossing the narrower gulley: and, at last, a means of doing so seemed to offer. Several trees had been carried past by the current; but they were all borne on headlong, and he had no means of arresting their course: but one came at length, a trunk of the largest growth, and therefore making its way more slowly than the rest. It tilted from time to time against the bank, and when it reached the island, fairly stuck at the very point where the stream was narrowest. With intense gratitude, — gratitude which two hours before he would have denied could ever be felt towards slaves, — Horner saw the negroes cluster about the root of the tree to hold it firm in its position. Its branchy head seemed to him to be secure, and the only question now was, whether he could keep his hold on this bridge, while the torrent rose over it, as if in fury at having its course delayed. He could but try, for it was his only chance. The beginning of his adventure would be the most perilous, on account of the boughs over and through which he must make his way. Slowly, fearfully, but firmly he accomplished this, and the next glimpse of moonlight showed him astride on the bare trunk, clinging with knees and arms, and creeping forward as he battled with the spray. The slaves were no less intent. Not a word was spoken, not one let go, and even the women would have a hold. A black cloud hid the moon just when Horner seemed within reach of the bank; and what happened in that dark moment, — whether it was the force of the stream, or the strength of the temptation, — no lips were ever known to utter; but the event was that the massy trunk heaved once over, the unhappy wretch lost his grasp, and was carried down at the instant he thought himself secure. Horrid yells once more arose from the perishing man, and from the blacks now dispersed along the bank to see the last of him.

"'He is not gone yet,' was the cry of one; 'he climbed yon tree as if he had been a water-rat.'

"'There let him sit if the wind will let him,' cried another. 'That he should have been carried straight to a tree after all!'

"'Stand fast! here comes the gale again!' shouted a third.

"The gale came. The tree in which Horner had found refuge bowed, cracked, — but before it fell, the wretch was blown from it like a flake of foam, and swallowed up finally in the surge beneath. This was clearly seen by a passing gleam.

"'Hurra! hurra!' was the cry once more. 'God sent the wind. It was God that murdered him, not we.'

"When the planters were sufficiently recovered to exchange letters of condolence. Mr. Mitchelson wrote thus to Mr. Bruce. 'You have probably heard that my overseer, poor Horner, was lost from the waters being out when he was making his way to the field where his duty called him. We all lament him much; but your son will be glad to hear (pray tell him when you write) that my slaves are conducting themselves as well as if still under the charge of him we have lost. I am persuaded they would have risked their own lives to save his, if it had been possible. But, as they say, it was God's will that he should perish!' —pp. 152–158.

We intend, at some future time, when more of the Illustrations are before the public, to examine more at length Miss Martineau's general merits as a writer, and to discuss some of the principles of political economy which she supports.

ART. V. — *The Evidences of Christianity in their External Division, exhibited in a Course of Lectures, delivered in Clinton Hall, in the Winter of* 1831–2, *under the appointment of the University of the City of New York.* By CHARLES P. M'ILVAINE, D. D., Rector of St. Ann's Church, Brooklyn, — Professor of the Evidences of Revealed Religion and of Sacred Antiquities in the University of the City of New York. New York. G. & C. &. H. Carvill. 1832. 8vo. pp. 565.

THESE Lectures do not profess to be the result of original investigations, nor are they elaborate treatises in any respect, nor can they be said to be recommended by a peculiarly felicitous method or style. Considered, however, as popular discourses hastily prepared, they present, as well as might be expected, the common arguments in the common order with the common applications, and were listened to, doubtless, with attention and profit by "a class of many hundreds, from among the most intelligent in the community, and composed, to a considerable extent, of the members of the New York Young Men's Society for Intellectual and Moral Improvement," before which they are said, in the

Preface, to have been delivered. Personal and local considerations may also, now that they are published, give them in some quarters, as the author modestly intimates, a temporary interest and advantage in the perusal, not possessed by the standard works on the subject; but we are by no means prepared to assign them a place among the standard works, or to regard them as a very valuable contribution to the literature of the country.

The skepticism of the present day is of two kinds; that of the Free Inquirers, who maintain that we have no proper evidence respecting God or the spiritual world, and therefore that it is equally absurd to assert or deny any thing about them; and that of the Anti-Supernaturalists, who believe in the being of a God, and in his providence, but deny what they term his *irregular* or *immediate* providence, or miracles. Bishop M'Ilvaine has not thought it worth his while to study into the nature, history, or tendencies of either of these existing developements of the skeptical principle; but has contented himself, so far as a knowledge of the causes and grounds of infidelity is concerned, with a superficial acquaintance, gathered for the most part from the writings of their opponents, of the old English Deists. We submit, whether the writer of the following paragraph understood Hume, whom he professes to refute, — or himself. After having given Hume's argument against miracles, as abridged in the Encyclopædia Britannica, he says:

"The grand hinge of the whole is this, that our belief in testimony is founded on no other principle than OUR EXPERIENCE OF THE VERACITY OF HUMAN TESTIMONY. Hence the reasoning is, that a miracle being, in the author's estimation, contrary to experience, opposes and contradicts the very foundation of its evidence, and therefore destroys itself. But let me ask, admitting that a miracle is contrary to experience (which is not true), *What experience* is it contrary to? The argument requires that it should be contrary to our experience *of the veracity of human testimony*. To say merely that it is contrary to experience of some sort, without specifying this particular sort, does not touch the question. It is its contrariety to that particular kind of experience, on which our faith in testimony (according to Hume) is built, that must destroy the credibility of a miracle, if it is to be destroyed at all. But this, it would be ridiculous to assert. So far from miracles being inconsistent with our experience of the veracity of human testimony;

the truth is directly on the other side. Deny that miracles were ever wrought, and your whole experience of the truth of testimony is directly and violently opposed." — pp. 181, 182.

Another objection to these Lectures still more serious, and one which must make them worse than useless, considered as a book to be put into the hands of intelligent skeptics, is their want of the appearance, and, we regret to say it, of the reality of candor in speaking of unbelievers. We can pardon the lecturer's infirmity, not very uncommon, some have said, in the logic of the pulpit, of being particularly confident where he is particularly weak. Neither are we inclined to blame him for expressing unmeasured contempt, if he really feels it, for the reasonings and abilities of noted infidels, much as we doubt its expediency. We are also willing to pass over the undue eagerness he sometimes manifests to make out a strong case, his disposition to make many of his arguments pass for more than they are worth, and his propensity to play the advocate even where he professes to sit as judge. But we cannot go along with him at all in his notions of historical fidelity, which allow him, it would almost seem, to believe every thing which Christians say of themselves or of infidels, but nothing which infidels say of Christians, or of one another. Take, for example, the impressions he would leave on the reader's mind respecting the private character of such men as Socrates and Lord Herbert, to whom we might add, much as we dislike them in many respects, Hobbes, Hume, and Gibbon. The only effect of such attempts on the enlightened and ingenuous must be to prejudice them against the writer, and if they are skeptical already, to confirm and exasperate them in their skepticism.

On other topics, our author is more just, discriminating, and satisfactory. The first Lecture is an introduction to the course; the second, third, and fourth are on the authenticity, integrity, and credibility of the New Testament; the fifth and sixth are on miracles; the seventh and eighth, on prophecy; the ninth gives the argument for Christianity from its propagation; and the tenth and eleventh, the argument from its fruits; the twelfth contains a summary and application of the whole; after which, in the thirteenth and last Lecture, comes a feeble exposition and defence of the popular views of inspiration, and the divine authority of the Scrip-

tures. Having excepted against parts of this work, we are unwilling to close our brief notice of it, without giving one or two favorable specimens, taken from the Lecture on the credibility of the gospel history.

"Generality is the cloak of fiction. Minuteness is the natural manner of truth, in proportion to the importance and interest of the subject. Such is the precise manner and continual evidence of the honesty of St. John. His history is full of the most minute circumstances of time, place, and persons. Does he record, for example, the resuscitation of Lazarus? He tells the name of the village, and describes the particulur spot where the event occurred. He gives the names of some of the principal individuals who were present; mentions many unbelieving Jews as eye-witnesses; states the precise object for which they had come to the place; what they did and said; the time the body had been buried; how the sepulchre was constructed and closed; the impression which the event made upon the Jews; how they were divided in opinion in consequence of it; the particular expressions of one whose name is given; the subsequent conduct of the Jews in regard to Lazarus. This, you perceive, is being very circumstantial. It is only a specimen of the general character of St. John's Gospel. It looks very much as if the writer was not afraid of any thing the people of Bethany, or the survivors of those who had been present at the tomb of Lazarus, or the children of any of them, might have to say with regard to the resurrection. Now, when you consider that John's history was widely circulated while many were yet living, who, had these events never been, in Bethany, must have known it; and among a people, who, in addition to every facility, had every desire to find out the least departure from truth, I think you will acknowledge that the circumstantial character of this book is very strong evidence that the author must have written in the confidence of truth." —pp. 146, 147.

Again he says:

"How much has been made of the testimony of the Roman historian, *Tacitus*, to some of the chief facts of the gospel history. It is the testimony of a Heathen, and, therefore, supposed to be incomparably valuable. Now suppose that Tacitus the Heathen had not only been persuaded of the facts he has related, but had been so deeply impressed with the belief of them as to have renounced Heathenism and embraced the Christian faith, and then published the history we now possess, — who does not know that, with the infidel, and with many a

believer, his testimony would have greatly suffered in practical force? No reason for this can be given, except that we have a vague idea that a Christian in the cause of Christianity must be an interested witness. To be sure he is interested. But is his testimony the less valuable?

"A scientific man, bearing testimony to a phenomenon in natural history, is an interested witness, because he is devoted to science, but his testimony is not the less valuable. A good man, bearing testimony to the character of another good man, is an interested witness, because he is the friend of virtue and of all good men, but his testimony is not the less valuable. In this, and no other sense, were the original disciples interested witnesses. They were interested in Christianity, only so far as they believed it true. Suppose them to have known it to be untrue, and you cannot imagine the least jot or tittle of interest they could have had in it. In such a case, on the contrary, the current of all their interests and prepossessions would run directly and powerfully in opposition to Christianity. This, then, being all the way in which they can be regarded as interested, the force of their testimony, so far from being in the least impaired, is greatly enhanced by the consideration. The bare fact that any primitive writer, bearing witness to events related by St. John, was not a Heathen, or a Jew, but a Christian, is the very thing that should be regarded as completing his testimony. Is the evidence of Tacitus, who relates such events, but remained a Heathen, any thing like so strong, as if we could say, It is the evidence of Tacitus, who was a Heathen, but believed those events so firmly that he became a Christian? — pp. 152, 153.

We learn, with no less surprise than regret, that this work is about to be adopted in some of our Colleges as a text-book. It is, as a treatise, professedly incomplete, being limited to what the author terms, somewhat quaintly, "the external division" of the evidences of Christianity, no notice whatever being taken of the internal evidences, though these are known to have, especially with young men of intelligence and philosophical habits of thought, a peculiar attraction and weight.

To prove that our criticisms have not originated in mere captiousness, and that we have the whole subject deeply at heart, we shall now offer some suggestions of our own on the proper mode of presenting the evidences of Christianity, in order to induce a firm, practical, life-giving faith. Many

persons are alarmed, and not altogether without reason, at the tendency of the times in regard to skepticism and unbelief. Christianity has nothing to fear from the ultimate results of investigation, — of the freest, strictest, profoundest investigation. But it has much to fear from half-knowledge; from smatterers in learning; from a reckless spirit of innovation for innovation's sake; from the sullen and indiscriminate skepticism of minds conscious that they have been imposed upon once, and resolved that they will not be imposed upon again; from the wild careering and plunging of minds, which have not had liberty long enough to learn how to use it without abusing it. The community, as a community, is fast getting into the condition of an individual, who has just broken loose from the trammels of authority, and is beginning to look round to see if the religion in which he has been educated, and which he has held hitherto on on the ground of authority alone, can be rationally held, and on other grounds. It is idle to shut our eyes on the fact that the community, as a community, is, and has been for some time, in a transition state on the subject of religion, passing from a condition of pupilage to one of independent thought and action. Now what we dread, as has been intimated before, is not the final issue of this change; believing, as we believe we live, that it will result at last in a more enlightened and better sustained faith, and in juster apprehensions of God, and of the service he requires. Neither would we, if we could, prevent or postpone the transition itself; nevertheless it is undeniable that the transition state is one of peculiar danger, and to be watched over, therefore, by the friends of truth and order with intense anxiety.

The danger is, not that men will think for themselves, but that they will not come to this duty with the requisite intelligence, seriousness, and moderation. The danger is, not that men will think to canvass and weigh the apparent difficulties and objections in the way of an enlightened faith; but, as it is always much easier to understand the objection than the answer, that they will stop at the objection, and not go any further. The danger is, not that men are abating their confidence in tradition and authority, in matters of religion, but that many at least may lay aside these dependences before taking care to provide themselves with better

and surer ones. Under these circumstances, what is to be done? It is to no purpose to represent this state of things as a hazardous experiment we are trying; or, the moment the danger begins to press, to talk about retracing our steps. We cannot retrace our steps. It is no experiment we are trying. It is a gradual and inevitable developement of the human mind in its social and religious capacities and relations. We must meet the crisis. How is it to be met?

Let us understand, in the first place, as precisely as we may, the nature and extent of that want in the individual, and in society, which Christianity was intended to meet and satisfy. Mankind are by nature religious beings, in the same sense in which they are by nature social beings; that is, they are born with powers, capacities, and susceptibilities, which fit them, under the proper influences, to become religious. These influences Christianity supplies; and they are supplied in perfection by nothing else; neither by paganism, nor by Judaism, nor by the light of nature, nor by the refinements of reason or philosophy. It is a common impression, we believe, that as the human mind is cultivated and improved in other respects, and civilization advances, Christianity becomes less and less indispensable both to the individual and to society. So far, however, is this from being true, that almost any thing in the shape of religion will answer in the simpler and ruder stages of humanity; and it is only after the mind has been in some good degree educated and refined, that it can no longer content itself with the old and imperfect religions, and looks round earnestly and anxiously for a better system. This single consideration, pondered well, will solve at once two problems; namely, why it is that Christianity was given, and why it is that it was not given earlier. In the progressive developement of human nature, a deep want of the soul had begun to be generally felt, which was only mocked and tantalized by the various forms of pagan superstition and philosophy, and even by the preparatory and imperfect dispensation of Judaism, — a deep want which Christianity alone could meet and satisfy. The fulness of time was come. "A desire universally displayed itself," says Neander, "for a revelation from heaven, which might ensure to the inquiring mind that tranquillity which was neither to be found in the contending systems of ancient philosophy, nor

in the antiquated religions, now called back to the world in an age of artificial refinement. Porphyry, that zealous defender of the old religion, himself alludes to this desire, so deeply felt; a desire which, while he supports himself on the authority of the promises of the gods, he endeavoured to satisfy in his collection of old responses, as the groundwork of a system of theology. On this subject he says: 'The utility of such a work, those will best be able to estimate, who, feeling an anxious desire after the truth, have wished that some open vision of the gods might be granted to them, and set them free from their doubts.'" *

Our next inquiry should be, How must Christianity be believed in, that it may answer the purpose for which it was intended, that it may meet and satisfy the want of which we have spoken? It is not enough considered, that there are several sorts of truth, our belief in which must be different in its nature, and rest on different bases. There is mathematical truth, our faith in which rests on demonstration; historical truth, our faith in which rests on testimony; and moral truth, which is addressed, not to the intellect merely, but also to the affections and the conscience. Now the essential truths of Christianity are, for the most part, of the last mentioned description, — moral truths, truths addressed to the affections and the conscience, as well as the understanding. They must, therefore, be *felt* as well as perceived. Until we feel them, — feel them as realities, we cannot be said, in any proper and practical sense of that word, to believe in them. We must feel them as well as perceive them; nay, it is only by feeling them that we can perceive them. Take away our moral nature, and leave nothing but our intellectual, — take away our affections and conscience, or let them become utterly and hopelessly corrupt, and we should be given over, on all moral and religious subjects, to utter and hopeless skepticism. It is true, therefore, as the Apostle says, on all moral and religious subjects, — true, not figuratively, but literally, that we must believe "with the heart."

The great question now comes up, How is this faith to be induced at the present day, and in the present state of society?

* Neander's Church History, Vol. i. p. 29.

First of all, we must take care and be just to skeptics and infidels. Doubtless some men, from the original constitution of their minds, are less affected than others by the same evidence, especially in regard to things extraordinary and marvellous. We should also make proper allowances for unavoidable prejudices taken up against Christianity from faults or defects of education, from mere ignorance, or from the bigotry or scandalous lives of pretended believers. Of course we do not mean to deny, that there is such a thing as "a wicked heart of unbelief"; but, as it is not for us to judge men's motives, we are not competent to decide, neither are we at liberty to pronounce, in particular instances, when they merely err, and when they sin. Nothing, at any rate, will be gained to the cause either of truth or charity by heaping on them opprobrious names and imputations, which can have no other effect than to confirm and exasperate them in their opposition to the gospel, and create a general sympathy in their favor as the injured party, which will do more, a thousand times over, for infidelity than all their arguments. We are persuaded, and, if true, it is desirable on many accounts that this should be the common impression, that a large proportion of those who have their doubts about Christianity, would be glad to be rid of these doubts, and to believe as they see others do. If we hope to have any influence over such persons, we must not begin by charging them with a hatred of the truth itself, as truth; which they must know from the testimony of their own consciousness to be an imputation as false as it is insulting.

We regret to say, nevertheless, that there are few undertakings more entirely hopeless than the attempt to convince an inveterate doubter, especially where this habit of mind is connected, as it often is, if not with sin, at least with self-conceit and an affectation of singularity and paradox. He has an answer for every thing, which, if not satisfactory in itself, satisfies him, and makes him inaccessible to argument, and impervious to all impression on the disputed subject. May we not fear, indeed, that the doubts of such persons, instead of being removed, are more frequently multiplied and confirmed by what is commonly understood by preaching the evidences, and by the common treatises on the evidences? The reason is, that these discourses and treatises relate generally, and almost exclusively, to the details of the Chris-

tian evidences; whereas the difficulties with most thinking skeptics do not relate to the details of the evidences, but to certain previous questions, often entirely overlooked by the advocates of Christianity. Infidels, therefore, finding themselves unconvinced by these defences, are more and more persuaded that their objections are insuperable.

Our only hope in regard to such persons consists, as it seems to us, in inducing them seriously to reconsider their need of a revelation, and the necessary dependence of all faith in moral and religious subjects on the previous state of the mind, on previous habits of thought and feeling, and therefore in this connexion, and indirectly, on the will. Unbelievers, we suspect, are seldom either made or unmade by pure argument,—abstract, naked argument. A way must be made through the affections and conscience, before the light of the glorious gospel of the blessed God can reach and illuminate the understanding. Christianity addresses itself to our whole nature; not to our intellect or reason alone, but to our whole nature, and must be responded to by our whole nature. It is not enough, therefore, that men have sound heads, they must also have sound hearts; it is not enough that they have a cultivated and clear understanding, they must also have a cultivated and clear conscience, or they are not in a condition to feel the full force of the appeal. It may be laid down, we believe, as a universal law, that a man is no farther in a condition to be convinced of Christianity, than he is in a condition to love the moral beauty and harmony and perfection which it reveals and enjoins. Hence it is, that the minds of confirmed skeptics and unbelievers are so much less frequently affected by mere argument and evidence, than by exciting or afflictive incidents, or touching scenes or appeals, which remind them of their infirmity, awaken them to a consciousness of their moral and spiritual nature, flash light across the dark and troubled course of their inward experiences, and in this way reveal to them the deep wants and the deep disease of an unbelieving, unsanctified soul.

Something may be done, and ought to be done, to cure skepticism; but, after all, our principal security lies in preventing it, as we would prevent any other perversity of the heart or understanding, by an early and wisely directed mental and moral culture. Christian faith in its fulness and

tranquillity is scarcely to be expected, except as the result of Christian education. If we would have a Christian community, that community must be trained, must be educated, in the faith and obedience of the gospel. The plastic mind of infancy and childhood must be formed to the consciousness, the love, and the belief of the truth as it is in Jesus. It has been said, that a man should not be able to remember the time when he did not believe in a God. Equally true is it, as it seems to us, that he should not be able to remember the time when he did not believe in Christ as the Son of God; when he was a doubter of the reality, or a stranger to the conditions or the influences, of the Christian salvation.

Our meaning is not, that under any pretence whatever we should think to prejudice the mind in regard to religious opinions. It is not among the proper or legitimate objects of education, either in religion or in any thing else, to inculcate an implicit or blind faith, to bind down and enslave the soul to a fixed creed, or to dictate, either directly or indirectly, what the mind shall think, feel, or believe. The proper and legitimate objects of all education, whether regard be had to the understanding, the conscience, or the heart, are simply these; to develope the mind itself, to awaken it to a consciousness of its latent powers and capacities, and to furnish it with the means, and inspire it with the courage, and guard it against the errors and excesses of self-direction and self-determination. It is not education on the subject of religion, but the want of it, which prepares men for a blind and implicit faith, by making them incapable of thinking for themselves, — incapable of thinking freely, and at the same time soberly and wisely. Education, indeed, supplies men with the only substitute for prejudice, knowledge; so that without education all must be prejudice. Besides, the principal reason for insisting on the necessity of education in this case is, that religion, properly so called, cannot be founded on prejudice merely, or on opinion merely of any kind, but on a developement of our moral and spiritual nature. We are born with a moral and spiritual nature, which may be neglected, or stifled, and the result will be atheism; or excited, developed, and misdirected, and the result will be superstition; or excited, developed, and directed aright, and the result will be religion. Obviously, therefore, every thing is made to depend on a developement of our nature,

our whole nature, and on a developement of our whole nature in its proper order and just proportions. But this is the work of education, and Christianity was given to enable us, by its moral and spiritual influences, to make the education perfect. Christianity offers the means necessary to a full and perfect developement of our moral and spiritual nature; and why not avail ourselves of them, as well as of the means necessary to a full and perfect developement of our intellectual and social nature?

Still, parents and teachers may have but a vague impression of what is intended by educating children in Christianity, or in the belief of Christianity. Some may confound it with instructing them in the history of Christianity; as if Christianity were not one thing, and the history of Christianity another; as if law or medicine were not one thing, and the history of law or medicine another. Others again may confound it with instructing children in the philosophy of Christianity; as if Christianity itself were not one thing, and the philosophy of Christianity another; as if any art or science were not one thing, and the philosophy of any art or science another. We do not mean that the history and philosophy of Christianity are not proper objects of attention, and useful and necessary in their time and place; but they are not Christianity itself, nor is attention to them indispensable to the first stages of a Christian education. Nay, an undue and premature urging of these topics on the minds of children is likely to make them mistake for Christianity what is not Christianity, and otherwise to induce doubts, distastes, and misconceptions, which will trouble them as long as they live. A child is educated in Christianity, and in a belief of Christianity, who is brought up under the practical influences of Christianity, and is thus induced from the beginning to regard its vital principles as realities, and is affected by them as realities. Christianity embodies a collection of moral and vital truths, and these truths, apart from all history or philosophy, constitute Christianity itself, and must be moulded into the forming character of the child, so that after he has grown up he may not be able to recollect the time when he did not believe, feel, and know them to be realities. Christianity by education and habit must become a part of his personal consciousness, the unfolding germ of his inward and spiritual life.

Here we are to find, as it seems to us, our principal security against the inroads of skepticism and unbelief. But how, it may be asked, is all this to be effected? How are we to begin, and how proceed? Or, to restrict and define the question still further, so as to bring our remarks within the necessary limits, by what means and processes may parents and religious teachers hope, with the divine aid and blessing, gradually to win over the mind of infancy and childhood to a rational, practical, and enduring faith?

Let them rely, more than they commonly do, on the power of truth, and especially of moral truth, when clearly and fairly stated, to recommend itself at once to an unsophisticated mind. Consider, respect, we had almost said, reverence the confiding spirit of childhood, and think not to confound it with the weakness of grown-up credulity, which it resembles hardly in a single particular. It is the first thought of an unperverted mind, which, on a moral question, is, in ninety-nine cases out of a hundred, wiser and better than any after-thought. The reason why we do not through life see moral truth intuitively, the reason why we afterwards require evidence extraneous to the truth itself, is to be found in the prejudices we are contracting from day to day, and which spread themselves like a film over our moral vision. As children are without these prejudices, they need not this extraneous evidence; in the same proportion as their minds are unsophisticated, they can on moral subjects see intuitively. Instead, therefore, of perplexing and confounding them with what are called the evidences of Christianity, give them Christianity itself. Begin by giving them Christianity itself, as exhibited in the life and character of the Lord Jesus, as illustrated by his simple, beautiful, and touching parables, and as it breathes through all his discourses. They will feel it to be true. Depend upon it, paradoxical as it may sound, children will be much more likely to believe Christianity without what are called the evidences, than with them; and the remark applies to some who are not children. Why talk to one about the argument from prophecy, or the argument from miracles, when these are the very points, and the only points on which his mind, from some peculiarity in its original constitution, or from limited information, chiefly labors. Give him Christianity itself, by which we mean the body of moral and vital truths which constitutes Christianity.

Observe it when you will, you will find that the doubts and difficulties suggested by children, relate almost exclusively to the history of Christianity, or to what are called the external evidences of Christianity, and not to the truth of Christianity itself. Give them Christianity itself; for if they believe in that, it is enough. Such a book as Mrs. Barbauld's Hymns is more likely to make a child perceive and feel the truth as it is in Jesus, than twenty formal treatises on the evidences. Give him not the husk, but the kernel, not the external evidences of Christianity, but Christianity itself; and trust, at least in the first instance, to the power it has to approve itself, at once, to unsophisticated minds.

If the child is not interested or impressed, inquire, next, whether this be owing to some defect in the child himself, or in the evidence as it strikes his mind. Is it the fault of the eye, or of the light? and if the former, do not expect to remedy the evil by increasing the light: cure the eye. It will not help a blind man to see, to bring more lights: cure the eye. Waken into life and activity that spiritual and immortal element in his nature to which Christianity appeals; bring his soul into harmony with the moral tone of the gospel; make him, as you are able, feel his need of a salvation, and out of this very need will grow a conviction that what meets and satisfies a deep and inextinguishable want of his moral nature, must be moral truth. When he becomes fully conscious of the soul's adaptation to Christianity, and of the adaptation of Christianity to the soul, he will hardly be able to resist the conclusion that they must have had the same Author, and belong to the same plan of infinite goodness and mercy. We believe it to be one of the rarest things in the world to convert a skeptic or unbeliever to "that faith which worketh by love," except through some change first wrought in his habits of feeling and association on the subject. Nor is it singular or wonderful that it should be so, when we reflect how much more apt persons are to be influenced and determined in all their convictions, by the habits of the mind, than by the force of argument or evidence directly applied: above all, when we consider that the truths of the gospel are moral truths, and must be responded to by our moral nature, so that any disorder there must be as fatal to a sound and hearty faith, as a disorder of the understanding. Cure the eye. If the eye be single,

the whole mind shall be full of light; but if the eye be evil, the whole mind shall be full of darkness.

We do not mean that the common and appropriate arguments and evidences for the truth of Christianity should be withheld even from children, after they begin to feel their need of them to repel objections, and are able more and more to understand and appreciate them. Urge at proper times, in their proper order, and in a proper spirit, the argument from the nature of Christianity itself, the argument from the character and circumstances of its Founder, the argument from the internal marks of truth and honesty in the sacred writers, the strictly historical argument, the argument from prophecy and miracles, the philosophical argument, the practical argument. But the inquiry, in what manner and order must these several arguments and proofs be presented, so as to give them their full force over the mind, opens before us a wide field of remark, on which we can at present enter only so far as to make a few rapid and cursory observations.

And, first, in regard to miracles, it should be recollected that they belong to the history of Christianity, and to one branch of its evidences, but do not constitute Christianity itself. Considered even as one important and legitimate branch of the Christian evidences, judicious parents and teachers will be slow to lay much stress on miracles alone, as a means of persuading or convincing the very young. We do not presume, of course, that children will reject the Christian miracles, considered merely as facts; but they will be likely to hold them in much the same way, and with much the same connexions and associations, as they do other marvels, and not as the appropriate and satisfactory evidences of a divine dispensation. When, at length, they are old enough to comprehend a miracle in its true character, the teacher may begin to avail himself of the argument from this source, by explaining a miracle. So far, he may say, as our personal experience extends, every thing takes place according to general and established laws, called the laws of nature: and hence we sometimes insensibly slide into the error of regarding these laws as the agent. They are not the agent; God is the Agent, and these laws, as we call them, are but the regular course of proceeding to which God is pleased voluntarily to conform

himself for wise and benevolent purposes. If an emergency arises, however, and there is certainly no presumption, and nothing unphilosophical in supposing that such an emergency may arise, in which wisdom and benevolence prompt an occasional and temporary deviation from this regular course of proceeding, it is plain that all the reasons and motives which induce God generally to observe what are called the laws of nature, must induce him, in this particular case, to deviate from them. And hence miracles.

Let the teacher endeavour, also, to make his pupil understand the peculiar and important uses of miracles, considered as divine manifestations. As has just been intimated, the habit of regarding the universe as governed by fixed and immutable laws, tends to atheism, — to practical atheism. We deify these laws; we deify nature: and hence the necessity that God should reveal himself as a Being above these laws, above nature, and able to change, suspend, and control them at his will. Miracles, it has been said, are contrary to all human experience; but this is manifestly begging the question. They ought rather to be regarded as so much added to human experience, the addition being necessary to give man the evidence of fact, as well as of reason and consciousness, in support of truths essential to his inward and spiritual life. Believing, as the Christian does, that Jesus, in repeated instances, actually raised the dead, it is no longer in his mind either contrary to or beyond human experience, to anticipate the time when all who are in their graves shall hear his voice and come forth.

When he comes to the consideration of particular miracles, the religious teacher will warn those whom he would convince, against the skepticism occasioned by vainly attempting to make the miracles of the New Testament appear like natural occurrences. They are not related as natural occurrences, and if they could be made to seem as if they were, it would be to rob them of their character and use as miracles. And yet this, unless we are greatly mistaken, is the real foundation of much of the distrust felt respecting them. Men, in short, would be willing to believe in miracles, if miracles were not miracles. The teacher, also, at the same time that he indicates the miracles, will indicate their result, and show that it requires less credulity to believe in this result, as it stands in history, with the miracles, than without them.

Knowing, as we do from history, who our Saviour was, what were his human means of success, and what he actually became and accomplished, we have but to believe in the miracles recorded in the New Testament, and all is plain: deny them; and we must believe, not, indeed, in miracles, but in inconsistencies and impossibilities. There are few subjects which call more loudly at the present day for an ample and thorough exposition than the credulity of unbelief.

Once more; in giving the testimony for the miracles of the gospel, let the teacher be careful to point out the clear and broad distinction existing, in this respect, between them and all pretended miracles. Let him demonstrate, as he can, that it would be just as unreasonable to argue from pretended miracles against all miracles, as to argue from the existence of a few counterfeit bank-notes, so badly executed that a common man detects them at the first glance, against all bank-notes; not reflecting that the very idea of a counterfeit presupposes something real and genuine to be counterfeited. Let him also demonstrate, as he can, that, in regard to some of the miracles, the witnesses could not have been deceived themselves, and that they could have had no reason or motive for attempting to deceive others, especially as they must have known that their narratives were, many of them, of such a nature, that if not well founded, the imposition could not live an hour. If all these efforts fail, he may presume, that it must be owing to some natural or moral defect in the child, which he should aim, if possible, to supply. Meanwhile, however, nothing can be more injudicious, as it seems to us, than to persist in urging the argument from miracles on a mind, that from any cause has thus become indifferent to it, and perhaps impatient of it. How idle to think to convince a person of Christianity by miracles, when it is these very miracles, and not Christianity, that he doubts. The instances, we suspect, are not rare, even of adults, who are first converted to Christianity itself; and afterwards, through the moral and spiritual change which Christianity induces, are brought to believe entirely and devoutly in its miraculous origin and history.

We have not space to notice particularly the other evidences of Christianity, or the best mode of inculcating them. In general, we would say, be not in a hurry to awaken doubts

in young minds, that you may exercise your ingenuity in quieting them. They will be able to understand the objection, before they can understand the answer; besides, why anticipate the wise appointments of Providence, according to which doubts and difficulties arise, as the mind is gradually prepared to cope with them. It is the doctrine of some, we know, that a child should be made acquainted with all the difficulties and cavils, which he is likely to encounter in the world, that he may be supplied beforehand with the antidote. A better and safer course, as it seems to us, is to instruct him in the general evidences of Christianity, and above all in its vital truths, and to weave these truths into his affections and his soul. Perhaps he will never hear of your difficulties and objections, or if he does, he will feel at once that not one in a thousand bears on Christianity itself, but only on its corruptions, or on things extraneous, or merely formal. It is enough if you answer the doubts that spring up in the mind itself; but these you must answer. It will not do to affect not to see the difficulty, to talk learnedly and unintelligibly, to quote authors of unpronounceable names, and to conclude, at last, by answering not the real objection which he does feel, but an imaginary one of your own which he does not feel.

Do not proceed as if the object were, not to convince the child of the truth of Christianity, but to convince him that your favorite argument for its truth is the best one, and alone sufficient. Our minds are differently constituted from the beginning in regard to the influence of evidence on our convictions, so that while one person is chiefly affected by one argument, another is chiefly affected by another argument. One man believes from the evidence of prophecy or miracles; another is not so much affected by these as he is by the argument from the character of the religion and its Founder. Now, what we want to do, is not to convince persons of the truth of Christianity by this or that particular evidence, but simply to convince them of the truth of Christianity itself. Let every one be fully persuaded in his own mind, and it matters not on what evidence. We do serious harm to the cause we would promote, if we persist in trying to convince a child who is convinced already, and this too by arguments which to his mind are ungrateful and unsatisfactory.

Presume not to impose on a child, under the name and

sanction of Christianity, what, as he grows up, he will be likely to see through and reject as a groundless superstition. The question has sometimes been started, — an idle question, as it would seem, to all who are not disposed to believe wrong, one way or the other, — whether it is safer to believe too little or too much; one thing, however, is certain, that it is safer to begin with inculcating too little, than too much. Afterwards, as the child has occasion, he may go on to extend his faith, without disturbing its general foundations, but if he is obliged to give up large portions of what he has hitherto held with as much confidence as the rest, his confidence in the whole is gone. He is almost sure, from the common propensity to extremes, to swing round from that of believing every thing, to that of doubting every thing. More is to be apprehended from this error now, however innocently committed, than formerly, when men did not feel themselves at liberty to call in question what they read in print, or heard from their minister, or were taught in the nursery; and nothing probably is doing so much at the present day, to induce, in persons of intelligence and reflection, an open or secret skepticism.

Finally; do not think to convince any one, and children last of all, of the truth and reality of what you have doubts about yourself. Every man, every woman, every child, it has been said, is a natural physiognomist, and reads the heart in the face. There is not so much deception in this matter as is often supposed; for even if a man is speaking in another room, you can commonly tell, by the tones of his voice alone, whether he really believes, or is only making believe. Nor will it help the matter, but make it worse, to say to a child, that whether Christianity is true or not, it is certainly useful, especially among the ignorant. Now he understands you; now he is ready to *say* he believes any thing. Who does not perceive that however the reason here given may be a good one for wishing to believe, or pretending to believe, it is no reason at all for really believing? Besides, it is by such suggestions that the suspicion is awakened in the minds of the young, especially in the educated and prosperous classes, that it is an understood thing among the enlightened, that religion is something to be put on for its moral or political uses, and not because, like integrity or gratitude, it has its foundation in truth and human nature.

ART. VI. — *A Letter to the Editors of the Christian Examiner.*

I WAS lately conversing with a religious friend, not altogether settled in his faith, and somewhat anxious on the point, when, in the midst of the conversation, he exclaimed with strong emotion, "Oh! that there were but *one* way!" The reflections that arose in my mind, from this expression of feeling, I propose to give you in the form of a letter.

The wish expressed by my friend, might easily lead me to discuss topics of very wide and extensive bearings. I might consider the importance of decision in religion; and of such consequence, indeed, do I hold it to be, that I am inclined to say, that a set of religious ideas, though less pure, is, when connected with this quality, more conducive to earnest piety, than a faith some degrees purer, when weakened by faint-hearted indecision. It is emphatically said of "the double-minded man," "Let not that man think that he shall receive any thing of the Lord." To be for ever balancing between different systems and sects, is to be helped by none. Thorough exertion is likely to proceed from nothing but thorough persuasion. This is a consideration of great importance to a sect of professed inquirers, — of professed improvers of their faith. They should take care that their labors for this end should not be so carried on, as to bring upon them the severest and most irreparable of individual sacrifices. I am inclined to think, that the best Christians I have known have been the most decided Christians. And for my own part, I am glad to see any Christian, whether Catholic or Protestant, whether Episcopalian or Quaker, or Methodist or Unitarian, thus joying in his faith and worship.

But here I should have a large proviso to make; I should consider the principle that is to limit and control this confidence, — and that is charity. I believe that these principles are perfectly compatible. Must a man condemn all who differ from him? Must he say that their faith is dead, their worship cold, their piety a vain imagination, and their hope delusion? Shall one weak, ignorant, erring creature *dare* to say this of another, because he differs from *him*? Even our Saviour, infallible teacher as he was, did not take such ground; but he rebuked the disciples when they said, "Mas-

ter, we saw one casting out devils in thy name, and we forbade him, because he followeth not us: but Jesus said, Forbid him not!"

I have said, it must be injurious to any mind to want decision; but surely it must be no less sad a thing to want charity. It must, to any ingenuous and affectionate mind, be a grievous thing to feel obliged to deny all piety, all genuine goodness, all holy joy, to those who differ from it. It is cutting off the larger part of the virtues of the human race from our sympathy and love. It is consenting to lose what is dearer than all the other treasures in the world. I would not take, for one day, the pain of such a state of mind for all the joys even of a just confidence. I had rather be a modest and timid believer, for ever distrusting my own views of religion, unfortunate as that would be, than to be compelled thus to judge my brethren. I have said, it is a grievous thing; and a grievous thing it has been, and still is, for the church of God. Instead of the harmonious company of Christian believers, whose primitive distinction was, that they loved one another, instead of that blessed union among his followers for which Jesus prayed, this principle of mutual judging and condemning has presented, for the scorn of the world, through all ages, the spectacle of a divided and distracted church, broken up into hostile sects; suffering, enfeebled, bleeding, from wounds inflicted by its own members.

The union, then, of decision and charity, I would propose as a healing measure. Christians ask to be decided and earnest, in their respective ways. I would say, Let them be so; though they doubtless ask for more than they are competent to manage; they insist upon deciding more points than they well understand; but, for the purposes of this argument, if I were to carry it out, I would say, Let it be so. Let them decide as many points as they will. And let them be attached to as many things, at least, as they have made the subjects of a reflecting and reasonable choice. Let them, each body of them, love their own church, love their own faith, love their own mode, their own worship. But let them not suppose, that, by this preference of their own way, they are obliged to condemn or denounce all other, or any other Christians for exercising the same privilege. If this must be done, or shall be done, what end is there ever

to be, of our unhappy dissensions? The principle is fatal to church union. The body of Christ can never be what he prayed for, — can never be *one* in mutual affection and confidence, if the principle is admitted, that decision for ourselves is decision for others, that decision upon *our creed* is decision upon *their characters*, that all are to be condemned who follow not after us.

But not to go into this general discussion of the subjects on which I have touched, I propose to narrow the range of my observations down to the point, which I have brought forward in the commencement of this letter. There are many minds that are often very painfully agitated and anxious about the question, whether they are in the right way. Different classes of religionists approach them, and forgetting the principles by which decision and charity are to be combined, each one claims for itself the credit, not only of being right, but of being exclusively right. One maintains that its church, as an outward institution, is the only true church, that its ordinances are the only authorized ordinances, that its clergy have come down in the only line of divinely protected succession from the Apostles. This is the claim of the Episcopalian and the Catholic. Another class insists that it holds the only system of saving doctrines, that the Evangelical doctrines, as it calls them, or as we think, miscalls them, the doctrines of total depravity, and irrespective election, and special grace, and vicarious atonement, and of the Trinity, are the only instruments of the power of God unto salvation. Such are, generally speaking, the Trinitarians and Calvinists of all communions. Others still, rejecting, as they say, all improper dependence upon mere outward institutions and dogmas, require the seeker of religion to look within for the fountain of spiritual life. These are the Friends; and certainly they deliver a doctrine which wants nothing to make it wise and wholesome, but charity, and with many of its advocates, I am happy to believe, it does not want that. I might go on, and mention other classes who lay claim to the only right way. Some found this claim upon a single doctrine, or rather upon a single explication of a doctrine, as those who say that the atonement, in their sense of it, — for all Christians profess to hold it in the Scriptural sense, — that the atonement, in their sense of it, is the only foundation of hope. Others, as the

Swedenborgians, lay stress upon their mode of interpreting Scripture, and say that no one can enter into the full and blessed light, but by the heavenly science of correspondences.

I say nothing now about the truth or falsehood of these various systems. Let them all be true, if that be possible. The question is not about their truth, but about their indispensableness. I might say, however, that these claims, in their very multiplicity and variety and inconsistency, do, in fact, neutralize and destroy each other, and ought to neutralize and destroy all the power they have, even over the weakest and most timid mind. For all cannot be true, and yet all are alike confident, and I might add, alike deserve confidence, — alike deserve, that is to say, the absolute and exclusive confidence which they demand. I say that these various and confident claims to exclusive perfection and safety, when taken together, neutralize and destroy each other. But the evil is, that they do not come *together*, and thus drown each other in the clamor of their voices; but they come separately and silently. In the private and affectionate interview, with the tone of holy, and, no doubt, honest solicitude, with a devout sincerity and a devoted zeal, each one speaks, and thus runs the moving tenor of the communication, which he addresses to the religious seeker: "I sympathize with your feelings. You say that you want to feel the power of religion. It is of infinite importance that you should feel it. My very heart is moved to you; for this is the most interesting of all inquiries. I, too, was once a seeker. I have felt all that you feel, all the destitution, the want, the anxiety. But at length I found what I sought. I found I felt the power of religion." "And where," says the anxious inquirer, with an eager and trembling voice, — "where did you find it?" "Oh! I found it," is the reply, and here the reply is various, — "I found it in Holy church," or, "I found it in such and such meetings or revivals," or, "I found it in such and such views of the doctrines of religion," or, "I found it in the secret of my own bosom." One answer, the inquirer receives to-day; another, from a different person, to-morrow; and another still, at some other time; till he exclaims, with the most unaffected solicitude and uncertainty, "Oh! that there were but one way in the world. Oh! that there had never been any controversy about it. What a blessed thing if

there were but one way; then I could be at ease; then I should have nothing to do but enter into it, and pursue it with all my heart."

Let me say to the reader, there *is* but one way; and that is what I shall undertake to show him. There is but one way, and that way is distinct from all the peculiarities of sects. It is a way "so plain that he who runs may read, and the way-faring man, though a fool, need not err therein."

But I would first address myself more generally to this state of mind. It is a state of indecision, produced, as I have intimated, by the want of charity in the treatment it has received from others. This painful indecision, I say, is created by uncharitableness. For if the language of Christian sectaries to one another had been, "There is light enough among us all to save us; one way may be better than another, but to the sincere and faithful and earnest all these ways are essentially right," — if this had been the language, there would have been, in most minds, no distressing uncertainty about their own particular way. They would have felt, that to the pure all ways are pure, and to the right in heart all ways are right. They might still have been seriously anxious about their fidelity to the way in which they were striving, and this might be very useful, but this would be very different from the indecision in question, — an indecision that causes much suffering, and does much moral harm besides.

To this indecision, then, I would address myself. "Oh! that there were but one way," says the anxious mind, "oh! that there never had been any controversy about it."

Now, the thing desired, in the sense in which it is desired, let me say, in the first place, is impossible. From the very nature of things, from the very nature of the mind, there must be controversy. I do not say, that there must be just such controversy as Christian sects have often carried on, — least of all in the spirit of it; but there must be this thing in fact, if not in the precise form which it has usually taken. For what is controversy? It is the conflict of opinions. And from what does this proceed? From the difference of opinions. But the difference of opinions springs from human imperfection, from education, from society, and is therefore unavoidable. Why, there is controversy in every social circle. That is to say, there are different views

of subjects, and those views are expressed, and advocated, and opposed; and that is controversy. There is controversy in every body politic, in every learned society, in every village debating society, in every meeting of neigbours by the wayside. Between friends and acquaintances, concerning business, trade, agriculture, labor, there is a perpetual canvassing of different and conflicting opinions; and this, again I say, is controversy. And this is unavoidable. It belongs to human nature and to the human condition. There is nothing peculiar to religion in its being the subject of controversy, but the idea, the mistaken idea *that the vital spirit, the essential interest of it, depends upon these controversies.* In all other subjects we are accustomed to say, that discussion does good, that it helps to set men right, that imperfect beings thus assist one another to arrive at the truth. And so we should say in religion, if it were not for this grand mistake by which personal character is implicated in the discussion, by which salvation is made to hang on the issue. At this door come in fear, and anxiety, and anger, and strife, and evil-speaking, and persecution. Yes, it has been the very door to the Inquisition, the gate-way to its darkest dungeons. Men have been imprisoned, tortured, killed, for their honest opinions, because their opinions were held to be fatal to the soul. And was not this imprisoning, torturing, killing, a legitimate conclusion from that one grand error? For, according to that error, opinions became crimes, and the public good required that they should be punished as such. If to deny the supremacy of the Pope, or the doctrine of transubstantiation, was to advance an opinion that threatened to be fatal to the souls of millions, why should not the heretic, avowing such opinions, be destroyed for the public good, as well as the traitor, who only disseminates an opinion likely to be fatal to some thousands of lives in a single country?

But I am wandering from the point. I say that controversy about religion is unavoidable, and not only so, but that it might do good. Nay, and I am inclined to say, that it has done good after all; that the earnest spirit of piety has really risen with rising controversy, through all its difficulties; that there has been most religion, precisely in those parts of the world, where there has been most controversy. Better is a mistaken and misdirected action of religion, than

no action. Better life of almost any sort, than the deadly stupor of implicit faith and universal acquiescence.

It may relieve the suffering, then, which indecision causes the anxious inquirer for the right way, to reflect, that differences of religious opinion are unavoidable, that they spring from the evident ordination of Heaven, that no strange thing has befallen religion, or befallen him, in this matter; and that the thing which has befallen him, — the state of controversy, that is to say, — however trying, is generally useful. The revelation from heaven might have consisted of a certain number of separate, select, simple sentences, which could not have been misunderstood. But how much more abstract would it have been; how much less interesting; how much less action of mind would it have called forth. And mental action elicits light; and the light, in fact, has been growing brighter through ages of controversy. So political light has advanced; so the light of philosophy. Why should it not be so with the light of religion?

I have said that controversy, with all the evils that have attended it, has done good. Let me dwell a moment longer on this point. And to make it clear to the reader's apprehension, let me ask, What would be the effect in society, if, on every possible subject of conversation, all men were of one opinion, — if all men thought precisely and exactly alike? Their thoughts, their opinions, it is evident, could not be perfect, for they are imperfect creatures. And how unlikely would they be to *improve*, how unlikely to suspect the need of improvement, if no one ever heard from his neighbour the voice of dissent. Suppose a single class of persons privileged, as they might consider it, — privileged never to hear that voice, never to have their opinions questioned. This is what some so earnestly desire in religion. But would such an exemption be found favorable, in the general relations of life, to the cultivation of a manly intellect, or of modesty, forbearance, and humility? It would be just as fatal in religion. Let no body of religious men, therefore, no church, nor priesthood, laying any claim to wisdom, desire any such exemption from that reasonable distrust, which not only must attach, but which, for its own improvement, ought to attach to its religious opinions. Let no seeker of the right way desire, in the sense in which so many do desire, that there might have been but one way, —

one way, that is, of opinion, of institutions, of doctrines, or of discipline; for such a uniformity, it is obvious, would have been a bond and a check upon all improvement, if it were not even, what it doubtless is, an absolute impossibility.

There must be controversy, then, I repeat once more; there must be different opinions, there must in this sense be different ways, and there cannot be the *one* way desired. And this necessity, of Heaven's ordaining, cannot be, in itself, an evil. It is evil only as man, by passion, prejudice, and uncharitableness, makes it evil. That which makes controversy an evil, I still insist, must be something wrong. How evidently wrong, then, is that assumption of various sects, that, in the essential point, the point of saving efficiency, each one is the only one right! For this assumption, more than any thing else, tends to make controversy an evil. He who holds a principle which must rob one of the great dispensations of God, controversy, of its chief uses, may well look to it, and consider, whether he is not more manifestly fighting against God, than any body whom he dares to condemn as the enemy of God.

This grand error of Christian sectarism is every way to be regretted. It not only occasions great suffering to individual minds, it not only deprives them of much comfort and steadfastness, leading them to hesitate and hang about minor points, when they ought to press forward in the manifest way of Christian zeal and fidelity; but it deprives Christian sects of the mutual aid and counsel which they might render to one another. As Christian denominations, we want one another's help. Each one, perhaps, has taken hold of some good point, and is very honestly, — that is the liability of human nature, — very honestly pressing that point too far. And instead of helping, moderating, controlling one another, they all now stand in an attitude which is pushing each one to the greatest excess. I regret it, — I say it frankly, — I regret it for the sake of our own denomination. I believe that we might derive some good from the example of our brethren around us. I believe, too, that they might derive some good from us. When shall Christians thus sit down together, in the acknowledgment of common frailty, and learn to love one another, and bear with one another, and help one another? God, in his mercy, grant it in due time!

But, in the next place, I maintain, that the great interest of the mind, its life, light, and purity, does not, and cannot essentially depend on any of these controversies. To sustain this position, I shall ask the reader to look, first, at the Orthodox creed itself, not, at present, to see whether it is true, but whether it touches the essential grounds of piety.

In what, then, does that life, of which we speak, that life, light, purity, happiness of the soul essentially consist? I answer, and surely no religious man will gainsay me, it consists in the love of God, and of goodness; it consists in the love of our fellow-men. These are the two great commandments of Jesus, and on these, he declares, hang all the law and the prophets. But look now at some of the prominent questions in Christian controversy, with reference to the piety, virtue, happiness of the soul. Can I not love God, without deciding upon the mode of his existence, whether it be a trinity, or a unity, in the metaphysical sense of those words? Can I not love God, without believing in the atonement, as some one particular class, or some other particular class of divines explain it? Suppose it were true that some one particular explanation exhibited the atonement as a greater favor, and a stronger claim upon our gratitude. Yet can I not love God for that blessed display of his goodness which I do see, and which is all that I can see, in the death of Jesus? And can I not love him, for all the other innumerable reasons, which universal nature and life, which ten thousand mercies of my existence, and ten thousand glories in heaven and earth, press upon my heart, compelling me to love him? Again, can I not love my fellow-beings, without believing in their total native depravity, and in special grace and favor extended to some of them, in the sovereign election of a part to heaven, and in the sovereign, purposed, and awful passing by of others, as they are struggling in their sins, and sinking to perdition? These views, to be sure, seem to me far enough from being fitted to awaken love, either to men or to God. But suppose that they were adapted to that end; the question is, Can they be necessary to it? Let me appeal to the heart of the Christian of whatever sect or creed. Do you never love your fellow-men, do you never feel your heart warm and melt in kindness to them, without thinking of total depravity, and sovereign election, and special grace? And when you feel the love of God in

your heart, when your whole soul is kindling and glowing with that fervent and blessed affection, are you always, at the same time, thinking of the Trinity, and of the atonement? I will answer for the Christian, and I believe I might almost indignantly answer, No. But then I say to such a man, if you can sometimes, nay, oftentimes love your God, and your fellow-beings, without being moved to do it by those doctrines, why can I not always love them without such aid? The truth is beyond all doubt, for experience testifies to the truth, that no such aid is necessary.

"Nevertheless," says some one, "the doctrines of the incarnation and atonement, of the incarnation of God, and an atonement by the word made flesh, are very moving doctrines. Nothing ever effectually moved my heart but these; nothing else sustains the life of religion in me. Without the incarnation, the very idea of God vanishes away into obscurity, and loses its power. And all piety, without this, is fast verging into a vague, cold, inefficient abstraction of mere sentiment. We shall soon," says he, "hear the rejecters of the incarnation, talking about the *anima mundi*, the soul of the world, and the worship of nature." To this I have two replies to make. In the first place, he who testifies concerning matters of experience, can testify only about his own. If any one says, that his mind can be thoroughly moved by nothing less than the doctrines of the incarnation and atonement, I am very sorry, — I was ready to say, — I am very sorry for the state of his mind; but this I may without offence say, that although the exclusive power of those doctrines to move his mind, may be a great consideration with him, it can be nothing to me any farther than I see a reason for it. Now, my reply is, in the second place, that I see no reason for it whatever. Indeed, it amazes me to hear any reflecting man lay the stress that some do, upon the circumstance of incarnation. Must the idea of God be a powerless abstraction to me, unless I can see him through a weak human body; nay, unless I see him holding a mysterious connexion with that body? For I do see him manifested in all men, yet more in good men, far more, most of all, in Jesus Christ. And what is all nature, but a kind of incarnation of God, — a material manifestation, that is to say? And what more, except in degree, can a human body be? What we want, is manifestation; and all nature, all life, all

worlds, all souls manifest God, clearly, distinctly, and oftentimes with overwhelming impression. Incarnation might be interesting to some, no doubt, as a mystery; but a mystery, so far as it is a mystery, certainly is not a manifestation. The conception of this doctrine of incarnation seems to be, and if so, it is questionable for other reasons than its mysteriousness, — it seems to be, that the essential, infinite, omnipresent Divinity was located, had its abode, dwelt, in that body, had a connexion with bodily organs, as their soul or animating spirit. Some *such* connexion, I say, must be supposed; for if all that is meant be, that God peculiarly manifested himself in the person of Jesus, this is what we all believe. Incarnation then, — grant it were a true doctrine, — the question now is about its impressiveness, — incarnation must be something more than manifestation. But what is more than manifestation is mystery. It is impossible to tell what it is, and, therefore, impossible, as it would seem, to be rationally affected by it. Such is not the doctrine, Messrs. Editors, for which, as a religious body, we contend. Free from all mystery, the manifestation of God in Christ, reconciling the world to himself, is powerful; and we might, with much more show of reason, say to the mystical believer, you must come to us, you must come to the simplicity of the gospel of Christ, in order rationally to feel its power, than he can make the same appeal to us in favor of his mystery. In short it is a case of testimony against testimony. Some Trinitarians are fond of saying that they have tried both systems, that they have found theirs alone to be effectual, that they have found ours to be cold and dead. Strange witnesses, we must think, concerning our system, who have proved nothing in it but their own coldness and death. Dead they confess they were, and yet propose to testify of what passed in that state, just as if they had been alive. Let the *living* with the *living* compare their experience. We, too, have tried both systems, have been alive to both; and we may say this with special emphasis, for the body of us were once Trinitarians. And sure I am, that there are many among us who might aver, with all solemnity, that, although the system in which we were educated had a certain power with us, yet that the system we have embraced, on mature and prayerful consideration, has a far steadier and stronger influence over us; that it brings all our affections

more completely under the control of religion; that it goes more entirely to the foundation of our character, and builds up a loftier superstructure of joy and hope, than any other system of spiritual improvement that we have ever known. I might say with an Apostle, "That which I thus speak, I speak it not after the Lord, but as it were foolishly in this confidence of boasting." Yet, with the Apostle, I would still say to the reader, "Bear with me." And for this purpose let him recollect, that, as reasonable men, we must be allowed to speak thus for our own faith; as men who are not like fools bent upon their own destruction. Why, in the dearest concern of our existence, should we or any men, adhere to a faith which is manifest death and ruin to us? And not only as reasonable men are we warranted, but as men, assailed with every species of argument, and most of all with this charge of coldness, we are obliged, though with reluctance and almost with shame, thus to speak for ourselves. God forbid that we should be the cold and insensible and wretched beings which our misguided brethren dare to represent us! And God be thanked, with all humility, as well as gratitude, for the conviction, the precious assurance of our own hearts, that it is not so! If there be such a thing as feeling in human nature, if there ever were such a thing on earth, I know that in thousands of hearts, and they too most legitimately and fully under the influence of this system, feeling has been awakened to the highest energy, and to the fullest and most overpowering delight.

But although it may be admitted by those who would not assume the forbidden prerogative of judging the hearts of their brethren, that there is sincere and strong feeling under this system, there is yet another bar to charity, another argument to disturb anxious and timid minds, involved in the assumptions of the creed itself. It is said, "There is but one way of salvation provided, and that is, through an atonement, wrought out by an incarnate God; and if this is rejected, no way of salvation remains."

Observe, now, that every word in this statement is technical, every word, — that is, every word which involves any question, — belongs to a peculiar theological system. The word "atonement," though a Scriptural word, is not used here, as we conceive, in a Scriptural sense. What is this statement, then, but a purely human sentence of exclusion?

We believe in salvation, through an atonement, that is, a reconciliation to God, wrought out by the teachings and sufferings of Jesus Christ. But what is this that is taught us, and demands to be received on the penalty of perdition for its rejection? *An expiatory atonement, wrought out by an incarnate God!* Where is the sentence, where are the words to be found in the holy volume?

I said that every word in this statement is technical. It belongs, that is to say, to a humanly devised system. Let us look, for a moment, at the main point, — the atonement. It is for this end chiefly, that the incarnation of the Deity is held to be necessary. There are some minds, indeed, which with a kind of reasoning, like that by which the Catholics defend the adoration of the Virgin Mary, contend that incarnation is necessary to render the Deity interesting, to make his being palpable and real to them. They say that they cannot feel as if God came near to them, as if he were their friend, but as they see him veiled in flesh. To this idea, which I hope is uncommon among Protestants, I have already replied. The common idea, however, as I have just said, is that the incarnation is necessary to constitute a valid atonement. But now what is, according to the human theory, this valid atonement?

The law was violated. The penalty was incurred. That penalty, says the theory, or an equivalent, must be inflicted on some one. There could be no pardon without that. To remit the penalty, on the repentance of the transgressor, would be ruin to a moral government. I might say in passing, that I cannot see the force of this conclusion. Repentance, real repentance, seems to me itself the highest homage to law; the fullest acknowledgment and vindication of its righteousness. Obedience, it is commonly admitted, would have sufficiently honored the law, and rendered the atonement unnecessary. But repentance *is* obedience so far as it goes, and it is obedience in the most striking form.

But, not to dwell on this, what does the theory allege that God has done? Man has offended, and to show his displeasure, God punishes, not the offender, but an innocent person. Let us avail ourselves of an example to illustrate the whole case. The father of a family makes rules, and annexes a penalty to the violation of them. A beloved child, — every creature of God's family is a creature of his

goodness and love, — a beloved child breaks one of these rules. Now suppose, to test the whole theory, that this child repents; he is smitten with sorrow for his offence; and he sues to his father with tears for his forgiveness. Now, by the supposition this child does not need to be punished in order to be *reformed;* for he is already reformed. His whole soul is melted to gentleness and humility and sweet obedience, and he only asks, implores, that his father will smile upon him. But the father says, — such is the theory, — "I cannot; it does not consist with my justice; my authority will be destroyed if I do; you must suffer under my frown all your days, unless some one will bear this penalty, or what is equivalent, for you."

Reader, I ask you to look at it, and to tell me, — let your heart tell me, — if you would admire, or revere, or love such an inexorable being as this parent. Would this be a language that would exalt him in your esteem, or in that of any rational creature?

But let us now advance another step, and we come to that atonement which the theory insists upon. The father cannot pardon till he punishes, — that is, cannot pardon at all. In this exigency, an innocent and lovely child, who has neither done nor deserved any harm, comes forward and offers to endure whatever the parent is pleased to inflict, to obtain release for his brother. The offer is accepted; the penalty, or an equivalent, is laid upon the innocent head; and now the father is pleased, and smiles upon his beseeching child.

I ask the reader again, — could you admire such a parent? Or could you do the same thing, — could you do it *at all?* — but could you, I ask, do it, without drawing upon you the indignation of all who know you? And yet this is the exhibition of the Infinite Father, without which it is said that we cannot love him!

Let it not be said, that in rejecting this tremendous interpretation of the Scriptures, I reject the Scripture doctrine concerning the sufferings of Jesus. There were purposes to be answered by his sufferings. And for accomplishing these purposes his sufferings were necessary. He "must needs suffer" the things he did. There was a moral necessity for his death; his death was a moral means of our forgiveness. "Without the shedding of blood there is no remission." But all this is different from the gratuitous and revolting

interpretation against which I am contending; an interpretation which, whatever other claims it may have, seems to me, beyond expression, unsuitable to awaken piety or to promote true virtue.

Nevertheless the exclusionist may say, "This is what we believe; this is the ground we take, and upon this must we stand. We must discharge our consciences, and pronounce the sentence of condemnation upon all who do not agree, essentially at least, agree with us." If this, alas! is the conclusion from which there is no appeal, not even to the common faith of Scripture, not even to the common Judge of quick and dead, then I can only desire the reader to look at the parties, and see which occupies the most obviously Christian ground. Thus they stand, then, before God and men. The one party says, "Unless you receive our explanation of the Bible, we hold you as beings reprobate, accursed, without piety, without true virtue, unworthy of our Christian love, abhorred of God, and sinking to hopeless perdition!" The other body of professed Christians can adopt no such language; it can assume no such imposing attitude before a world, that is filled with anxious and fearful minds, and ever liable to be impressed more with the aspect of confidence, than of modety. But I ask the reader still to look at their position, and to hear what they say. They say, "Brethren, we believe that you are wrong. We believe that your faith is, in several important points, a departure from the simple gospel of Jesus Christ. But we do not say that your hearts mean so. We do not say that you are bad men. We trust that there are many among you in whom the love of God dwells and abounds, and we rejoice to think this of you. Why should we make ourselves so unhappy, as we should do by holding you reprobate, and excluded from the kingdom of God? We believe, indeed, that you are in the wrong; but we judge you not. That solemn office we leave to the great Searcher of hearts. Before that great Being we shall soon stand. And we would humbly admonish you, while we solemnly charge ourselves, not to forget the high and unbending law of that future decision which is already promulgated, to wit, that "with what judgment ye judge ye shall be judged, and with what measure ye mete, it shall be measured to you again."

I have now descanted much more at large than I intended,

upon the popular creed itself, and upon its assumptions, with a view to show that the great interests of the soul, its purity, its happiness, its salvation, do not and cannot depend upon its peculiarities, or upon any controversies about it. With the same view, I desire the reader now to look from these differences of opinion themselves, to their origin.

How comes it to pass, that men think so differently? Is the cause one that implies criminality? Why,—let us ask, is it possible, that beings with imperfect minds should all think alike? Is it possible, that men differently educated should think alike? Is it possible that men brought up in different communities, should think alike? If it is not possible, morally not possible, then it cannot be a crime to differ. But look at the case more in detail. Look at a man brought up in a Roman Catholic country, who has scarcely ever heard of Protestantism. Look at a man of Protestant education, who has never heard of Popery, except to hear it condemned and spurned. Can you believe that one of these men will be condemned to future punishment, for not being a Protestant in his creed, or the other, for not being a Catholic? But look again at the different denominations of Protestants, and more particularly at the minds that are trained up amidst them. One is educated an Episcopalian, another a Baptist; one a Calvinist, another an Arminian; one a Trinitarian, another a Unitarian. Each one is brought under all the influences that mould the young and susceptible mind; influences social, friendly, parental, strong, controlling, authoritative, and, for a considerable period of life, scarcely less than irresistible. Who can believe that the peculiarities of these creeds are the turning points on which character, virtue, piety, and heaven depend? What must be the idea of God which such a belief must inspire; of that God who has laid the foundation for just such diversities of opinion in human nature, in human imperfection? Why, even the heathen, acting up to their light, shall be accepted. Shall Christian sects be less favorably treated? Is Christianity such a questionable good, nay, such a dangerous gift, that every form of it but one, is more destructive to our moral welfare and hopes, than heathenism; and that multitudes of Christians might justly prefer to live and die under the dispensation of Idolatry? For, assuredly, if, as various Christian sects

contend, there is but one form of Christianity that can save, and if it is difficult to tell which it is, it were better to take refuge, at once, under heathenism, — under the broad seal of God's impartial mercy.

But take a parallel case. Suppose that political opinions were to occupy the same place in the final account which it is alleged that religious opinions do. Suppose that there were but one true system, but one correct creed in political economy; and that those only who received this, could be happy hereafter. Does not every one see that the rule would be preposterous and monstrous? Where are all people, under their multiplied governments, forms, institutions, systems of society and education, to find this one model? Suppose the model, the only right system, to be a deep system of truth. How are the multitude of men, amidst ignorance and toil and prejudice and perversion, to detect and embrace this system? I can only say, that if Christianity assumed such a principle, I could no more regard it as an instrument of mercy, than I could the iron bed of the robber of Attica, who, not content with seizing and binding his victims, stretched or hacked every one till he was brought to the exact measure. Christianity, instead of being a beautiful system, breathing mercy, would seem to me like that engine of barbarous and cruel torture.

But let me approach, now, as it will be thought high time indeed, to the ultimate point which I proposed to reach in this communication. Notwithstanding what has been offered to show that there must be differences of opinion, and that these unavoidable differences do not and cannot involve the question of salvation or perdition, the feeling may still arise that says, "Oh! that there were but one way!"

I say, then, finally, that there *is* but one way to be saved. Am I asked what this is, I answer, it is for every man to be earnest in his own particular way, whatever it be; to be earnest, whether in one way or another way of sectarian preference is not material. What *is* material, and all that is material on our part is, to be *sincerely, thoroughly, and entirely in earnest.* "Strive to enter in at the strait gate." "Labor for the meat that endureth unto everlasting life." "Give all diligence to make your calling sure." These are the Scriptural directions, and they know nothing of sects or

creeds or speculations. They are plain, they are practical, they are level to the simplest apprehension, and they will infallibly save all who follow them.

The painful indecision of some minds is created, I have said, by the variety of sects and the urgency of their several claims. The hesitating and wavering in faith meet with one and another, now a convert to this way, and now a votary of that, who talks so earnestly, so feelingly of religion, and of his peculiar religious steadfastness and assurance and joy, that they are ready to say, from the natural impulse of sympathy, "This man or that man is right; surely he must, — with such feelings as his, — he must be right!" And so he is right; but what is it that makes him right? Why, the truth is, that each one of these fervent Christians is deeply interested in religion, not because each one's system is the best, for that by the supposition is impossible, — not because every one of a dozen systems is most calculated to awaken feeling, for that is equally impossible; but each one is interested, because he has given attention to religion, because he has heartily taken hold of it, in that form which he has embraced. His ardent feelings, indeed are so strongly and vividly associated with that particular form of doctrine, or of worship, that he refers them, by a very natural and common mistake, to the peculiarities of his faith, or of his church. He thinks he could never have been a Christian, unless it had been in that particular way.

The secret of power, then, in every religious system, lies in earnestness. Earnest attention, earnest endeavour, earnest prayer, — this, with the promised grace of Heaven, is all that is wanting to give efficacy, reality, and energy to religion. Does any one say that he would know the power of your religion. But is he indeed willing to know it? If he is not, let him not think that any system, any appointed course, any certain process would help him. No faith nor worship can save the negligent soul. But if the professed seeker is willing, yes, and heartily anxious to know all that religion can teach him, all of its might and grandeur, and beauty and sweetness, then let him make full trial of it. Let him give his heart to it without reserve. Let every morning witness his prayer, and the night-watches his meditation. Let life have no dearer object to him, than to grow in the love of God. As the hart panteth for the wa-

ter-brooks, so let his soul pant for God, for the living God. No system of faith can prevent this aspiration, this attention, this earnestness: no mere system can create it. It is a mistake, if it is not something worse, to be thinking so much of this way, and that way. No, reader, in your soul, — direct your thoughts there, — in your soul is the glorious power, and there God will breathe the holy influence upon every earnest endeavour. There work out the glorious work. There work out your own salvation with fear and trembling, knowing that it is God that worketh within, both to will and to do, of good pleasure.

So, in fine, Messrs. Editors, will every man among us be fully persuaded in his own mind. There ought to be no satisfactory persuasion, no assured confidence, without an earnest devotion of the soul to religion. But with this there will be a persuasion, which nothing can disturb, a decision, which nothing can bring into question. Oh! better will it be than all confidence in creeds or in forms. It will be a confidence in God, a trust in his providence, an assurance of his promises. It will be the confidence of human love, in divine and infinite love, a clinging of human weakness to infinite strength, a repose of all human agitations on the arm of infinite faithfulness, a supply of all human wants in the ocean of infinite mercy. It will be decision and charity. It will be decision, for the perfection of love casts out fear, the fulness of joy removes doubt; a heart full of these blessed emotions would have no room in it, for painful misgivings. It will be charity, for a heart filled with love does not naturally or easily lean to distrust; it does not ever yield to bitterness; it is not apt to constitute itself a severe judge of others; it does not feel itself more comfortable, because it thinks itself alone right; it thinks not of others, but to love them, and to wish them well; "it thinketh no evil:" "it beareth all things, believeth all things, hopeth all things."

Craving your pardon, Messrs. Editors, for the length of this communication, I am your friend and fellow-servant in the cause of our common faith.

O. D.

[For the Christian Examiner.]

ART. VII. — *Review of a Modern Substitute for a Supposed Sinful Nature, as exhibited and recommended in Professor Stuart's "Commentary on the Epistle to the Romans."*

THE prevalence of wickedness among mankind has been in all ages an occasion of grief to the pious and benevolent; and the occasion of much inquiry respecting its cause. Among Christians it has been a common opinion for many generations, that God, to manifest his displeasure on account of Adam's apostasy, doomed all his posterity to be born with a nature wholly sinful. Hence, to this sinful nature, with which they were cursed by God, all wicked actions have been ascribed. In later times, in New England, respectable writers, who were denominated Orthodox, discovered, or thought they discovered, that John was correct in saying, — "*Sin* is the transgression of the law." On such ground it was very natural to infer, that the term *sinful* should not be applied to the *nature* which God gave us, and should only be used to express the *nature* of such *volitions* or *actions* as are contrary to the commandments of the Lord. It was, however, still believed by these very men to be a fact, that all the posterity of Adam become sinners by their first moral volitions, and also become totally sinful, having no other volitions of a moral nature but those of transgression. The minds of these thinking men were of course excited to inquire, what cause could be assigned for a fact so extraordinary and so universal as this, that the first moral volition of every child should be sinful, when it had been admitted that no child is born with a sinful nature? Dr. Hopkins and many of his disciples accounted for the fact, on the ground of a "divine constitution," which connected the first sin of Adam with the first moral act of each of his descendants. More recently the phrase, "by a divine constitution," has, if I mistake not, been pretty much laid aside, and other forms of speech have been adopted, which, I presume, are supposed not so directly to affirm or imply a positive divine agency for the production of an effect so dreadful.

Within a few years Dr. Taylor of New Haven, with his

associates, including "The Christian Spectator," have done much to diminish the reputation of what had long been regarded as the Orthodox and Calvinistic views on this subject, and have brought on themselves a considerable share of clamor and reproach. But the "Commentary on the Epistle to the Romans," lately published by Professor Stuart of Andover, contains a more full examination and refutation of those views than I have seen in any other New-England publication. He has done so well in exposing the absurdity of former hypotheses, that I cannot but regret that the one he advances as his own is not less liable to serious objections. To account for the supposed universal sinfulness of Adam's posterity, without the supposition that they are born with a nature wholly sinful, he has advanced the following hypothesis, which is several times expressed with some diversity of form:

"I admit that all are born in such a state, that it is now certain they will be sinners as soon as they are moral agents, and that they will never be holy until they are regenerated." — p. 240.

"That they are in such circumstances that they will all sin as soon as they are capable of sinning, and never do any thing holy until they are regenerated." — p. 242.

"All come into the world in such a state, as makes it certain that their appetites, which lead to sin, will prevail; and that they never will have any holiness, until they are born again." — p. 526.

The hypothesis of Dr. Taylor is expressed as follows:

"A ground of certainty exists in the mind of each individual of our race, that the first and all subsequent acts of moral agency will uniformly be sinful, previous to regeneration."

Such is the modern substitute for the ancient supposed sinful nature; and if the substitute can be supported by Scripture testimony, it may as fully account for all the depravity which exists among men, as the hypothesis of a propagated nature wholly sinful. It is, however, to be observed, that Mr. Stuart has not attempted to support his hypothesis by a course of argumentation. In his enumeration of the supposed evils or losses to which the offspring of Adam were subjected by his fall, he has introduced the hypothesis which I have quoted, as one of these evils. It will be my aim to

examine the subject with all the candor and respect due to the Professor, from one who formerly entertained a similar opinion, — and whose present dissent originated in a conviction that the doctrine is not taught in the Bible, and cannot be reconciled to the more important doctrine, — "God is love."

That there are passages of Scripture which, literally understood, would imply that all mankind are sinners, including infants and idiots, I shall not deny; and there are a few texts in which children are poetically or hyperbolically spoken of as going astray from their birth, or as speaking lies as soon as they are born. Such passages have often been collected and arranged to prove, that children come into the world with a nature wholly sinful. But notwithstanding all such passages, Professor Stuart has boldly said, "All men pronounce infants to be *innocent*, until theory bids them to contradict this."* He has also shown that he is fully aware, that such passages were never intended to be understood in a strictly literal sense; and what he has said to invalidate their force, as used by Calvinists, is of equal cogency against applying them for the support of his own hypothesis. Indeed I have no belief that he would adduce such passages in support of his views, were he to attempt to support them by argument; for he appears to me to have adopted candid and judicious principles of interpretation generally.

In his remarks on Rom. v. 19, Mr. Stuart has the following passage:

"It seems to me impossible, without doing violence to the Scriptures, to deny that Adam's first offence is here asserted to have a connexion with, an influence upon, the sin and condemnation of all his posterity. *But* HOW *is not said.* Let the reader remark this well. Paul neither asserts that Adam's sin was propagated; nor that it was imputed to us without any act of our own; nor that it is ours merely by the force of example. Nor does he say, that *hereditary* depravity is the ground and cause of all sin; nor that we are condemned without being *actual* sinners." — pp. 539, 540.

On the same principle, and with the same truth I may add, — Nor did Paul say, "that all are born in such a

* Page 543.

state that it is now certain they will be sinners as soon as they are moral agents." . . . . . "Let the reader remark this well!" I have no disposition to deny, that the apostasy of our first parents was "connected with, and has an influence upon the sin and condemnation of their posterity," in the same manner as the apostasy and dissipation of virtuous parents, at the present day, tends to the ruin of their offspring.

Perhaps Mr. Stuart is not quite correct in his remark, "*But* HOW *is not said.*" For in the very verse on which he was remarking, we read as follows, — "For *as* by one man's disobedience many were made sinners, *so* by the obedience of one shall many be made righteous." Is not this equivalent to saying, — We were made sinners by the disobedience of Adam, *as* we are made righteous by the obedience of Christ? I think it is.

So far, then, as men can know how they are made righteous by the obedience of Christ, they may know how they were made sinners by the disobedience of Adam. It is, I believe, by a moral influence in both cases, and not by supernatural means or agency. To me it is very clear, that we are not made righteous by having the obedience of Christ transmitted to us "by ordinary generation"; nor by having his obedience imputed to us as our obedience; nor by being placed "in such circumstances" *as render it certain that we shall be obedient as soon as we are moral agents.* I therefore cannot believe that it is in a way analogous to either of these, that children are made sinners by the disobedience of Adam; and I think I may safely appeal to the conscience, even of Professor Stuart, whether Paul's contrast in relation to the "HOW," does not bear as hard against his hypothesis, as it does against either *imputed* or *propagated* sinfulness.

Mr. Stuart has more than once suggested, that there are some who assert that the posterity of Adam become sinners "merely by the force of his example." On this ground he asks, "How can we account for the sins of such of his posterity as never knew any thing of his example?" This question was to me a little surprising; for what intelligent man does not know, that *imitations* of a bad example may have influence on thousands who never saw the original. But, in truth, I know not to whom the Professor refers; for I am not aware that any class of men suppose, that we become

sinners "merely by the force of example." It is surely not so with me. I believe that the posterity of Adam are born with such animal appetites and passions as exposed him to temptation and sin; but the danger is enhanced in proportion as they are exposed to the influence of evil examples and instructions. Is it then difficult to account for what we know of the wickedness of little children, who not only possess such animal properties as exposed Adam to sin, but are much exposed to the influence of pernicious instructions and examples?

No propensity in children is more observable than the propensity to *imitate*. This is an estimable property, if directed by good examples; but it exposes to danger when called into exercise by pernicious examples. I am, however, not aware that any valid evidence can be produced to prove, that little children in general are less disposed to imitate what is apparently amiable and good, than what is bad and hateful. But when I seriously consider to what extent children are commonly exposed to the influence of bad examples and instructions, — how little care is generally taken to preserve them from such influence, and how imperfectly the business of moral education has been attended to, or even understood; I am as much inclined to wonder that children are not generally worse than they are, as that they are so bad.

Few Christians will doubt that the example of Christ has done much to make many righteous; and that the example of Adam has done much to make many sinners. But example is not all. The example of Christ, however, includes his preaching, as well as other parts of his practice. His doctrines, his precepts, his promises, his threatenings, his example, and his sufferings, have all had a salutary influence to make many righteous. So there may have been much in the example of Adam, besides his first sin, to make many sinners, — even things of which we have no distinct knowledge.

Mr. Stuart has furnished me with one example which may be useful in illustrating this subject. While opposing Calvinistic views, he stated the following query:

"If a writer should say that millions in Europe have become, or been constituted profligates by Voltaire; would the meaning necessarily be, that his sin was put to their account? Certainly

not. It would be enough to say, in order fully to explain and justify such an expression, that Voltaire had been an instrument, a means, or occasion of their profligacy." — p. 538.

Surely Professor Stuart will not say, that the influence of Voltaire placed the "millions" in "such circumstances" as rendered it certain that they would become "profligates" as soon as they become moral agents. Why then does he imagine that the first sin of Adam had such an effect in relation to his posterity? In reference to the language of Paul on this subject, may I not borrow the language of Mr. Stuart, — "It is enough to say, in order fully to explain and justify" those expressions, "that" Adam "was an instrument, a means, or occasion of their" sin? I am unable to see why such an explanation is not as pertinent for setting aside the hypothesis of Mr. Stuart, as that of Calvin or Edwards.

On the whole, and after much reflection and inquiry, I may truly express the belief, that there is far less of mystery or of supernatural or arbitrary arrangement implied in Paul's comparison of Adam and the Messiah,* than has generally been supposed; and that the better we understand the Scriptures, and the more carefully we observe the common effects of apostasy in parents, the less need we shall find for any of the shocking hypotheses by which writers have attempted to account for the fact, that "by one man's disobedience many were made sinners." And as little probably shall we need the hypothesis of vicarious punishment to explain "how" by the obedience of one many are made righteous.

There are, however, objections to the modern hypothesis which appear to me of a more serious nature than any thing which I have yet mentioned. These I shall now exhibit. Though I have not observed that either Mr. Stuart or Dr. Taylor has said that it is "by a divine constitution" that children are placed in "such circumstances" as render it certain that "they will all sin as soon as they are capable of sinning"; yet, if such be the fact, these "circumstances" must have had a designing cause; and the results thus produced are of a character so extraordinary, that no

* Rom. v. 14 – 17.

cause can be adequate but the infinite mind of Jehovah himself. No reflecting person can suppose that effects so uniform, so universal, and so perpetually occurring, could be the *natural effects* of a single volition of Adam to transgress; nor that his volition could cause such a change in the human constitution, as naturally to occasion each individual to become a sinner at the very moment he becomes a moral agent; and at that moment to pass from a state of perfect innocency, to a state of total sinfulness. If "such circumstances" do in fact exist, as render such a change in every child "certain," at such a particular period of his existence, there is not, it is believed, in all the works of creation or providence, any thing more evidential of immutable *purpose* and strong *desire* on the part of God. But what must be the nature of a purpose or a desire, which has for its direct and immediate object, the *total sinfulness* of all the human race, to manifest God's displeasure on account of Adam's first transgression! Must it not be of the nature of revenge, or of doing evil that good may come? The arrangement of "such circumstances" as would render the supposed effect "certain," invariable, and as durable as the successive generations of men, must have been independent of the knowledge or the volition of Adam, and of all his descendants; and an arrangement for which they could not be responsible or blamable. Are we then to believe that God had such an invincible desire to see all the human race, for a time, totally depraved, that he caused a special or supernatural arrangement of circumstances to render the awful result certain and inevitable!

Another consideration which seems to me of great force against the hypothesis is this; if such an arrangement of circumstances has been established by our Maker, all pious efforts on the part of parents to preserve their children from becoming disobedient and vicious, must be useless. What, then, must be the feelings of reflecting parents, who believe this doctrine, and also believe, that "every sin deserves God's wrath and curse, both in this life and that which is to come"! Let this case be examined with care. A pious father and mother have a child born to-day, for which they feel tender affection and solicitude. They think of the new duties which will devolve on them as parents, should the life of the child and their own lives be prolonged for years to come. They recollect the injunctions, — "Suffer the

little children to come unto me, and forbid them not:" "Bring up your children in the nurture and admonition of the Lord;" and they feel disposed to pray for their child, and that God would assist them to be wise and faithful in the discharge of parental duties. But after having reflected, and sought divine direction for a while, suddenly their creed occurs to their minds, — that every child is placed in "such circumstances" as render it certain that he will sin as soon as he becomes a moral agent, — and from that time will be totally sinful even unto death, unless it should please a sovereign God to grant special influenees of his spirit, and effect the work of regeneration. Of course, no prayers, no efforts, no care on their part, can be of any use to prevent the fearful result. Should the child live and advance like other children, he must soon be ripe for moral agency; then *sin he will*, for *such are the circumstances*, as to insure this result. Nay he will sin not only once, but become totally depraved, so as to have no other moral volitions but those of rebellion against his Maker. How trying, how appalling, how paralyzing must be the doctrine to the minds of these parents! At present, however, they regard their babe as innocent and lovely, one who would probably go directly to heaven, should it die before it becomes a moral agent. Must not love to the child lead them fervently to pray, that God would in mercy remove it by death, before the fatal day of moral agency shall arrive?

Besides, if God has told us by his word, that it is his purpose that all the posterity of Adam should "sin as soon as they are capable of sinning," then this uniform result is a part of his *revealed will.* If such is the fact, — or is believed so to be by parents, must it not be wicked in them to use any means with a desire to save their infant children from becoming transgressors? How then shall we reconcile the two supposed parts of God's revealed will, — that which has made known his purpose, that every child of Adam shall be a sinner as soon as he is a moral agent, and that which forbids all sin, and requires parents to train up their children in the way they should go? And what is the character ascribed to God, when we teach that it is a part of his revealed will, that all Adam's offspring should become sinners "as soon as they are capable of sinning"? The language adopted by Professor Stuart in relation to the Calvinistic

hypothesis, appears to me applicable to his own. The following are his impressive remarks:

"Now can the human mind well conceive, that perfect justice would punish with everlasting and inevitable corruption and misery beings who are sinners only *putatively*, that is, in mere supposition, and not in fact? For myself I can only say, that all the elements of my moral nature set themselves spontaneously against such a representation as this. It is one of those cases which make it necessary for me to be made over again, and have new and different faculties, before I admit its truth." — p. 537.

The Professor indeed supposes something more than mere "*putative*" sin, as soon as the child becomes a moral agent; but prior to this he regards the child as "innocent." "Now can the human mind well conceive that perfect justice would," on account of Adam's offence, doom the innumerable millions of his innocent offspring to "inevitable corruption," and place them all in "such circumstances" as renders it "certain that they will be sinners as soon as they are moral agents, and that they will never be holy until they are regenerated"! If, on account of Adam's offence, such were the feelings and the purpose of God towards our race, why should it be thought improbable, that he cursed us all with a nature wholly inclined to sin, and that this is one of the "circumstances" by which it was rendered certain that every child will sin as soon as it is capable of sinning? I may add:

It is unquestionably the duty of Christians to be "fellow-workers" with God, in promoting his *revealed purposes*. If then it be a truth he has revealed to us, that it is his will that every child shall become a sinner as soon as he becomes a moral agent, why should not parents do more than merely to forbear the use of means to prevent their children from becoming disobedient, and enemies to God? Why should they not be "followers of God as dear children," and do what they can to place their children in "such circumstances" as will render it certain that their first moral actions will be sinful? But what good parent could adopt such a course? And what would be thought of a parent, if seen employed in using means to render it certain that his child shall have no obedient volitions till *after* he has become totally de-

praved? Would he not be deemed a monster in iniquity, grossly deluded, or fearfully insane? If so, ought we not to inquire very carefully into the grounds of our belief, before we venture any more to ascribe such conduct to our heavenly Father?

Mr. Stuart will not pretend that the proposition which I have called his hypothesis, can be found in the Bible. It is *his* "philosophy of Scripture doctrine," or his inference from what he regards as Scripture premises. Nor will any well-informed Christian venture to assert, that the arrangement of "such circumstances," as his proposition implies, was a necessary or natural effect of Adam's apostasy. What is it then but an arrangement produced by supernatural agency, for the very purpose of insuring that every child shall be a sinner as soon as he is a moral being? But can *such* effects be the proper objects of supernatural agency?

If it is by supernatural agency that all Adam's offspring are brought into a sinful state, it may be very natural to suppose that their regeneration is effected by a similar agency. One passage in the Commentary has led me to suppose, that Mr. Stuart's hypothesis was an *inference* from his views of depravity and regeneration. The following is the passage to which I allude:

"Of course, we necessarily draw the inference, that men are born destitute of such a disposition to holiness as Adam had in his primitive state; and this from the fact that they never, before regeneration, do any thing which is truly good or holy, but always sin in all their actions of a moral nature. This makes a wide difference between their present natural state, and the original condition of Adam. And into this natural state they are born, as we have reason to conclude, in consequence of Adam's fall. Although the Apostle does not specificate the particular point in which the fall injured all men, yet as he so often asserts the fact that it did injure them, it must be of course allowed that in some way or other the truth of this fact is developed. In what way then is this developed, if not in the manner stated, — namely, by our being born into a state destitute of all disposition to holiness, and with passions and appetites, which, situated as we are, will certainly lead us to sin, and always lead us to sin, in all our actions of a moral nature?" — p. 560.

That Adam's posterity have sustained injuries by his fall, I readily admit; but these may have all been the *natural*

effects of his apostasy, and not the effects of God's anger, nor of any supernatural or extraordinary arrangement of "such circumstances" as were adapted to involve in "corruption and misery" the whole human race.

I shall also admit that in certain respects the condition of Adam's children at the commencement of moral agency, has been different from his, and less favorable; but whether they have been different in all the respects supposed by Mr. Stuart is questionable. As to animal "passions and appetites," I suppose that these were possessed by Adam before his fall, as well as by us, — and that they were to him occasions of temptations as they surely are to his offspring. In regard to the "holy disposition," which it has been supposed that Adam possessed in "his primitive state," I have several queries to propose.

Is it not highly probable, that Adam was at first *innocent*, prior to his being *holy*? If so, he was in this respect in such a state as Mr. Stuart supposes children are, prior to being sinful. If the term holiness expresses the nature of obedient volitions, had Adam any holiness but what consisted in obedience? Are not what we call *moral dispositions*, such qualities as are *acquired* by obedience or disobedience, — or in the same way that moral habits are acquired? Was not Adam's "disposition to holiness," the *effect*, — not the *cause* of obedient volitions, — as a *disposition* for gaming is acquired by practice? If the latter queries are to be answered in the affirmative, as I think they should be, there may not be so great a dissimilarity between the condition of Adam and infant children as Mr. Stuart imagined.

There are, however, some particulars in which a distinction should be recognised. I believe it is generally supposed, that Adam commenced his course, as a moral agent, an adult in stature and mental faculties; but his posterity commence their course with what may be called infant faculties, compared with those of an adult. If this comparison is correct, the advantage is truly on the side of Adam. Besides this, Adam had no parents, and of course no grand-parents, no uncles or aunts, no brothers or sisters, and no neighbours, by whose evil examples or instructions he was exposed to be led astray. How very different from this has been the condition of little children generally! When we take into view these facts, and also recollect that children commence

moral agency with such animal passions and appetites as probably led Adam astray when adult, it seems to me that we have enough fully to account for all that is *known* of the early transgressions of little children, without either the revolting hypothesis of a propagated sinful nature, or a supernatural arrangement of circumstances to render it certain that all will sin as soon as they become moral agents; enough indeed to render it very probable, that they will generally transgress very early.

If any of my brethren shall still think, that in addition to the natural circumstances which I have named, God was disposed to express his displeasure on account of Adam's sin, by a supernatural arrangement of circumstances, to render early transgression and total depravity *more* certain, — it is for them to reconcile this supposed conduct to the spirit of benignity and forgiveness, which the Messiah ascribed to our heavenly Father.

Those who shall read the passage in the "Commentary" last quoted, may be convinced, that Professor Stuart inferred his hypothesis from his views of depravity and regeneration. I am aware that it has been a common opinion, that regeneration would be unnecessary, if mankind were not totally depraved. This opinion will, I think, be found incorrect, when the work of regeneration shall be better understood. So far as regeneration is the work of God, it is, I believe, that work by which he produces in men *spiritual life*, or the spirit of obedience. The work, if I mistake not, is effected by sowing the "good seed" of divine truth in the hearts of men, and causing it to spring up, grow, and bear fruit. Such a work, I suppose, was necessary to Adam in a state of innocency, in order to his becoming spiritually alive, or truly obedient to God. The same is necessary to every human being, and perhaps was so to angels. I may now add, that I am unacquainted with any passage of Scripture which forbids the belief, that many children, religiously educated, have been regenerated, prior to being guilty of any transgression. But if regeneration or spiritual life should commence thus early, the child may still be liable to sin, as is the case with adult converts, and as was the case with Adam and Eve. The meek, humble, kind, and obedient temper, which is often seen in little children, appears to me far better evidence of early regeneration than has ever yet been produced in favor of universal

and total depravity. Though many professedly believe the doctrine of universal and total sinfulness, in regard to little children, yet I may boldly ask, What good man ever *practically* conformed to this belief? Does not common sense forbid the parent to accuse his children of transgression in *all they say*, and *all they do*? In hundreds of instances little children give better evidence of a humble and obedient temper, than is generally given by professors of religion; and in how many instances might Christ exhibit the little child as an example to professedly religious parents, as he once did for an example to contending apostles!

When we see in little children the spirit of kindness, humility, and obedience, with care to avoid vice, on what principle can we tell them that they sin in all they do? If we do this, is it not clear that we substitute some theological dogma of our own, for the rule given by Christ, — "*By their fruits ye shall know them.*" Had this rule been duly observed in regard to children, many very young would have been deemed not only "innocent" but virtuous. When we see in children, amiable dispositions and actions, we have reason to hope that they have been "born of God"; and the care of parents and teachers should be, to encourage and comfort such children in the way of well-doing, — forbearing to bewilder their minds by teaching them that all their moral actions are sinful and offensive to God. If children *aim* to do right, and do that which they *think* is right, how pernicious might be the effect of trying to make them believe, that all they do is from a wicked heart, — a heart full of enmity to God! I have not a doubt that such teaching has done vast injury to children, as well as to their parents. How much more commendable would it be for parents and teachers to treat little children of amiable dispositions, as the Saviour did, believing with him, that "of such is the kingdom of heaven."

Parents who believe that all children "sin as soon as they are capable of sinning," and that they have no other moral volitions but those which are sinful, are continually exposed to self-contradiction. They cannot but be pleased with what is amiable in the dispositions and conduct of their children; — hence, in one hour they will be saying, perhaps, "You are a *good child*, — you have *done very well*;" the next, they may be heard preaching according to their creed, that

all children sin as soon as they are moral agents, and continue to sin in all they say and do, till God regenerates them by his special influence. How can little children, or any body else, reconcile such conduct or such language?

The passage last quoted from the "Commentary," seems to imply, that Mr. Stuart himself does not regard his hypothesis as unquestionably true. He says, "Although the Apostle does not specificate the particular point in which the fall injured all men; yet as he so often asserts that it did injure them, it must be of course allowed that in some way this is developed." He next asks, "In what way then is this developed, if not in the manner stated?"

If Paul did not "specificate," why should we? and can it be safe for us to "specificate" by an hypothesis in favor of the universal and total sinfulness of mankind, which suggests the horrid idea that it is even so with their Maker! What *father*, not totally depraved, could even *wish* to avenge the first offence of a son, by causing all the posterity of that child to become totally disobedient, as soon as they are moral agents?

Should it be asked, How then did the fall injure all men, as the Apostle "so often asserts"? In answer, I would inquire, In what connexion, and by what forms of speech, did the Apostle assert the fact? All he said of this kind is found in a contrast by which he attempted to show, that the evils occasioned to our race by the disobedience of Adam, are even overbalanced by the favors which result from the obedience of Christ. The language which Paul used in summing up the contrasted evils and benefits, is, by Professor Stuart, thus handled: "For as by the disobedience of one man the many were constituted sinners; so by the obedience of one the many will be constituted righteous."

If from the first part of the verse we may infer that all little children become sinners, "as soon as they are capable of sinning," why not from the latter part infer, that, since the resurrection of Christ, all children become righteous as soon as they are moral agents? I am induced to think that Dr. Macknight's paraphrase of this verse approaches nearer to its correct interpretation: "As through the disobedience of one man all were made *liable* to sin and punishment,—even so through the obedience of one man, all have been, are, or shall be, made *capable* of righteousness and eternal life."

I might here more fully express my thoughts on Paul's contrast; and also show, that our liability to sin does not result from God's displeasure on account of Adam's apostasy, but from his kindness to us notwithstanding that offence; that our animal senses, appetites, propensities, and passions, by which we are so constantly exposed to temptation, were not implanted in our natures, to render us liable to sin; but as expressions of kindness, adapted to promote our usefulness and comfort; that our sin does not consist in possessing these properties, but in the indulgence of them in a forbidden manner. But in another work on "Man's Liability to Sin," which may be published at a future time, these topics, and many others, have been illustrated in so ample a manner that I indulge a hope that the work will afford some light on an important subject, — and obviate some difficulties which have long perplexed the minds of many good people.

I am not aware of any other doctrines which are supported by any sect of Christians, that now seem to me to have such an injurious bearing on the character of God, as that which represents him as so revengeful on account of Adam's sin, as to cause all his posterity to be born with a nature wholly sinful, or to be placed in "such circumstances" as render it certain that they would become totally sinful, prior to having any obedient volitions, — and that which represents him as so unforgiving that he could not pardon the sins even of the penitent, except on the ground of vicarious punishment. If, while on the borders of the grave, I may be allowed to do something to counteract the influence of these doctrines, I deem it a duty so to do; and particularly so, as in the earlier part of my life I did something in their favor. I have used the words *revengeful* and *unforgiving*, because I think that no better feelings can account for such conduct as these doctrines ascribe to God.

As in this review I have expressed my dissent from several doctrines which I once thought to be correct, and which others still regard, not only as correct, but important, I wish it to be understood, that my dissent is not from any doctrine as expressed in the gospel; but from "the philosophy of Scripture doctrines," by which others have attempted to account for facts, or to explain Scripture language, in accordance with some human system. I believe that "by

one man sin entered into the world, and death by sin;" and that, "as by the disobedience of one man many were made or constituted sinners, so by the obedience of one" many have been, and "will be, made righteous." At the same time I have dissented from every human hypothesis which imputes our liability to sin to God's anger, on account of the sin of Adam. I also believe in the necessity of regeneration, not merely on the ground of human sinfulness, but because "that which is born of the flesh is flesh," and destitute of spiritual life,—and, because without spiritual life no one is fit for the kingdom of God. I believe, too, that regeneration implies the operations of God's spirit,—the same spirit or energy by which he created the world, and by which he produces *vegetable life*, *animal life*, and *spiritual life*,—by which also he gives us every good and perfect gift. Whoever is the instrument in sowing or in watering, it is "God who giveth the increase," both in the natural, and the moral world.

Discussions on theological questions of great importance, between brethren who happen to be of different opinions, may be of public utility, if conducted in the spirit of meekness, kindness, mutual affection, and becoming respect for each other's characters. On this principle I have endeavoured to write this review. If in any particular I have violated this principle, the greater disadvantage resulting from the failure must be on my own part. I think that He who knows my heart is my witness, that it has been no part of my aim to injure the moral character of Professor Stuart. Though I have aimed to invalidate the reputation of his hypothesis, I have no belief that he viewed it in the light that I have done, nor that he was at all aware of its being of a pernicious tendency. In writing, I express what I believe to be true; and I doubt not that it is so with him. Few men, perhaps, have had more ample evidence of their own liability to err, than has fallen to my share. The effect of this experience on myself has been to remove from my mind every disposition to impute to wickedness of heart, what I regard as errors in the theological opinions of my Christian brethren.

APPENDIX.

Professor Stuart is aware of the importance which Calvinistic writers have attached to a belief in their views of original sin, and of man's sinfulness by nature. He appears to be also aware, that his dissent from their views will expose him to suspicion and reproach. Before closing his remarks, however, he exhibits a brief contrast between his views and those he has attempted to refute; and makes a forcible appeal, as to which "presents the most cogent reasons for penitence and humility, — which inculcates the deepest sense of our need of a Saviour," — and which "best agrees with proper views of God's justice and our own accountability."

I am unwilling to suspect Mr. Stuart of any intentional unfairness in forming his contrast, as the ground of his appeal; but it so happens, that he has presented the darkest features of the Calvinistic theory, against the best features of his own, — wholly omitting the appalling hypothesis to which I have objected. He states the contrast in the following hypothetical form:

On the part of Professor Stuart: —

"If man, fallen as he is, has in his fallen state all the faculties necessary to do good, and has a moral sense, conscience, judgment, reason; if 'not being yet born he has not done any good or evil,' — Rom. ix. 11; and he sins altogether of his own free will and choice whenever he does sin; then it is indeed true that he is guilty of death; then is punishment not only threatened but altogether *deserved.*" — p. 547.

On the part of President Edwards: —

"But supposing, on the other hand, that men are born with a positively evil disposition, which is itself sin, and incurs eternal death antecedent to all choice and action; supposing them to have, as President Edwards asserts, a propensity [to sin] that is *invincible,* or a tendency which really amounts to a fixed, constant, and unfailing *necessity;* and supposing that this propensity, thus implanted in their natures and antecedent to all choice and action, is the basis or ground of all subsequent sins; then indeed they may need redemption; they are truly in a ruinous state; they are indeed objects of our pity and of overwhelming misfortune; but where is the aggravated measure of their voluntary guilt, which the Bible charges upon them as agents altogether free?" — p. 547.

Let it now be supposed that President Edwards should revisit New England to answer Professor Stuart's appeal; may he not with propriety address to him a note of the following import? —

J. E. to M. S.

'My friend: In your late Commentary you have spoken of me in terms sufficiently respectful, and some of my ancient opinions you have ably refuted. But in forming your appeal, as to the comparative tendency of your theory and mine, you have failed to do me justice. From your contrast many may be led to think, that I failed to teach that "man in his fallen state has all the faculties necessary to do good"; or, "that he sins altogether of his own free will and choice." But I wrote some bright things of this kind. Why did you not set some of these against the bright things of your own theory? I wrote many years ago; and many things which I then believed to be true will not bear examination in the light which now prevails in New England. If you thought it best to exhibit the dark spots in my theory, why did you not set against these the appalling spots in your own? In a future day some ideas which you have written may appear as odious to others, as any of mine now do to you. Could a nature wholly sinful, or an invincible propensity to sin, be more fatal to little children, than being "born in such a state," or placed "in such circumstances" as render it certain that they will sin as soon as they are moral agents, — and only sin till they shall be regenerated? You object to my theory because it supposes, that a propensity to sin was implanted in the natures of children "antecedent to all choice and action, and is made the basis of all subsequent sins." You indeed suppose that children are born innocent, and continue so till they become moral agents; but you also suppose that God takes seasonable care, that they never shall have one obedient volition till they shall have become totally sinful. This is done, as you suppose, by placing them in "such circumstances" that it is certain they will sin "as soon as they are capable of sinning," and that they will sin in all their moral volitions till they are regenerated. Now what had these innocent children done, that they should be all placed in circumstances so perilous and fatal? And do not you account for their "subsequent

sins" on the ground of "such circumstances," as fully as I accounted for them by an invincible propensity to sin, or "a tendency which amounts to a fixed, constant, and unfailing *necessity*?" In what respect then is your hypothesis less exceptionable than mine, either in relation to the condition of children, or the character of God? In regard to your claims on the question of free agency, of what use are faculties for free agency, if God has designedly placed the agents in "such circumstances" as render it certain that they will not have any holy or obedient volitions till after they shall have served an apprenticeship to Satan in the school of total depravity? Can it be consistent with perfect benevolence or forgiving love in God, to place all the posterity of Adam in such circumstances as a mark of his displeasure against the first offence of the human race?

'The evils, natural and moral, which commonly fall to the lot of the children of ungodly and profligate parents, are *natural effects* of vicious examples and instructions; and as opposite effects are generally seen to result when children are wisely and faithfully trained up in the way they should go, we can see a good end, as the object of these arrangements in both cases. The sad results in the former case, are a solemn admonition to all parents to shun the ways of disobedience, lest they bring evil on their offspring. The happy results on the other hand, are adapted to encourage all parents to adopt and pursue the paths of wisdom and virtue, that it may be well with their children, and children's children. This divine policy, in both cases, is adapted to enlist the natural affections of parents for their children on the side of piety and virtue. But what *good end* can be perceived in such a constitution, or such an arrangement of circumstances, as is embraced in your hypothesis? It supposes every child of Adam confined to a state of "inevitable corruption," and total sinfulness, for no offence of its own, and by such circumstances as are completely adapted to subvert all the pious efforts of godly parents to save their children from the paths of disobedience. It even tells godly parents, that however faithful, humble, and prayerful they may be, their infant children are just as sure to become totally sinful, as the children of the most impious, profligate, and abandoned parents in the world!

But, my friend, by careful inquiry and observation, you

may find, that both the word and the providence of God are adapted to encourage parents to "bring up their children in the nurture and admonition of the Lord." Any hypothesis which denies this, even implicitly, must be erroneous, whether mine or yours, or by whatever number of good men it may have been adopted. You have very justly represented some of my former hypotheses as absurd, and of bad tendency. I shall not be surprised, if within fifty years, a large portion of the clergy in New England, shall be agreed in classing your hypothesis with mine, as erroneous, and of pernicious tendency. Some may probably say, that it exhibits God as a most vindictive Being, disposed to revenge on innocent children the offence of the first man; a Being too who devised a supernatural and *permanent establishment*, for the purpose of suddenly transforming innocent little children into beings totally sinful. When this state of things shall occur, you may know how to sympathize with me and thousands of others, who have found that some doctrines, which were once thought essential, are even reproachful to God, and injurious to man.

'As I wish you to be seasonably aware of the danger of your hypothesis, I will state a simile for your consideration.

'ELIHU was a child remarkable for his intelligence, and for an amiable and obedient disposition. At length, however, he yielded to temptation, and exposed himself to punishment by disobeying a parental command. His conscience reproached him severely; and he was filled with grief, anxiety, and alarm. He soon made known his condition to a pious neighbour, in whom he had entire confidence. He stated all the circumstances of the case so far as they were known to him; and expressed his astonishment that he should be found guilty of such an act. In the course of conversation the neighbour assured Elihu, that his own father had planned all the circumstances by which he had been induced to disobey, to make it certain that he would transgress; and that his father had told him that such was the *fact*. If Elihu believed these declarations, what must have been his views of his father's character and conduct? Would he not think that he had now some excuse for his offence; and that it would be unreasonable in his father to punish him for an offence, which resulted from his own arrangements, to render disobedience certain?

And, should the case be brought before an impartial court, would not the father be deemed the more blamable of the two?

'What then, my friend, will be the natural effect of teaching mankind, that their heavenly Father, to express his displeasure on account of Adam's sin, caused all his posterity to be placed in such circumstances as makes it certain that they will all sin and become totally sinful, as soon as they become moral agents? A little reflection may lead you to doubt whether your hypothesis is a *revealed truth*. If God had intelligence to form such a plan as your scheme asserts, and a *heart* to execute it, is it not reasonable to believe that regard for his own character would have disposed him to keep the affair a profound secret in his own breast?

'My doctrine of a sinful nature, or an invincible propensity to sin, you regard as placing mankind in a state of "overwhelming misfortune." But is being born with such a nature or such a propensity a greater "misfortune" to children than, — after being for a time innocent, to be placed in such circumstances as insure that they will sin and become totally sinful as soon as they are moral agents? But, sir, is it not a dreadful doctrine, — whether it be mine or yours, which precludes all encouragement for pious parents to use means to save their children from total depravity? If holy Adam could sin without a previous sinful nature, or an arrangement of such circumstances as would render his fall certain, why should we resort to such hypotheses to account for the common and early transgressions of little children? I have become convinced that what I once called a sinful nature consists in such lusts of the flesh, such animal senses, appetites, propensities, and passions as exposed Adam and Eve to transgress. These properties are not in themselves sinful; nor were they implanted to render it certain that children will sin as soon as they are moral agents. They are *favors*, bestowed by God to render us capable of enjoyment and usefulness; but they are like other favors which expose mankind to temptation. When abused or unlawfully indulged, they are occasions of sin.

'Intelligent and reflecting men of the present age are in the habit of considering the different circumstances under

which different children are born and educated, when called to estimate the nature of their actions, or the degree of criminality attached to such actions as appear odious or reprehensible. If, in consequence of the vices or the imprudence of his parents, a child is born blind, diseased, deformed, imperfect in his intellects, or the subject of any natural defect, allowance is made for such omissions or defects in his conduct as are supposed to result from misfortune, or the wickedness of his parents. So if by the ignorance or the wickedness of his parents, a child is denied the advantages of religious instruction, and trained up in ignorance of God, and under the influence of vicious examples, so as to be made to believe that revenge is noble and praiseworthy, it will readily be said that nothing *good* can be expected of him. If at seven years of age he should kill a brother, a sister, or one of his playmates, to revenge some wrong, when the affair is brought before a court, inquiry will be made in regard to the character of his parents, and the disadvantages under which the child had been placed; and great allowance will be made on the ground of those unfortunate circumstances. If it shall appear that his parents were capable of teaching the child the path of duty, but did not, a great share of the blame will be ascribed to them. From such facts you may readily infer, that your hypothesis, as well as mine, is very far from being adapted to impress the minds of children or of men with correct views of their sinfulness, or of the real nature of sin; that it tends to furnish an excuse for early transgression and depravity. Though I once had an unfavorable opinion of such Christians as denied or doubted the total sinfulness of little children, as a consequence of Adam's sin, I am now convinced that the more the minds of children are impressed with a belief that this doctrine is true, the more confused their ideas will be as to what sin is, — the more they will see themselves as objects of pity, and the subjects of "overwhelming misfortune"; — the more too they will excuse their real transgressions, and impute the blame of them either to Adam or to God. If you wish men or children duly to feel what an evil and bitter thing it is to sin against God, forbear to impute their liability to sin to the displeasure of God on account of Adam's transgression; and do what you can to make them feel that their sin consists in an ungrateful abuse of the kindness and manifold favors of the Lord.'

ART. VIII. — *A Family Prayer-Book, and Private Manual: to which are added Forms for Religious Societies and Schools. With a Collection of Hymns.* By CHARLES BROOKS, Minister of the Third Church in Hingham, Mass. First Stereotype Edition. Boston: B. H. Greene. New York: C. S. Francis. 1833. 12mo. pp. 349.

THE Manual, the title of which we have placed at the head of this notice, was commenced in 1821. It has passed through several editions; and, in all, more than ten thousand copies have been called for. It has been noticed in most of our domestic Reviews, and in some of the English; and in none, we believe, has it been denounced. In comparing this edition with the editions which preceded it, we perceive many and various alterations. The prayers which, in former editions, were arranged for two weeks, have been divided and arranged for three weeks. The whole number of prayers in the volume is one hundred and sixty. In addition to the new ones among the *Family* prayers, there are more than sixty entirely new prayers, on different occasional and specific subjects. The whole volume, with the exception of a few pages, has been rewritten and newly arranged. It has occupied the leisure of the author for the last two years; it has received his last finish, and is now presented to the public in an unchangeable stereotype edition. It has been printed on paper of different qualities, so as to furnish copies to those who may wish for them, at a very low price. The type is unusually large and good; and the execution remarkably neat and accurate. So much for the history of the work, which is the subject of our notice.

It is not necessary, perhaps, to say any thing further on the subject. The public has passed its decision, and we cheerfully accede to it, for we think that it has decided right. We feel happy that this Manual has been so extensively called for, and so extensively circulated. It indicates, we think, a favorable state of religious feeling in that class of Christians, which has so frequently been accused of neglecting the duty of prayer. We would not, by any means, attempt to strike a balance between the numbers of pray-

ing families in different denominations of Christians. Every such attempt is invidious. It proceeds upon a false principle. It substitutes the shadow for the substance, the external rite for the internal emotion. The question has often been put to us with an air of triumph, by our Orthodox brethren, "In which denomination do you find the greatest number of praying families?" Now, we consider such a question improper, and contrary to the whole spirit of Christianity. It savours too much of spiritual pride. It always reminds us of the parable of our Saviour, respecting the two men who went up to the temple to pray. It establishes a most fallacious criterion by which to judge of the devout and holy aspirations of the human soul. Does no prayer ascend to the throne of mercy, but that which is clothed in human language, and uttered in words audible to the human ear? Has the soul no *secret* communings with the invisible Spirit from which it emanated? Are the sublime speculations, the devout feelings, and holy aspirations of the soul, in direct proportion to the stated number of prayers which a man may make before his family or before the world? We think not. We believe that thousands have abstained from the public performance of the exercise of prayer, from a profound sense of the sacredness and solemnity of the service. They feel it a kind of mockery to express in words their thoughts and feelings to a Being who knoweth all their thoughts and all their feelings, before they can be uttered in words. We may be mistaken as to the number of those who have these feelings; but we are sure that there are some, from our own knowledge, and from the assertion of others, with whom we have conversed on the subject. At any rate, we think it very unjust to judge of the devotional frame of a man's mind from the number of prayers he may repeat in the hearing of his fellow man. It is judging from false appearances. It violates the precept of our Saviour respecting the frequency and publicity of prayers, and leads to all the Pharisaic hypocrisy and Pharisaic abuses which he so severely reproved. A man's *life*, his *whole life*, is the criterion by which we are to judge of his religious character. This should be a constant prayer, not in words, but in thought and feeling, and external deportment. It should be a constant expression of filial confidence in the Father of his spirit, of lively gratitude for

the blessings which he receives, and of patient resignation and Christian fortitude, under all the trials to which he may be exposed.

Still, however, social worship is agreeable to the human heart. External rites and ceremonies are, to a certain extent, correct expressions of the internal emotions. The error is, in establishing *one* particular rite or particular ceremony as the criterion of a man's character, to the exclusion of every thing else that helps to constitute his life.

Among all the means of Christian improvement, none, perhaps, is so efficacious, if properly conducted, as family prayer. And, although the extensive circulation of the Manual before us, may not entirely repel the charge that is so frequently made against us, of neglecting this duty, still it may show that the charge has been urged with too much violence, and carried beyond the bounds of justice. It may show that, although there may not be so uniform an observance of this external ceremony as would be desirable, there is yet a religious sentiment, a devotional feeling in the community, which welcomes the simple and fervent prayers that are here presented to us, as the natural expression of the heart.

We will not stop to answer the objections that have been raised against all manuals and forms of prayer, merely because they are written. None but the most profoundly ignorant will deny their utility. We do not wish them to be a substitute for the extemporary ejaculations of the heart, in the interesting exercises of family and private prayer. We do not wish them to be used in the same unvaried routine, day after day, and year after year, until the words fall upon the ear without exciting one glow of feeling; but we wish them to be used occasionally as aids to devotion; as exciting trains of thought which would otherwise never be excited, and suggesting appropriate expressions for the various circumstances of life.

The "Family Prayer-Book, and Private Manual" is well adapted to answer the purpose for which it was designed. In the beautiful language of the Preface, "a Christian family should be a Christian church. Instruction should make it a school of virtue; piety a temple of the living God. In such a family, prayer is the very breath of the soul. They will celebrate God's perfections with reverence and

joy, acknowledge his mercies with gratitude and love, confess their sins with humility and penitence, offer their supplications with piety and fervor, and intercede for their brethren with sympathy and affection." "To meet the wishes and supply the wants of such a family" was the object of the author in preparing the work under consideration. He has succeeded in his purpose as well, perhaps, as any individual author who has preceded him. The prayers are, in general, short, clear, simple, comprehensive, and fervent. We do not recollect one which is liable to be called an "*elegant prayer.*" We see no attempt to display the *prettinesses* of language and flowers of rhetoric. We meet with very few uncommon words and far-fetched images. All is simple and easy; and it is remarkable that so great a variety of thought and expression could have been secured with so little appearance of effort.

What pleases us, however, the most, is, the *spirit* that pervades the whole of them. They breathe the spirit of love and peace. They contain no harsh imprecations against the ungodly. They contain no expressions to wound the feelings of those who differ from the author in speculative opinion. They may be used by the Orthodox as well as the Unitarian. The prominent relation in which they place the Deity before us, is, that of our Father in heaven. The prominent feeling which breaks forth on every page, is, filial confidence and filial piety. There is a spirit of brotherhood pervading them which is delightful. We love to read a book of devotion, in which the barriers, that have been so often raised between the different portions of the human family, are not to be found; in which we may present our petitions to the Universal Father, as members of his Universal Family.

With respect to the propriety of adding to the present edition, so many prayers upon occasional specific subjects, there may be some difference of opinion. By some, they may be deemed unnecessary, or even, in some instances, inappropriate; to others, however, they may be of great value.

Finally; to all who are desirous of forming their character upon the pure principles of Christianity; to all who are desirous of cultivating in themselves, and in those with whom they are connected, a spirit of true devotion to God,

we would cheerfully and cordially recommend this "Family Prayer-Book and Private Manual," as a great and important aid.

[For the Christian Examiner.]

[Since we received the following article, in continuation of a series on the same subject, its excellent author has been numbered with the dead. In the course of our last interview with him, he spoke slightly of a cold in his head, which he thought might prove troublesome to him in returning to Sandwich in the depth of winter. This supposed cold was the commencement of a serious disorder, which in a few days hurried him to the grave.

The investigation into the meaning of the Greek and Hebrew words, which have, in our received translation of the Bible, so often been invested with the sense of *eternal duration*, would probably have been brought to a close by Mr. Goodwin some time ago, had we been able to print his communications as fast as he prepared them. But the truth is, the majority of our readers did not take, and could not be expected to take, an interest in the inquiry commensurate with its real importance, and the thorough and scholar-like manner in which it was conducted. The discussion was too thorough, too learned, too careful for the generality of the subscribers even to a theological work, and we were therefore obliged to delay the publication of the successive letters for longer intervals than our own wishes would have dictated. We have had but one opinion of these letters from their commencement. We have always thought that they were distinguished for originality, patience of research, a happy union of respect for celebrated biblical scholars and lexicographers, with a resolution not to submit to their guidance or dictation implicitly, a great beauty and fertility of illustration, and, crowning all, a true Christian charity. We acknowledge ourselves indebted to them for much information, and are convinced that their author has thrown a light upon the words in question, which will hereafter be gratefully acknowledged by those who shall seek to discover their meaning, and which cannot excusably be disregarded by any biblical student.

In Mr. Goodwin we have lost, not only a correspondent, but a friend; one whom we were constantly learning to esteem and prize more and more. We never conversed with him, though but a few moments, without being made better and wiser. His mind was always vigorous and inquisitive; his heart was always kind. He was not, as many solitary students are, ignorant of all subjects, and indifferent to all, but those within their own confined sphere. His eyes were open to surrounding objects and passing events, and he could speak pleasantly on most of the topics of general interest. Natural history received much of his attention, for he loved to study the works as well as the word of God. But all his knowledge was consecrated to the high uses of piety. From the fields and the woods, from the rivers and the sea, he brought their first-fruits, and their rare and beautiful things, and laid them as an offering upon the altar.

His congregation has lost a faithful pastor and teacher. It will probably be long before his place will be supplied to them or to the neighbouring community. Every year of his life had increased his influence, and his influence had always been devoted to the most beneficial purposes. His image is bright and holy in the memory of all who knew him.

The Rev. Ezra Shaw Goodwin was born on the 11th of September, 1787. He fitted for college with the Rev. Mr. Gurney, late of Middleborough, and was graduated at Harvard University in the year 1807. He was settled in

the Christian ministry at Sandwich in this state, on the 17th of March, 1813, for the period of ten years, and at the expiration of this term was engaged without limitation. He died February 5th, 1833. At the time of his decease he was a member of the Massachusetts Historical Society, and of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences.

Besides the articles contributed to this work on the meaning of Αἰὼν, &c. which were written in the form of letters addressed to his venerable friend and father-in-law, the Hon. Judge Davis, of this city, Mr. Goodwin had published the following works. "A Sermon on the Secrecy of the Soul in Communion with God;" printed in Vol. iii., No. IX., of the Liberal Preacher. "Address before the Barnstable Peace Society;" December 25, 1830. "Ancient and Modern Orthodoxy;" an article in the Unitarian Advocate, for December, 1831. "Alice Bradford;" a Tract. "Some Scriptural Readings, compared with some Unscriptural Sayings," a Tract printed for the American Unitarian Association, No. 66, 1st Series. "Notices of the Great Storm, September 23, 1815;" printed in the 10th Volume, 2d Series, of the Massachusetts Historical Collections. — The Editors.]

Art. IX. — *Meaning of* עולם. *Fourth Letter from the Rev. Mr. Goodwin.**

My Fifth evidence of a spiritual sense in עולם is the actual Usage of this word in the Hebrew Scriptures.

In order to elucidate this usage, it would be desirable to produce all the instances in which this word appears, and endeavour, "in each case, to determine its meaning from the connexion in which it stands." But, to do this with every instance would far exceed my present limits. It would require a volume. It, therefore, becomes necessary, to make a selection of a number of texts containing this term, sufficient to exhibit its habitual meaning. If such a selection be fairly made, we may, from these texts, form a correct judgment concerning others, in which the same term appears. But, should I make such a selection, it would be liable to the charge of having been made for the express purpose of proving the meaning in question. In truth, it would be so done, and would, of course, be regarded, by the reader, with a jealousy unfavorable to the reception of the amount of evidence which it might afford. I, therefore, abstain from so doing; and, willingly adopt a selection of texts made by Professor Stuart, himself, as that in which to pursue the investigation.

Professor Stuart produces a number of passages containing עולם, which he exhibits as examples of its habitual

* For the Third Letter, see the Christian Examiner for November, 1832, Vol. VIII, New Series, p. 225.

meaning. This meaning he considers to be *eternity, eternal, everlasting, for ever*, etc., and wishes to be so understood.

It is to be presumed, that a list of texts selected by so eminent a critic for this express purpose, presents a fair view of the habitual import of the term in question. Although, therefore, I might have chosen some passages more directly to my purpose than some of these, and omitted some which have no direct bearing on the point in hand; yet, that the subject may be fairly met, I exhibit each of his proof-texts in order, without omitting any. In remarking on them severally, I inquire,

1. Does the term, in this text signify *eternity*, or *eternal*?
2. Does it signify *spirituality*, or *spiritual*?
3. What (if neither of these) does it signify?

In the outset, Professor Stuart produces twenty-one passages; which he thinks "are enough to show what meaning עולם usually bears in the Hebrew Scriptures." I give my first attention to these twenty-one texts; premising, that in these quotations from Scripture, the words printed in *Italic* are intended to correspond to עולם in some of its forms. The texts are quoted, with the numbers of the chapters and verses as they appear in the Received English Translation of the Bible. They are as follow;—

Genesis ix. 16. "That I may remember the *everlasting* covenant."

This covenant is that in which God affirms, that there shall not "any more be a flood, to destroy the earth." Of this covenant the rainbow is the seal, or witness. This covenant is *eternal* if the *earth* be eternal; and not otherwise. Unless you would consider a covenant to remain, after both its object and its subject have ceased; which is not to be believed. But, truly, we may ask what will become of the *eternity* of this *everlasting* covenant, in the day when the "earth shall be burnt up"; and what will become of the rainbow, the witness of this covenant, in the day when "the elements," necessary to its existence, shall have melted with "fervent heat"? It is to be suspected, that this would be a short eternity, compared with one which knows no end. The longest possible *endurance* of this covenant, is, I conceive, expressed in Genesis viii. 22, where the thoughts of the Divine mind are thus declared; "While

the earth remaineth, seed time and harvest, and cold and heat, and summer and winter, and day and night shall not cease." The covenant in question was, without doubt, the actual declaration of the Divine purposes here described; its endurance, of course, is limited to the (to us) *unknown* term, "while the earth remaineth." The meaning of עולם in this place, then is simply *enduring*, if the word refer here to duration at all, which I very much doubt. I am more inclined to think, that the term refers to the new *state* which was taking place for mankind, at the time when the covenant was made; the new *αἰὼν*, *sæculum*, *age*, *existence*, or by whatever name you will call it.

One *state*, or one עולם, or one *αἰὼν*, had been completed, and brought to an end at the flood. A new one was now taking place, and the covenant had reference to this new *state* or *existence*, ordained for mankined. But, having no precise adjective, by which to express reference to such a *state*, unless it be *existential*, which I cannot expect will be admitted, I therefore adopt the term *enduring* by which to express what I believe to be the meaning of עולם in this place. Perhaps the Latin *scæulare* might come nearer to it; if Henry Stephens be correct in affirming that certain things which "the Romans called *sæculares*, the Greeks called *αἰωνίους*."

Genesis xvii. 7. "I will establish my covenant . . . . . for an *everlasting* covenant."

This is the covenant, which God made with Abraham, and his seed after him, to give them the land of Canaan for an *everlasting* possession, and be their God. If positive *eternity* be here expressed, then eternity endures no longer, than from the days when the covenant took effect, to those of the Messiah. A very brief *eternity*, in truth. The mere *human* race have already seen it exhausted; and have seen another period of equal length elapse besides.

But I do not think that the reference in this place is to the *duration* of the covenant at all, any farther than as duration, of some sort, forms part in the idea of every existent thing. God intended to constitute a *state* or *dispensation*, which was to continue till the advent of the Messiah. The possession of the land of Canaan was requisite to the people of the state in view, not merely as a place of abode, but for the different duties, privileges, institutions, ordinances, reve-

lations, prophecies, promises, laws, doctrines, the natural, spiritual, civil, and ecclesiastical conditions and circumstances, appertaining to the *dispensation* or *state* which was then constituted. The covenant which gave them this land with such specific reference to that *dispensation*, or *state* of things, is better described by the word *dispensational*, than any other. This I believe to be the meaning of the Hebrew adjective in the present instance; and I may hereafter make use of the same term to express the meaning of the same Hebrew word, when it seems appropriate.

Αἰὼν has been already proved to signify *state* or *condition* of things; and considering *αἰώνιος* to have been either *coined* or adopted by the Seventy, in order to answer the *adjective* עולם, I must believe that it refers, among other things, to the nature, circumstances, and duration of the particular *state*, *condition*, or constituted *existence*, with respect to which it is at any time employed.

I can hardly believe, also, that any one acquainted with Hebrew modes of thinking and forms of speech, will wish me to go into an argument to prove, that עולם corresponds, with exact precision, to *αἰὼν*, in this meaning of *state*, *condition* of things, *dispensation*, in general *an existence*, as well as in many other meanings. Suffice it to say, that the *present* עולם and the עולם to come, the *τοῦτος*, or *νῦν αἰὼν*, and the *αἰὼν μέλλων* are reciprocally correspondent to the *state that now is*, and the *state which is to come;* and that many Hebrew writers, of ancient or modern times, designated and still designate the *state* of things under the Mosaic dispensation, and the new *state* of things to take place under the Messiah, by the contradistinguishing terms, the *present*, and the *future* עולם, STATE, or world. On this meaning some further remarks will be made, in commenting on Psalm xc. 2.

I now return to the text under consideration, and observe, that many wise men think, that under the covenant to give Canaan to Abraham and his seed, there was couched a covenant to give to Abraham and his true, i. e. *spiritual* seed, the *spiritual* inheritance of the righteous. Be it so; and then it is a *secret*, *mysterious*, SPIRITUAL covenant, and appositely illustrates the sense of *spirituality*, in עולם, which I believe to exist in that word as well as the sense of *state*, *age*, *dispensation*, &c.

Genesis xvii. 13. "My covenant shall be ..... an *everlasting* covenant."

It is the covenant of *circumcision*, which is here described. On which, I can only express my amazement, that Professor Stuart should have introduced that which has, long since, "perished in the using," as evidence that עולם, employed with reference to it, signifies *eternal*. Had he been endeavouring to prove that the word does not contain this meaning, he would have done, and has actually done it, most effectually by quoting this text. The covenant, beyond all question, relates to the *dispensation* then constituted, and is fittingly described by the word *dispensational*.

Genesis xvii. 19. "An *everlasting* covenant."

This covenant is that which the Divine Being promised to make with Isaac and his seed after him. It may relate, either to the possession of Canaan, or to the birth of the Messiah, or, generally, to the promise that Jehovah would be their God. In the first case, perhaps in the second, it is *dispensational*; in the last, it is *spiritual*. But, most probably, it relates to the peculiar relation which Isaac and his posterity sustained to Jehovah, as his peculiar *family*, *nation*, and *church*; which extended through all the conditions of that dispensation, and ceased at the death of the Messiah.

Genesis xxi. 33. "Abraham ..... called on the name of Jehovah, the *everlasting* God."

Here I pause to inquire. This is the first instance, in which עולם is employed in the Scriptures with special reference to the Supreme Divinity. It is translated αἰώνιος by the seventy; *everlasting* by the English translators. But, on examination, I think it by all means more consonant with the circumstances of the case, and more likely to be the truth, that Abraham intended to proclaim the *spirituality*, or the *essential vitality* and *completeness*, rather than the mere *eternity* of Jehovah.

Abraham had gone into the land of the Philistines; a notoriously idolatrous people. It seems to have been his purpose to sojourn among them many days; and, like a true servant of the Most High, he made preparation for the worship of his God.

It is well known that the people, amongst whom he was residing, were exceedingly carnal in their religion. They

worshipped not only the sun, moon, and stars, "the host of heaven," but also many other material objects; outward objects, which the eye could see, the ear hear, and the hands touch. These they called gods, and gave them names as such. These people, moreover, were individually attached each to his own God; in a loose sense, to be sure; but still so far that each individual, or family, had their own God.

In their minds, the name *Jehovah* was nothing more than the name of *Abraham*'s God. To their apprehension, this name, Jehovah, implied nothing more than a certain Deity which Abraham worshipped. They, in all reasonable probability, thought that his God was like one of their gods in his nature. Some of them, indeed, seem to have thought him to have been a very *powerful* God, who befriended Abraham, and by whom if Abraham should swear, the oath would be effectual. But they do not seem to have suspected him to have been different in *nature* from their own objects of worship.

When Abraham "planted a grove," or "builded an altar," (it is uncertain which,) and "invoked the name of Jehovah," he appears to have done it, not only as a preparation for his personal and family worship, but also as a *profession of his religion.* "He called himself by the name of Jehovah," that is, "the servant of Jehovah;" or, "he professed the name of Jehovah," would answer the original, equally as well as the common translation.

Now, had Abraham, in this profession of his religion, described his God, by a term expressing merely the *perpetuity* of his being; the idolaters around him would have said, very appositely according to their ways of thinking, "our gods are *everlasting* as well as Abraham's Jehovah." They believed so, concerning some if not all of them. In that case, then, he would not have exhibited Jehovah in so prominent a point of contradistinction to material gods, as one so well acquainted with him must have wished to do. It might, even have given some encouragement to idolatry, by suffering Jehovah to appear in no such distinctly stated point of difference, as should hinder him from being mingled in the minds of idolaters, among the hosts of their idols.

Abraham was too sincere a Unitarian to admit of this. In professing his religion, he would naturally and earnestly

seek to exhibit some particular relating to Jehovah, which would decisively distinguish him from every God worshipped by idolaters. The single attribute of *perpetual existence* was not sufficient for this purpose. He therefore chose a term, which expressed, not merely the duration, but, also, the *spirituality* of Jehovah. By invoking his name, as that of the *secret*, *unsearchable*, *immaterial*, or, in one word, *spiritual* Deity, he set his religion in direct contrast with theirs; and put to shame their material divinities.

Abraham had been admitted, extensively, into the Divine Mind; where that, which, unto creatures, is to be, already exists. There he saw the day of Jesus Christ, "and was glad"; there, also, he, undoubtedly, beheld a vast amount of those spiritual treasures, those "*unsearchable* riches of Christ," prepared of God for them that love him. On the thoughts, affections and purposes of the Divine Being, towards human nature, in Christ Jesus, this chosen progenitor of the Messiah must have occupied himself, much, and joyfully; and, by admitting the meaning of *spirituality* in עולם, in this place, you see Abraham, when contemplating God, not always running his mind along the endless line of his Maker's perpetual existence, but, exalting his thoughts and extending his affections into the immense spiritual realms of the DIVINE MIND; rejoicing in views, and exulting in hopes, "higher than heaven, and deeper than hell;—longer than the earth; and broader than the sea." At the same time, you can see him, leading the minds of any about him, who should inquire concerning his God, far away from every material object of religious homage, into the same enlarging, spiritualizing, and soul-saving views of the Divinity.

Having, therefore, a choice among the meanings of עולם and *αἰώνιος*, I believe nothing would be lost and much would be gained, both to truth and holiness, by translating the passage thus;

"Abraham builded *an altar*, and called on the name of Jehovah, the SPIRITUAL DEITY"; or, if the term be admissible,—"the EXISTENTIAL God"; considering this adjective as expressing the qualities of *self-existence*, *spirituality*, and self-comprehending *completeness*. An idea very similar, is expressed by Aristotle, when speaking of the *αἰὼν συνεχὴς καὶ ἄϊδιος*, which appertains to God; and by Timæus Locrus,

when he speaks of "the *existential* God," whom "mind alone can discern," while a generated God is an object of perception to the senses.

Adam Clarke, on this verse, gives the Arabic rendering of the expression אל עולם ["everlasting God"]. He then remarks, that "the [Arabic] word is from the same root with the Hebrew, and is used by the Arab lawgiver, in the commencement of his Koran, to express the *perfections* and *essence* of the *Supreme God.*" — In the present age of liability to reproach, it may be somewhat perilous to quote Mahomet, for any thing. But, I know no reason, why he is not competent authority for the use of words in his day; and his employment of the Arabic word from the same root with the Hebrew עולם in this *spiritual* sense, is not altogether contemptible evidence, that a similar sense existed in the original Hebrew term.

I have been thus particular, upon this passage of Scripture, because it is the first instance, in which עולם is employed to express a quality, or attribute, or the nature of the Divine Being. If, in this place, we have good reason to believe, that the word was designed to represent the spiritual nature and *life* of the Most High, rather than his *perpetuity* of duration, we may, then, the more readily admit a similar meaning, in the same word, in other places, where the connexion does not so clearly indicate its precise import.

Deut. xxxiii. 27. "The *eternal* God is thy refuge."

On this text I may be excused from making any comment; inasmuch as עולם does not appear in it in the Hebrew. It was probably introduced by Professor Stuart, through one of those mistakes to which the most accurate are liable. — The true word is קדם, which signifies *rising*, like the sun; and exhibits, in a delightful view, the mode in which God, spiritually discerned, rises higher and higher, draws more and more near, diffuses more and more light, becomes more and more an all-absorbing object, and ever present refuge, to the heart that trusts him.

Ps. xc. 2. "From *everlasting* to *everlasting*, thou art God."

Admit the sense of *eternity*, here, if you will. And yet, it is by no means requisite, either for the consistency of the

passage, or for the probability of what was in the writer's mind. The expression, in the original, is "מעולם עד עולם," in the Septuagint ἀπὸ τοῦ αἰῶνος ἕως τοῦ αἰῶνος. It might be sufficient to render it, — "From *existence* to *existence* thou art God." This form of speech would, then, set forth God as extending through all existence, past, present, and future; fashioning, sustaining, connecting, and harmonizing all. An idea not very dissimilar from that of Aristotle, in his description of Deity, — *De Mundo*, Cap. 7. p. 475. E. διήκων ἐξ αἰῶνος ἀτέρμονος εἰς ἕτερον αἰῶνα, — *extending through from a boundless* EXISTENCE *to another* EXISTENCE. But, in respect of duration, the author of the ninetieth Psalm does not seem to have been contemplating any deeper duration, than what might, with propriety, be compared with that of the mountains, the hills, and the earth. His mind, throughout this psalm, is evidently contemplating the changes of created existences, one vanishing away, and another coming; and he rejoices in God, continuing the same, and extending through them all, in the unchanging exertion of wisdom, power, and love. This might, very naturally, lead to contemplations of God's eternal duration. But, whether he intended to affirm that duration, in this form of speech, admits of great doubt.

As one meaning of *αἰὼν* in Greek, so one meaning of עולם in Hebrew, is *state, condition of things*, condition of *existence*, either limited by some known events, or unlimited by any thing known to us; either past, present, or future; a *habit* of affairs, a *dispensation*, etc., as has already been brought to view. There are different shades of the same meaning. It is commonly given in English by the word *age* [sæculum]; but this term, *age*, does not seem sufficiently comprehensive to convey the full sense of עולם, when used in this intention. The term *state* seems more appropriate; inasmuch as it comprehends the common meaning of the word *age*, and, also, any *condition of things*, either definite, or indefinite, known or unknown; an *existence* of any kind; and it is the more appropriate, because it admits a sense of *secrecy* as to limit and duration, which forms an essential feature in the meaning of עולם, and is applicable to any *condition* of things, past, present, or future. But, it ought to be remarked, that the *state* represented by this word in Scripture, is, in almost if not quite all cases, of un-

known duration, or unknown circumstances, at the time when the word is used with respect to it, however these may have been subsequently made known by subsequent events.

In proof of these assertions, suffice it to say, that עולם signifies a *former state* of things; as Josh. xxiv. 2. "Your fathers dwelt on the other side of the flood, *in old time*" [מעולם]; a former *state*, the exact circumstances and duration of which are unknown. — It signifies a *present state*; as Exod. xxi. 6; concerning the servant who will not be made free, — "his master shall bore his ear through with an awl, and he shall serve him *for ever* [לעולם]; that is, during, and with reference to the *state* appropriate to the service contemplated. The special circumstances and duration of that state varied with so many contingencies (as the occurrence of the Jubilee, death, wealth, or poverty), that the עולם in question was altogether indefinite, saving only in respect to the *cordiality* and *completeness* of the service to be rendered by the slave. — It signifies a *future state*; as Gen. xiii. 15. "The land which thou seest, to thee will I give it, and to thy seed *for ever* [עד עולם]"; that is, with respect to a *state hereafter to be constituted.* It is notorious, that the patriarchs, in person, did not inherit the land of promise. They merely wandered over it, or sojourned for a season in one or another part of it, like other shepherds of their day, with whom they used it in common. Abraham "sojourned in the land of promise, as in a *strange country*, dwelling in tabernacles with Isaac and Jacob, the heirs with him of the same promise." * So far from inheriting the territory, he did not possess in it even a burying-place, until after he had bought one for money, in the territory of the children of Heth.† The עולם, therefore, spoken of to Abraham, in this passage is a *then* future *state*, to commence at the introduction of the Israelites into the land of Canaan, and cease at the death of the Messiah.

In view of this definition, *human life* is an עולם; an *αἰών*; an *existence*; — a *form of civil government*; — a *form of ecclesiastical constitution*; — a *settled habit of the public mind*; — or, any *condition of things* may be appropriately called by this name. So that the expression, *κατὰ τὸν αἰῶνα τοῦ κόσμου τούτου* (Eph. ii. 2.) may signify, *according to the*

* Heb. xi. 9. † Gen. xxiii. 3—20.

existing habit of this world; and in this meaning, *αἰὼν* accords very extensively with its classical import.

I here pause, also, to remark concerning the Rabbinical usage of עולם. We are told by respectable critics, that the Rabbins employ this word in the sense of *world*, considered as an *existence, place of abode*, etc.; as when *we* speak of the *present world*, and the *world to come*. But, the instances produced from Rabbinical writings, in support of this meaning, have always, so far as I have seen them, been from passages relating to the Messiah, and *the state of things* to take place at his coming. The עולם הזה and the עולם הבא of the Rabbins have plainly represented the *state now existing*, — and, the *state then to come*. Neither of these meanings refers to *the world*, in the common acceptation of the term; for both the *states* in question are to take place *on earth*, according to their views. Are there any instances, in which the Rabbins make use of עולם to represent any other *world, place of abode*, etc., excepting the present? If there be any such, I am sure that I express the wish of *many* in expressing my own, that this usage of this word may be exhibited, "that we may see it." For, in the present condition of the evidence, I am left to suspect, if not to believe, that this term, in the later Hebrew never signifies *world*, but *state, condition of things*, or something of this nature. In the *ancient* Hebrew, it is agreed by all, that עולם has no such meaning as *world*, considered as an *earth*, a *planet*, or *place* of abode;* neither has *αἰὼν*

* There is one instance of עלם [noun] in which it is translated *world*. It is commonly understood as being the same with עולם; so that I did not introduce it among the separate instances of עלם, in my last communication. The meaning is so doubtful that it has but little weight in the case. Still, it is desirable to have all the evidence which can be had. I therefore present it now; —

Eccles. iii. 11. He hath made every thing beautiful in his time; also, he hath set *the world* [את העלם] [Septuagint, *σύμπαντα τὸν αἰῶνα*] [Jer. Vulg. *mundum tradidit disputationi eorum*] in their heart, so that no man can find out the work that God maketh from the beginning to the end.

Parkhurst translates this text thus, — "*He (God) hath made every thing beautiful in its season; (but) he hath even put (such) obscurity in the midst of them that man cannot find out the work that God doth from beginning to end.*

"The ways of Heaven are *dark* and *intricate;*
Puzzled in mazes, and perplexed with errors,

any such sense in *ancient* Greek. And I am slow to believe, that these words had acquired such a meaning in the days of the Apostles. But it is not necessary to the present object, either to affirm or deny it.

From this digression, if such it must be called, which seemed necessary to a correct explanation of terms, I now return to the text under consideration; — Ps. xc. 2, "From *everlasting* to *everlasting* thou art God." That the sentiment conveyed in the English translation is true, no one doubts. There is, also, a sublimity in the expression, which makes us desirous to retain it. But, whether the writer of this Psalm intended to affirm what our translation represents, is exceedingly doubtful.

His mind is evidently contemplating the changes of created existences, and particularly those in the human race, by reason of successional generations. He ascends, through them, to a period antecedent to the creation of the earth. He rejoices in God, as he contemplates him remaining the same, through all these changing *states* of things; even from the unknown *state*, existing before the earth, and the world, unto and through the *states* now existing, and onward still, to the unknown state which shall exist when these shall have ceased to be. With his mind thus extending, through the known to the unknown past, and onward to the unknown future, he exclaims, "Before the mountains were brought forth, or ever thou hadst formed the earth and the world, even from the *unknown state*, to the *unknown state*, thou art God;" or, as perhaps a more comprehensive rendering, "From *existence* to *existence*, thou art God."

Our understanding traces them in vain,
Lost and bewildered in the fruitless search;
Nor sees with how much art the windings run,
Nor where the regular confusion ends." — ADDISON.

Now, it seems to me, that the connexion of words in this text requires that עלם should be translated in a sense of *spirituality*; as by *hidden wisdom*, or some similar term. It would then read something on this wise; — "God hath made every thing beautiful in its season; but he hath introduced such *hidden wisdom* into the midst of them all, that man is not able to comprehend God's work, completely from beginning to end." — Rendered thus, the whole passage is consistent with itself, and is plainly accordant with truth. But to render עלם, *world*, certainly makes very *obscure* and inconsistent meaning. To render it *eternity*, makes the passage equally obscure and inconsistent.

In the mode of interpretation here proposed, the second verse harmonizes more readily with the first; and gives an emphasis to what he had just said, "Lord, thou hast been our dwelling-place *in all generations.*"

I have no great anxiety to have you receive this as the true exegesis of this passage. But I believe it to be so; and I am the more confirmed in it, because the author, in verse eighth of the same psalm, employs עלם in the express meaning of *secret state* or *condition.* It is translated "*secret sins,*" in the English Bible; and by the Seventy, ὁ αἰὼν ἡμῶν. We cannot imagine, that he intended to say, "Thou hast set our *eternity,*" but can readily conceive of his saying, "Thou hast set our *secret state* (our entire *existence*) in the light of thy countenance." And in this case, there can be no doubt, that the state or existence contemplated is a *spiritual* one.

After these explanations, I shall not deem it necessary to make particular comments on each text; but will take liberty to set down what may appear to be a proper translation, or interpretation of any particular passage, and leave it for yourself to judge of its correctness. But, where instances occur requiring it, I will give you my thoughts upon them. I proceed with the texts produced by Professor Stuart.

Ps. ciii. 17. "The mercy of the Lord is from *everlasting* to *everlasting.*"

Read the whole sentence thus, "The mercy of the Lord is from *state* to *state,* or from *existence* to *existence,* upon them that fear him; and his righteousness unto children's children; to such as keep his covenant, and to those that remember his commandments to do them." It is evident, that he could show these objects no favor *before they existed;* saving as all things are *eternal* with God; but it is easy to be conceived, that his mercy should "*extend through*" all their *generations, conditions,* and *states,* whether external or *spiritual,* visiting them every morning and blessing them every moment.

Ps. cxii. 6. "The righteous shall be in *everlasting* remembrance."

"A good man . . . . . shall not be *spiritually* disquieted; the righteous shall be in *secret* remembrance"; or *enduring* or even *everlasting* remembrance, as you judge most conso-

nant to the nature and circumstances of the case. But there are many cases in which the term *cordial* would answer well to עולם and *αἰώνιος*, and appears to have been contemplated by the inspired writer. *Cordiality* is of course, one form of *spirituality;* and *cordial*, implying the qualities of *sincerity, fixedness, earnestness, intensity of mind*, and *endurance*, may well express that mode of spiritual action, which seems to have been intended by עולם, in such cases. The above text may not be an unapt illustration of this meaning. I will write it down so, and you can see how it reads. "A good man . . . . . shall not be *spiritually* disquieted; the righteous shall be in *cordial* remembrance." There will be further occasion to mention this meaning in עולם.

Prov. x. 25. "The righteous is an *everlasting* foundation."

"As the whirlwind passeth, so is the wicked no more; but the righteous is a *secret* [or *spiritual*] foundation." — The contrast, in this verse, certainly does not refer to the actual *being* of the wicked and the righteous; for, in that respect, the one is as surely founded as the other. It refers entirely to their respective inward *states* of energy, peace, and happiness; i. e. their *spiritual* states. The one is restless and changing as the passing whirlwind; the other possesses a *secret, spiritual, established* foundation of peace. Nay, it is no great violation of literal truth to affirm, that the righteous is, in himself, such a spiritual *establishment*, or *foundation*. The Septuagint rendering of this text is well worthy of attention; — *παραπορευομένης καταιγίδος ἀφανίζεται ἀσεβής, δίκαιος δὲ ἐκκλίνας σώζεται εἰς τὸν αἰῶνα. As the whirlwind, moving at random, the ungodly vanisheth; but the righteous, reposing at rest, is spiritually* [or *permanently*] *saved.*

Isa. xxxv. 10. "The ransomed of the Lord shall return, and come to Zion, with songs and *everlasting* joy upon their heads."

The joy of the saints is *spiritual* joy, without dispute. It may not be amiss to observe that many consider the term עולם in this and similar passages, to signify *ancient;* and that the *joy* means such joy as former servants of God used to possess; thus, for instance, George S. Clarke:

> "God's ransomed race
> With songs, returning, Sion's causey trace;
> For Sion's *ancient* lays their thoughts employ."

Isa. xl. 28. "The *everlasting* God."

"Hast thou not known? Hast thou not heard, that the *spiritual* Divinity, Jehovah, the creator of the ends of the earth, fainteth not, neither is weary? There is no SEARCHING of his understanding."* Read to the end of the chapter and then judge whether *spirituality of nature and action*, or mere *perpetuity of duration*, be the most appropriate to the mysterious Being who is there described; God, who, from his own vital energy, "giveth power to the faint; and increasseth strength to them that have no might"; and by his spiritual influence, causes them "that wait upon him" to "renew their strength," to "mount up with wings, as eagles," to "run and not be weary," to "walk and not faint." It is one of those passages in the reading of which it is impossible to keep the mind fastened down to the mere endless *line* of the perpetual duration of the Being whose *spirituality* and *self-completeness* are here so sublimely described.

Isa. li. 11, "The redeemed of the Lord shall return . . . . . and *everlasting* joy shall be upon their head."

Spiritual joy; as in xxxv. 10.

Isa. lvi. 5, "I will give them an *everlasting* name, that shall not be cut off."

A *spiritual* name.—It is to be given to those who are excluded by positive enactments, and immovable obstacles, from having an outward name in the outward church.—Perhaps the same thought is contained in Rev. ii. 17, "a new name, which no man knoweth, saving he that receiveth it," or, Rev. iii. 12, "I will write upon him my new name."

The promise in Is. lvi. 5, is clearly this,—that whatever external obstacles may hinder one from being received into the external church; still the good man shall be, in reality, a member of God's *spiritual* household. The name, therefore, by which this adoption or establishment is expressed, is a *spiritual* name; as *secret* and *unknown* to beholders, as are any of those *spiritual* things, which are discerned by no man, save him who possesses them.

Is. lx. 19, "Jehovah shall be thine *everlasting* light."
The same again in lx. 20.

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* "His understanding is unsearchable."—*Lowth.*

And wherefore not thy *spiritual* light? — In all this chapter, and these verses in particular, the Prophet is addressing himself to the church. He predicts a period when the church shall be greatly prospered, enlarged, and exalted in the present state of being. In order to describe the happy condition of things, which shall then take place, he seems to have taxed the whole world, to furnish appropriate images of wealth, peace, splendor, and power, and attributes them all to the church, in the day of her prosperity. But he also teaches, that her best, essential glory does not consist in a state of actual earthly exaltation and enlargement; however that earthly condition may be "clear, as the sun," and "fair, as the moon." The essential glory of the church shall consist in the favor, character, and presence of her God, producing a similarity of character in her members. Although, therefore, the sun of her prosperity shall not go down; still, it shall not be for the essential light of the church by day; neither shall her moon withdraw itself; but it shall not be for the true brightness that giveth light unto her, but "Jehovah," dwelling in the souls of her members, "shall be" her "*spiritual* light, and" her "God shall be" her "glory." — The prophecy refers to that state of things which shall be, when the Most High shall dwell *spiritually* and *powerfully* in the souls of his people; and himself, known and understood, shall be an illuminating and vivifying source of light and life, pervading every realm of those "new heavens" and that "new earth," "wherein dwelleth righteousness." As it is written, "Cry out and shout, thou inhabitant of Zion; for great is the Holy One of Israel in the midst of thee." * "Let him that glorieth, glory in this, that he understandeth and knoweth me, that I am the Lord." †

This I believe to be the true interpretation of this passage in Isaiah. But if you think best to read *an everlasting*, instead of a *spiritual* light, I have no great disposition to contend with you for it; although I believe the Prophet intended to represent the *nature*, rather than the *duration* of the light that is to illumine the church.

A similar thought, if not the same, is expressed in Rev. xxi. 23. "The city had no need of the sun, neither of the

* Is. xii. 6. † Jer. ix. 24.

moon, to shine on it; for the glory of God did lighten it, and the lamb is the light thereof." — There are few, if any, who will not concede, that "the city" of the blessed God, here described, represents *the church*, whether in heaven or earth, or both; that its essential light is a *spiritual* light, irradiating the *souls* of the citizens, and causing them to shine in the "*spiritual excellency*" of holiness and truth; and that the essential light of the church is, in reality, a *spiritual influence*, emanating from God, in and through the Messiah.

Is. lxi. 7. "*Everlasting* joy shall be to them."

Spiritual joy; as in Isa. li. 11.

Is. lxiii. 12. "To make himself an *everlasting* name."

The Prophet is here alluding to the deliverance of the Israelites from Egypt; and particularly, to the passage of the Red Sea; "dividing the waters before them, to make himself an *everlasting* name."

It cannot be doubted, that the name to which Isaiah refers, is described on the *occasion* to which he refers, in Exod. xiv. 17, 18; "I will get me *honor* upon Pharaoh . . . . . And the Egyptians shall know that I am Jehovah, when I have gotten me *honor* upon Pharaoh, upon his chariots, and upon his horsemen."

It is also morally certain, that the name, referred to in Isa. lxiii. 12, is the same with that mentioned in verse 14 of the same chapter, — "Thou didst lead thy people, to make thyself a *glorious* name." The Prophet, in verse 14, seems to be repeating his ideas of the wondrous work of God in saving his people, under a new similitude, in order to make it the more impressive. He appears, clearly, to have meant the same thing by a *glorious*, as by an *everlasting* name; and was thinking more of the *nature*, *extent*, and *influence* of the honor acquired by the miracle, than of its mere *perpetuity*. — "To make thyself a *wonderful* name," or "a name *of astonishment*," would hardly fail of expressing what Isaiah appears to have been contemplating.

Jer. x. 10, "The living God [is] an *everlasting* king."

"A *spiritual* king," exhibits an idea peculiarly consonant to the entire passage, verse 7–16 of this chapter, where so much is said of the wisdom and omnipotence of the Supreme Being, and of his operating *energy*, existing in, and emanating from his own spiritual nature and self-moving

action; in contradistinction to the materiality, vanity, impotence, and worthlessness of idols; — verse 9, "They [idols] are all the work of cunning men.

"10. But Jehovah is the true God; he is the living God; and a *spiritual* [everlasting] king; at his wrath the earth shall tremble, and the nations shall not be able to abide his indignation."

"12. He hath made the earth by his *power;* he hath established the world by his *wisdom;* and hath stretched out the heavens by his *discretion.*"

I cannot but believe, that far more of *spirituality* than of *eternity* was in the eye of the Prophet's mind, when he wrote these things concerning the God of his *inspiration.*

Jer. xxxi. 3. "I have loved thee with an *everlasting* love."

"I have loved thee, with an *inscrutable,*" or, *immeasurable,* or in one word, *spiritual* "affection; therefore, with loving-kindness have I drawn thee." * It is one of those cases, in which we may have a choice of one among several words, by which to translate עולם. Perhaps *cordial* would not fall far short of expressing the thought of the Prophet; or, if you are willing, take the word *existential,* and let it signify that which is interwoven with the very *being* and essence of God. The "*everlasting* love" would then mean much the same as the "*tender mercy,*" expressed in Luke i. 78, and there called σπλάγχνα ἐλέους θεοῦ ἡμῶν, — "*bowels of compassion* of our God," which cannot be very different from Jeremiah's idea, in the text.

Dan. xii. 2, "Some [shall awake] to *everlasting* life; and some to shame and *everlasting* contempt."

To quote this passage as one in which *perpetuity of duration* is the plain meaning of עולם, would be begging the question of a *Universalist;* it being one in which they positively deny the meaning of *eternity* in this word. Were I a believer in the immediate salvation, or final restoration of all men, I should call for further evidence of the meaning of the word, before I could admit this as a proof-text. But let this pass, as something irrelevant to the matter now in hand.

It ought not however to pass unnoticed, that Professor Stuart repeatedly asserts, that the *gospel* affords the *only*

* "For-with-a love of-long-standing have-I-loved-thee." — George S. Clarke.

foundation we have for a belief in the immortality of the soul. "What a glorious, blessed truth it is, — that 'life and immortality are brought to light in the gospel!' It is equally true, that they are brought to light *only* there." * This sentiment is *repeatedly* expressed in his Dissertation concerning αἰὼν and αἰώνιος. — Now if עולם, in Dan. xii. 2. signify *eternal*, then Daniel brings life and immortality to light, as surely as does the Messiah. Equally so, in the same case, do the other prophets, if עולם, in their writings, signify *eternity*. Indeed, if *eternity* be the true and prevailing force of this word, then the Old Testament writers are continually proclaiming purposes of God towards the human soul, which cannot be accomplished on any other supposition than that of the eternal existence of that soul; and cannot be understood in any other way. If this be the ruling meaning of עולם, then expressions abound in the Old Testament which as clearly indicate *eternity of being* for man, as do any in the New Testament. This appears, beyond the necessity of argument, in many of the texts already quoted; as well as in multitudes more, which might be produced.

This consideration, it is true, has little effect on the meaning of this word, abstractly contemplated. For myself, I believe that it does, in some cases, perhaps many, signify *perpetuity*; and, possibly, deeper researches into the meaning of this and other Hebrew terms, may yet make it plain; that the doctrine of the eternal existence of the human soul was not unknown to "Moses and the Prophets," and many to whom they spake; although it be more clearly revealed, and brought down to sense and apprehension in the gospel; particularly "by the resurrection of Jesus Christ from the dead."

Professor Stuart himself seems to have become aware, that he had expressed himself too strongly on this subject; if, in fact, he had not altered his opinion in the progress of the investigation. For, in this dissertation upon שאול, he argues at considerable length, that "the people of God, among whom were patriarchs and prophets," could not have known "less respecting a future state of rewards and punishment, than their heathen neighbours, who were wholly

* Pages 7, 8, 12.

destitute of any special revelation." * In some subsequent publications, also, he expresses his opinion that the ancient Hebrews, previous to the Babylonish captivity, were believers in the immortality of the soul; and censures, in no very gentle terms, those who do not accord with him.

But, to return to the text, Dan. xii. 2. — The state of things to which this prophecy refers, appears clearly from the Prophet's subsequent words, to be a state that is to take place *on earth*. A period is foretold, when, either by the direct action of his power, or by the operation of his providence, God shall give such energy, glory, and beauty to *religion*, that men shall unavoidably perceive its glory, and its "beauty of holiness," and shall feel its power, either in condemning or extirpating their vices, or in honoring and advancing their virtues. It is a state in which *religion* shall so *prevail*, that it shall be the great *standard of judgment*. The characters of men shall be tried by this high and divine criterion; and the consciences of men shall try themselves by *religious* rules, and not by the blind and selfish maxims of the world. Then men shall be honored or disgraced, and shall be happy or unhappy, according to the conformity or nonconformity which they individually possess, and are conscious of, to the truths and precepts of God. — "Many of them which sleep in the dust of the earth," [*who are concealed from a true judgment in the opinions of men, or, from a true discernment of their own spiritual state, by reason of the common maxims of a sinful world, or by selfish and earthly influences of any sort*] "shall awake," [*shall be made consciously to discern the truth, spirit, and power of religion; and shall appear, both to observers and to themselves, in their true characters, and so shall come forth;*] "some to *spiritual* life," [*a state of unmeasured, and hitherto unknown power, glory, and joy;*] "and some to shame and *spiritual* abhorrence," [*a state of unmeasured, and hitherto unknown disgrace and wretchedness.*] I offer this as what I believe to be the true meaning of this passage. — The Hebrew word, translated *contempt* in the English version of this place, is דראון, the same which is used in Isa. lxvi. 24, and is there translated an *abhorring*; — "They shall go forth and look upon the carcasses of the

* Page 107, et seq.

men that have transgressed against me; for their worm shall not die, neither shall their fire be quenched; and they shall be *an abhorring* [דראון] unto all flesh." I believe this word does not occur in the Scriptures in any instance excepting these two. In Isaiah, Buxtorf (Concord.) translates it by the singularly expressive word *nausea*. I know not why it should not be so translated in Daniel. In Isaiah the *abhorring* expressed is an abhorring of the animal senses, towards a loathsome animal object. In Daniel it is an abhorring of the mind towards hypocrisy, wickedness, or mere destitution of religion; a *spiritual* abhorring, of course; a *nausea* of the soul, which is brought to view in divers places in the Scriptures, under different forms of speech,* and the effect of which is emphatically exhibited in Rev. iii. 16.

When, also, we contemplate this *abhorring* as existing, not only in good minds, towards wickedness, but also in wicked minds towards their own inward state, when judging themselves by the high standard of religion; we can then perceive a powerful and searching meaning in the expression a *spiritual* abhorring, or contempt, or *nausea*, far more appropriate to the subject, than the single sense of perpetuity of duration.

It can hardly admit a doubt, that our Lord Jesus alludes to this passage of Daniel in John v. 25–29. The same thing is, evidently, intended to be represented in both these places. It is no part of my present purpose to discuss the nature of the resurrection in general. But, in order to make my view clear on the text in Daniel, I will state my opinion of what is intended by *that* resurrection which is described in these passages. It is, that *this* resurrection in particular is a *spiritual* one. It is the rising of the *soul* from a state of indifference, worldly-mindedness, ignorance, error, or contempt with respect to religion, and the becoming of the soul quick to perceive, and sensible to feel the truth and force of religion; whether he love it or not. When this *quickening* takes place, and religion exerts an active power, both in the individual heart, and in society at large; then the good awake, and arise, and come forth to great honor and felicity; the wicked to shame, abhorrence, and wretchedness. The honor and felicity on the one hand, and the shame, abhor-

* See Ps. xiv. 3; xxxviii. 5; Ezek. xx. 43, &c.

rence, and wretchedness on the other, are equally *spiritual* in their nature, and will endure as long as their respective characters endure. This, you will say, is nothing but opinion. True; it is nothing more; and I write it in order to explain what I think to be the true meaning of the text, Dan. xii. 2. And I believe it capable of demonstration, that the "coming of the Son of Man," or of "the kingdom of God," which is thought to have been referred to by Daniel in this place, and is often named in the New Testament, represents such a *state* as has now been attempted to be described; however inadequate the description must be acknowledged to be.

I have now gone through the twenty-one first instances produced by Professor Stuart, as evidence that the usual meaning of עולם, in the Hebrew Scriptures, is *eternity* or *eternal.* I willingly submit it, without further comment, whether, even in any case, they certainly prove that meaning; and, with equal willingness, whether they do not far more abundantly make manifest a sense of *spirituality* in that word.

Professor Stuart next produces some other instances of עולם in different forms of expression, the consideration of which I reserve to another opportunity.

Yours in good will,

E. S. Goodwin.

Sandwich.

Art. X. — *A History of King's Chapel, in Boston; the first Episcopal Church in New England; comprising Notices of the Introduction of Episcopacy into the Northern Colonies.* By F. W. P. Greenwood, Junior Minister of King's Chapel. Boston. Carter, Hendee, & Co., and Allen & Ticknor. 1833. 16mo. pp. 215.

The substance of these memoirs, as we learn from the Prefatory Notice, was preached before King's Chapel society in a series of eight discourses, in the spring of 1832. Mr. Greenwood has judged right in publishing them, as the history cannot fail to be peculiarly interesting to the members of his own congregation, and will be regarded by readers in

general, as an important and valuable contribution to the ecclesiastical history of New England. He may also, as he says, be "almost sure of the favor of antiquaries, to whom facts are never unimportant or dull."

The Introduction contains the best account that has come under our notice, of the early struggles of Episcopacy in New England, and of the controversies that grew out of them. The first serious and organized efforts to erect an Episcopal Church in Boston were made in the year 1686, the history of which and their results, as regards King's Chapel, is given in the body of the work, the whole being divided by Mr. Greenwood into seven Periods. The first Period contains an account of the formation of the society under Robert Ratcliffe, the first Rector; by whom the service was conducted for some time in the library-room in the east end of the Town-House, which then stood where the Old State-House, or, as its present name is, the City Hall, now stands. In the second Period the history is continued to the building, in 1689, of the first Chapel; which was of wood, and stood on the spot covered by the present church, but did not occupy nearly so much ground. The third, fourth, fifth, and sixth Periods, bring down the narrative to the erection of the Stone Chapel, the name by which the present church is now familiarly known. Notices are given of the successive Rectors and their Assistants; of the spread of Episcopacy, and the attempts, early in the last century, to introduce American Bishops; of the enlargement to twice its original size of the old Chapel in 1713, and the setting up, the same year, of an organ, given by Thomas Brattle, Esq., undoubtedly the first ever heard in a New-England church. The present Chapel was so far completed, August 21, 1754, as to be opened with appropriate religious services on that day. The seventh Period gives an interesting account of what has since occurred in the Society, and particularly of the change which has taken place in their religious opinions and ecclesiastical connexions.

Mr. Greenwood, though alive to the wrong done the Episcopalians in the early days of New England, does not think to deny or palliate the overbearing manner in which their pretensions were sometimes urged by the officers of the crown. Of Sir Edmund Andros he says:

"The new governor was not long in showing his arbitrary dispositions, and the strong hand with which he intended to rule. One of the first acts of his despotism is connected with the history of our church, and indeed comes in regular continuation of it. The very day of his landing and the publication of his commission, he had a conference in the library of the town-house with the ministers of the three congregational churches, concerning the accommodation of the Episcopal society, and suggested that it might be so contrived that one house might serve two assemblies. The ministers, with four lay members of each congregation, held a meeting the next day, to consider what answer to give to the governor, and it was agreed, as Judge Sewall says in his diary, that they could not with a good conscience consent that their meeting-houses should be made use of for the common-prayer worship. On the evening of the following day, December 22, Mr. Mather and Mr. Willard waited on the governor at his lodgings, and "thoroughly discoursed his Excellency about the meeting-houses, in great plainness, showing they could not consent." The governor, either from an unwillingness to hurt their feelings too rudely, or from a fear of displaying his power too suddenly, seemed to say that he would not impose upon them what was manifestly so disagreeable. And so the matter was suffered to rest, but only for a short time. On the 23d of March, 1687, the governor sent Mr. Randolph for the keys of the South meeting-house, now called the Old South, that the Episcopalians might have prayers there. A committee of six, of whom Judge Sewall was one, thereupon waited on his Excellency, to show that the house was their own property, and to repeat that they could not consent to part with it to such use. This was on Wednesday. The following Friday, which was Good Friday, Sir Edmund Andros sent to command the sexton of the South church to open the door, and ring the bell for those of the Church of England. The sexton, though he had resolved not to do so, was persuaded or intimidated into compliance, and the Governor and his party took possession of the house, and the church service was performed there.

"In looking back on this event, we are obliged to consider it, though not of itself of great political importance, as one of the most arbitrary acts ever perpetrated in this country, while it remained under the English government. No excuse is to be rendered for it. It was such a deliberate outrage on the common rights of property, to say nothing of conscience and liberty, that we may only wonder that Andros and his abettors, of whom Randolph was doubtless one, suffered no personal violence from

the people. But none seems to have been offered; and the proprietors of the South meeting-house, finding that they could not resist the imposition, submitted to it as well as they could. Both parties, indeed, after the intrusion was effected, and regarded as a settled thing, evinced some desire to accommodate each other with regard to the hours of their several meetings, though Andros was still the dictator. On Easter day, March 27, the governor and his retinue again met in the South Church, at eleven o'clock, word having been sent to the proprietors that they might come at half-past one; but it was not till after two that the church service was over, owing, as it is stated by Judge Sewall, to 'the sacrament, and Mr. Clarke's long sermon; so 't was a sad sight,' he continues, 'to see how full the street was with people gazing and moving to and fro, because they had not entrance into the house.'" — pp. 37 – 40.

The facts in regard to the changes in their doctrine and liturgy are thus given:

"On the 20th of February, 1785, the proprietors voted that it was necessary to make some alterations in some parts of the Liturgy; and appointed a committee to report such alterations. This committee consisted of seven gentlemen, in addition to the wardens, who were to consult and communicate with the Rev. Mr. Freeman. On Easter Monday, the 28th of March, they reported that some alterations were essentially necessary; and the alterations as reported were read, considered, and debated at several adjournments. On the 19th of June, the proprietors voted, "that the Common Prayer, as it now stands amended, be adopted by this church, as the form of prayer to be used in future by this church and congregation." The yeas and nays being called for, it appeared that of yeas there were twenty, and of nays seven; and three out of the seven dissentients had worshipped at Trinity Church ever since the year 1776. The alterations made in the Liturgy were principally those of Dr. Samuel Clarke, the celebrated English divine, and for the most part were such as involved the omission of the doctrine of the Trinity. The work as amended was immediately put to press, and was used in this church till the year 1811, when other amendments were made.

"Here was a most conspicuous, and as we must regard it, a most happy revolution; an auspicious turning from the dominion of creeds and phrases of men's device, to the easy yoke and authority of simple Scripture. This important change is to be attributed mainly to the judicious and learned expositions of

Mr. Freeman, who preached a series of doctrinal sermons to his people, and by the aid and influence of the word of God, moved them to respond to his sentiments. *The first Episcopal church in New-England, became the first Unitarian church in America,** and our venerated senior minister, though not absolutely the first who held or even avowed Unitarian opinions, still on many accounts deserves to be considered as the father of Unitarian Christianity in this country." — pp. 137 – 140.

The influence which these changes had on their Episcopal and other ecclesiastical relations is thus stated:

"Although the congregation thus adopted a Liturgy from which all recognition of the doctrine of the Trinity was excluded, as being an erroneous and unscriptural doctrine, they nevertheless continued to regard themselves as Episcopalians, and desired to remain in connexion, if possible, with the American Episcopal Church. At a meeting held on Sunday, July 22d, 1787, they voted 'that a letter be addressed to the Rev. Bishop Provost at New York, to inquire whether ordination for the Rev. Mr. Freeman, can be obtained on terms agreeable to him and to the proprietors of this church, — and that this letter be drawn up by the Rev. Mr. Freeman, and signed by the Wardens.' The letter was written, approved, and sent; and an answer thereto was returned by the Bishop, in which he declined giving a decision in a business of such moment, and stated that it was to be referred, by advice, to the ensuing General Convention.

The congregation then determined to ordain Mr. Freeman themselves. A plan of Ordination was reported on the 4th of November, and adopted on the 11th, and on the 18th of the same month, 1787, it was carried into execution, and the Rev. James Freeman was ordained on the afternoon of that day, by a solemn and appropriate form, 'Rector, Minister, Priest, Pastor, teaching Elder, and public Teacher" of the Society worshipping at King's Chapel. The evening service being performed as usual, the wardens joined Mr. Freeman in the desk, and the senior warden made a short address to the proprietors and congregation, setting forth the reasons of the present procedure. The first ordaining prayer was then read by Mr. Freeman, after which the senior warden read the

* "The writer does not mean to assert that King's Chapel was the first church in America, in which Unitarian opinions were to any extent entertained, but the first which came out and appeared before the world, in a body, as a Unitarian Church."

ordaining vote, which was unanimously adopted by the Society, and signed on the spot by the wardens in their behalf. Mr. Freeman next declared his acceptance of the office to which he had been chosen, and signed the same. The ceremony of ordination was then performed by the senior warden, who, as the representative of the Society, laid his hand on Mr. Freeman, and declared him to be their Rector, &c.; in testimony of which he delivered to him a BIBLE, enjoining upon him 'a due observance of all the precepts contained therein.' He then blessed him in the name of the Lord, and 'the whole assembly, as one man, spontaneously and emphatically pronounced, *Amen!*'

"After this, Mr. Freeman read the second ordaining prayer, and, an anthem having been sung, preached on the duties and offices of a Christian Minister. Another anthem closed this affecting and appropriate service.

"The validity of this ordination was furiously assailed in the newspapers of the day, as might have been expected, and vehemently protested and argued against by some of the former proprietors of the church. The newspaper abuse was sufficiently and pleasantly answered in a short piece attributed to the Rev. Dr. Belknap, always a truly liberal and charitable man. The protest was triumphantly refuted by an unpublished reply of the wardens of King's Chapel, distinguished for good sense and sound argument. A sort of repudiation or excommunication of Mr. Freeman and his church, was also circulated by the clergymen of five episcopal churches of New-England. But all the notice which Mr. Freeman took of this, was to send it to the Columbian Centinel, requesting its insertion in that paper." — pp. 140 – 142.

The Appendix contains a selection of old and curious, or otherwise valuable papers and documents. The volume is also embellished with an engraving of the present Chapel, and of the old Chapel, as in 1720, with Beacon Hill in the distance. The form in which Mr. Greenwood has published these memorials, and the mechanical execution generally, may be recommended as a model to the preachers and publishers of century, and other historical and elaborate discourses.

THE

CHRISTIAN EXAMINER.

No. LVII.

NEW SERIES — No. XXVII.

JULY, 1833.

ART. I. — *The Biography of Intelligent Reformers, and History of the Reformation in the Sixteenth Century.* From REES'S CYCLOPÆDIA. Being Vol. iii. of the New Series of the Christian Monitor, published by the Society for Promoting Christian Knowledge, Piety, and Charity. Boston. Samuel G. Simpkins. 1833. 24mo. pp. 213.

WE are glad to see that the abovenamed religious society continues its labors with so much spirit and punctuality. This is the third volume issued under its auspices, which we have had occasion to notice within the space of a year; and though it cannot have cost nearly the same care in preparation as the two others, indeed none at all but that required in selecting the articles from Rees's Cyclopædia, yet we are pretty certain that it will be more read than either of them, on account of the interest invariably belonging to narrative. It contains the lives of Wickliffe, Huss, Jerome of Prague, Luther, Zuingle, and Calvin, to which is added a short history of the Protestant Reformation. We have read the collection with great pleasure, and commend it to those who do not possess the tomes from which it has been taken.

And now let us inquire, What is the spirit of reform? What is it that has animated and enabled men from time to time to become reformers, not disturbers, but true reformers; and not religious reformers alone, but moral reformers of all descriptions? Has it not been a sense of independence and personal responsibleness, and of superiority to what are usually termed existing circumstances and the spirit of the age?

A very large proportion of the evil which has always exist-

ed in society, may be traced to the want of personal independence, and disregard of personal responsibility. We do not mean by independence, that fiery essence of pride and selfishness, which is quick to resent a slight or wrong; which is always ready to meet aggression more than half way; and which delights to show itself in rudeness or haughtiness, as its condition may happen to be low or high. For such independence we have little sympathy and less respect, and so far from thinking that there is a want of it in the world, can only lament that there is such a superfluity. By independence we mean another and a far different thing. We mean the resolution which adopts, and maintains, and obeys its own standard of right and wrong; which refuses to render an unquestioning homage to the voice of the many; which, being based upon principle, is not to be driven to and fro by the popular breath, even should that breath rise into a whirlwind; which, acknowledging allegiance to a higher than any mortal authority, will not forfeit it at the behest of any. This is the independence which leaves to a man his own views and convictions, his own conscience, and his own conduct. Without inciting or suffering him to be forward or boisterous, it makes him steadfast and sure. Without obliging him to feel an uncharitable scorn of public opinion, it offers a rule to his admiration and observance which is alone worthy of his serious study, and entitled to his faithful submission,— the great rule of right, the solemn law of God. It teaches him to consider himself as responsible for his thoughts and actions, in the first and highest place, not to the multitude, but to his Maker; and in the second place, not to the multitude, but to his own soul. It leads him into a safer, happier, and more glorious path, than the broad, dusty, soiled, and soiling road, which is beaten by the multitudinous and crowding world. It sets his feet and his heart at liberty, and breathes into his soul the consciousness of individual existence and value, and the sense of individual duty.

This is the independence, to the want of which may be traced and referred very much of past and existing evil. Not possessing it, men lose themselves, their accountability, their dignity, all that constitutes them men, in the absorbing mass; where they acquire the color, and motions, and tendencies of the mighty vortex which has engulphed them. Instead of uttering a voice of their own, they wait for an acclamation, and then they join in; instead of having opin-

ions of their own, they listen for the prevalent opinions, and then they repeat them; instead of having a morality of their own, a religion of their own, they are content to be just as moral and just as immoral, just as religious and just as irreligious, as other people; taking the tone of the world around them, which is seldom the highest, and imbibing its sentiments, which are not always the purest. They do not test and try opinions by any self-instituted process. They do not examine manners and actions according to a fixed and exalted standard. They trouble themselves with nothing of the kind. They fall in with the great procession, without inquiring whither it is going, upwards or downwards, to a good end or a bad one; it is enough for them that they are going with it. And thus it comes, that there are so many slaves to custom and fashion; and that there are so many expensive and monstrous sacrifices to custom and fashion. Thus it comes, that those who ought to be economical are extravagant, and those who ought to be industrious are idle, and the rich so often grow poor, and the poor so often keep themselves poor, or grow poorer, and strip themselves to destitution. Thus it comes that so many think evil is metamorphosed into good, when they see the multitude practise it, and good is turned into evil, when they see the multitude slight, or forsake, or forbid it. And thus it comes, that the amount of evil is so vastly increased, because there are so many who blindly and carelessly, or cowardly, without using their own eyes to observe, or their own minds to prove, follow the multitude to do it.

But must we be singular? Must we be eccentric? Must we do nothing that others do; say nothing that others say? Must we be perpetually quarrelling with society about its usages and habits? No. We are to do none of these things. It is best that we should follow the many in all ways which are indifferent; perhaps it is best that we should follow them in some ways which are inconvenient; but we must not follow them to do evil. "Thou shalt not follow a multitude to do evil." That is the simple commandment. It is very true that singularity and eccentricity, when they come from a causeless, wilful, diseased principle of opposition to general custom and sentiment, are no virtues; but even then they partake no more of the nature of sin, than does a servile acquiescence in general custom

and sentiment. Without doubt, public opinion, on most points, is worthy of respectful attention and examination; but, after you have examined it by the great and permanent light within, after you have weighed it in the balance of truth and the gospel, and found it false and wanting, reject and oppose it, and if your decision is to be called singularity and eccentricity, let it be called so, and, in the name of all that is true and holy, be singular and eccentric. We are not required to dispute with the world step by step; we are not required to be solitary and to forsake the world; we are rather called upon to do all the good we can in it, and receive all the good we can from it. But we are required to recognise a higher authority than the world's will; to obey a more sacred commandment than the world's law. We are required to form moral and religious principles of our own, and to regulate our commerce with the world by our principles, and not borrow our principles from our commerce with the world. If we will not do this, we shall do evil; for we shall do whatever the multitude does, and the multitude often does evil. The very reason why so many follow a multitude to do evil, is, not that they take any particular pleasure in evil, but that they are in the weak and silly habit of following a multitude, as a matter of course, without considering whether it is for evil or good. That is to say, they want moral independence, and do not hold themselves individually accountable to their own spirit, or to the Father of Spirits.

This want of independence is manifested by some, who yet would repel the charge of following a multitude. We care not for the multitude, say they. We are not governed by the popular voice, or the popular taste. We acknowledge no such vulgar dominion. We go with the select few, and not with the many, whom we avoid and despise, and feel no disposition to follow.

Such persons are to be told, that their distinction is merely verbal. Their select few, or the fashionable world, or whatever else it may be termed, is to all intents and purposes a multitude, for it is a multitude to them, acting upon them by all the influences of a combination, and with all the despotism of general example. So that we surrender our conscience, and our right of judging, deciding, and acting, it matters not whether the surrender is made to a well-clad or an ill-clad collection of people, to the fashionable or unfashionable world. These

precious powers and dignities we are not to lay at the feet of any body of men, be they kings, priests, or common people. We are to resist improper influences, at all events and from all directions; whether they come down from palaces or up from hovels. A multitude is not necessarily a mob. Any number or circle of people, be it large or small, genteel or ungenteel, to whose dictates we yield an Eastern homage, whose maxims we obediently adopt, and in whose ways we implicitly tread, is our multitude, with all the power and associations of a multitude; and they carry their chains with them, be they gold or be they iron; and if we eare bound, if we cannot stir but in a certain mode and to a certain extent, of what consequence is it what our fetters are made of? We are not at liberty. We have parted with our birthright. We have suffered ourselves to be divested of the privilege of self-control. We follow our multitude, and, when it runs to evil, to evil; and evil is of such a homogeneous character, that it is of little moment whether it is coarse or refined. No kind of evil is genteel in the eyes of the really upright and good. They are essentially the subjects of a kingdom, the only one, we believe, where evil, in any dress, is always out of fashion; the kingdom of righteousness and heaven.

Are there those, who say that they are not in bondage, or that their bondage is a voluntary one; that they do not act by compulsion; that it is their will and pleasure to follow a multitude, and follow it anywhere? The amount of this assertion is, that, instead of doing evil with the rest of the world thoughtlessly or unwillingly, they do it wilfully and willingly; that, instead of disobeying the commandment of God blindly or with reluctance, they disobey it readily and fearlessly. They take the offered fetters gladly, and put them on with their own hands. They are proud of them, and desirous of wearing them. They do not intend to inquire what is good or what is evil. They only intend to do as others do, whether what they do is evil or good. This alacrity and satisfaction in parting with their independence, and denying a supreme law of right and wrong, and submitting to an earthly direction, bears a character of explicitness and reckless hardihood, and that is the best that can be said of it. It is no extenuation of the offence, but the contrary. If they declare that it gives them pleasure to follow a multitude, and that they mean to follow it, they only declare that they are

more completely and in spirit servile, than he is who says, that he cannot help following the multitude, that he dislikes the bondage, but cannot throw it off.

We have shown that the great danger of disobeying the divine law lies in the habit, so easily, and, unless carefully guarded against, so inevitably formed, of following a multitude; of giving up our sentiments and conduct into the hands of those around us, instead of keeping them in our own; of having no permanent rule of action, above the authority of a multitude, and beyond their power; of permitting ourselves to be dependent on a multitude, and to forget all other and higher accountability. Our main duty, therefore, is, as it will be our great safeguard and defence, to have a fixed standard, to acknowledge a supreme rule, and to refer to this standard, and observe this rule, firmly and regularly, let the multitude go as they will.

It has all along been intimated where the great and sacred law is to be found. God has written it on our hearts, and he has revealed it in the Scriptures. We have a sense of right and wrong; and we should heedfully attend to its unperverted monitions. We are gifted with reason, that divine light within; and we should use it in determining what is profitable and what is unprofitable; what is hurtful to our nature and what is helpful to it; what is a useful and dignified employment of our time and faculties, and what is a waste and abuse of them; what will contribute to exalt, and what to degrade us.

From the same Eternal Source and Supreme Authority, we have a light and a law in the Bible. The word is written there against all sin and all manner of defilement. Unequivocal precepts of righteousness are laid down there, which it is impossible to misconstrue, and concerning which there can be no controversy.

And then there is the example of the Saviour, who practised the purity, integrity, and holiness which he came to teach; and whose life can be no more misapprehended than his moral doctrine can be; a life of piety, a life of truth, a life of singular, independent excellence, a model of living for all the sons of God.

Behold, then, the law, the testimony, and the life which are to be our standard and rule, as men and as Christians. Let these be erected above the world's highway, — far

above it. Let these be obeyed and followed before the world's commandment and example, — far and long before them. Then shall we not follow a multitude to do evil, because we shall follow, first of all, and rather than all, those divine dictates, and that divine example, which are clothed with the highest authority, which beam with the clearest light, which call us to our own true happiness, and can only lead us to do good.

The above remarks have been made, and principles laid down, preparatory to the consideration of the correctness of some ideas which are commonly entertained with regard to the nature and power of circumstances.

When we are reviewing the history of a generation, the character and conduct of ancestors, or the biography or writings of individuals, it is the constant habit to account for, and at the same time to extenuate, and almost to justify, some of the worst of their faults and sins, by imputing them to the circumstances of the age in which they lived. Let there be gross inconsistencies, glaring errors, burning shames in the scene, the broad veil of circumstances is only to be dropped before them, and it covers, conceals, or, at least, shades them all.

Now, it is not to be denied that the circumstances of the times and manners of the age are in a certain degree palliative of vices, irregularities, and excesses which grow out of them, or go to constitute them. That is to say, the mighty force and sway of general example, for evil as well as for good, are to be duly allowed in estimating the movements of society. The proneness of individuals to follow a multitude, and of the constituent members of a multitude to follow each other to do evil, is a fact in our moral nature which is not to be overlooked, and which, in some cases, and with respect to the very ignorant and benighted, amounts to nearly a full palliation of offences. But it is not to be allowed, that circumstances are the complete justification of offences in all cases, which they are often asserted to be. It is not to be allowed that a bad example, however general, cannot be resisted; that a man, by exercising his reason, speaking to his courage, and putting forth his strength, cannot break away from the enthralling influence of the many. We therefore think that the usual estimate of what are called circumstances, as excuses of corrupt morals and fatal principles, is superficial, delusive, and of injurious tendency.

What are circumstances? With many, they seem to mean a sort of fate; an undefinable, incomprehensible, and irresistible combination of agencies, which take into their hands the moral government of the world; an overhanging cloud, under the oppressive shadow of which all men must grope; an external power, with the mysterious action of which men have no concern but that of obedience. This vague notion of circumstances, is, as we conceive, at war with the important truth of each man's responsibility, and with some other truths and facts, as may be briefly and easily shown.

Circumstances, then, we say, are not external and overwhelming powers, but the effects of the free actions and opinions of men themselves, both as individuals and as the constituent parts of society; and the influence of circumstances is, for the most part, nothing more than the influence of prevalent example; which we have already allowed to be great, but not almighty and resistless.

From this definition we of course except physical circumstances, such as a cold or a warm climate, a maritime or an inland situation; but the other class, which we may term moral circumstances, and which are not constant, but continually varying in the same climate and country, are nothing more than what we have already stated them to be, the effects of the free actions and opinions of men themselves, for which men themselves are to be held accountable. What are called unpropitious circumstances, are the manifestations and influences of something bad in the character of a people, which, by a reference to a pure and existing standard, might have been better. To yield to such circumstances, to be governed by them, is to follow the multitude to do evil; which is to evince a common and yet culpable want of independence and resolution. A law and a standard have always been set up before the faces of men, by observing which they might have kept in a more excellent way than that which the world has usually or ever pursued. That they might have kept in it, is proved by the fact that some always have kept in it. In all ages, we are made acquainted with individuals, who, like Noah, and Lot, and Joshua, have resolved, with their houses, to serve the Lord, let others serve whom they would. In all nations, there have been those who have worked righteousness and been accepted;

who have listened to the still monitions of their bosoms, in preference to the noise of the multitude; and have walked by the light of heaven, whether it shone from within or beamed from the written word, rather than by the delusive and perishing fires which were kindled by the passions and perversities of the crowd. Have such persons any merit? If they have, have not the multitude, and those who follow the multitude, any sin? If those who stand aloof from surrounding corruption are to be praised, are not those who permit themselves to be swallowed up in it to be blamed? We had always thought that it was the prerogative, the dignity, and the duty of men to resist circumstances, even physical circumstances, certainly the circumstances manufactured for them by men like themselves, the vicious fashions, habits, and systems set up for their worship by the idolatrous world. And we had consequently thought that the human prerogative was yielded, and the dignity lost, and the duty neglected, when the soul submitted and the knee was bent.

Is it said that the general sin is a necessary result of the general ignorance, and that when men have no light, it is no wonder that they stray? The answer is, that there has always been a light above the darkness, and if the darkness has been preferred, it has been more or less the fault of those who have preferred it, and whenever the light has been preferred, it has been more or less the glory of those who have preferred it. And surely, since the rising of the sun of righteousness, there has been light enough. Since the promulgation of the Christian code, there has been a sufficient law, and a satisfactory standard. And the fact is, that those who have enjoyed the most light, have often wandered the widest, and have made circumstances worse than they found them. Must these be defended, too, on the score of circumstances and the manners of the age? Must they who pervert their superior powers to administer to the popular wickedness and so make it greater, must they, too, be sheltered under the convenient mantle of the spirit of the times? We repeat it, they make circumstances, and in different degrees and ways we all make circumstances; for it appears as plain to us as anything which we behold, that circumstances do not come up from the ground or fall down from the sky, but are made, actually made by the ever-operating wills of men. If a generation or class of men are remarkable for

laxity of manners, sensuality and grossness, it is not because they do not know that there is a divine blessing pronounced upon the pure in heart, and a wo against the unclean, but because, knowing, they choose to slight both blessing and ban, and indulge appetite in defiance of law. Again, if they are quarrelsome, revengeful, and warlike, it is not because they are not commanded, and do not know that they are commanded, to love one another, but because they determine to give loose to their fiery passions, and send them forth to burn, waste, and destroy; and because one man follows his neighbour, and follows the multitude, to do evil, without giving the heed which he ought and very well might to his own steps, that they should be found in the way of righteousness. Thus are circumstances created; and as they are created, so can they be resisted and destroyed,—even by the wills and energies of men. The command always exists, Thou shalt not follow a multitude to do evil; and it can always be obeyed; for it cannot be considered as issued to those who are absolutely unable to obey it.

An illustration or two may help us in the consideration of this subject. Open the works of one of the English dramatic writers of the sixteenth or seventeenth century. They are full of scenes and passages which you acknowledge are not fit to be read by man, woman, or child. But you say, the author was a fine genius, and while his writings are certainly not to be recommended in all respects, he himself ought not to be charged with the faults of his age. Why is he not to be charged with the faults of his age? And why is not the age to be charged with its own faults? They had a law; the same law which we have, uttering the same language which it does now, clothed with the same sanctions. And yet, knowing this law, and knowing that it called on them to put away the works of darkness, and distinctly specified what those works of darkness were, the crowd, both the well-dressed and the ill-dressed crowd, could demand such plays as were then written, and the fine geniuses could write them; and people, who had bibles in their houses, or at least heard them read in the churches, could go to the theatre, and listen to the grossest stuff which was ever penned or spoken, without a murmur or a blush. Are those playwrights to be excused for their indecency and profaneness, because the spirit of the age excused and even required such things?

We cannot see why either they or the age are to be excused; why the age is to be considered innocent in having such a spirit, or the playwrights are to be absolved for affording it its congenial nutriment. The divine law did not excuse them, and they knew it did not. And here is the great point in this case. They sinned, both the multitude and those who followed them, against a known commandment. A light was shining, and they did not heed it. A standard was erected, and they did not recur to it. No circumstances can furnish a full excuse for such sinning as this, especially when the sin and the circumstances are one and the same; the sin being the circumstance. To defend such writings as we are speaking of, therefore, by a slight recurrence to the spirit of the age, is a loose and dangerous way of treating moral subjects of this moment. That age was a Christian age, a polite and advanced age, and its spirit ought to have been better. All sin, indeed, which is indulged in by numbers, may admit of the same excuse. You may call it the spirit of the age, if you please, but unless you can show that there was no corrective principle existing, no loudly uttered law against it, you cannot maintain that the spirit is necessary and blameless, for you cannot prove that a sin is no sin when many partake in it, and follow one another to commit it.

Then it is further to be considered, that in those very times to which our attention has been directed, there were those who had the independence and the true wisdom to bring the existing state of morals and habits into comparison with a standard which they revered, and which was worthy of their reverence, and to see the fearful opposition in which the former stood to the latter. And they courageously refused to be governed by the circumstances to which others submitted, that is to say, to be enslaved by the reigning vices; and they resisted the spirit of their age, and by resisting reformed it. In other words, they made new circumstances, or greatly modified the old ones. We allude not only to the noble army of Puritans, whose utter abhorrence of the spirit of the age, led them into some harsh but very natural extremes, but to many others, who, though they did not nominally join the puritans, kept themselves pure amidst impurity, and thus contributed to bring about a chaster style, a more moral taste, and a more serious and practical religion.

Are these men worthy of praise? You will readily allow that they are. Why, then, must you not also allow, that those others from whom they separated themselves, writers and readers, corruptors and corrupted, the makers of fashion and the slaves of fashion, are deserving of blame? And allowing this, will you not grant, that as moral circumstances may be thus formed and changed by men, yielded to or opposed by men, they are in the power of men, being the opinions and customs of men themselves, and therefore not irresistible fates compelling men to certain courses, and depriving them of their accountableness?

Perhaps there is no sin which has called more frequently for this excuse of circumstances, and plead more successfully in its defence the spirit of the age, than the sin of religious intolerance. Catholics and protestants, churchmen and puritans must all be acquitted of the guilt of fiery passions and horrible persecution, because persecution was the fashion of their times, and religious toleration and liberty of opinion had not yet been invented. Strange, indeed, that sixteen hundred years after the law of charity and love had been proclaimed to the world, men had not come to the understanding and obedience of it. But some did understand and obey it. Are they to be put on the same level in the moral scale with those who did not? Is Archbishop Laud to take rank among the peacemakers and sons of Christian liberty, with Roger Williams, William Penn, and Lord Baltimore? Are circumstances and the spirit of the age really to be permitted to have this equalizing power? Are the passionate and the peaceful, the forgiving and the revengeful, to be thus jumbled together, because a great majority of their contemporaries were passionate and not peaceful, revengeful and not forgiving? If it is said that the asserters of full liberty of conscience were really no better men than the advocates of persecution, but were taught their principles by the imposed lessons of dire experience, we shall not take the trouble of disputing the assertion, though we do not believe it, but even then, granting it to be strictly true, we say that it was some credit to the former that they were docile, that they could be taught at all, taught by anything, while they were surrounded by the latter, who, subject to the same dire experience, suffering under the same discipline, could be taught by nothing. It is much, we repeat, in a man's favour, that he can be taught.

If this is a just exposition of the nature and power of moral circumstances, it follows that it is one of our first and gravest duties, to do whatever we can to resist and overcome bad circumstances, and to create good ones. This double fronted duty, as it may be called, looks behind and before, to the past and to the future. It enjoins upon us a steady warfare with the false notions, injurious customs, and all the unpropitious circumstances which may have come down to us, and among which we find ourselves; and it requires us to prepare favorable circumstances, by the performance of good works, and the exhibition of a good example, for those who are to come after us. It may be a hard thing, and doubtless is for most of us, to contend resolutely and perseveringly with prevalent and allowed immoralities. We have not said that it is easy to resist perverse circumstances, but that it is practicable and is our duty. A man with a heavy burden on his shoulders, cannot be expected to rise with as much facility as if he were not thus laden, and therefore his burden is some excuse for him, if he sits still, or sinks prostrate; nevertheless, if by vigorous exertion he is able to rise, his burden does not justify him for neglecting or refusing to exert himself and rise up on his feet.

If we are aware that resistance to the opposing current of circumstances is hard, and that yielding to it is perilous and sinful, so much the more earnestly should we brace ourselves up to the encounter, both for duty's sake and the sake of those who are to take their turn of duty when we are called to our account. Let us do all we can for them to diminish their danger and their toil, and still they will have enough left to do themselves, and will see no time lying idle on their hands, if they would carry forward the great work of human improvement, and leave the world better than they found it.

We have already spoken of the duty of regarding and obeying a law of right in preference to the example of the multitude. We have also spoken of the duty of resisting those circumstances which may be resolved into the evil influence of general example, and also of the corresponding duty of forming good circumstances as far as lies within the compass of each man's ability. We will conclude the subject, by stating the kind of exertion which seems to be requisite in the performance of these duties. How are we to

treat the circumstances by which we are surrounded? How are we to oppose those which are of a bad tendency, and how are we to create new and good ones? Such are the questions which we propose to answer.

First of all, a reflecting and investigating habit is important. Having a law and a standard, we must keep them steadily in view, and bring other authorities and influences to the test of comparison with them. With the very best dispositions, we may frequently follow the multitude to do evil, if we are not wakeful and watchful, and do not ponder well our ways. We must examine circumstances, and not be satisfied that they are innocent because they are familiar, or because they are introduced to us by friends. We must not take for granted that opinions are true or customs correct and harmless, because they are held and practised by many whom we have much cause to respect and love. Respect and love are supremely due to God and his word; and our great care and constant care should be to try all propositions by the highest and not an inferior rule. If such and such persons, whom we esteem, do such and such things, it is exceedingly pleasant, to be sure, to bear them company,—much more pleasant than to stand apart or go on alone,—provided those things are good,—but that is a point which we are bound previously to settle by a holier authority than their example; for though estimable they are not infallible. We never ought to lull our suspicions of the rectitude of a course by repeating the names of those who pursue it. It is a bad precedent, though a royal one, to have any keepers of our consciences, which we ought to keep and guard ourselves. There is exceeding danger in indulging a careless, indifferent, pains-hating temper, which acquiesces in all usual and established injunctions, and avoids the trouble of moral investigation and personal decision. It is a proof of weakness, and of a poor understanding of our duty, to say, I form this engagement, I partake of this amusement, I adopt this fashion, because my friends and acquaintance do the same. The proper interrogatives to be put to ourselves, are, Is this engagement consistent with my known and positive duties? Can I enter into it with safety, and come out of it unembarrassed, and without a breath on that mirror which reflects to me the image of my inner self? Does this amusement interfere with none of the more serious allotments

of my time? Does it help me or hurt me in the process of self-cultivation? Is it a relaxation or a temptation? Does it relieve or dissipate my mind? Is it perfectly innocent? And if innocent now, will it be so by and by; or if innocent to my neighbour, is it so to me? And how is it with regard to this fashion? Is it only one of the varieties of taste, or is it in itself preposterous? Can I afford to adopt it? Will a compliance with one of the caprices of the day be of no injurious consequence to my health, my real comfort, or my fortune? And, finally, will a participation in any engagement, amusement, or fashion, which is presented to me by the consent of those about me, make me less respectable in my own eyes, and less worthy in the sight of the omniscient and omnipresent Judge? Considerations of this sort we should bring before us very often in our intercourse with the world; for if we do not, we shall be very apt to slide into that easy, careless habit above mentioned, and be ready to receive whatever comes with the broad seal of society affixed to it, and join in with a multitude, whichever way they are flocking.

That the want of that reflection and discrimination, the importance of which we have been urging, is quite a common want, may be perceived in the conversation of numbers, who, from the way in which they talk, evidently entertain the conviction, that there really is no authority above and beyond the general voice and example, and no such duty as that of examining, for themselves, the validity of the world's law and the propriety of an established usage, before they consent to them, and obey them. It never seems to have entered their heads that a custom of fair repute is a thing to be questioned or sifted, or compared with any thing else; and by the unsuspecting, definitive manner in which they say 'It is the fashion,' you see that their meaning is the same as if they had said, 'It is right, and of complete and final obligation.' Hence it is that old practices are suffered to continue, till some who are wiser than others take up the task of examining them, and then it is found, perhaps, and acknowledged, that these practices had been preying on the vitals and drinking up the life-blood of the community. Was not this the case with many of the details, for instance, connected with the prevalent vice of intemperance? Twenty years ago, nobody thought of inquiring into and arraigning the custom of display-

ing and using a variety of spirituous liquors at all times, in all forms, and on all occasions, before dinner, and with dinner, and after dinner, and in the evening, and just before bed-time, and for all meetings of men, even those which solemnized the obsequies of the dead. Though the mournful victims of excess were everywhere about us, no one thought of tracing the ruin, in part, at least, to the simple fact, that the means of excess were everywhere about us, too, — thrust into our way, and by ourselves thrust into the way of others, as an indispensable mark of hospitality and kindness, wherever we could turn. This was the universal custom, and therefore, as in our sleepy, dreaming state we concluded, it was all right. But presently some of us woke up, and woke others up, and we began to see that it was all wrong, and that it was a mistake to have supposed that the general practice could have ever made it right. Thus it has been with all past reformations, and thus it will probably be, in time, with some present practices, which we think we must follow, or at any rate allow to exist, because they have never been probed and investigated. Hereafter they will be tested, and their vanity or iniquity be fully revealed, and they will be discountenanced and repudiated. Then it will be found that the circumstances of society have been changed, — and how changed? Changed, we answer, by the reflections of the thoughtful, the examinations of the discerning, the comparisons instituted by the wise and good between the ways of the world and the laws of reason and of God. Some men have changed the habits and practices of other men, and there is a better general example than there was before, and this is a change of circumstances. Thinking men, and virtuous and religious men, owning a supreme law, have taken circumstances into their own hands, and have changed them. If they had been left entirely in the hands of the unreflecting and the vicious, of those whose only law was the law of passion or of custom, they would never have been changed, except from bad to worse, and from one folly to another.

The first step in the treatment of circumstances, then, is the cultivation of a habit of thinking, examining, and comparing for ourselves. With this habit to befriend us, we shall be little likely to follow the multitude to do evil blindly, because it will be a usual inquiry with us, whither they are going, what is the direction of their path, and where will be its end.

In the second place, having measured the general example or custom by the eternal standard, and found it deficient; having examined circumstances by the true and steady light, and determined that they are corrupt and baneful, it becomes our duty to act up to our convictions with courage and perseverance.

It is no easy thing to withstand the general rush of long perverted opinion; no easy thing to face out reiterated discharges from the battery of ridicule; no easy thing to be content to be called singular, and visionary, and romantic, and millenial; no easy thing to dare the hazard of being dragged into the newspapers. But all this must be done and dared, if we are going to do our duty as good members of society and opposers of vicious practices and customs. Then we must sometimes be ready to appear to be interfering with the rights and domains of others, — observe that we say, *appear to be interfering*, for really to interfere with them, is a sin great enough to vitiate the merit of our best intentions. But the hosts of wickedness, the tempters of youth, the doorkeepers of the house of death, when they see their base interests in danger, are always ready to talk of their rights, and place themselves in the predicament of injured and persecuted citizens. And what are their rights? the rights, we mean, about which they make all this pretension? They are, almost universally, rights to do wrong, which, to say the best of them, are very imperfect rights. And why may not an honest man, who feels that his happiness is going to wreck all about him, through the exercise of such rights, say to those people, "Sirs, I do not recognise your rights. You have no right to entice away, by the preparation of the most dangerous blandishments, from duty, from happiness, from home, and from me, those who are dearer to me than life. You have no right to sell poison and death to my children, even for the support of your own. And if I can find a way, a legal way, of breaking down the intrenchments which you call your rights, my wrongs call on me to take it, and I shall take it. Be virtuous, sirs, be honorable, be innocent, and then your rights will be perfect ones, and no one will be disposed to molest them, no one can take them away." If true Christian courage will prompt some to go forward, and say such things, the same courage should prompt others to support them and countenance them. And it must either

be an unworthy temporizing, or a strange mode of reasoning which could allow us to hold back, and leave the bold few alone. For our own poor part, we hope we shall always have the heart and mind to say in behalf of those who now or at any time are boldly and lawfully advancing any real, generous reform, here or elsewhere, we hope we shall always have the heart and mind to say, in public and private, in the pulpit and in the closet, for our own sake and for our children's sake, "God speed them, and God bless them!"

But we must be prudent, considerate, rational, and careful, surely, as well as courageous. If we are not, indeed, our courage will probably be of small avail. We have already said, that abuses, customs, fashions, and prevalent notions must be examined; and we can hardly do this without acquiring thoughtfulness, and a habit of looking at things on all sides. A restless, meddlesome, prying temper, never at ease, and never suffering others to be at ease, is not the best calculated for changing circumstances and effecting improvement. There are some who are fond of busying themselves with the private and domestic concerns of their neighbours; who intrude their advice, and perhaps their embarrassing help, where they are not asked, and are not wanted; who like to get up an excitement, if it is only to have something to do, to show themselves, or to get their names printed. This petty, meddlesome disposition, ought to be discountenanced, as it commonly is. It is very different from the judicious, energetic, brave spirit, which arrays itself against evil circumstances, and alone can resist them with any permanent success.

And finally, the very best rule, as a universally applicable one, for the resistance of evil circumstances, is, the silent and steady opposition to them which each one who pleases may manifest in his own behaviour and life. There are those, singular as it may seem, who are exceedingly sensitive to the extravagances and follies of the times, and declaim much against false notions and absurd fashions, and yet go along with them all, in their own practice, exactly the same as if they were entirely pleased with them. Such conduct as this, is not only no help, but a great hindrance to improvement. We must be reformers and puritans at home. Let a man take care of himself in the first place, and of those over whom he has a natural and just influence in the second

place, and his and their life will of itself be of incalculable benefit to the good cause. If a fashion or custom appears to you a bad one, follow it not, adopt it not, keep it away from your own doors, let it not take a seat by your own hearth-stone, and then your own resistance, your own simplicity, your own prudence, must have some influence, — and if they should have none, you and yours will be blameless of the great offence, — and that surely is something, is everything, to creatures holding themselves accountable to God, and looking for a righteous judgment.

[For the Christian Examiner.]

Art. II. — *A Chapter of Intellectual Philosophy. The Final Cause of the Inequality between our Powers of Conception and Execution.*

That discontents and inquietudes make an inseparable part of our present lot, is proverbial. That these discontents and inquietudes are expressly designed to accomplish results magnificently good, and are, therefore, to be regarded as blessings instead of curses, is quite generally overlooked.

One source of disquiet has not, I apprehend, attracted its due share of attention, namely, the disproportion existing between our intelligent and our active nature.

This disproportion is very striking. It fixes a great gulf between our reason, which sees, and our will, which executes.

It is, too, a universal disproportion. In the wisest and best of men, the power of performance lingers far behind the faculty of perception. Fast and far as they may climb the heights of excellence, not the less above them may they behold

> "Alps on Alps, on mountains mountains rise."

The principle holds as well in small things as in great. How earnestly soever we strive to execute our purpose, — to clothe our conception in visible form, — when it stands up completed before us, we are smitten with disappointment. We do not own the work of our hands to be a fair represen-

tative of the creature of our minds. The philosopher and the poet, the artist and the handicraftsman are alike vexed with their continual failure to give adequate expression to the images their minds had shaped. Nor less has the Christian cause to lament his perpetually coming short of his ideas of duty. "The law of his members wars," and *prevails* "against the law of his mind, so that the thing, that he would, *that* he does not."

This peculiarity in our structure, merely in a speculative view, is an interesting fact. But it is, I apprehend, a peculiarity of no small practical consequence.

Let us inquire, then, why, and to what end it is, that we thus know better than we do, — that we conceive better than we execute, — that we see better than we accomplish?

The solution of this inquiry is to be sought in a consideration of our nature and destiny. And what are these? Immortal in our nature, our destiny is perpetual growth. But we, — on whom presses the weight of a destiny so magnificent, and yet awful, — we are, at the outset, simple existences; hardly so much persons, as things. We see not, — we conceive not, — we feel not; — but we possess the *germs* of these functions, — the capability of seeing, and conceiving, and feeling. The unfolding of these germs, and the developement of this capability, — the enlargement of our intelligence and the expansion of our sensibilities, — in one word, growth without measure or end, is the one thing, for which our nature was created; the one thing, for which it lives; the one thing, for whose accomplishment all things beside the soul were created as auxiliaries.

The soul's life, then, being perpetual advancement, it demands a perpetually active moving force. In the composition of this moving force many and various elements meet. One of these elements is that peculiarity in our spiritual structure, of which we are speaking. We are so constructed, that our intelligent nature precedes, by a wide interval, our active nature. We conceive better than we execute; we see better than we accomplish.

But this inequality between the two departments of our nature is a spring of disquiet. For our nature, by one of its strongest instincts, covets wholeness, or inward unanimity. No disturbance of this unanimity, no internal dissension can occur, without generating some degree of pain.

There is no stimulant to action more potent than pain. The uneasiness produced by the want of symmetry between our intelligent and our active nature immediately prompts the endeavour to diminish this want, — to effect a correspondence between our powers of conception and of execution. And in this process, ever going on, but never to be completed, is found the working out of our destiny, which is progress, growth.

We have a cause, then, and it is a cause most wise and good, why the perceiving reason so towers above the executing will. It is for an end the highest and holiest, and not for pastime to a vacant fancy, that from their birthplace and home, the creative presence of God, ideas of yet unrealized perfection descend to visit the minds of men.

Fixed and radiant before the artist's inward sight there lies an image of unearthly beauty; and laboriously and painfully does he strive to give it, on the canvass or in the marble, an outward existence.

Over the soul of the orator there broods what the prince of orators calls a "something immeasurable and infinite"; — and his bosom heaves and his eye kindles with its inspiriting presence.

Coming and going before the poet's eye are visions of ethereal loveliness and grandeur; and with an earnest and sleepless perseverance does he strive to disclose them to others through the magic-glass of "words fitly spoken."

And before the eye of the aspirant after moral excellence, the genuine desciple of Christ, there float evermore ideas of spotless purity, and self-forgetting benevolence, — of love unshadowed, and uncomplaining patience, — of piety that never chills, and holiness without a stain. Turn whithersoever he may, they are still before him, frowning on his unfaithfulness or indolence, smiling approval on each well-aimed endeavour, and beckoning him onward and yet onward.

These are but illustrations of a universal principle. To every thing there is a perfection after its kind, which may continually be approached, but is never fully attained. Whatsoever thing our minds may devise, or our hands find to do, there lies before us, either clearly or dimly, an idea of the perfection of that thing. To bring this idea within the sphere of our will, as well as within the sphere of our vision, — in other words, to effect a closer correspondence between

the acts of our voluntary power of execution, and our half-involuntary power of conception; or, in other words still, to lay hold on with the hands as well as with the eye; — this is the secret, and the whole secret, of what we call improvement, or progress.

The thought of the nature and origin of the ideas of which we are speaking, is, to the reflecting, a solemn and yet kindling thought. What are they but rays from the one great central Sun? — gleams visiting the human soul from the one indivisible, far-shining Orb of Perfection? For all light and truth, all beauty and goodness, are but reflections of the divine nature. It is the destination, while it is the sole happiness and glory of the created spirit, to attain a resemblance to its author. Therefore is it planted in a universe, where it is entirely compassed about with God. On this side and that, turn whithersoever it may, there break on its perception glimpses of Him, within whose circling presence it lives. In these glimpses we behold the ideas of which we speak. These ideas proclaim their own design; which is, by degrees, and in separate portions, as befits our nature, to reveal to us the nature and character of our great Original.

In all this, we are, to a great degree, passive. For much of the Divine Being, — what He is and what He requires, — we cannot choose but see.

But it is not enough that we *see*. It remains that we *act*. To transfer these ideas, from an insulated, barren existence in the understanding, to a station, where they shall overlook, and command, and move, as one, the whole various nature; to plant them in the midst of the affections, and permit the affections to wind round, and be moulded by them, — to assign to them the place and dignity of a law, according to which the will shall decide, — this is the task given us to do.

The materials, and the implements to be employed in the execution of this task, are the world in which we are, and the life which we live. The innumerable acts, small and great, which we gather up and class under the names of conduct, character, and the like, — the whole circle of the arts, including even the lowest of the manual arts, wherein a whole is constructed by the putting together of parts, — all these are but different modes of giving outward expression to ideas. They constitute the element in which,

by various successive experiments, our active nature, — that is, our will, our passions, and our affections, — moulds itself to a conformity with our perceptive nature, or works out a correspondence between itself and those ideas, which beam on our Reason's eye from the original Source of Light.

There is, then, a cause, and it is a benevolent cause, for the universal inequality between our powers of conceiving and executing. Its effect is to spread out before the soul a thousand allurements attracting it towards its Author; to open a thousand different paths, all leading to the throne of God.

And thus, though this want of harmony between the two main branches of our nature be fraught with perplexities, disquietudes, and pains, yet is it a condition of our being, that conducts to issues the noblest and most desirable,— even the transforming of weakness into strength; of the mortal into immortality; of the frail, ignorant child of earth into a creature bearing, distinct and radiant, the impress of the Most High God!

In the preceding views, we are presented not only with a solution, such as it is, of the great problem of human life, but an exposition of the manner in which we may, and should turn life to practical account. The work assigned us is to follow out, or give outward expression in full to our ideas, — allotting the predominance, of course, to those which are demonstrated by their very essence, to be the soul's governing ideas.

First and paramount in our nature stands the moral element. First and chiefly, then, should our endeavour be to give full expression to all our moral ideas; or, in other words, to make our external acts the true representatives of our conceptions of duty.

"To act up to our light;" "to do what we think right;" "to follow the dictates of conscience;" — these are phrases with which common speech clothes our doctrine; and they tell strongly for its soundness, inasmuch as they are the spontaneous fruit of the common sense and feeling of mankind.

Again, whatever be our profession, art, or occupation; in other words, whatever be the mode in which we choose to put forth habitually the principal sum of our intellectual activity, or of our intellectual and physical activity combined,

our endeavour should be that our execution correspond, as closely as possible, to our idea of what is perfect.

"To do the best we know how;" "what is worth doing at all, is worth doing well;" — these are phrases which demonstrate our doctrine not to be alien to the common sense and feeling of mankind.

The wise man's exhortation, "Whatsoever thy hand findeth to do, do it with thy *might*," bears, with equal force, on all the three modes of exerting our nature's activity, the moral, the intellectual, and the physical. "Whatsoever thou doest," he would say, "be it of much or of little importance, do it according to the best of thy knowledge and ability. Let this be with thee a settled habit. Do not at all, — or, at least, deviate from this rule as rarely as may be, — do not at all what time and opportunity will not allow thee to do according to thy utmost light and capacity."

This principle, extending from the least unto the greatest of our nature's operations, is the one only sufficient proof of our nature being in a completely healthful tone.

Our doctrine is not a mere barren interpretation of facts. It is a doctrine, in the highest sense, practical. It embodies a principle, in whose working is found the spring of all excellence of whatever kind; a principle, the degree of whose energy affords a universal *measure* of excellence.

Wherever you find one excelling, be it in what it may, you will, by inquiry, discover the secret of it to be, that, through a long series of efforts, — each gaining on the last, — he has been sustained and led onward by an idea, existing in his mind, of something superior, in the same kind, to what any one of his successive efforts has reached.

The painter and the sculptor, the architect and the poet, are each kindled and allured forward by an image of beauty or grandeur, which they strive to fix, and embody in external symbols. One effort follows another, earnest and laborious, and still they are disappointed and vexed to witness the imperfect correspondence between the image within and the symbol without. But if actuated by the spirit implied in the names they bear, — the genuine spirit of the doctrine we are urging, — every failure, instead of disheartening, will stimulate to further and more energetic effort. And gathering new force from defeat, — even as the fabled giant became threefold stronger from every prostra-

tion, — they will draw continually nearer to giving complete outward expression to what is within them; that is, they will constantly *improve* in their respective arts.

He, in like manner, who thirsts for moral excellence, — whose ambition it is to realize all that is indicated by the name *Christian*, — he finds, in those majestic images of Christian virtues and graces, which flit across the firmament of his Reason, the spring of his noble thirst, of his high and holy ambition; — and to arrest these images, and give them a permanent home in his inmost soul, and make them the counsellors of his will and the guardians of his affections, will be his settled aim and strenuous endeavour, and herein consists the process of religious culture. *Fail* he will, again and again; but not so will he lose courage or give over. In the words of the great Apostle, himself a model in this kind, "he is troubled on every side, yet not distressed; perplexed, but not in despair; persecuted, but not forsaken; cast down, but not destroyed." Bruised and wounded, discomfited once and again, yet once and again he rallies; and stung with ingenuous shame and penetrated with wholesome regrets, he presses the more ardently forward, and will press forward until the prize is won, to which he is called by God from on high through Jesus Christ.

The ideas we have been considering, at least in their greatest vividness, belong most naturally to youth; — to the youth, I mean, of a mind, which, having been sheltered with the utmost care from evil influences, has been, at the same time, provided with such intellectual and moral nutriment, as is suited to its years. Such a mind has not become fettered by the tyrannous customs, or sophisticated by the maxims, of an artificial and imperfect state of society. There is a comparative closeness of sympathy between itself and that benign Spirit, who is the Life and Light of all things. Such a mind, therefore, swarms with images of excellence in every kind, and burns with the desire to give them outward form and feature. Wisely, therefore, said one of those clear Natures that make us rejoice in our Humanity, 'Tell him, when he is a man, to reverence the dreams of his youth.'

The worldling would stigmatize these dreams with the epithet *romantic*. But alas for the debasement of him, who can look back with shame on the time, when his heart

was warm and unhackneyed, and his love a spring perpetually overflowing, and his hopes bright, and his mind full of the thoughts of all excellent deeds. Matter of triumph rather and grateful rejoicing should be the dreams of our youth. Nor this alone. They should be prophecies involving and insuring their own fulfilment. Counsel more solemn or more momentous can be addressed to no one, than that he take heed not to fall away from his early aspirations.

Let not the world cover thee with its cold, blighting shadow. Hearken not to the sophistry, which would persuade thee to substitute expediency for right; smooth hypocrisy and fair-seeming equivocation for honesty and truth, — cold prudence and unfeeling self-interest for frankness and free-gushing love. Rely rather on thine own pure, spontaneous impulses, than on the narrow, frigid maxims of an unspiritual world. Let those images of truth and beauty, of good and right, which were the stars of thy youth, be the light-beaming and warmth-diffusing suns of thy riper years. Work while it is yet day. With earnestness and perseverance, — not disheartened by failure, not crushed by defeat, — strive to bring thy heart into harmony with whatsoever thy mind can conceive of universal excellence.

Thus strive thou till the end of life. And, thus striving, shalt thou accomplish the task assigned thee by thy Maker; and by His hand be crowned with "glory, honor, and immortality."

ART. III. — *Report on Punishment by Death.* By Messrs. SULLIVAN of Boston, RANTOUL of Beverly, KENDALL of Boston, HOLDEN of Charlestown, and DAVIS of Boston, a Committee of the House of Representatives. June 9, 1831.

THE Marquis Beccaria published, in 1767, his admirable essay on Crimes and Punishments, in which he argues lucidly aad cogently against the justice and expediency of punishment by death. The Grand Duke of Tuscany was induced by the perusal of it to abolish this mode of punishment. And ever since, there has been, throughout the civilized world, a

constant progress of sentiment in favor of its abolition or infrequent infliction, — a progress that has kept pace with the increase of intellectual light, with the advancement of science, with the improvement of public morals, and especially with the growth of religious knowledge, and of Christian faith and piety. The doctrine, that the legal destruction of human life is unnecessary and impolitic, has sprung up and gained ground under a light, before which antiquated errors of all kinds are disappearing. In the present age of intelligence, virtue, and philanthropy, it is maintained by many among the wisest and best of men. Whether their views are sound and well-based, it is our present purpose to inquire.

We are willing to concede at the outset, that civil government *has a right* to inflict capital punishment, *if the public good demand it;* and to rest our decision wholly on the question of *expediency.* In discussing this subject we shall, *first,* inquire, whether it be expedient to punish capitally aggressions upon property, such as arson, robbery, and the like; *secondly,* whether it be expedient to punish murder capitally; and, *lastly,* whether, if we reply negatively to the two first questions, there be any case in which it is expedient to inflict capital punishment.

I. Is it expedient to punish capitally mere aggressions upon property?

Laws, themselves the expression of public opinion, as long as they are in force, exert an influence upon it. The fact that a legislative provision attaches the same penalty to several different crimes, tends to place those crimes on the same footing in the public mind. We appeal to our readers for the truth of this remark; and ask them whether they have not looked upon the house-breaker, the highway robber, and the incendiary, with the same horror and loathing that they have felt for the murderer. Yet we doubt not that many a man has robbed, who would not at the moment have committed murder, even to save himself from the gallows, — that many a man has been led by a deep sense of injury to fire his neighbour's dwelling, who would be among the first to rescue its occupants from the blazing ruins. But not only do the virtuous part of the community class crimes as the law classes them. That the viciously disposed make the same classification every one's own ob-

servation will evince. There is a large class of people among us, who are habitually guilty of intoxication, quarrelling, and petty thieving, for which they are periodically committed to the almshouse or the county jail. They compass all the minor arts of iniquity; but never dare to go beyond them to crimes which would subject them to a higher penalty. Then there are those who break stores, steal horses, and commit crimes of that class so frequently as to spend about half their time in the state-prison; but who, though initiated in the whole circle of the crimes that send one thither, never commit a higher offence. And he who has passed this goal, — who has once committed, without detection or conviction, an offence which would expose him to capital punishment,— seldom stops short of murder. For he finds that he has incurred the highest penalty that society can inflict, — that he has committed a crime which legislative wisdom has classed with murder; and he therefore deems it little better than murder, and easily nerves himself, when tempted by cupidity or revenge, to take the life of his fellow. It should then be the policy of government to graduate punishment according to the different degrees of heinousness attached to different crimes.

Justice, too, demands a similar graduation of punishment. The criminal has rights as well as the injured party and the community; and the latter invade his rights when they inflict on him a punishment altogether disproportioned to the offence. Now, what proportion is there between the loss of a purse or a dwelling-house and the loss of life? Or what justice is there in punishing an injury, which in some cases is hardly felt and in most may be easily repaired, by inflicting an irreparable injury, — by cutting off the offender's probationary existence, and sending him, without opportunity for reformation, to his Maker's tribunal?

Again, the *public safety* requires that aggressions upon property, not attended by murder, should be punished by some slighter penalty than that annexed to murder. If a man robs on the highway or enters a dwelling-house by night, having about him a weapon capable of producing death, he is, by our laws, liable to capital punishment. Now he may rob or commit burglary with or without committing murder. If he fail to commit murder, he leaves alive the principal witness or witnesses against him, and thus renders

his apprehension and condemnation the more certain. If he kills the man whom he robs, or the inmates of the house which he enters, he puts out of the way the principal witness or witnesses against him, thus greatly diminishes the chance of his detection, and, in case of conviction, is liable to no greater penalty than if he had spared the life of his victim. So also, in case a man, while in the act of setting fire to a dwelling-house, should meet a spy, it would be for his interest to put so troublesome a witness out of the way. Thus our laws encourage murder, — offer a premium upon murder. Whereas, if aggressions upon property, unaccompanied by murder, were punished less severely than murder itself is, they would in almost every instance be unaccompanied by murder.

To show that the laws, as they now stand in this and other states, encourage murder in *fact* as well as in theory, we will quote a few sentences from the confession of the celebrated pirate, Charles Gibbs, made to Justice Hopson, at New-York, a little more than two years ago. The question was asked: "Gibbs, why were you so cruel as to kill so many persons, when you had got all their money, which was all you wanted?" He replied: "*The laws are the cause of so many murders.*" He was again asked: "How can that be? What do you mean?" His answer was: "Because a man has to suffer death for piracy; and the punishment for murder is no more. Then, you know, the dead tell no tales. But I am sure that, if the punishment for murder and piracy were different, there would not be so many murders."

But it may be said, that, if slighter penalties be annexed to burglary, robbery, and the like, they will be more frequently committed. Then let them be so. What is the loss of property compared with that of life? Better have ten robberies without murder than one with murder. The property stolen may be recovered or replaced. The blood shed cannot be gathered up, — the lost life cannot be restored to the community, to friends, to duty, to probation.

But these crimes would not be more frequently committed, were a lighter penalty annexed to them; for the certainty of punishment would be increased, in proportion as its severity was diminished. In England, there are no less than a hundred and sixty offences punishable by death. But,

according to Blackstone, this dreadful list, instead of diminishing, increases the number of offenders; for the injured through compassion, often forbear to prosecute,* juries either acquit the offender against law and evidence, or bring him in guilty of a less than his actual offence,† and judges often commute the sentence of death, or commend those who have incurred it to the pardoning power.‡ Instances of this kind have not as yet become notorious in this country; but they are becoming more and more frequent every year, and one recent case in our own neighbourhood, in which a jury, to save a man from the gallows, brought him in guilty of a less than his actual crime, will recur to the minds of many of our readers. There is in our community a growing prejudice against capital punishment; and, while this is the case, there will be in every instance a strong probability, that a man tried on a capital indictment, for any offence short of murder, will either be acquitted by a tender-hearted jury or pardoned by a lenient executive. And this probability holds out for the commission of such crimes an encouragement, which would be removed, were the infliction of a lighter, but still a very severe, punishment made morally certain.

We have said enough, we trust, to prove the inexpediency of punishing by death any offence short of murder; and we now proceed to inquire

II. Whether it be expedient to punish murder capitally. And under this head, we shall introduce several considerations which bear against capital punishment in general, but which were not needed under the former head. We shall attend, *first*, to the principal *arguments which are urged in favor of punishing murder capitally.*

And we are met at the outset by an argument to which great weight is attached by those who maintain the affirmative of this question, and which therefore merits the severest scrutiny. I mean the text in Genesis, where God, blessing Noah after he left the ark, says, *Whoso sheddeth man's blood, by man shall his blood be shed.* § Now, there is

* See Christian Examiner, Vol. XII. pp. 7 – 11.

† Ibid. pp. 5, 6.

‡ How small the chance is, that a man *convicted* of a capital crime in England will be hung, may be seen from the following fact, that from 1824 to 1831 inclusive, the number of executions was but 407, while no less than 8781 were sentenced to death.

§ Genesis ix. 6.

good reason to suppose that *human* murderers are not referred to in this text; but that man is here simply permitted or commanded to kill any *beast* that might occasion the death of a man. This interpretation is confirmed by the reason given for the provision, namely, *In the image of God made he man.* The meaning of man's being created in the *image of God* may be ascertained from Gen. i. 26, the first instance in which the phrase is used: "Let us make man after our *image*, and let them *have dominion* over the fish of the sea, and over the fowl of the air, and over the cattle, and over all the earth, and over every creeping thing that creepeth upon the earth." Man then was created in God's image, inasmuch as God gave him a power over the inferior animals similar to that which He wields over all orders of beings, — inasmuch as God made man the lord of this lower world, as He himself is Lord of the Universe. Now man's being lord of the inferior animals has no connexion with a command to kill a *human* murderer. But it would be a sufficient reason for killing a *beast* who occasions a man's death, and is thereby guilty, as it were, of *lese-majesty.* The text, literally rendered, decides nothing; for the Hebrew word translated *whoso sheddeth* is a present participle, corresponding to the English word *shedding*, and we have as good a right to supply the ellipsis by *whatever* as by *whoso* or *whoever.* Let us now see how the interpretation that we would propose suits the whole connexion. God has been giving Noah directions respecting the use of animal food. He then proceeds to say: "When your lives are taken, I will require at man's hand vengeance for your blood upon the beast that occasions the death of any one of you; — I will require the brother or the near relative of any man whose life is thus lost, to avenge it. *Whatsoever beast* occasions man's death, by man shall his blood be shed; for God created man in his own image, — endowed him with authority like his own, — made him to have dominion over the inferior animals." The whole passage seems to refer to the relation in which man was to stand with the lower orders of creation; the superiority and authority of man over them have been expressly recognised in the *second* verse; and the subject of the destruction of man's life by them expressly introduced in the *fifth.* Nor let any one deem it beneath the dignity of the Divine Being to issue a precept for the slaughter of ani-

mals, who, innocently, in accordance with their natural instinct, should destroy human life; for it is a well known fact that comparatively harmless animals, who have once successfully attacked man, are thus rendered untameable, ferocious, and dangerous. We find also a similar command given to the Israelites immediately after the promulgation of the decalogue: "If an ox gore a man or woman that they die, then the ox shall be surely stoned, and his flesh shall not be eaten."

But we may be asked: "What avails it to show that God did not sanction capital punishment for murder at the time when Noah left the ark? Did he not sanction it in the Mosaic law?" We answer, that, if the *common* interpretation of the text under consideration be correct, God not only sanctioned, but *instituted* this mode of punishment; and farther that the text thus interpreted represents the immutable God as issuing opposite commands under similar circumstances. For we are told,* that God set a mark upon the first murderer, lest any finding him should kill him. Now, if in society's first infancy God was thus careful to preserve the murderer's life, is it by any means probable that in its second infancy he would have so peremptorily commanded his death? How then did capital punishment for murder originate? It had its origin doubtless in the principle of revenge. The nearest relative of the murdered person undertook to avenge his blood, whether the murder were from malice prepense or from sudden passion, whether intentional or accidental. This appears to have been the custom at the time of Moses; and the code of laws divinely promulgated through him, so far from instituting this mode of punishment, attempts to regulate it and to check some of the numerous abuses growing out of it. In this law we first find a recognition of capital punishment, and here a mere *recognition*, not an express approval of a practice, to which we might well apply our Saviour's remark respecting the law of divorce: *For the hardness of their hearts he permitted this.*

But, even if we suppose that God instituted capital punishment when Noah came out of the ark, we have no reason to think it designed for all nations and ages. It might have

* Genesis iv. 15.

been peculiarly adapted to the earlier stages of social refinement; and, at any rate, had the infliction of it been a matter of religious obligation, the precept requiring it would doubtless have been republished in the *Christian* code. It is generally acknowledged that all the precepts given at this time to Noah were not of perpetual and universal obligation. He was then ordered to abstain from blood, — a ritual abstinence which no sect of Christians, except the Sandemanians, consider as binding.

But even if the precept, *Whoso sheddeth man's blood, by man shall his blood be shed*, meant what it is commonly understood to mean, and were still obligatory, it would not authorize the present mode of killing murderers, through the medium of judges, juries, sheriffs, and public executioners. Whatever vengeance is required by that precept, the brother or nearest relative of the murdered person is by the context commanded to take it. "*At the hand of every man's brother* will I require the life of man." This was, in fact, the mode in which murderers were punished before the time of Moses, — a mode which was continued with some restrictions under the Mosaic dispensation. But an attempt to revive this mode of punishing murder would by our laws be punished as severely as murder itself would be.

To pass to another argument, the advocates of capital punishment for murder defend it on the ground that it puts the offender out of the way of doing farther mischief. But he would be put no more surely out of the way of doing farther mischief by hanging than by imprisonment for life without the hope of pardon; and, the more severe the penalty, the greater the chance of his escaping it through the weakness of the jury or the executive, and thus being turned adrift upon the community.

It is farther urged in favor of punishing murder capitally, that, by assigning a slighter penalty to murder than that now attached to it, we should make its reputed heinousness less in the eyes of the community at large. But, we would ask, does the community or its government show the highest degree of disesteem for this crime, if, whenever a private individual commits a murder, it commissions the public authorities to commit one also? Let us see how the same principle would operate, if carried into practice generally. Suppose that a government, whenever it were sufficiently proved that

one of its citizens had committed burglary, should send armed police officers to break open his house by night, alarm his family, ransack his apartments, and pillage his goods, would that government manifest any disapprobation of burglary? Suppose that a modern legislature should revive the old Jewish law of retaliation, and take *an eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth*, would you say that those legislators disapproved or approved of the mangling of the human body? And now we would ask, does a government manifest its horror for the destruction of human life, or does it not rather show an indifference with regard to the taking of life, by legally killing every man who illegally kills his neighbour? If civil government, by abolishing the punishment of death, tacitly declared that human life, yea, the life of the most profligate, was too sacred a possession even for the stern ministers of justice to touch, — if the guardians of the public safety showed an unwillingness in any case to cut short the probation of a fellow man, they would express more strongly, than in any other way they could, their detestation of the crime of murder. A certain kind of respectability is attached in the public mind to every operation which the law performs or sanctions; and hence one great advantage attending punishment by imprisonment, namely, that it inflicts upon a criminal an evil which man is not wont to inflict upon his fellow, and thus gives sanction to no form of outrage.

But the main argument employed in favor of punishing murder capitally is the following: "The chief end of punishment is the prevention of future crime; and that is the most surely effected by annexing the highest of all penalties to the highest offence against the peace of the community." It is then incumbent on us to inquire, whether men will be most surely deterred from the commission of murder, if it continue punishable by death, or if it be punished by perpetual imprisonment to hard labor without the possibility of pardon, which is the substitute we would propose.

We would first remark that the *certainty* of punishment does more than its severity in deterring men from crime. A man would be less likely to commit murder, if it were morally certain that he would be imprisoned for five, eight, or ten years, than if there were only thirty, or forty, or fifty chances in a hundred of his being hung. Now there is in our country a great and growing difficulty in convicting any but the

most atrocious criminals, when death must follow the conviction. Hardly a jury has been impannelled in this state on a capital trial for many years past, some members of which have not been excused from serving, because they could not conscientiously bring in a verdict which would deprive a fellow man of life. Such being the state of the public mind, a man indicted for murder, unless the case be one of the deepest malignity or accompanied with an overwhelming weight of evidence, will too often slip through the hands of a timid jury, who would readily doom him to any less awful penalty. But, if he be convicted by the jury, he still may hope to escape death by a pardon, a series of reprieves or a commutation of sentence by the executive. The pardoning or reprieving power with reference to *capital* punishment must exist somewhere; for murderers are almost always convicted on circumstantial evidence, to which, in the interval between the trial and the execution, a new complexion may be given, so as to make the guilt of the criminal a matter of doubt. But, if murder be punished by *perpetual imprisonment*, there is no need of lodging the pardoning power any where; for, should any new evidence present itself or any circumstance transpire to invalidate the former evidence, the court might issue a precept for a new trial, and thus leave an impartial jury to confirm or rescind the first verdict.

Uniform experience has shown that to make punishment more certain, even if it be at the same time rendered less severe, tends powerfully to check crime. The empress Elizabeth of Russia never inflicted, and Catharine the Second abolished, capital punishment; but, by rendering the police of the empire more active and faithful, they greatly diminished the amount of crime. When the Grand Duke of Tuscany abolished punishment by death, he at the same time remodelled the police so successfully as to render detection almost inevitable; and the result was that crime was not only diminished in amount, but almost extirpated.* In our own community, the old and vulgar proverb, *Murder will out*, is emphatically true. Every murder is, in the public mind, attributed to some person or persons, who are sooner or later brought to trial. All that is wanting to make pun-

* During the *twenty* years immediately succeeding the abolition of capital punishment in Tuscany, only *five* murders occurred.

ishment in every case almost certain is, to affix to this crime such a punishment as will shock neither the moral feeling nor the prejudices of the community, and as will render it safe to remove the pardoning power from the hands of the executive.

Again, those who are viciously disposed will be most effectually deterred from crime, if they have an example of punishment frequently or *constantly* before them. But to suppose the examples of *capital* punishment frequent is to suppose a disturbed and disorderly state of society, — the very state which it is the object of laws and punishments to avert. Murders must be committed frequently, in order that numerous instances of punishment may deter or check their commission. The daily walk and the nightly repose of the citizen must first be made insecure, in order to deter those who would make them so from making them so. Numerous executions, though they indicate a depraved state of society, are a safeguard and a blessing to it; and a period when no outrage had been for a long time committed would be the very period when society had most to fear. But if, on the other hand, we make *perpetual imprisonment* the punishment for murder, men may have examples of punishment constantly before them, even if a new crime does not take place once in ten years. Every viciously inclined person will know where the murderer's prison is, — will know that *there* are a set of men who have dragged out for years an unenviable and unwished existence, in a monotonous and cheerless round of servile drudgery. He will receive exaggerated accounts of the haggardness of their countenances and the depth of their despair. He will look with terror and awe at those thick and high prison walls which no strength or dexterity has ever broken or leaped, and at those massive gates which have never opened to discharge a pardoned convict. Let this place of confinement be, not in the wilderness or the hamlet, but in the centre of the populous city or village, rearing itself like a charnel-house in the midst of business, bustle, and gayety, where every eye must see it, and see it frequently, and where its death-like silence may be most strikingly contrasted with the voices of the free, the virtuous, and the happy; and a more effectual mode of deterring men from the crime that would bring them thither cannot be devised.

By the substitution, then, of perpetual imprisonment for death as the penalty annexed to murder, we should make the punishment of every offender the more certain, and keep an example of punishment constantly before the eyes of the community. But this is not all. The prospect of perpetual imprisonment would be more terrible than the prospect of death, at the moment when the criminal first conceives the design of committing a capital crime. How little those desperadoes, who can take the lives of their fellow men, fear the loss of their own, appears from the frequency with which suicide is committed, — has been committed in our own commonwealth, by criminals before or after their trial for capital offences. Most of these men have in the early stages of their profligacy cast off every thing like religious fear or religious faith. They look upon death as the termination of misery at least, if not of existence, and would as readily leave the world with hardly a moment's suffering, as live a few days or years longer, and then die perhaps by a keenly painful accident or disorder. Besides, such men have generally familiarized themselves with danger of death in numerous and various forms, so that they run no new risk when they destroy life to gratify their cupidity or revenge. But among our most atrocious criminals, there are doubtless those who have never lost the religious *belief* of their childhood, — who have all along determined to close a life of sin and to wash away its pollution by a few days or hours of penitence. How must such men as these look forward to death by the hands of the executioner? That space for repentance which so many men expect and expect in vain on their death-bed, the officers of justice have marked out for *their* victim. They have numbered his days, and assigned him a portion of them which he can apply to no other purpose than to the acquisition of heavenly wisdom. Now is not a death thus definitely fixed, with a season of preparation thus liberally allowed, the very death which a man who believed in a future retribution, held exaggerated views as to the efficacy of repentance, and wished to terminate a life of sin with the hope of eternal happiness, would desire, would seek, would in distant prospect even welcome?

The manner in which criminals generally die, and the expression of public feeling before and after their execution, are adapted to make this mode of death less terrible in the eyes

of the profligate. A man, who, before his condemnation, was an object of scorn and hatred to the whole community, as soon as he is sentenced to the gallows receives the public sympathy, is regarded less as a guilty than as an unfortunate sufferer. Every wish that he breathes is a law,—every word that he utters an oracle. The marks of the contending emotions which agitate him are interpreted as the expressions of contrite or devout feeling; and, if he utter a word of genuine, imagined, or feigned sorrow, resignation, faith, or hope, there are hundreds of tongues ready to reëcho it, and hundreds of pens ready to canonize him at once. On the day of execution, the criminal is generally firm and self-collected, either in the effrontery of fool-hardiness, beneath the mask of hypocrisy, in the fervor of self-delusion, or, seldom it is to be feared, how often God only knows, in Christian peace and hope. All however is the same to the assembled multitude; in their eyes the bravado and the resigned penitent die one and the same death,—a death so easy, so tranquil, apparently so happy, that those, who have seen their virtuous friends die in the utmost agony of body or distress of mind, think little of the sufferings and much of the heroism of the criminal, and even profanely associate with the gallows the idea of fortitude, of courage, yea, of Christian triumph. And then at the foot of the gallows the ballad-monger is vending his trash, in which in uncouth rhyme he sets forth for the man just hung a character and a dying speech worthy of a confessor. And next day comes the newspaper, containing an account of the tragedy of yesterday, which, if you would only substitute the word *martyr* for criminal, the most sagacious reader might mistake for a *martyrdom*. And, last of all, the minister of religion, from whose high office and sacred character better things should be expected, pronounces an eulogium on the sufferer, tells the story of his contrition and piety, (which, if true, should be the subject of his own gratitude and joy, but ought never to be penned or told for the encouragement of the workers of iniquity,) and fastens upon the minds of his hearers the impression that the gallows is one of the surest avenues to heaven. Now all these circumstances are, in the present state of the community, inseparable from public executions, and most of them from executions in any mode; and are not they all adapted, we will not say to diminish, but almost to annihilate the sal-

utary terror which the infliction of capital punishment might otherwise diffuse?

But the punishing of murderers by perpetual imprisonment would excite no such public sympathy. Every one would feel that the penalty was deserved, and necessary for the public good. The sentimental would weep and the benevolent grieve for the sufferings of the incarcerated; but, as their punishment would not be momentary, but protracted, so sympathy in their behalf would not be violent, passionate, and temporary, but rational, subdued, judicious, permanent, and beneficial. He who contemplated the commission of murder would then look forward, not to a heroic death amidst the tears and the caresses of the tender-hearted and the pious, but to the irksome life of a slave, uncheered by the voice of kindness or the hope of pardon or reprieve. Let the alternative be presented to any member of the community, be he brave or timid, good or bad, believer or infidel, he would prefer death to the entire and irremediable loss of liberty. And more especially, would those who are hardened in iniquity, who think little of their accountability, of a judgment to come and an eternity, and who by long familiarity with danger have grown reckless of life, make this choice.

Thus have we shown, as we hope to the satisfaction of our readers, that, as far as the prevention of future crime is the object of punishment, punishment by death does not effect that object so surely as perpetual imprisonment would. The limits of the present article will not permit us to dwell upon the less prominent arguments employed by the advocates of capital punishment; and we therefore proceed, *secondly*, to consider some of the most weighty *objections against this mode of punishment.*

The first that we shall mention is, that it inflicts unnecessary pain and disgrace upon the friends of the criminal. They are not accountable for his sins. If they are virtuous, their feelings should be regarded with tenderness. If they are vicious, they will sooner or later suffer sufficiently from the consequences of their own guilt; and they may be made worse by the idea that their name and family are irretrievably disgraced by the public infamy of their relative. Now, the kindred of the murderer cannot be spared a great deal of shame and sorrow. But, if he be put to death, the utmost

intensity of feeling is called forth. Who can fathom the depth of that anguish which pervades the soul of the father, mother, or sister of the wretched victim of the gallows! Who can tell how keen a sense of shame cleaves to such a family, when they have cast off their weeds and emerged from their sad solitude! How must the idea that their voices, their countenances, their names, their abode, recall to the minds of others their guilty son or brother, follow them wherever they go, and embitter all their social intercourse! How frequently must the recurrence of domestic eras and of long-familiar sights and sounds recall his image, and with it the day of his execution and the horrors of that day! Such remembrances would haunt them through life, and would not improbably cleave to the family for more than one generation. But, if the murderer were simply imprisoned, there would be no moment when the sympathy and sorrow of his relatives would be so intensely called forth, — none in which his name and family would be put to such open shame. His kindred would indeed suffer in his sufferings; but would derive much consolation from the thought that he was not to be put entirely out of the reach of their kindness, and especially that he was yet to be allowed time for repentance and reformation. They would feel themselves disgraced in his disgrace; but not permanently or irretrievably. He has not been hung up between heaven and earth as a spectacle to the whole community, his knell has not been tolled, his dying speech has not been vended, his black-trimmed obituary has not been printed, his funeral sermon has not been preached; and they might hope that the remembrance of his crime or the thoughts of his existence would in a few months pass away, and leave them to hold up their heads among their fellows, and to enjoy unblushingly the honors and the pleasures of social life.

Another great objection to capital punishment is, that there is no unexceptionable mode of execution. Public executions are now generally admitted to be of the most deleterious moral tendency. They are regarded by the vulgar and vicious as edifying spectacles. The gallows is always surrounded by the means of dissipation, and of low and gross vice. In England, it is no uncommon thing for the very same crime for which one man is hanging on the gallows, to be committed by others at its very foot. And in our country

few public executions take place at which pockets are not picked, — none at which there are not loud complaints of profaneness and intoxication. And how could it be otherwise in a crowd of many thousands, the majority of whom are either adepts or pupils in the school of vice? It has been proposed to substitute for public, private execution in the criminal's cell, in the presence of none except the ministers of justice. But this would open the door to the greatest abuses, and, in a community like our own, would never be tolerated; for publicity is the genius of our government, and secrecy of operation in every department is abhorred by it. It has been recently proposed in our legislature to draw from the jury boxes of the county, whenever a criminal is to be executed, fifty men who shall be witnesses of the execution. But few *respectable* men would, for a juryman's slender compensation, witness such a solemnity, unless there were a legal provision for compelling their attendance; and a government, by compelling attendance upon such scenes, would wage war with feelings of humanity, which it would be their best policy to cherish.

Another objection to capital punishment, especially to its public infliction, is, that it has in numerous instances encouraged suicide. A man, who has long been dissatisfied with life, and has wished yet feared to rid himself of its burden, is encouraged by the sight or report of an execution, of the apparent ease of the mode of death, and the tranquillity and fortitude of the sufferer. The tragedy of death appears less awful than before, and he nerves himself to commit a rash deed which before he had not dared to do. The statistics of crime for the last century would bear us out in the assertion that, in different countries and at different periods, the number of suicides has been very nearly in proportion to the number of public executions. In England the infliction of death by hanging takes place, on an average, oftener than once a week; and suicides in the same mode are there shockingly frequent. In our country, hardly an execution takes place, which is not followed by one or more instances of suicide, under such circumstances as show the latter to have been induced by the former. Any file of newspapers will furnish cases in point.

But a most weighty objection to capital punishment is yet to be mentioned. *It leaves no opportunity for correcting*

mistakes and reversing wrong decisions. It disables the criminal from appealing anew to justice, if any new evidence transpire to cast a doubt upon his guilt or to prove his innocence. As we have before observed, murder is seldom perpetrated in the immediate presence of witnesses, and is almost always to be proved on circumstantial evidence, which at best does not amount to certainty, and has in some instances been indubitable in the public mind, when the innocence of the person condemned by it has been subsequently made manifest. Even the confession of a person on trial or under sentence has sometimes proved a false one. In the memorable Salem delusion many were hung for ***witchcraft*** on their own confession. In England, in several instances, men have been hung on their own confession for the murder of persons, who have afterwards appeared, or whose real murderers have been subsequently brought to justice. In Vermont, not many years ago, a man was condemned to death, on the strongest circumstantial evidence, ***corroborated by his own confession,*** for the murder of a man then missing, but who re-appeared on the day before that appointed for the execution. The uncertainty even of the strongest circumstantial evidence may be well illustrated by the following, which purports to be an authentic narrative. In an Italian city, several years ago, a young nobleman walked out early in the evening, without his sword. He saw, as he passed, a curiously wrought silver scabbard, which he picked up and put in his own belt, thinking to find an owner for it. He walked on rapidly from the spot. He was soon overtaken by police officers, who stopped him to examine his person, found that he carried an empty scabbard, and applied to it a bloody dagger, which one of them held in his hand. The dagger fitted, and its workmanship corresponded in every particular with that of the scabbard. No similar dagger or scabbard could be found in the whole city. A wealthy and unpopular citizen had just been murdered at his own door, and the dagger was found in his body. The possessor of the scabbard was, in the minds of all, undoubtedly the murderer. His own story seemed improbable to the court, and he was condemned and executed. Several months after, a hired assassin was arrested in the very act of stabbing a man; and while under sentence of death for this assassination, confessed several other murders, and among others this, for

which the young nobleman had suffered. We know not how frequently cases of this kind may occur among us; but we do know, that in our country men not unfrequently declare on the gallows, at the awful moment of death, their entire innocence of the crime for which they suffer. And who can say but that in some, nay, in many instances, this declaration has been sincere and true? Now, in this point of view, the law which annexes capital punishment to murder may inflict an injustice for which there is neither remedy nor redress. But if imprisonment for life be the penalty attached to murder, then, whenever new circumstances or witnesses favorable to the prisoner were brought to light, a new trial might be ordered, and if sufficient ground appeared, he might be honorably acquitted by a jury similar to that which had convicted him. To be sure, the months or years which he had spent in prison could not be restored to him; but his time might in a moral point of view have been profitably spent, he might receive a pecuniary recompense for the loss of his labor to his family, and return to them with better habits and principles and a clear character.

Having thus discussed the arguments of those who advocate capital punishment for murder, and offered our own objections to it, we proceed, in the *third* place, briefly to state some of the *positive advantages which the plan of confining murderers to hard labor for life would have over that of putting them to death.*

And the first that we shall name is, that the imprisoned murderer might become a useful member of society. "It has long since been observed," says Voltaire,* "that a man after he is hung, is good for nothing, and that punishment, invented for the good of society, ought to be useful to society. It is evident," continues he, "that a score of stout robbers, condemned for life to some public work, would serve the state in their punishment; and that hanging them is a benefit to nobody but the executioner." Now there are various purposes to which the proceeds of the murderer's labor might be advantageously devoted. They might be employed for the support of his own family, for the assistance of the family whom his violence had bereaved, or for some object of public charity, such as the relief of impris-

* Commentary on Beccaria on Crimes and Punishments. Chap. X.

oned debtors or the support of state paupers. Or his industry might be exerted without compensation in works of public utility.

The advantages of thus employing the industry of convicts seem to have been early perceived. We quote from Diodorus Siculus * the following account of one of the early kings of Egypt. "One Sabach, an Ethiopian, came to the throne, who went far beyond his predecessors in his worship of the gods and his kindness to his subjects. Any man may judge of his gentle disposition by this, that, where the law pronounced the severest judgment, I mean sentence of death, he changed the punishment, and made an edict, that the condemned should be kept at work in the city in chains, by whose labor he raised many mounds and made many commodious canals."

Again, punishment by perpetual imprisonment to hard labor is a *less severe* punishment than death. And here we may be accused of inconsistency, as we have already stated our belief that the *prospect* of this punishment would be more terrible than that of death, and would more surely deter men from the commission of crime. But these two propositions are perfectly consistent with each other; and herein lies one of the strongest reasons for preferring punishment by imprisonment, namely, that it is far more terrible in prospect than in reality. And why is this? He who looks forward to a life of forced and monotonous labor, attempts to form an idea of the aggregate suffering of years, while the prisoner feels only the restraint or fatigue of each moment as it passes. He who contemplates the prisoner, thinks of his sufferings in the abstract, in their severest and unmitigated form, while the prisoner himself has found his burden lightened by habit, and has discovered in his cheerless abode some, perhaps many, sources of enjoyment. In fact, men confined under such circumstances would, under a humane government, possess many of the comforts of life. They would have better food, better clothing, better shelter, than most of them could have *honestly* obtained, or had *uniformly* enjoyed, when at large. They would lead a life which, according to the reports of our own state-prison, is to an unprecedented degree favorable

* Bibliotheca Historica, Lib. I.

to health. While they were treated with a sufficient degree of severity to render their prison an undesirable place, they would still be regarded as men, with human sensibilities, emotions, and wants, and with strong claims upon the compassion of their fellow-men. Confinement without hope of release is indeed a terrible penalty; but the human mind is endowed with a wonderful elasticity, by which it can accommodate itself to every mode of existence. Long-continued calamity ceases to be felt as such. To one who knows that a little cell is henceforth to be all the world to him, that cell becomes a world, — the very spiders and flies that people it become companions and objects of intense interest and sympathy. While no space is too large for man's ambition, none is too small to furnish him room for mental action, to gratify his affections, and to afford comfort and enjoyment. And thus the imprisonment which we would propose for the murderer, while it would be terrible in prospect, grievous in its commencement, would, through the power of habit, daily become less and less irksome; so that the prisoner would be at the same time kept from doing farther mischief, held up as a frightful example to those who would fain be his followers in iniquity, and placed where the intensity of his sufferings would be constantly decreasing, and his few sources of enjoyment increasing.

The last advantage of this mode of punishment that we shall mention is that it allows the criminal opportunity to reform and to prepare for death. And this with Christian legislators should be a most weighty consideration. Whether the murderer live a few days more or less, whether he suffer a little more or less anguish, is of small moment compared with the inquiry, whether he shall be hurried into eternity from the midst of his iniquity, or whether he shall be allowed, remote from temptation, to form and cherish, if he will, good resolutions and principles, to receive instruction concerning his highest interests, and to acquire Christian trust and hope. We have little confidence in the Christian character formed between the sentencing and the execution of a criminal. That brief interval, with so awful a catastrophe in near prospect, is no time for discharging a work which demands the concentrated energies of the soul, and for which the longest life is not too long. Now the punishment which we would have substituted for that of death, would allow

its subjects the usual period of human life as a season of preparation for eternity. It would remove them from the solicitations of sin. It would cut them off from the society of their former companions in guilt, and would restrict or prevent (as is done in several state-prisons in our country) their intercourse with each other. Their reformation would be one of its prime ends, an end, the accomplishment of which, in numerous instances, we doubt not that eternity would attest. And for this reason, if for no other, might the proposed change commend itself to every Christian philanthropist.

If the reasoning of the preceding pages have been in the main correct, we are prepared to acquiesce in the conclusion that it is inexpedient to punish murder capitally; and to pass to the consideration of our third question.

III. Are there any cases in which it is expedient to inflict capital punishment?

We answer that, in a time of peace and public tranquillity, and among the regular members of a community, there are no such cases. But there may be offences against *military* discipline and good faith, which no other punishment can effectually prevent. The ringleaders of a mutiny in an army self-defence would require the officers to punish in this way. Desertion for fear of death in a hazardous service could be prevented only by making death the penalty for it. And in fine, constant subordination being indispensable among troops on actual duty, it may be generally necessary to punish capitally great or long-continued insubordination. But the taking of life by martial law should not be regarded as equitable in the abstract, — as a penalty in strict justice proportioned to the heinousness of the offence. Nor should the offending soldier be put to death under circumstances of disgrace or ignominy. But he should be regarded in the same light with the invading or invaded enemy, as one who has himself done nothing to merit the death which he is made to suffer, but whose destruction, in the unfortunate exigency of the case, the law of self-preservation requires. It must indeed be regarded as one of the most lamentable circumstances attending the unnatural state of war, that the governments engaged in it are obliged for a time to place a portion of their citizens out of the jurisdiction of equity and law, and under the arbitrary control of perhaps the least humane and honest of their

fellow-citizens. And this circumstance, if no other, should lead the philanthropist to wish ardently for the arrival of the day, when Christianity shall have accomplished its benevolent design of establishing peace upon earth.

Some cases of *treason* may also demand capital punishment. If a man, though deprived of liberty have such power and connexions as to endanger the public safety, — if his mere existence is perilous to the community, it is right that he should be put to death. Thus the Bourbon family, after their second restoration to the throne of France, would have been justified (if the British government had permitted it) in procuring the death of Napoleon in his rocky prison at St. Helena. He had once emerged from a place of actual, if not nominal, confinement, and usurped their quietly reëstablished government. He had shown them that to conquer, disarm, and banish him, was not to deprive him of his power. He had connexions who were capable of making interest for him as long as he lived, and who in the hope of reinstating him in power, and themselves through him, would strive to the utmost to produce a revolution in his favor. He had numerous friends in all parts of the kingdom, and among all ranks of the citizens, to whom in any season of political excitement his very name would be a watch-word, and the mere idea that he was in the land of the living a rallying point. His death, then, could the Bourbons have procured it, would have been for the stability of their government, and the welfare of their subjects. This, we know, is an extreme case. But in every civil commotion, in every insurrection, there is commonly some leader, whose popularity has excited and cherished it, whose apprehension and confinement would only inflame the minds of his followers still more and produce an attempt at rescue, and whose very existence would prevent the return of that tranquillity which his death would at once restore. And in such a case, it would be expedient to sacrifice the leader to the safety of the followers, and to the public quiet. But let him not be put to an *ignominious* death; for he may not deserve it. He may have gained his influence by splendid talents and virtues. He may have wielded it in a cause which *he* thinks just, in favor of an innovation which *he* thinks that the public good demands, or against practices or laws which *he* thinks oppressive. At any rate his crime is not one which *necessarily*

implies moral turpitude. Let him then be *sacrificed* rather than punished.

We have thus completed the plan which we sketched at the commencement of this article; and now beg leave to offer in a summary form our opinion on the whole subject.

1. It is inexpedient to punish capitally aggressions upon property unattended by murder. These should be punished by imprisonment, in duration and severity in each instance apportioned to the heinousness of the offence.

2. It is inexpedient to punish murder capitally. But this should be punished by imprisonment for life to hard labor without the possibility of pardon. And it would be well, we think, to punish the murderer still farther by making him civilly dead, that is, by dissolving the matrimonial contract, and letting his goods pass through the hands of an administrator to his heirs, as if he were actually dead.

3. Capital punishment should be inflicted only upon soldiers guilty of heinous offences against military discipline, and upon popular and influential ring-leaders in civil commotions and rebellions, and in these cases not as an ignominious punishment, but as an act of social self-defence.

In preparing the foregoing remarks, we have of course made free use of the labors of others. We would particularly express our obligations to the Committee of the House of Representatives for the able Report placed at the head of this article, and to the gentleman whose name stands the second on this Committee for a series of papers in "The Salem Gazette," in which he contends, with characteristic simplicity and force, for the entire abolition of capital punishment. If this cause, of the excellence of which we are fully convinced, shall be in any measure advanced by our present labors, we shall feel that they are amply rewarded.

ART. IV. — *Poems*, by Miss H. F. GOULD. Second Edition, with Additions. Boston. Hilliard, Gray, & Co. 1833. 18mo. pp. 224.

IT is impossible to find fault with Miss Gould's poetry. It is so sweet and unpretending, so pure in purpose and so

gentle in expression, that criticism is disarmed of all severity, and engaged to say nothing of it but good. It is poetry for a sober, quiet, kindly-affectioned, Christian heart. It is poetry for a united family circle, in their hours of peace and leisure. For such companionship it was made, and into such it will find, and has found, its way.

The pieces contained in this volume, as is common in collections of the kind, are of various degrees of merit. They were brought together by near friends of the author, who could not part lightly with any production of her pen, nor select with the coolness of indifferent persons, from the whole number before them. We cannot blame them for this, but rather yield them our sympathy, because we feel that under similar circumstances we should do the same.

A great proportion of these pieces are remarkable for presenting a single impressive thought or incident in a succession of natural lights, and leaving an undivided moral effect on the mind of the reader. What a touching picture of a solitary midnight occupation, is presented in the following lines.

"THE ROBE.

"'T was not the robe of state,
Which the high and the haughty wear,
That my busy hand, as the lamp burnt late,
Was hastening to prepare.

"It had no clasp of gold,
No diamond's dazzling blaze
For the festive board; nor the graceful fold
To float in the dance's maze.

"'T was not to wrap the breast,
With gladness light and warm,
For the bride's attire — for the joyous guest;
Nor to clothe the sufferer's form.

"'T was not the garb of woe
To conceal an aching heart,
When our eyes with bitter tears o'erflow,
And our dearest ones depart.

"'T was what we all must bear
To the cold, the lonely bed!

'T was the spotless uniform they wear
In the chambers of the dead!

"I saw a fair, young maid
In the snowy vesture drest;
So pure, she looked as one arrayed
For the mansions of the blest.

"A smile had left its trace
On her lip, at the parting breath,
And the beauty in that lovely face
Was fixed with the seal of death!"

The same character belongs to the piece entitled "The Empty Bird's-Nest."

"And thou, my sad, little, lonely nest,
Hast oft been sought as the peaceful rest
Of a weary wing and a guiltless breast!
But where is thy builder now?
And what has become of the helpless brood,
For which the mother, with daily food,
Came flitting so light, through the spicy wood,
To her home on the waving bough?

"The fowler, perhaps, has hurled the dart,
Which the parent bird has received in her heart;
And her tender orphans are scattered apart,
So wide, they never again
In thy warm, soft cell of love can meet,
And thou hast been filled with the snow and the sleet,
By the hail and the winds have thy sides been beat,
And drenched by the pitiless rain.

"Though great was the toil which thy building cost,
With thy fibres so neatly coiled and crossed,
And thy lining of down, thou art lorn and lost,
A ruin beyond repair;
So I 'll take thee down, as I would not see
Such a sorrowful sight on the gay green tree;
And when I have torn thee, thy parts shall be
Like thy tenants, dispersed in air.

"Thou hast made me to think of each heart-woven tie;
Of the child's first home, and of her, whose eye
Watched fondly o'er those, who were reared to die
Where the grave of a distant shore
Received to its bosom the strangers' clay;

For when, as thy birds, they had passed away,
'T was not to return, and the mother and they
In time were to meet no more!"

The next specimen which we shall offer, is, though shorter, still better. It is the versification of an incident which has occurred in many a family, and will occur again and again. Miss Gould has judged well in uttering it in simple words; for any thing different from simplicity would have spoiled it. It will cause not a few parents to sigh deeply — perhaps, to weep.

"THE PLAYTHINGS.

"'Oh! mother, here's the very top,
That brother used to spin;
The vase with seeds I 've seen him drop
To call our robin in;
The line that held his pretty kite,
His bow, his cup and ball,
The slate on which he learned to write,
His feather, cap, and all!'

"'My dear, I 'd put the things away
Just where they were before:
Go, Anna, take him out to play,
And shut the closet door.
Sweet innocent! he little thinks
The slightest thought expressed,
Of him that 's lost, too deeply sinks
Within a mother's breast!'"

There are some pieces in the volume, of a gayer character than those we have extracted, and they are happily executed. But in so short a notice as this, we do not feel disposed to fly "from grave to gay," and shall therefore leave our readers under the impression of the feelings which the general tone of this book is calculated to inspire.

ART. V.—"*The District School as it was*, by ONE, WHO WENT TO IT." Boston. Carter, Hendee, & Co. 1833. 12mo. pp. 156.

WE hope and trust this little book will be extensively read. If not, it will be for some reason besides its want of merit. One merit, and this is among the very rarest, it certainly has; that of effecting precisely what it undertakes. It undertakes to picture the District School. And the District School, both without and within, both in its unity and in its variety, both in its principal and in its accessory ideas, stands right before us. We see, we have seen a thousand times, that old, weather-stained, crazy building, with its slamming blinds, and its curiously diversified windows, apparently contrived, by wooden, cracked, and puttied panes, to prevent too large and direct an influx of light, the "District School as it was" not rejoicing in excess of light. We hear the continuous, bee-like hum of its swarming inmates. Our childhood is back upon us. Its giddiness is in our brain; its recklessness is in our heart; its vitality is leaping along every nerve, and whirling through every vein. We are again "reading," at the top of our voice, in utter defiance of emphasis, intonation, cadence, and such like antiquated prejudices. We are spelling "abomination," a tin medal being about our neck. We are battling sturdily, but with blows as aimless as old blind Polypheme's, with the "Parts of Speech." Our arm aches with long holding at full length the heavy Bible;—a not very wisely selected instrument of punishment, though often and variously used in old times. Our hand is blushing with the ferula's kiss. We are rolling and tumbling in the snow. We are on fire with the excitement of a snow-ball fight. In a word, the work of years is undone in a moment;—our hard-earned experience has slipped from our grasp;—and we are again that drollest of all droll things, that museum of all oddities, that incarnation of all angles, and twists, and crooks, that most care-free, uproarious, and happy creature, a country school-boy.

Our author is no copyist. His descriptions are not dim, spiritless imitations of some lifeless foreign original. His language is forcible, picturesque, and *his own*. It lets the thought shine through it, without rounding off one corner, or

smoothing out one wrinkle, or straightening a single crook. Rural life here is not a shrub sickly and pining at its removal from its native earth. It is thriving and vigorous, its native soil clinging to its roots, not one branch dead, not one leaf withered.

There is, indeed, a class of critics, who will be likely sometimes to take offence at our author's phraseology; — I mean that sapient class, who think Homer's similes vulgar, because they speak of sheep and kine; — or Edmund Burke guilty of bad taste, because he so often draws illustrations from the mechanic arts; — or the Old Testament writings unrefined, because so full of rural sights and sounds. Such critics may possibly quarrel with our author's phraseology for the very thing we particularly like it for; namely, that sprinkling of rusticity, which sets off so aptly the subject treated. To have spoken of the homely objects here brought before us in the silken language of the album, would have been casing a raw country boy in the full dress of a city exquisite.

This book is wonderful for its exactness of truth. We could almost hold up our hand in court, in testimony that we had ourselves been actors in all its scenes. Every graduate of a country school, who takes it up, will, unless we mistake, find it not easy to lay it down, until he has completed its perusal. And the city-born and city-bred, who would know just what rural life is, had better read this book with all convenient despatch.

It may be thought we should offer some specimens in justification of our encomiums, which, being representatives of our feelings, have not, we admit, been very stinted. We have no great opinion of specimens in general, and more especially in the case of a book like this, so much of the value of which consists in little nice touches, which, separate from their connexion, make but an indifferent show. However, in compliance with custom, we will cite one passage, to the verisimilitude of which, by the way, our own experience can bear witness.

Abijah Wilkins was a "surly, saucy, profane, and truthless" boy. He had, for years, been a thorn in the side of successive schoolmasters. Mr. Johnson, this winter's master, had been apprized of this boy's little pleasant peculiarities, and was prepared for them.

"Well, the afternoon of the first day, Abijah thrust a pin into a boy beside him, which made him suddenly cry out with the sharp pain. The sufferer was questioned, Abijah was accused, and found guilty. The master requested James Clark to go to his room and bring a rattan he would find there, as if the formidable ferula was unequal to the present exigency. James came with a rattan very long and very elastic, as if it had been selected from a thousand, not to walk with, but to whip. Then he ordered all the blinds next to the road to be closed. He then said, 'Abijah, come this way.' He came. 'The school may shut their books and suspend their studies a few minutes. Abijah, take off your frock, fold it up, lay it on the seat behind you.' Abijah obeyed these several commands with sullen tardiness. Here, a boy up towards the back seat burst out with a sort of shuddering laugh produced by a nervous excitement he could not control. 'Silence,' said the master, with a thunder, and a stamp on the floor, that made the house quake. All was as still as midnight. Not a foot moved, not a seat cracked, not a book rustled. The school seemed to be appalled. The expression of every countenance was changed. Some were unnaturally pale, some flushed, and eighty distended and moistening eyes were fastened on the scene. The awful expectation was too much for one poor girl. 'May I go home?' she whined with an imploring and terrified look. A single cast from the countenance of authority crushed the trembler down into her seat again. A tremulous sigh escaped from one of the larger girls, then all was breathlessly still again. 'Take off your jacket also, Abijah. Fold it and lay it on your frock." Mr. Johnson then took his chair and set it away at the farthest distance the floor would permit, as if all the space that could be had would be necessary for the operations about to take place. He then took the rattan, and seemed to examine it closely, drew it through his hand, bent it almost double, laid it down again. He then took off his own coat, folded it up, and laid it on the desk. Abijah's breast then heaved like a bellows, his limbs began to tremble, and his face was like a sheet. The master now took the rattan in his right hand, and the criminal by the collar with his left, his large knuckles pressing hard against the shoulder of the boy. He raised the stick high over the shrinking back. Then O what a screech! Had the rod fallen? No, it still remained suspended in the air. 'O,—I wont do so agin,—I'll *never* do so agin,—O,—O,—don't,—I *will* be good,—sartinly will!' The threatening instrument of pain was gently taken from its elevation. The master spoke. 'You promise, do you?' 'Yis, Sir,—O, yis, Sir.' The tight grasp was

withdrawn from the collar. 'Put on your frock and jacket and go to your seat. The rest of you may open your books again.' The school breathed again. Paper rustled, feet were carefully moved, the seats slightly cracked, and all things went stilly on as before. Abijah kept his promise. He became an altered boy; obedient, peaceable, studious. This long and slow process of preparing for the punishment was artfully designed by the master gradually to work up the boy's terrors and agonizing expectations to the highest pitch, until he should yield like a babe to the intensity of his emotions. His stubborn nature, which had been like an oak on the hills which no storm could prostrate, was whittled away, and demolished, as it were, sliver by sliver."

This we call pictorial writing; and if it does not tempt our readers to go straightway and get the book, it is pretty clear that we cannot prevail on them to do so.

ART. VI.—1. *A Complete History of the several Translations of the Holy Bible and New Testament into English, both in MS. and in print; and of the most remarkable Editions of them since the Invention of Printing.* By JOHN LEWIS, A. M. The Third Edition. To which is now added, *a List of various Editions of the Bible, and Parts thereof, in English, from the Year* 1526 *to the Present Time*, extracted from Bishop NEWCOME's "Historical View of the English Biblical Translations"; with *a Continuation* by Another Hand. London: 1818. 8vo. pp. 415.

2. *The Existing Monopoly, an Inadequate Protection of the Authorized Version of Scripture. Four Letters to the Right Hon. and Right Rev. the Lord Bishop of London; with Specimens of the intentional and other Departures from the Authorized Standard.* To which is added *a Postscript, containing the Complaints of a London Committee of Ministers on the subject; the Reply of the Universities; and a Report on the Importance of the Alterations made.* By THOMAS CURTIS, of Grove House, Islington, Secretary to the Committee. London: 1833. 8vo. pp. 115.

3. *Oxford Bibles.* An Article published in "The British Magazine" for March, 1833. — Mr. Curtis's *Misrepresentations Exposed.* 8vo. pp. 19.

The people of this country are as much interested in whatever relates to King James's Bible, as the people of England. It is the authorized, or at least the generally received and accredited version of the Scriptures, wherever the English language is spoken. In England and most of its dependencies, and in this country, it is looked upon, not so much as a translation of the Bible, as the Bible itself. Mr. Curtis's pamphlet mentioned above, and Mr. Cardwell's tract on the "Oxford Bibles," contain much curious information respecting the present state of the text of this version, and the changes it has undergone since its first publication in 1611. We propose to spread this information before our readers; but as the subject has not been much attended to in this country, we have thought it would be well to introduce it here with a pretty full account, chiefly historical and bibliographical, of the version itself, and the principal English versions by which it was preceded.

The common authorities on the subject are, Lewis's "Complete History of the Translations of the Holy Bible and New Testament into English," which we have set at the head of this article, Johnson's "Account of the several English Translations of the Bible," and Archbishop Newcome's "Historical View of the English Biblical Translations." Lewis's work is particularly valuable for its references and citations; but on all questions of taste or criticism his judgment is entitled to but little weight. Johnson's account, though often adduced as an authority, and honored with a place among Bishop Watson's "Theological Tracts," is not only meagre and unsatisfactory, but full of inaccuracies. Newcome relied for his historical information almost wholly on Lewis, whom he often copies word for word.

Fox, the martyrologist, in the Dedication to his edition of the Four Gospels in Saxon, published in 1571, says, — that "our countryman Bede did translate the whole Bible in the Saxon tounge; that he translated againe the gospell of St. John in the English tounge a little before his departure: that K. Alfrede translated both the olde and the newe Testament

into his own native language: and that if Histories be well examined, we shall finde both before the Conquest and after, as well before John Wickliffe was borne as since, the whole body of Scriptures by sondry men translated into thys our country tounge; insomuch, that Thomas Arundell, then Archbyshop of Yorke and Chauncellour of England, at the funeral sermon of Queene Anne, who dyed 1394, as Polidore seith, did avouch, that she had the Gospells in the vulgare tounge with divers expositors upon the same, which she sent unto hym to be viewed and examined." Mr. Lewis shows very satisfactorily, that by Fox's "English tounge" we are here to understand the Anglo-Saxon, and that Queen Anne's Gospels were in this language, and not in English as it began to be spoken and written after the Conquest.

Sir Thomas More refers repeatedly in his Dialogues to the translations, "that were already well done of old before Wiclif's daies," and says expressly that "the hole byble was longe byfore his daies by vertuouse and wel-learned men translated into the englysh tongue, and by good and godly people with devotion and soberness wel and reverently red." It is also observed in a Prologue, printed as Wiclif's in 1550, and said to be taken from a manuscript Bible then in the King's Chamber, that "the common latine bibles had more need to be corrected than had the english bible lately translated." On these authorities Lingard,* Charles Butler,† and others hold, that several versions of the sacred writings had been made into English, properly so called, by Catholic hands, and were already in circulation, before Wiclif's was undertaken. Others, among whom we may mention, as of the highest authority on this question, Lewis,‡ Baber, § and Vaughan, ‖ incline to the opinion, that More must have intended Anglo-Saxon Bibles, or that he mistook the antiquity of some of the English Bibles extant in his time, or that he referred to English versions of parts of the Bible. "If,"

* History of England, Vol. IV. p. 267, English Edition.

† Memoirs of the English Catholics, Vol. I. p. 221. Butler makes More say, in the extract given above, "the whole Bible," instead of "the hole (holy?) byble."

‡ History of English Translations of the Bible, p. 44.

§ Historical Account of the Saxon and English versions of the Scriptures, previous to the Opening of the Fifteenth Century. Prefixed to his edition of Wiclif's New Testament.

‖ Life of Wycliffe, Vol. II. p. 42.

says Lewis, "this were indeed so, that there were old English Bibles before Wiclif's time; or that before any such translation was made by him, the Bible was by some other person translated into the English spoken here since the Conquest, and that the Bibles so translated were allowed by the Constitution to be used and read, it seems a little strange, that there are none of them now remaining, when we have so many of Wiclif's, notwithstanding the zealous endeavours of the Catholic folk to destroy them." As for the Prologue above quoted, it is now generally, if not universally, agreed, that it is not Wiclif's, but written by one of his disciples and followers, and prefixed to a revised edition of his version. "The english bible lately translated," to which the writer refers, was probably that made a few years before by Wiclif himself.

Parts of the Bible had been translated, manuscripts of which still remain, the oldest being "the Sauter that Richard hermyte of Hampole translated into englyshe after the sentence of doctours and resoun." This is an English version of the Psalms, with a comment on each verse, by Richard Rolle, a hermit of the order of St. Augustine, known by the title of Richard of Hampole, from his residence in a nunnery of that name, near Doncaster. The author, who died in 1349, says in the Prologue, "In this werke I seke no straunge Ynglys, bot lightest and communest, and swilk that is most like unto the Latyne: so that thai that knawes noght the Latyne be the Ynglys may com to many Latyne wordis. In the Translacione I felogh the letter als-mekille as I may, and thor I fyne no proper Ynglys I felogh the wit of the wordis, so that thai that shalle rede it them thar not drede errynge. In the expownyng I felogh holi Doctors." The following is a specimen of this Psalter, as given by Mr. Lewis.

"*Here bigynneth the Sauter. Psalmus primus.* Beatus vir.—In this psalme he spekith of crist and his folewris blaundishyng to us, bihotyng blisfulhede to rightwise men. Sithen he speketh of veniaunce of wikkede men that thei drede peyne, sith thei wolle not loue ioye. He begynneth at the goode man and seith, *Blessed is that man the whuche ghede not in the counsel of wikede, and the wey of synfule stood not, and in the chayer of pestilence satte not.*"

There is also in Bennet College in Cambridge a manu-

script translation, with a comment, of the Gospels of Mark and Luke, and the Epistles of Paul, which, as it contains no reflections on the Friars and Catholic prelates usually found in the writings of Wiclif and his followers, was probably made before his time. A few specimens of this version have been furnished by Dr. Waterland, from which we copy the following.

Mark i. 7. "And He prechyde sayande, a stalworther thane I schal come eftar me of whom I am not worthi downfallande, or knelande, to louse the thwonge of his chawcers.

vi. 22. "When the Doughtyr of that Herodias was in-comyn and had tombylde and pleside to Harowde, and also to the sittande at mete, the kynge says to the wench."

John Wiclif was born in a small village near the town of Richmond in Yorkshire, about the year 1324, and died in his own Rectory of Lutterworth in the Diocess of Lincoln, December 31, 1384. His translation, the first, we believe, that was made of the whole Bible into English for popular use, appears, from a reference to it in one of Wiclif's own Homilies, to have been finished and published some time before 1381. Knyghton, Canon of Leicester, a neighbour and cotemporary, complains in his work *De Eventibus Angliæ*, "that by this means the Gospel was made vulgar, and laid more open to the laity, and even to women who could read, than it used to be to the most learned of the clergy, and those of the best understanding: and so the gospel jewel or evangelical pearl was thrown about and trodden under foot of swine. "Algates," says Wiclif in the Homily above referred to, speaking of the ecclesiastics generally of his day, "they dyspysen that men shulden knowe Chryste's lyfe, for thenne prestes schulden schome of hyre lyves, and specially these hye prestes, for thei reversen *crist* both in worde and in dede." But from his own account it would seem that in other quarters his Bible met with a better reception. "On coumfort is of knyghtes that they saveren muche the gospel, and have wylle to rede in englysche the gospel of *crist's* lyf." It is in allusion to this fact that Lingard, the Catholic historian, says: "Wiclif made a new translation, multiplied the copies with the aid of transcribers, and by his 'poor priests' recommended it to the perusal of their hearers. In their hands it became an engine of wonderful power. Men were flattered by the appeal to their

private judgment: the new doctrines insensibly acquired partisans and protectors in the higher classes, who alone were acquainted with the use of letters; a spirit of inquiry was generated; and the seeds were sown of that religious revolution which in little more than a century astonished and convulsed the nations of Europe." *

Wiclif's Bible is a servile translation of the Vulgate, as will appear in one or two passages here given in illustration of its general merits.

Matthew v. 1 – 10. "And Jhesus seynge the people, went up into an hil; and whanne he was sett, his disciplis camin to him. And he openyde his mouthe, and taughte hem; and seide, Blessid be pore men in spirit; for the kyngdom of hevenes is herun. Blessid ben mylde men: for thei schulen weelde the erthe. Blessid ben thei that mournen; for thei schal be coumfortid. Blessid be thei that hungren and thirsten rigtwisnesse: for thei schal be fulfilled. Blessid ben merciful men: for thei schul gete mercy. Blessid ben thei that ben of clene herte: for thei schulen se god. Blessid ben pesible men: for thei schulen be clepid goddis children. Blessid ben thei that suffren persicucioun for rightwisnesse: for the kyngdom of hevenes is hern."

1 Corinthians, xiii. 9 – 13. "For aparti we knowen, and aparti we profecien, but whanne that schal come that is parfyt, that thing that is of parti schal be avoidid. whanne I was a litil child I spak as a litil child, I understood as a litil child, I thoughte as a litil child; but whanne I was maade a man I voidide the thingis that weren of a litil child. and we seen now by a myrour in derknesse, but thanne face to face. now I knowe of parti, but thanne I schal know as I am knowun. and now dwellen feith, hope and charite these thre, but the moost of these is charite."

Though attempts were made soon afterwards to suppress and destroy this version, manuscript copies of it are still frequently to be met with in England, not only in the public libraries, but in private collections. The New Testament was printed for the first time in 1731 by the Rev. John Lewis, already repeatedly referred to in this review as the author of the "Complete History of English Translations of the Bible;" and again in 1810 by the Rev. Henry Hervey

* History of England. English 8vo edition, Vol. IV. p. 267. The views taken by this eminent writer of Wiclif, and the controversies in which he engaged, deserve particular attention.

Baber, Assistant Librarian of the British Museum. Wiclif's version of the Old Testament has never been printed, but we are happy to learn from the Preface to Mr. Le Bas's Life of Wiclif, published the last year, that the Rev. J. Forshall and F. Madden, Esq., both Librarians of the British Museum, are now preparing the same for the Clarendon Press.

The first English translation of the Bible, or of any considerable part of it, purporting to be made from the original, and the first actually printed, was the New Testament by William Tyndal, in 1526. This bold and enterprising reformer was born somewhere in Wales, and educated at Oxford, and afterwards passed some time at Cambridge, and went from that place into the family of a gentleman of Gloucestershire in the capacity of private tutor to his children. It may serve to give some idea of the low state of Greek learning in England at this time to know, that it was accounted an extraordinary thing that Tyndal, after such opportunities of study, was able to translate an oration of Isocrates. Strongly inclined to the reformation, which already had made so much progress in Germany, he "perceived by experience," to borrow his own words, "how that it was impossible to stablish the lay-people in any truth, except the Scripture were plainly laid before their eyes in their mother-tongue, that they might see the processe, order, and meaning of the text." Being unable to do this in his own country, he went over to Antwerp in the Netherlands, and there, with the assistance of John Fry [or Fryth], and William Roye, finished and printed, in the year above named, his translation of the New Testament. "It was printed," says Lewis, "without a name, in a middling octavo volume, and without either calendar, concordances in the margin, or table in the end, as George Joye tells us. At the end of it Tyndal added a pistil, in which he 'desyred them that were learned to amende if ought were founde amysse.'"

Several pirated editions of this version were sent out in quick succession by the Dutch printers, which, amounting in all to about twelve thousand copies, were, notwithstanding the severe measures taken by the court and the bishops to prevent it, smuggled into England, and sold and dispersed there, and eagerly read. They were sold singly for seven or eight groats apiece, and by the Dutchmen at the rate of thirteen pence apiece, or three hundred for sixteen pounds

five shillings. It was on their part wholly a money speculation, and "for that they had no Englishe-man for to correcte the setting, thei themselves, havying not the knowlege of our tongue, were compelled to make many mo fautes then were in the copye, and so corrupted the book, that the simple reader might ofte tymes be taryed and steck." This is Joye's account of the matter, who was employed by them in their fourth edition, in 1534, to remedy the growing evil, and had for his labor, as he says, "but XIV shylyngis *flemesshe*," though this labor consisted not merely in correcting typographical errors, properly so called, but also in mending the translation itself by "the latyne text." "For," he observes in justification of such liberties, "I wolde the scripture were so puerly and plyantly translated, that it needed nether note, glose nor scholia, so that the reder might once swimme without a corke." These liberties, however, were not well taken by Tyndal, as appears from the second edition published by himself in November of the same year, after careful revision, and with marginal notes. "Here," says he in the Prologue, "hast thou, most dere reader, the New Testament or Covenant made with us of God in Christ's blood, whiche I have looked over againe (now at the last) with all dilligence and compared it unto the Greke, and have weeded out of it many fautes which lacke of helpe at the begynning and ouersyght did sow therein." Soon after this, or rather, as Fox tells us, before the whole of the edition had passed through the press, Tyndal was apprehended as a heretic, and being condemned to death by the Emperor's decree, was in 1536 strangled in his prison at Villefort, near Brussels. About twenty editions of his New Testament were printed, at home and abroad, and all before the close of the sixteenth century.

"None will deny," says Fuller, writing about the middle of the next century, "but that many faults needing amendment are found in his translation: which is no wonder to those who consider; first, Such an undertaking was not the task for a man, but men. Secondly, No great design is invented and perfected at once. Thirdly, Tyndal, being an exile, wanted many necessary accommodations. Fourthly, His skill in Hebrew was not considerable; yea, generally, learning in languages was then but in the infancie thereof. Fiftly, Our English tongue was not improved to that ex-

pressivenesse, whereat at this day it has arrived. However, what he undertook was to be admired as glorious; what he performed, to be commended as profitable; wherein he failed is to be excused as pardonable, and to be scored on the account rather of that age, than of the authour himself." * "No doubt," says Orme, † "can be entertained that Tyndale understood Greek; though it is probable that his first translation was not made directly from the original text; for in the preface to the above [his second] edition he speaks only of having 'compared it unto the Greek.' Bishop Marsh thinks he was greatly indebted to Luther's German version; as Tyndale passed some time with Luther at Wittemberg, and the books which he selected for translation into English were always those which Luther had already translated into German. This conclusion, the Bishop says, is farther confirmed by the Germanisms which it contains, some of which are still preserved in our authorized version. Tyndale's version is excellent vernacular English, a good literal translation; and in many places preferable in its renderings to the version now in use." "If," says Dr. Geddes, "I had been inclined to make any prior English version the groundwork of mine, it would certainly have been Tindal's. And this is, perhaps, what I would have done, if Tindal's Hebrew text and mine had been exactly the same. His mode of translating is so little different from mine, that it would have been an easy task to mould it into the same shape." ‡

Henry the Eighth at this time had broken with the Pope, and by the exaltation of Cranmer to the Primacy, and the appointment of Cromwell to the newly constituted office of Vicar-General, had opened a way effectually for the introduction of the Reformation into England. As early, indeed, as 1531, the king, after requiring his subjects to "detest and abhor" "the New Testament in English of the translation that was then printed," was pleased to say that "he would cause the New Testament to be by learned men faithfully and purely translated into the English tongue." Coverdale's Bible appeared in 1535, dedicated "unto the moost victorious Prynce and our moost gracyous Soveraygne Lorde Kynge Henry the eyghth, Kynge of Englande and of

* Church History, Book V. p. 224. † Bibliotheca Biblica, p. 35.
‡ General Answer to the Queries, &c. pp. 4, 5.

Fraunce, Lorde of Irlande, &c. Defendour of the Fayth, and under God the chefe and suppreme heade of the Church of Englande." Myles Coverdale, from whom this version takes its name, was a native of Yorkshire, and had been a friar of the order of St. Augustine, until entertaining some of the opinions of Luther, and falling under suspicions of heresy, he had fled for safety beyond sea, where he applied himself chiefly to the study and translation of the Scriptures. His Bible is a folio, and is remarkable for being the first printed edition of the whole Bible in English, and seems from the dedication and other circumstances to have been published under the authority, or at least under the countenance and favor, of the court. It consists of a revision of Tyndal's New Testament, and of that part of the Old Testament translated by him before his death, namely, the historical books and the book of Jonah, and of a new translation of the other books of Scripture and of the Apocrypha, made by Coverdale himself. The following are specimens of Tyndal's and Coverdale's versions, showing how much the latter depended on the former, and that both excelled here as elsewhere, and particularly in propriety and delicacy of expression, King James's translators.

Tyndal.	Coverdale.
"When the Lorde sawe, that Lea was despised, he made her frutefull, but Rahel was baren. And Lea conceaved and bare a sonne and called his name Ruben, for she sayde: the Lorde hath lokeed upon my tribulation. And now my husbonde will love me."	"But when the Lorde sawe, that Lea was nothinge regarded, he made her fruteful, and Rachel barren. And Lea conceaved and bare a sonne whom she called Ruben, and sayde: The Lorde hath loked upon mine adversitie. Now wyll my husbande love me." Genesis, xxix. 31, 32.

Coverdale, in his Epistle to the Reader, observes, that his object was "to set forth this *special translation*, not as a checker, reprover, or despiser of other mens translations, but lowly and faithfully following his interpreters, and that under correction. Of these, he said, he made use of five different ones, who had translated the Scriptures not only into Latin, but also into Dutch." To prevent weak minds from being offended at different renderings of God's word, he adds, that

"he was sure that there came more understanding and knowledge of the Scripture by these sundry translations, than by all the glosses of our sophistical Doctors. The readers therefore, he said, should not be offended though one call a *scribe* that another calleth a *lawyer*, or *elders* that another calleth *father* and *mother*, or *repentance* that another calleth *penance* or *amendment*. For if we were not deceaved by men's traditions, we should find no more diversitie between these terms than between fourpence and a groat." Coverdale omitted all Tyndal's prologues and notes, which were particularly obnoxious to Henry and the Bishops, and prefixed to every book the contents of the several chapters, and not to the particular chapters as was afterwards done. The celebrated text, 1 John v. 7. "(for there are three whiche beare recorde in heaven, the father, the worde, and the holy goost, and these thre are one)," is placed within a parenthesis, as are generally the interpolated passages.

This Bible was printed abroad, and probably, as some antiquarians have conjectured from the typography, at Zurich, by Christopher Froschover. So far however were the court from forbidding or discouraging its circulation in England, that royal Injunctions were issued, in 1536, requiring "that every person [parson] or proprietary of any parish churche within this Realme shall on this side the feast of St. Peter *ad vincula* [August 1.] nexte comming prouide a boke of the whole Bible both in Latin and also in English, and lay the same in the Quire for everye man that will to loke and reade thereon: And shall discourage no man from the reading any parte of the Bible either in Latin or English, but rather comfort, exhort, and admonish every man to read the same as the very word of God, and the spiritual foode of manne's soul, whereby they may the better knowe their duties to God, to their soueraigne Lord the King and their neighbour: ever gentilly and charitably exhorting them, that, using a sober and a modest behavioure in the reading and inquisition of the true sense of the same, they doo in no wise stifly or eagerly contend or stryve one with another aboute the same, but referre the declaration of those passages that be in controversie to the judgement of them that be better learned," Two editions of this Bible were printed in 1550, one in folio, and the other in large quarto; and another in quarto, in 1560, which was the last.

In 1537 Matthewe's Bible was published, "set forth," as appears on the title page, "by the King's most gracyous licence." It was first printed, Mr. Lewis inclines to believe, at Marpurg in Hesse, or Marbeck in the Duchy of Wittemberg, under the supervision and correction of John Rogers, the martyr, and hence is sometimes called Rogers's Bible. It is the Bible last mentioned, but little altered except by the restoration generally of Tyndal's prologues and notes. The fictitious name of Thomas Matthewe was assumed, probably, on account of the prejudice existing in some quarters against the real translators, and particularly against Tyndal. The account which Mr. Whittaker gives of this version in his "Historical and Critical Enquiry into the Interpretation of the Hebrew Scriptures" is somewhat different. He says, "it was printed by Grafton and Whitchurch, at Hamburgh as is supposed, though it bears date, London, A D. 1537. Bale, Bishop of Ossory, says that Rogers translated the whole Scriptures, and that he used the Hebrew, Greek, Latin, German, and English Bibles. Johnson also tells us that Coverdale revised this translation 'from the Hebrew,' and it was in fact a mere revision of the former Bible undertaken by Coverdale and Rogers together. It ought to be considered as their joint production in the same manner as the first Bible is regarded as the work of Tyndal and Coverdale." * It is not true, however, if Lewis copies the title-page correctly, that this impression "bears date, London, A. D. 1537," — the year only being given, and no mention whatever being made of the place of printing or publishing. It is also of Cranmer's or the Great Bible, and not of this, that Johnson says, "Miles Coverdale was the man now that compared the translation with the Hebrew, mended it in divers places, and was the chief overseer of the work." No evidence has come under our notice, that Coverdale personally had a hand in this edition, any more than Tyndal, now dead. It is of this Bible, especially of Tyndal's part, that Dr. Geddes, though a Catholic, thus speaks: "The violent opposition it had met with at home seems to have arisen more from the injurious reflections, contained in the prologues and notes, on the then established religion, than from any capital defects in the version

* See Quarterly Review, Vol. XXIII, p. 296, where this passage is cited.

itself. It was farfrom being a perfect translation, it is true; but it was the firstof the kind; and few first translations will, I think, be found preferable to it. It is astonishing how little obsolete the language of it is, even at this day; and, in point of perspicuity and noble simplicity, propriety of idiom, and purity of stile, no English version has yet surpassed it." *

Fifteen hundred copies were printed of this impression, at an outlay on the part of Richard Grafton and Edward Whitchurch, the publishers, of five hundred pounds, a great sum for those days. It was patronized from the beginning both by Cromwell and Cranmer, at whose instance not only a royal licence for it was obtained, but Injunctions, similar to those before mentioned, were published, requiring it to be purchased and set up in "some convenient place within the churches." A Declaration was likewise published by the King, to be read by the curates of the several churches, wherein they were to tell the people, that " it had pleased the King's Majestie to permit and command the Bible, being translated into their mother-tongue, to be sincerely taught by them, and to be openly layde forth in every parish church." " But herein " says Johnson, " the waywardness of the priests was observable; they read confusedly the Word of God, and the Injunctions set forth and commanded by them to be read, humming and hawing and hauking thereat, that scarce any could understand them. They bad their parishioners, notwithstanding what they read, being compelled so to do, *that they should do as they did in times past; to live as their fathers; and that the old fashion is the best;* and other crafty and seditious sayings they gave out among them. — Notwithstanding this, it was wonderful to see with what joy this Book of God was received, not only among the learneder sort, and those that were noted for lovers of the Reformation, but generally all England over, among all the vulgar and common people; and with what greediness God's Word was read, and what resort to places where the reading of it was. Every body, that could, bought the book, and busily read it, or got others to read it to them, if they could not themselves, and divers more elderly people learned to read on purpose." †

In April 1539, Cranmer's or the Great Bible, a revised

* Proepectus of a New Translation of the Holy Bible, pp. 88, 89.
† Historical Account. Watson's Tracts, Vol. III. p. 74.

edition of Matthewe's, came out in large folio, printed by the same publishers, *cum privilegio*, as they say in the title-page, *ad imprimendum solum*. The prologues and notes were again rejected, probably because they were still found to give great offence to those who retained any of their Catholic prepossessions. "Many handes," however, are set "both in the margent of this Volume and also in the text," in explanation of which the anonymous editors say in a short Prologue of their own, "We purposed to have made in the ende of the Byble (in a table by themselves) certen godly annotacyons: but for so moch as yet there hath not bene suffycient tyme mynystred to the Kyng's moost honourable councell for the oversyght and correccyon of the sayd annotacions, we wyll therefore omyt them tyll their more convenient leysour." The spurious passage, 1 John v. 7, is printed in this edition also in a smaller letter, to denote that it is not in the original. "This," says Lewis, after stating the fact just mentioned, "had been observed by Tyndal in his edition of the New Testament, 1526, and in the after-editions of 1535, 1536, and 1537; and was done, it seems, on the authority of Luther and the great Erasmus, who, in the Latin translation of the New Testament, which he published at Basil, A. D. 1518, omitted these words, though he restored them in his *third* edition of this book a few years after, *ne cui foret ansa calumniandi*, as he said." The "Latin translation," here referred to, was Erasmus's first edition of the New Testament, in Greek and Latin, which was published not in 1518, but in 1516.

Another edition, or "recognition," as it is called, of the English Bible, varying more materially from Matthewe's, was published, the same year, by Richard Taverner, a lawyer by profession, a *protegé* of Cromwell, and eminent, it is said, for his "knowledge and expertness in the Greek tongue." Taverner retains most of the marginal notes in the Matthewe's Bible, but omits some of them, and inserts others of his own, which after the fall of Cromwell, his friend and protector, brought him under the censure of government; but he had the address to reinstate himself in the royal favor. In speaking of the merits of the various editions of the Bible published about this time Dr. Geddes observes: "Cranmer's *great* Bible, and all the other Bibles that were published during the reigns of Henry VIII. and Edward VI.

are only so many improved copies of Tyndal's and Coverdale's translation. In some of them the additions that are found in the Greek or in the Latin Vulgate, though not in the present original, were judiciously inserted; either in a smaller character, or with some distinguishing mark. Tyndal's prologues and notes were also generally omitted and some of the most exceptionable words altered. The editions revised by Taverner recede the farthest from their prototype, and are, therefore, the worst." *

The attainder and execution of Cromwell, in 1540, was doubtless the heaviest calamity that could have befallen the cause of the reformation in England. That cause now depended, for the most part, on Cranmer, who, though his merits, as it seems to us, have generally been underrated by all but high-churchmen, wanted the courage and self-confidence, which the emergency required. Accordingly the Catholics began from this time to recover the ascendency, not only in the church but at court, and soon caused it to be "reported that Thomas Cromwell, late Earl of Essex, was the chief doer, or the principal actor, in authorizing the English Bible, and not the King, but as led by him: and therefore it was a common reflection made on it, that this Bible was of a traytor's setting forth, and not of the King's." "They likewise," says Lewis, "represented to the King, that the allowing the people the free use of it was a means of encreasing faction and parties, and destroying the peace of his kingdom; that the common people disputed of the Scriptures, and quarrelled about them in taverns and ale-houses, calling one another Papist and heretic; and that others read them in the churches in time of divine service so loud as to disturb the congregation then assembled." Henry, even in those Injunctions, repeatedly issued by him, permitting and recommending the reading of the Scriptures to his subjects, had been careful to remind them, in a jealousy of the prerogative characteristic of the Tudors, that the liberty which they enjoyed was not a right to which they possessed any claim, but a favor granted "of the royal liberality and goodness." This indulgence was soon recalled; the use of Tyndal's version was interdicted altogether, as "crafty, false, and untrue"; and the liberty of reading any Bible in English was restricted to the

* Prospectus, p. 90.

privileged classes. "No women, except noblewomen and gentlewomen (who might read to themselves alone and not to others any texts of the Bible, &c.), nor artificers, prentises, iourneymen, serving-men of the degrees of yomen or under, husbandmen, nor labourers, were to read the Bible or New Testament in Englishe to himself, or to any other, privately or openly, upon paine of one month's imprisonment." Mr. Lewis has preserved the following remark made by a poor shepherd on a spare leaf of an English abridgement of Polydore Virgil's Book of "Inventions," which he seems to have purchased about this time. "When I kepe Mr. Letymer's shype, I bout thys boke, when the testament was obberagatyd, that shepeherdys myght not rede hit, I prey god amende that blyndnes. Wryt by Robert Wyllyams keppyng shepe upon Seynbury hill, 1546."

Under Edward VI., Cranmer and the other patrons of "the new learning" came again into favor; the restrictions lately put on the printing, selling, and reading of the Bible were taken off; and more was done, than had been in any part of the former reign to promote, and secure, a general dissemination of the word of God. As a proof of this it appears, that in less than seven years and six months, eleven impressions of the whole English Bible, and six of the English New Testament, were printed and published; to which may be added an English translation of the whole New Testament paraphrased by Erasmus. "It is worthy of notice," says Archbishop Newcome, "that the Bibles were reprinted according to the preceding editions; whether Tyndal's, Coverdale's, Matthewe's, Cranmer's, or Taverner's; that is, with a different text, and different notes: the reformers seeming more intent on gratifying the tastes of all readers, than fearful of perplexing them by slight variations, when the great outlines were the same." * Besides, though "reprinted according to the preceding editions," it does not appear that they were reprinted without alteration, as hardly an impression came from the press but with a new title-page, and some changes, more or less important, in the text and particularly in the prefaces and notes. These last, indeed, appear from the beginning to have been subject to constant variations, sometimes omitted altogether, sometimes partly omitted

* Historical View, p. 64.

and partly retained, and sometimes replaced by others, according to the humor of the editor, or his patrons, or the day. That the reader may better understand the character of these notes, and the reason of their offensiveness to the Catholics, and the changes they were continually undergoing, we give a collation of the note on Matthew xvi. 19. as it stands in two editions of Matthewe's Bible.

Edition of 1537.	Edition of 1549.
"Origên, writing upon Matthew, in his first homily affirmeth, that these words, *I will give the keyes of the kingdom of heaven*, were as well spoken to all the rest of the Apostles as to Peter: and proves it, in that Christ, John xx., saith, *Receive the Holy Ghost, whose sins soever* YE *re-mit*, &c.; not THOU remittest."	"Luke, in the letter G of his xi. chap., calleth these keys the *keys of Science*, that is to saye, of the knowledge of God by the Scriptures, whiche keyes Christ gave to his Apostles, that they might open unto the worlde the treasures of the kyngdome, that is to saye, communion of the faithful, remyssion of synnes, and lyfe everlasting thorow Christ, and for Christ's sake onelye."

The king's printer, Richard Jugge, published in 1552, a revised edition of the English New Testament, telling his Majesty in the Dedication, that he had used "thadvise and help of godly learned men, both in reducing the same to the truth of the Greke text, (appoynting out also the diversitye where it happeneth,) and also in the kepynge of the true ortographie of wordes."

In one of the prefaces to the translation of Erasmus's Paraphrase before mentioned, addressed to the "moste gracious Quene Katharine dowagier," the writer, Nicholas Udall, makes some statements respecting female proficiency at that time in "the studie of human sciences and of strange tongues," as well as in "endictyng and pennyng of godly and fruicteful traictises," which, we apprehend, are to be taken with some grains of allowance for courtly exaggeration. "It was now," he says, "no news in Englande to see young damysels in Nobles houses, and in the courts of Princes, instede of cardes and other instruments of idle trifleyng, to have continually in their hands either Psalms, Omelies, and

other deuout meditacions, or els Paule's epistles or some boke of holy scripture matiers, and as familiarly both to reade or reason thereof in Greke, Latine, Frenche or Italian, as in Englishe. It was now a common thyng to see young virgins so nouzled and trained in the studie of letters, that thei willingly set all other vain pastymes at naught for learnynge's sake." With the common people, at any rate, it was different; who, practised on by the priests, and irritated by other causes of discontent, broke out in many places, and particularly in Devonshire into open insurrection. These, laying their heads together, agreed on certain articles to be sent up to the king; one of which was, that the English Bibles already in circulation should be called in, and that the further publication of them should be prohibited. The reply to this demand, said to have been drawn up by Cranmer, breathes a noble spirit. "Wherefore," it is urged, "did the Holy Ghost come down in fiery tongues, and give the apostles knowledge of all languages, but that all nations might hear, speak, and learn God's word in their mother-tongue? And will you have God further from us, than from all other countries? that he shall speak to every man in his own language, that he understandeth, and was born in, and to us shall speak a strange language, that we understand not." *

Edward died July 6, 1553, and was succeeded by his half-sister Mary, under whose short reign of five years the nation relapsed again into Popery. One of the early objects of her government appears to have been to restore the law respecting the Scriptures to the same state in which it was left by her father. Accordingly in 1554 an address came up from the Lower House of Convocation to the Upper House, praying, among other things, that all suspected translations of the Old and New Testaments, according to the statute passed four years before Henry's death and after the Catholics had recovered the ascendency, might be destroyed and burnt throughout the kingdom. The "suspected translations" were Tyndal's, and those which were founded on his, and retained his obnoxious prologues and notes; the others being expressly excepted from the prohibition in the statute referred to. Lewis, from not regarding these exceptions, falls into the mistake of supposing all translations interdicted;

* Johnson's Historical Account. Watson's Tracts, pp. 83, 84.

though even he is afterwards led to conjecture, that, whatever discouragement the English Bible may have met with in this reign, the printed copies of it were not burnt or destroyed as they had been formerly. Mr. Charles Butler goes further, and says, without giving his authority, "It is remarkable, that, notwithstanding the persecuting spirit with which the reign of Queen Mary is justly charged, Cranmer's Bible was, throughout her reign, permitted to remain on sale."* This indulgence, however, did not probably originate in the good will of the government, but in the impossibility of extirpating immediately the immense number of copies of the English Bible already in circulation, in a preference for Cranmer's, as being, in their judgment, the least exceptionable, in the obvious impolicy of attempting too much at once, and in a plan to resort to further and more efficient measures, as public opinion should be ripe for them.

The severities practised against the Gospellers, as the favorers of the Reformation in England now began to be called, drove many of them (Neal says, above eight hundred) to seek an asylum in the Protestant states on the continent. Several of the most eminent of them settled at Geneva, and there employed themselves, Johnson tells us, "in translating the Holy Bible into English, intending to do it with more exactness than hitherto had been done, having the opportunity of consulting with Calvin and Beza in order thereunto. These were Miles Coverdale, Christopher Goodman, Anthony Gilby, Thomas Sampson, William Cole of *Corpus Christi* College Oxon, and William Whitingham, all zealous Calvinists, both in doctrine and discipline. What they performed may be perceived by the Bible that goes under the name of the Geneva Bible at this day. It was in those days, when it first came forth, better esteemed of, than of later times; but for a long while was much valued, by the Puritans, chiefly for the sake of the Calvinistical annotations, and had several impressions."† Coverdale, here mentioned, was the same person to whom we are indebted, as stated above, for the first printed English Bible. He had returned to England during the last reign, and for his great services as a reformer, and his learning, especially in the Scriptures, had

* Memoirs of English Catholics, Vol. I. p. 294.

† Historical Account. Watson's Tracts, Vol. III. p. 85.

been promoted to the bishopric of Exeter; but was now obliged a second time to find safety in exile. As he had before this declared himself in favor of a variety of translations, admitting at the same time that the Bible published by himself might be made more complete and perfect, we cannot wonder at his readiness to join in a project for an improved version. Johnson is mistaken in making William Cole to have been one of the six Genevan translators; it was Thomas Cole, the brother of William. All of them were imbued, in a greater or less degree, with Puritanism, and with more liberal notions of civil and ecclesiastical government, than were then generally prevalent, as appears occasionally in their notes, and on this account, more probably than on account of any real or supposed doctrinal leanings, their Bible never was a favorite with the high church party, or the high monarchists. The charge brought against this Bible by Simon and others, that it was only an English translation of the French of Olivetan, lately revised by Calvin and Beza, overstates the obligations of Coverdale and his associates to this particular version; though they do appear to have made it their model.

"The truth is," says Geddes, — "and why should not the truth be spoken? *ὀρθὸν γὰρ ἡ ἀλήθεια ἀεὶ*, — that James's translators did little more than copy the Geneva version; which was little more than a transcript from the revised French; which was chiefly borrowed from Pagninus. If any one doubt of this, let him compare all those versions with as much pains and patience as I have done; and then let him contradict me. *Legant prius, et postea despiciant.*" In a note he gives his opinion of the Geneva Bible compared with the present authorized version. "The principal difference," he says, "consists in a more scrupulous adhesion to the letter of the original, and in the insertion of a multitude of italics to supply its apparent deficiency; although the greater part of these supplements are virtually contained in the Hebrew. On the whole, I make no hesitation to declare, that I think the Geneva version, in general, the better of the two." *

The New Testament of this revision was printed, 1557, in a small duodecimo volume, in a small but very beautiful

* General Answers to Queries, &c. p. 4.

type. It is remarkable for being the first New Testament in English with the present distinction and numbering of the verses, instead of capital letters succeeding each other at equal distances in the margin. The expedient had been resorted to by Robert Stephens in an edition of the Greek Testament published about six years before, as a means of easy and direct reference to particular passages; but he only numbered the verses in the margin, and did not, like his English imitators, break them into distinct and separate paragraphs, often to the perplexity and obstruction of the sense. The Old Testament of this version did not appear until after the return of most of the refugees at the accession of Elizabeth; but some of the translators stayed behind until the whole was completed and published, in 1560. It was first printed at Geneva by Rouland Hall in quarto; after which it was carefully revised and again published in 1568; and again, in 1576, under the following title, "*The Bible:* that is the Holy Scriptures conteined in the Olde and Newe Testament. Translated according to the Ebrewe and Greke, and conferred with the best translations in divers languages, with most profitable annotations upon all the harde places, and other thinges of great importance, as may appeare in the Epistle to the Reader." In the Epistle, here referred to, the translators inform us, that "they thought they could bestowe their labours and study in nothing which could be more acceptable to God and comfortable to his church than in the translating of the holy scriptures into our native tongue: that albeit divers heretofore have endeavoured to atchieve this, yet considering the infancie of those times and imperfect knowledge of the tongues, in respect of the ripe age and clere light which God had then revealed, the translations required greatly to be perused and reformed: that therefore they had been for the space of two years and more, day and night, occupied in making this translation; and that they had been encouraged to take so much pains by the ready wills of such, whose hearts God likewise touched not to spare any charges for the furtherance of such a work; the great opportunitie and occasions by reason of so many godly and learned men, and such diversities of translations in divers tongues: and accordingly had by all meanes indeavoured to set forth the puritie of the word, and right sense of the Holy Ghost, for the edifying of the brethren in faith and charitie."

The political complexion of the notes may be gathered from one or two examples. The following is the marginal note on the conduct of the Hebrew midwives, Exodus i. 19. "Their disobedience to the kings of Egypt, in preserving alive the men children was lawful, but their dissembling evil." In 2 Chronicles xv. 16. it is said, "And king Asa deposed Maachah his mother"; on which the marginal comment is, "Or grandmother: and herein he shewed, that he lacked zeal: for she ought to have died both by the covenant and by the lawe of God, but he [Asa] gave place to foolish pitie, and would also seme after a sort to satisfie the Law." Such passages were thought by the court party under the Tudors and Stuarts to strike at their favorite doctrines of passive obedience and the divine right of kings. The doctrinal leanings of the notes, as has been intimated before, are highly Calvinistic; but not enough so, it would seem, to keep the orthodoxy of the translators from being suspected. Fuller, writing under date of 1611, says; "In this or the next yeare, a Doctor in solemn assembly in the University of Oxford publicly in his sermon at St. Maries, accused them as guilty of misinterpretation touching the divinity of Christ, and his Messiahship, as if symbolizing with the Arrians and Jewes against them both: For which he was afterwards suspended by Dr. Robert Abbot, *propter conciones publicas minùs orthodoxas, & offensionis plenas.*" *

Lewis says, that of this Bible, which was generally preferred and used in private families on account of the notes, there were above thirty editions in folio, quarto, and octavo, printed, mostly by the royal printers, from the year 1560 to 1616. Editions of it were also printed at Geneva, Edinburgh, and Amsterdam. Long after king James's Bible had been published by authority, and had found its way into general circulation, the people, we are told, lamented the absence of the marginal comments to which they had been accustomed, protesting, as many have done since, that there was no such thing as reading and understanding the word of God without "the Geneva spectacles." Of the earlier English Bibles few copies are to be met with in this country, and of some of them, none; but Cranmer's and the Geneva are not of unfrequent occurrence, especially in the public collections. A collated specimen of these, however, may not be

* Church History. Book x. p. 59.

unacceptable to our readers, showing how far the latter deviates from the former, the former being but a revised and slightly altered copy of Matthewe's, or, rather we may say, of Tyndal and Coverdale's.

CRANMER.

Matthew. The xxv Chapter.

Then shall the kingdom of heaven be like unto ten virgins which toke their lampes, and went to meet the brydegrome (and the bride). But fyve of them were foolyshe, and fyve were wyse. They that were folyshe, toke their lampes, but toke none oyle with them. But the wyse toke oyle with them in their vessels with their lampes also. While the brydgrom taryed, they all slombred and slept. And even at midnyght, there was a crye made: behold, the brydgrome cometh, go out to meet him. Then all those virgins arose, and prepared their lampes. So the folysshe sayde unto the wyse: geve us of your oyle: for oure lampes are gone out. But the wyse answered, sayinge: not so, lest there be not ynough for us and you: but go ye rather to them that sell, and by for your selves. And whyl they went to bye, the brydgrome came: and they that were ready, went in with him to the mariage, and the gate was shut up. Afterwarde came also the other virgins, saying: lord, lord, open to us. But he answered and sayde: verely I saye unto you: I knowe you not.

GENEVA.

Matthew. Chap. xxv.

1. Then the kingdome of heaven shalbe likened unto ten virgins, which tooke their lampes, and went to meete the bridegrome.

2. And five of them were wise, and five foolish.

3. The foolish tooke their lampes, but tooke none oyle with them.

4. But the wise tooke oyle in their vessels with their lampes.

5. Now while the bridegrome taried long, all slumbred & slept.

7. And at midnight there was a cry made, Behold, the bridegrome commeth: go out to meete him.

7. Then all those virgins arose, and trimmed their lampes.

8. And the foolish said to the wise, Give us of your oyle, for our lampes are out.

9. But the wise answered, saying, We feare least there will not bee ynough for us and you: but goe ye rather to them that sell and bye for your selves.

10. And while they went to bye, the bridgrome came: and they that were readie, went in with him to the wedding, and the gate was shut.

11. Afterwards came also the other virgins, saying, Lord, Lord, open to us.

12. But he answered, and sayde, Verely I say unto you, I know you not.

Elizabeth succeeded Mary, November 17, 1558. "When the Queen," says Johnson, "passed through the city from the tower to her coronation, in a pageant erected at Cheapside, an old man with a scythe and wings, representing Time, appeared, coming out of a hollow place or cave, leading another person all clad in white silk, gracefully apparelled, who represented Truth (the daughter of Time), which lady had a book in her hand, on which was written, *Verbum Veritatis*, the Word of Truth. It was the Bible in English, which, after a speech made to the Queen, Truth reached down towards her, which was taken and brought by a gentleman attending, to her hands. As soon as she received it, she kissed it, and with both her hands held it up, and then laid it upon her breast, greatly thanking the city for that present, and said, she would often read over that book." * She did not, in the general policy of her reign, disappoint the expectations thus raised at its commencement. Injunctions were soon issued, like those in Henry's and Edward's time, requiring every church to be provided, within six months, with "one booke of the whole Bible of the largest volume in English," and within twelve months with an English translation of Erasmus's Paraphrases, and that the same should be set up in some convenient place of resort for the use of the parishioners. Care was also taken that the clergy, instead of privately discouraging any person from reading the Scriptures, as many of them had done formerly notwithstanding similar Injunctions, should comfort and exhort all thereto, "as the very lively worde of God, and the special food of man's soul." The press, moreover, did not long remain idle. Impression after impression of the various English Bibles before mentioned began soon to be issued in quick succession, and circulated throughout the kingdom, to meet and satisfy the interest and curiosity which these measures had awakened. From 1560 to 1570, inclusive, no less than seventeen editions of the whole Bible, and six of the New Testament alone, were published, for the most part by the London printers. Here too we may observe, that such had been the progress of the Reformation in the neighbouring kingdom of Scotland, that as early as 1559 the following act was passed, notwithstanding the strenuous opposition of the

* Historical Account. Watson's Tracts, Vol. III. p. 86.

bishops, securing to the people the privilege of reading the Scriptures, clogged however with a condition which, though often acted on, has seldom been so baldly expressed. "It is statute and ordained, that it shal be lawful to all our Sovereign Lady's lieges, to have the holy writ of the New Testament and the Old, in the vulgar tongue, in Inglis or Scotts, of a good and true translation; and that they shall incurre no crime for the having or the reding of the same. Provided always, that no man dispute, or hold opinions, under the pains contained in the acts of parliament." *

None, however, of the English versions of Scripture, as yet made, gave entire satisfaction to the leading men in church and state. Bishop Sandys, writing to Archbishop Parker, said of Cranmer's Bible, "The setters forth of this our common translation followed Munster too much, who doubtless was a very negligent man in his doings, and often swerved very much from the Hebrew." A growing prejudice was also felt against the Geneva version, and especially against the notes, by the high-church party, as being, to adopt the words afterwards used by James, "very partial, untrue, seditious, and savouring too much of dangerous and traiterous conceits." It was found, moreover, "that copies of the former translation were so wasted, that very many churches wanted Bibles, and that they were very faultily printed." These considerations induced Archbishop Parker to undertake a new translation or revision of the Scriptures, under the authority and commission, as Fuller says, of the Queen. With this view he divided the whole Bible into fifteen or more parts, and distributed these among as many men of learning whom he could trust, eight of them being bishops, with instructions to each to revise and correct the part allotted him, and to return the same; thus reserving to himself the right and opportunity to "examine, prepare, and finish all." The several persons to whom the work was assigned proceeded in it with alacrity, and the edition of the Bible which was the result of their labors appeared in 1568, elegantly printed in large folio. It is sometimes called Parker's Bible, from the Primate, but more frequently the Bishops' Bible; at its first appearance it went in some quarters, we are told, under the nickname of Elizabeth's Opposition Bible.

* Burnet's History of the Reformation, Vol. V. p. 409.

The object of the revisers was, as the Archbishop says in the Preface, "to add some more light in the translation and order of the text, and to print it more correctly; in doing which they had followed the former translation [Cranmer's] more than any other, and varied as little as possible from it, unless where they observed it was not so agreeable to the original text." "No offence," he says, further on, "can justly be taken for this new labour, nothing prejudicing any other man's judgment by this doing; nor yet hereby professing this to be so absolute a translation as that hereafter might follow no other that might see that which as yet was not understood. In this point, it is convenient to consider the judgment of John [Fisher] once Bishop of Rochester was in, who thus wrote: It is not unknown, but that many things have been more dilligently discussed, and more clearly understanded by the wits of these latter dayes, as wel concerning the Gospels, as other Scriptures, than in old time they were. The cause whereof is, for that to the old men the ice was not broken, or for that their age was not sufficient exquisitely to expend the whole main sea of the Scriptures, or else for that in this large field of the Scriptures a man may gather some ears untouched after the harvest-men, how dilligent soever they were. For there be yet in the Gospels very many dark places, which without all doubt to posterity shall be made much more open." 1 John v. 7, which in Cranmer's Bible is printed in a different letter, is printed in this edition without any distinction. The chapters, also, in imitation of the Geneva Bible, are divided into verses, and numbered, as in the present version, and there are short original notes, and scripture-references in the margin. The Bishops translate the last clause of 1 Tim. iv. 14. "by the auctority of eldership"; and of 1 Peter ii. 13. "as having the preëminence." Formerly 2 Tim. iii. 16, had been rendered thus, "All scripture, geven by inspiration of God, is profitable;" which in this revision was made to read, as in our present Bibles, "All scripture *is* given by inspiration of God, *and* is profitable."

"Of this Bible," Lewis tells us, "I observe, that the editions of it are mostly in folio, and in quarto. I never heard of but one in 8vo. viz. 1569, in a small black letter, and the New Testament alone in 8vo. 1613." The reason of this probably was, that the Bishops' Bible, though

the authorized version, for forty-three years, was seldom used except in churches, the Geneva translation being generally preferred in private families, notwithstanding all the efforts on the part of the government to supplant it. Dr. Geddes assigns the following as another reason for the unpopularity of the Bishops' Bible: "The greatest objection made to this translation was, that it deviated too much from the original, in favor of the Greek and Latin versions. This, we apprehend," he goes on to say, "would not, at present, be accounted a great defect; for the deviations from the original are rarely unwarranted; or, rather, they are only deviations from corrupted copies, or rabbinical comments. But at that time the idea had begun to prevail, that the Masoretic text was inviolably to be adhered to; and this was, probably, the chief cause, why the Bishops' Bible was so little prized, and so soon superseded." The same writer adds in a note: "This translation having become extremely rare, a new edition of it was announced by Hogg in the year 1778: but this edition is a mere counterfeit; being an exact transcript of the Geneva Bible." *

"The Papists," says Lewis, "finding by the Bible's being printed so oft in English, that it was impossible to keep it out of the common people's hands, were now resolved to have an English translation of their own making." The account which he proceeds to give of Catholic versions, and the remark applies with still greater force to the account given by Johnson, is, as Mr. Butler justly complains, very imperfect, and written with an evident prejudice against the Catholic Church.† It is remarkable that men, who could find so much to admire in the constancy, and so much to pity and resent in the wrongs of Tyndal and Coverdale and the other Protestant exiles, appear so insensible to any similarity of merit and hardship in the Rhemish translators. Early in Elizabeth's reign they had sought refuge in Flanders, whence they were soon obliged to remove on account of the war to Rheims, and here in 1582 they published the Rhemish Testament, as it is called, in one quarto volume. The publication of the Old Testament of this version did not take place

* Prospectus. p. 91.

† See on this subject, Butler's Essay "On the Discipline of the Church of Rome, respecting the general perusal of the Scriptures in the Vulgar tongue, by the Laity." Works, Vol. IV. pp. 191–218.

till after their return to Doway in 1609, and hence the whole, which is in three volumes, is known by the name of the Doway Bible. A candid and competent judge has said of it: "It is a literal and barbarous translation from the Vulgate, before its last revision, and accompanied with acrimonious and injurious annotations. Their residence in a foreign country, and what they deemed a cruel exile from their own, had corrupted the translators' language, and soured their tempers; and it was, unhappily, the common custom of those lamentable times, to season every religious controversy with gall and vinegar. We do not find that Withers, Fulke, and Cartwright, who drew their quills against the Doway annotators, were a bit more courteous in their retorts." *

The translators themselves, in their preface to the Testament, say: "they did not publish upon an erroneous opinion of its being necessary, that the holy Scriptures should always be in our mother tongue, or that they ought to be read indifferently of all, or could be easily understood of every one that reads or hears them in a known language, or that they generally and absolutely judged it more convenient in it self, and more agreeable to God's word and honour, or the edification of the faithful, to have them turned into vulgar tongues, than to be kept and studied only in the ecclesiastical languages; but they translated this sacred book upon special consideration of the present time, state and condition of their countrie, unto which divers things were either necessary or profitable, and medicinable now, that otherwise in the peace of the church were neither much requisite, nor perchance wholly tolerable." "Moreover," they said, "in hard places they presumed not to soften the speeches or phrases, but religiously kept them word for word, and point for point, for feare of missing or restraining the sense of the Holy Ghost. As Eph. vi. 12. 'against the spirituals of wickedness in celestials.'" "Luke xxii. 20. they translated, 'This is the chalice, the new Testament' &c. not 'This chalice *is* the new Testament.'" "Sometimes also," they said, "they followed of purpose the scripture phrase, as 'the hel of fire.'"

We have now brought down the history of English biblical translations to the first publication of the present authorized version, or King James's Bible. † At the celebrated

* Geddes's Prospectus, p. 110.

† We have not had room to notice particularly the versions that

conference at Hampton Court in 1603, held soon after that monarch came to the English throne, the party who so feebly represented the Puritans on that occasion moved his majesty, among other things, that there might be a new translation of the Bible, on the ground that those allowed in the reigns of Henry and Edward were corrupt, and not answerable to the truth of the original. The proposition was favorably entertained by the king, and accordingly fifty-four persons were appointed under royal commission, in the following year, to undertake the work, and complete it with as little delay as possible. We have collected materials for biographical notices of these men, which, however, our limits will constrain us to defer, as well as all discussion respecting their competency as translators, and the value of their labors, and the expediency of another revision of the authorized version. Our remaining space, in pursuance of the plan marked out in the beginning of the article, must be given to some historical and bibliographical notices of the formation of the common English Bible, of its principal editors, and of the changes and present state of its text.

The translators were divided into six companies, two of which were to meet at Westminster, two at Oxford, and two at Cambridge, and distinct portions of Scripture were allotted to each for revision and correction according to certain rules prescribed by the king. Various causes conspired to delay the work, so that the several companies do not appear to have seriously entered on the duties assigned them until 1607,* and almost three years, it seems, were spent in the service. After this the several portions of Scripture, as amended by the companies, were sent up to London to be again revised and compared by a committee of six, others say twelve, delegates from the companies, who met daily at Stationers' Hall for the joint labor, and were engaged upon it for about nine months. The preface, a wretched piece of affectation and pedantry, is ascribed to Dr. Myles Smith, by whom, in company with Bilson, Bishop of Winchester, the whole work

appeared from time to time of separate parts of Scripture and single books, though these were numerous, especially of the Psalms or Psalter, and doubtless had considerable influence on subsequent translations of the entire Bible or Testament.

* Todd, on the authority of Anthony Wood, gives to this year, 1607, the conclusion of the work. — *Memoirs of Dr. Walton*, Vol. I. p. xiv.

was once more carefully gone over, and prepared for the press. It was first printed by Robert Barker, the king's printer, London, 1611, in folio. In the Preface the translators are made to say, in the writer's lucid and graceful manner that they "had spent about this work twice seven seventy-two days and more." As if to deprecate criticism they likewise observe "that the best things have been calumniated, and that his majestie knew full well, that whosoever attempted any thing for the public, especially if it pertaineth to religion, and to the opening and clearing of the word of God, the same setteth himself upon a stage to be glouted upon by every evil eye; yea he casteth himself headlong upon pikes, to be gored by every sharp tongue." Of their care and labor in the revision they observe, among other things "Neither did we think much to consult the translators or commentators, Chaldee, Hebrew, Syriac, Greek, or Latin; no nor the Spanish, French, Italian, or Dutch; neither did we disdain to revise that which we had done, and to bring back to the anvil that which we had hammered." Still they profess, that "they never thought from the beginning, that they should need to make a new translation, nor yet to make of a bad one a good one; but their endeavour and mark was to make a good one better, or out of many good ones one principal good one, not justly to be excepted against."

When in the judgment of the translators the sense required it, they supplied words in the English not having any precisely answering to them in the original; but these they put in italics. The contents of each chapter, as it was understood by the translators, are printed over it, and column titles are also given, both of which have the effect of a running commentary to lead, or mislead, the reader. Scriptural references and short verbal explanations, or various readings are occasionally set in the margin, which last, according to Dr. Adam Clarke, "are to be preferred to those in the text in the proportion of at least eight to ten." They also adopted a peculiar mode of distinguishing the names of the Deity by the manner in which they were printed. The word יהוה of the Old Testament, instead of translating it invariably Jehovah, as perhaps would have been best, they sometimes translate LORD, and sometimes GOD; but they aim to distinguish these titles, even to common English readers, from Lord and God, when representing other words in the He-

brew (אל and ארן), by printing them in small capitals as above. Mr Curtis tells us, that the modification of Archbishop Usher's system, sometimes, though erroneously, called "the Bible and authorized" chronology, was added to the margin of our Bibles about 1680. A costly and elegant edition was published, 1701, in large folio, under the direction of Archbishop Tenison, containing among other improvements many additional dates and other marginal notes by Bishop Lloyd. The printed copy, generally reputed, until of late, the most correct, and followed as the standard edition, is that of Oxford, in folio, 1769, prepared and published under the superintendence of Dr. Blayney. The text was carefully collated with several of the early and most approved editions, the punctuation amended, the italicizing of the words systematized, the summaries of chapters and running-titles at the top of the page revised, and above thirty thousand new scriptural references inserted. A few intentional alterations appear also to have been made in the translation itself with a view to bring it nearer to the originals.

Complaints have frequently been made, and the jealousies of the people awakened, respecting the state of the printed copies of the authorized version of the Scriptures. In Cromwell's time, a long list of *errata*, amounting to two thousand, most of them, however, unimportant, was brought in by the Company of Stationers against a Bible of Hill's, then in the press. Burton, in giving an account of the proceedings on this memorial in his Parliamentary Diary for January 14, 1657, says: "There was one Robinson, a Scotchman, corrector of his Highness's press, a very busy person, and swelling in his own opinion, and skill in the tongues, who openly arraigned, not only the Cambridge translation of church Bibles, but all other Bibles whatsoever now in England, as faulty, both in printing and difference from the original. Mr. Tymbes took an occasion to say, that a Jesuit could do no more but arraign our Bibles. Lord Strictland and I were of the same opinion, and that it was of dangerous consequence to grant that by a vote of the Committee. It would hear ill abroad. Robinson was so nettled at it, that he questioned Mr. Tymbes for com-

* See an account of Dr. Blayney's labors given in his "Letter to the Vice Chancellor and the other Delegates of the Clarendon Press," first published in "The Gentleman's Magazine" for November, 1769.

paring him to a Jesuit. The Committee ordered that Robinson should be reproved sharply, which was done. Ordered, that Mr. Hill do within fourteen days bring in a note to this Committee of his amendments, and another note of what he has not amended, to the end the Committee may consider, whether the impression may be so amended by putting in new sheets, &c., as that the same may be published." * Again, the Lower House of Convocation in a "humble representation" to the Archbishop and Bishops, in 1703, earnestly remonstrated against the "gross errors" which had found their way into some of the late editions of the English Bible, and among the rest into that of Bishop Lloyd's already mentioned. The abuse grew at length to such a height that orders were issued by the king, in 1724, requiring the patentees for printing Bibles, not only to print them on good paper, and at a reasonable price, but to employ such correctors of the press, and allow them such salaries, as the Archbishop of Canterbury and the Bishop of London, for the time being, should approve.

One of the first corruptions of the text which made much noise in the church was that of Acts vi. 3, by which "whom *we* may appoint over this business," was so altered as to read "whom *ye* may appoint," &c. As it favored the practice of the Independents, they were suspected by some of introducing it designedly, but without reason, as the error has been traced back to a Bible printed at Cambridge by Buck and Daniel, in 1638. Fuller, in his "Mixt Contemplations on These Times," mentions a Bible printed at London, in 1653, in which, 1 Cor. vi. 9., read "Know ye not that the unrighteous *shall* inherit the kingdom of God," for "shall *not* inherit." "In a Bible," to borrow Dibdin's account, "printed in the reign of Charles I., the word *not* was left out in the Seventh Commandment. Selden in his 'Table Talk,' (Art. 'Bible'), says, 'a thousand copies' were printed with the omission of the *not*. And Heylin, in his Life of Laud, Book III. p. 228., fixes it in the year 1632. 'His Majesty [Charles I.], being made acquainted with it by the Bishop of London, order was given for calling the printers into the High Commission; where, upon evidence of the fact, the whole impression was called in, and the printers deeply

* Burton's Parliamentary Diary, Vol I. p. 348.

fined, as they justly merited.' In this same reign an edition of the Bible was printed, in which the text, Psalm xiv. 1. ran, "The fool hath said in his heart, *There is a God.*" Mr. Nye (in his Defence of the Canon of the New Testament) tells us, that in consequence 'the printers were fined £3000, and all the copies were suppressed by the King's order.' If the fact be thus," Mr. Dibdin adds, "the punishment seems to have been frightfully disproportionate; for the error might have been committed, through inadvertency, by the most respectable printers. The wonder is, even in this our day, not that errors very frequently occur (which they *do*), but that *more* errors are not discernible, considering the millions of Bibles which perhaps half a dozen years bring forth." *

In 1831 Mr. Curtis, impressed it would seem with an opinion, that our modern Bibles have been grossly corrupted, as well by *intentional* as unintentional changes, first began to solicit attention to this subject from those, whom he supposed to have authority to remedy the evil. He has been encouraged and seconded by his Dissenting brethren in all that he has done, and has created a degree of excitement, and set on foot investigations, that may lead to important results. At present we shall go no further into this controversy than to cull out of the two pamphlets, mentioned at the head of this article, such information as will illustrate the general subject of our inquiries.

It is not generally understood in this country, we suspect, that the exclusive right of printing the common Bible in England belongs to the two Universities, and the King's Printers in London. This is "the existing monopoly," which Mr. Curtis mentions in his title-page as being "an inadequate protection of the authorized version of the Scripture." And for this protection, such as it is, the British public pay, he tells us, "from forty to fifty thousand pounds per annum."

"This at least," he says, "would appear to be paid on its entire supply, *over and above* what the Bible might otherwise be procured for, — a tax on the noblest and most needful knowledge, I would hope, and do believe, quite unparalleled. A judicious friend calculates that the Bible Society alone pays twenty-four thousand pounds annually above what it could print

* Library Companion, p. 34.

its English Bibles for, if the monopoly were broken up. Precautions in breaking it up might be necessary, but need not cost the country a twentieth part of this tax." — *Existing Monopoly*, p. iv.

As if to forestall the reader's indignation, Mr. Curtis prints the following statement or summary on the first leaf of his pamphlet:

"Counting the *words* only which are altered in the modern Bibles, and a few of the paragraph marks, which are important; that is, not at all including the general alterations of the orthography or minute punctuation, there appear —

INTENTIONAL DEPARTURES FROM KING JAMES'S BIBLE.

In the Book of	*Genesis*	containing	50	Chap.	807
"	*Exodus*	"	40	"	724
"	*Psalms*	"	150	"	600
"	*Lamentations*	"	5	"	59
"	*St. Matthew's Gospel*	"	28	"	416
"	*Hebrews*	"	13	"	147
"	*Revelation*	"	22	"	178
			308		2931

Or, in about one fourth of the Bible, upwards of Two Thousand Nine Hundred such departures, suggesting the presumption, that there are upwards of *Eleven Thousand* in the entire Version."

Fairness requires that Mr. Cardwell's reply to this formidable array of intentional alterations should be subjoined.

"In this calculation, Mr. Curtis has studiously omitted to inform us from how many different editions, and where and when printed, these variations have been collected. Now I have examined, with the help of a minute collation, the text of the Book of Genesis and St. Matthew's Gospel, and I affirm that, if we exclude changes as to italics and the printing of the word *Lord* or *God*, and such differences as between *toward* and *towards*, *ye* and *you*, *among* and *amongst*, *born* and *borne*, *flee* and *fly*, *to* and *unto*, — including, in short, those departures only which convey an actual difference of meaning, there are not in the copy which I have used (the Oxford 4to. of 1824) more than *nine* departures, intentional or otherwise, correct or incorrect, from the text of King James's Bible A (edition of 1611) in the Book of Genesis, nor more than *eleven* in the Gospel of St. Matthew. I affirm also, that in most of these

cases the departure is justified by the words of the original languages, and by the length of time during which each corrected reading has had possession in our English Bibles." — *Oxford Bibles*, p. 16.

Our confidence in Mr. Curtis is weakened still further by what is said in this controversy on the subject of identifying the original edition of the Common Version. In his Third Letter to the Bishop of London, that gentleman asks with reference to the changes made by Dr. Blayney, noticed above, —

"And now shall we find, my Lord, that Dr. Blayney, or any of his learned friends, KNEW the edition of 1611, to which they evidently refer as King James's Bible, to be the first or original edition? The phrase, '*the edition of* 1611,' was evidently written on the supposition of there being but one edition of that year. But I personally possess TWO (the candid reader will excuse a necessary egotism, in stating matters of fact): the copies of the Universities are all of one edition, I believe: but in the Archbishop's library at Lambeth, and lately in the possession of George Offor, Esq. of Tower Hill, was a *distinct* edition of 1611, answering to my No. 1. Those of the Universities answer to my No. 2.; and these editions are both in the 'large black letter.' Moreover, in the British Museum is a third, distinct edition of this date, in a *smaller* black letter, and having I. EDIT. lettered on the back, by the original direction, as it appears, of Dr. Charles Combe, of whose library the country became the purchasers at a large sum. In Dr. Cotton's list this is described as an edition of 1611, in small black letter. True it is, with regard to this last edition, that it exactly corresponds in various typographical errors and minute points with a copy in Christ Church, Oxford, and with another which I now have before me, belonging to the Rev. the Conference of the Wesleyan Methodists, dated 1613. It may be regarded, therefore, as doubtful at what period between 1611 and 1613 *it* was issued.

"But the fact of there being *two* editions, at least, of this year (1611) — one in the Lambeth library, and another at his hand, is surely sufficient to prove that Dr. Blayney and the Oxford Reformers of the text in 1769, were disgracefully ignorant of the materials they might have accumulated for their task: the resolution of the Delegates bears this ignorance of a *vital point* (which is the first edition) on the face of it; and leaves it doubtful whether throughout the whole business, they had *a document of the slightest genuine authority* before them! That

is, they may have mistaken a second and more inaccurate, for the first and genuine edition of the Translators." — *Existing Monopoly*, pp. 54, 55.

To this his Oxford antagonist replies, —

"That thirteen copies of A (the Oxford original) have been examined at Oxford; most of which have titles to the Old Testament, and all of them to the New. In every instance the date is 1611. Again, eight copies of B (the Curtis original) have also been examined, and four of them have titles to the Old Testament bearing date 1613, the titles of the rest being lost. In these cases the titles of the New Testament bear date 1611, but they seem to be taken, with some little alteration, from the same block with that of the edition A. This evidence then proves A to be of the year 1611, and B to be of subsequent date; and the result is confirmed by many small but decisive tokens, by which an intelligent and experienced printer can easily discover that B is the later of the two impressions. The Lambeth copy gives no support to the opinion of Mr. Curtis, as it did not belong to that library before the time of Archbishop Secker, and is found on examination to be made up from different editions, containing many leaves in various parts of the book, ascertained to belong to the year 1640." — *Oxford Bibles*, p. 5.

Besides it will not answer to reason, as Mr. Curtis often seems to do, on the presumption that if the corrector of the press has before him the original edition, he has an infallible standard. The following are given by Mr. Cardwell as a few among many of the more important errors in the two editions just mentioned, compared with a valuable edition of 1617, here denoted by C.

"Exodus xiv. 10. Twenty-one words printed twice over in A; corrected in B.
2 Chron. xxxii. 5. *prepared*, A and B; *repaired*, correctly in C.
Ezra iii. 5. *offered*, twice over A and B; corrected C.
Job xxxix. 30. *he*, A and B; *she*, correctly C.
Psalm lxix. 32. *good*, A and B; *God*, correctly C.
Jer. xxxviii. 16. *Zedekiah*, omitted in all three.
Mal. iv. 2. *ye*, omitted A and B; inserted C.
Ezek. xxiv. 7. *not*, omitted A and B; inserted C." — *Oxford Bibles*, pp. 2, 3.

We shall now copy some specific charges of corruption, as adduced by Mr. Curtis.

"I must submit," says he, "that *whenever a point affects the*

sense, we have no modern authority for altering the authorized punctuation. And the position of a comma will sometimes affect the statement of a scripture doctrine; *ex. gr.* Heb. x. 12. that of the all-important doctrine of the atonement. Our Translators, placing their comma at 'ever,' make the verse to read, 'This man after he had offered one sacrifice for sins for ever, sat down on the right hand of God.' Dr. Blayney and the modern Bibles, removing the comma, read, 'This man after he had offered one sacrifice for sins, *for ever sat down* on the right hand of God.' Your Lordship will be aware, that this comma decides to which of two Greek clauses of the verse (nicely balanced) the phrase εἰς τὸ διηνεκὲς attaches." — *Existing Monopoly*, p. 58.

He next passes to the consideration of the unauthorized changes made in Dr. Blayney's edition in the use of italics. After observing that King James's Translators often employ them to signify doubts on their part as to the authenticity of certain readings of the original Scriptures, as in 1 John ii. 23, he adds:

"Dr. Blayney and his coadjutors also employ them to express *their* doubts of the authenticity of particular readings, — see John viii. 6. where they thus, in a sense, discard the whole clause, '*as though he heard them not.*' Josh. iv. 6. 'Ask *their fathers.*' Josh. xiv. 10. and the conjunction '*and*,' Josh. xxi. 16. supply other instances.

"Some of the past consequences of this species of interference are curious. Mr. Horne (Critical Introduction, v. ii. p. 892, second edit.) quoting the Rev. G. Hamilton, the author of a Codex Criticus, designed to form a correct Hebrew text of the Bible, adduces the italics or supplemental words of the first and last of these texts in Joshua, as proofs of *what* Hebrew Bible King James's Translators used; whereas, the Translators here insert no supplemental words at all. 'Similar instances,' says Mr. Hamilton, '*may be observed in every book of the Bible!*' While Mr. Horne concludes his notice of the matter with an eulogy on 'the extraordinary and minute attention of our venerable and much-traduced Translators.' They have also this Gentleman's meed of praise for similar care with regard to the [*modern*] italics inserted 1 Pet. v. 13. where, although the Greek New Testament contains no corresponding words to '*church that is*,' they are found in the Peshito Syriac, and the Vulgate; and the Translators seem to have decided accordingly. 1 John iii. 16. supplies an instance of modern italics affecting the question of the Divinity of Him, 'who laid down his life for us.'" — *Existing Monopoly*, pp. 59, 60.

That is to say, in 1 John iii. 16, Mr. Curtis would not have "*of God*" italicized, though he knows that there is nothing answering to them in the original, and though he knows that the Translators profess to print such words in this way. Rather than vary at all from what we may charitably presume was a typographical error at first, he would persist in practising a deliberate and wicked fraud on the unlearned. And yet this is the man, who, when it suits his occasions, can rebuke others for "orthodox dishonesty," and speaking "crookedly for God." Other instances are given by him of words italicized in the modern Bibles, in regard to which we concur generally in the criticisms he has offered. We give a few examples.

"Gen. vii. 22. — 'All which was in the dry *land* died;' *i. e.* in the flood. This is an alteration of 1769. It does not mean the dryer heights or hills merely, but *the whole* of the dry land of the earth, as distinct from the waters. Two instances of a similar alteration (from the Authorized Version) are found in Gen. i. 9, 10. and four others in Exod. xiv. 16–29.

"Gen. xx. 17. — 'And they bare *children.*' From a Hebrew verb signifying to bear a child (Gesenius): not bare burdens, evil usage, or any thing of a more general nature.

"Gen. xxiv. 52. — 'Worshipped, bowing *himself* to the earth.' Not bowing to the earth, but bowing his whole person in the entire prostration of the East, to God.

"Gen. xlii. 11–34. — Five cases of 'true *men*': as opposed to spies. Not true brethren, or true Canaanites. There was no other way of expressing the plural of the original here.

"Exod. xix. 12 — 'Take heed to yourselves *that ye* go *not* up.' Putting 'not' (ignorantly) into italics here, makes a strong prohibition to which A PENALTY OF DEATH was attached, a command. The Hebrew decidedly *prohibits* the going up into the mount.

"Lev. iv. 13–27. — Three instances of '*somewhat against* any of the commandments of the Lord *concerning things* which should not be done.' A command concerning a thing which should not be done is a prohibition; so Gesenius renders it. By putting these words into italics, the *sin* is said to be *doing any of the commandments of the Lord which ought not to be done!!* And it is thrice said to be so." — *Existing Monopoly*, p. 62.

Dr. Blayney made many important changes in the heads or contents of the chapters, which give our author great offence.

"Certain obnoxious doctrines," he says, "are here softened; 'man's fall,' is not 'man's shameful fall,' as the Translators left it. (Gen. iii.) 'The church maketh confession of their natural corruptions,' Is. lxiv. (Trans.) is 'Confesseth her own unworthiness,' (Blayney). 'What we were by nature,' Eph. ii. (Trans.) 'The Ephesians, — their former corrupt heathen state,' (Bl.) So the prominence given to *Christ* (as a subject of prophecy in particular) appears to have been objectionable. Deut. xviii. 15. "Christ, the prophet, is to be heard,' (Trans.) is exchanged for, 'A prophet to arise like unto Moses, is to be hearkened unto, (Bl.)— Isa. xvi. 'Moab exhorted to yield obedience to Christ's kingdom,' (Trans.) 'To yield obedience to the throne of David,' (Bl.) — xxii. 'Eliakim prefiguring the kingdom of Christ, his substitution,' (Trans.) 'Eliakim's advancement in Shebna's room,' (Bl.) Again, while generally the Reformers of 1769, lengthen these contents in, those of Heb. i. where our Translators had said, "Christ is preferred before the angels, both in person and office,' Blayney omits the important words, '*both in person and*,' and makes the superiority only official. In the next chapter, where *they* say, 'We ought to be obedient to Christ, because he *vouchsafed* to take our nature upon him;' Blayney substitutes, 'The obligations we are under to give more earnest heed to the *gospel doctrine*.'" — *Existing Monopoly*, pp. 64, 65.

"Just an Unitarian phrase," says Mr. Curtis in a note on the last words. We are sorry, nevertheless, to learn, that this and the other judicious amendments proposed by Dr. Blayney have been withdrawn and suppressed, and that the Bibles published in England of late years have gone back to the false and absurd comments of King James's men. The proper way would be to have none, as in some of the Bibles published in this country.

On the subject of marginal additions and alterations, Mr. Curtis finds much to censure and condemn in the modern Bibles, and often, we must acknowledge, not without good cause. Thus, in Psalm xlv. 7, the innovators have inserted in the margin "O God"; on which our author observes: "Addressed to the Messiah. Dishonest orthodoxy. Dr. P. Smith would not admit this construction of the original into his first edition of 'Scripture Testimony.' In the second he admitted it; but is it fair thus to foist it into a public version?" Again, in the margin to 2 Peter i. 1, the innovators have inserted the various readings "Of our God and Saviour"; on which Mr. Curtis animadverts thus: "If one of the new readings supplied by the present doctrine of

the Greek article is to be introduced, why not the rest? But the principle of these surreptitious introductions is objected to. No good cause requires it." Mr. Curtis also rejects altogether the chronological notes, as being in every instance unauthorized, and often otherwise highly objectionable. He says, —

"A single specimen of the influence of an unfounded system of this kind will here suffice. It has induced the modern editors to add in the margin of the book of Judges a sort of running comment, to *shorten* the general period which the text seems to embrace; in fact, to reduce it from about the 450 years which St. Paul and Josephus, Michaelis, Eichhorn, Hales, Jahn, and others assign to this book, to 350 years, the period consistent with Usher's system. This has rendered it needful to *localize* certain deliverances of the Israelites (as that of Barak, for instance): though all the tribes were evidently expected in the battle; and to make other of the Judges contemporaneous who are said to have arisen 'after' one another. The heroic age of the Sophetim of Israel is thus broken up into mere fragments, resembling those in which that of all other early history appears, — but a great point of the historical truth and beauty of the Bible is thus resigned." — *Existing Monopoly*, p. 72.

Two Lists are annexed by Mr. Curtis to his Letters, one of which gives the typographical errors that have been committed "in and since Dr. Blayney's edition," and the other "the intentional departures from the authorized version," a large proportion of them, as he intimates, being peculiar to the Blayney copies. The following is a selection and abridgment of some of the most important particulars contained in the first.

"Num. xxxv. 18. The murderer shall surely be *put together*, for 'put to death.' Oxford ed. 8vo. 1804.

"Judges xi. 7. *Children of Gilead*, for 'elders of Gilead.' Dr. Blayney's ed. 1769. Also is in twelve different University Bibles to that of Oxford, 1814, showing it to be an uncorrected error of forty-five years. The King's Printers in 1806, 4to. also copied it.

"1 Kings viii. 19. Out of thy *lions*, for 'loins.' Oxford ed. 8vo. 1804.

"Psalm xlii. 1. As the *heart*, for 'As the hart panteth after the water-brooks.' Cambridge ed. 24mo. 1826; and again, 1830; and 12mo. 1830.

"Proverbs xxvii. 2. Let another man praise thee, and *to*, for 'and *not* thine own mouth.' Oxford ed. 8vo. 1801.

"Ezekiel xlvii. 10. The *fishes* shall stand upon it (the river), for the 'fishers.' London ed. 4to. 1806; again, 1813; and 8vo. 1823.

"These are the editions which the Rev. Mr. Horne so much commends, and which he states the Episcopal Church of North America has resolved to consider *standards*.

"Zech. xi. 17. Woe to the *idle*, for 'to the idol shepherd.' Oxford ed. 8vo. 1801. A very common error.

"Mal. iv. 2. *Son*, for 'sun of righteousness,' and 'ye' omitted in last clause, destroying an often quoted promise of God. Camb. ed. 12mo. 1819.

"Luke xiv. 26. Hate his own *wife*, for 'his own life.' Oxford ed. 8vo. 1810.

"John i. 12. But *as many* received him, to them gave he power, &c. for 'But as many *as* received him,' &c. Oxford ed. fol. 1786.

"John xvii. 25. Righteous Father, the world *hath known* thee, for 'hath *not* known thee.' London ed. 8vo. 1817. This edition was sent out by the Bible Society to a respectable Missionary, who detected the error while engaged in translating the Scriptures into an East Indian dialect.

"John xx. 29. Blessed are they that *they* have not seen, for 'Blessed are they that have not seen.' Oxford ed. 8vo. 1801; again, 1810.

"Rom. xvi. 18. Good *works* deceive, for 'good words.' Oxford ed. 8vo. 1801.

"Gal. iv. 29. Inserts 'to remain.' 'Persecuted him that was born after the Spirit *to remain* even so it is now.' Camb. ed. 12mo. 1805; again, 1819; again, 8vo. 1805–6, printed for the Bible Society. This error arose, it is said, from the printer in 1804 wishing to let a comma 'remain,' which he had at first marked out of the proof.

"Gal. v. 17. Flesh lusteth *after* the Spirit, for 'against the Spirit.' Oxford ed. 8vo. 1804.

"1 Tim. v. 21. *Discharge* thee, for 'I charge thee.' London ed. 4to. 1802.

"Heb. ix. 14. *Good works*, for 'dead works,' (νεκρῶν ἔργων) 'The blood of Christ purge your conscience from *good* works.' Oxford ed. 8vo. 1807. The writer has never met with an equally mischievous perversion of scripture abroad in the world, *as scripture*. This copy, very properly designated as the Antinomian Testament, was recently in use by a minister.

"1 John i. 4. That *our* joy, for 'your joy may be full.' Oxford ed. fol. 1769 (Blayney's). Traced in twenty editions of various sizes, and by all the authorized printers, to Cambridge, 12mo. 1824; i. e. fifty-five years.

"Jude 16. These are *murderers*, for 'these are murmurers.' Oxford ed. 8vo. 1801.

"Rev. xviii. 22. These words entirely omitted, 'At all in thee; and no craftsman of whatsoever craft he be, shall be found any more.' Oxford ed. fol. and 4to. 1769 (both of Dr. Blayney's); again, royal fol. 1770; again, fol. and 4to. 1772; also, London, 4to. 1773. Doubts are entertained whether this omission was intentional or unintentional. It is the largest omission which has been made during the 220 years of the transmission of our present version. Mr. Horne is mistaken in attributing it to 'the overrunning the folio edition of 1769, into the 4to size'; because the 4to according to Dr. Blayney's own account was printed *first*, and because it is in *both his editions*. It appears also, from Dr. Blayney's account, that he twice revised each of his two editions which contains this error. Two respectable London printers say, it could not be a typographical error. Dr. Blayney may have struck out the words in question on the authority of a various reading in a fragment of Hippolytus, and an inferior MS. quoted by Mill, and because πάσης τέχνης of the clause is omitted in the Codex Alex. and the Arab. version."

On the subject of this List, as given by Mr. Curtis, so far as it affects the credit of the Oxford Editions, Mr. Cardwell observes:

"It enumerates fifty-six mistakes, some of importance, and others totally unimportant, in different Oxford editions published from the year 1769 to the year 1823, inclusive. They are collected from eleven different editions; so that the result of this examination is, that the Oxford Bibles in question contain on an average five errors of the press. I have compared the List with the quarto edition of 1824, and in that edition, and probably in all that have succeeded it, not one of these mistakes is to be found." *Oxford Bibles*, p. 13.

Mr. Curtis's List of "intentional departures from the authorized version," is still more ample, filling nearly fourteen pages. But they relate, for the most part, to changes in the marginal notes, or in the use of italics, or in the manner of printing the names of God, in the text, of which enough already has been said. For the rest, instead of giving Mr. Curtis's list as it stands in his pamphlet, we shall give the substance of it, as corrected and explained by Mr. Cardwell.

"Gen. xxxix. 1. 'Bought him of the *hands*, for *hand*, of the Ishmaelites.' This change would certainly seem to be unne-

cessary, and is opposed both to the earliest editions and to the Hebrew. The error, if it be worth while to consider it as such, may be found in Bibles as early as 1629.

"Gen. xxxix. 16. 'Until *his* Lord, for until *her* Lord, came home. Vulg. *ostendit marito revertenti domum.* Right in 1750.' The Hebrew is *his*, and the change had been made in 1701.

"Exod. xv. 25. 'Made for them a statute; *for them* inserted.' This change also is according to the Hebrew, and had been made in the year 1701.

"Exod. xxvi. 24. marg. '*Twined*, for *twinned*.' It is singular that in the only other case where this word occurs, viz. Exod. xxxvi. 29, Mr. Curtis's favorite edition B and the edition C have the word with a single *n*.

"Lev. ii. 4. '*Unleavened cakes*, for *an unleavened cake*.' The Hebrew is plural, and so Bishop Lloyd printed the word in 1701.

"Deut. xxvi. 1. 'The LORD thy God. *Thy God* inserted.' This was probably an error of copy on the part of the Translators; for this expression is in the Hebrew, and the words appear in English Bibles as early as 1629.

"1 Sam. v. 4. marg. 'The *fishy*, for the *filthy* part of Dagon.' To show that *fishy* is not the right reading, Mr. Curtis refers us to Parkhurst. Now Parkhurst's words are these: 'From 1 Sam. v. 4, it is probable that the lower part of this idol resembled a fish; and it appears plain from the prohibitions, Exod. xx. 4, Deut. iv. 18, that the idolaters in those parts had anciently some fishy idols.' Could Mr. Curtis suppose that his references would be taken on trust? The real error is in *filthy* in editions A and B, and it was corrected as early as in 1617.

"1 Kings xiii. 11. 'His *sons* came, for his *son* came and told him.' The alteration, whether right or wrong, was made as early as in 1617.

"2 Chron. iii. 10. 'In the most holy *house*, for most holy *place*.' The change was made in conformity with the Hebrew as early as in 1629.

"2 Chron. xxxii. 5. '*Repaired* Millo, for *prepared*.' The error is in *prepared*, and it was corrected in 1617.

"Job xxxix. 30. "Where the slain are, there is *she*, for *he*, i. e. the male bird.' Mr. Curtis is here defending a palpable misprint. It was correctly printed *she* in 1617.

"Isaiah lvii. 8. 'Made *thee* a covenant. *Thee* inserted. Lowth omits it.' I answer, Bishop Lloyd in 1701 inserts it, according to the Hebrew.

"Dan. i. 12. 'Give *us* pulse. *Us* inserted.' The Hebrew requires it, and the word was in English Bibles as early as 1629.

"Dan. iii. 18. "Nor worship *the*, for *thy* golden image.' The same answer as the last.

"Hos. ix. 3. marg. '*Not* into Egypt. Flatly contradicting text.' Reader, the whole note is as follows, 'Not into Egypt itself, but into another bondage as bad as that.' Is this a flat contradiction of the text? Is the writer, who quotes it as such, and mutilates it for his own purpose, deserving of your confidence?

"Matth. iv. 20. 'Left *their* nets. The article τὰ used for the possessive pronoun.' In other words, Mr. Curtis complains that *their* is printed in italics, because τὰ, he says, is used for the possessive pronoun.

"John vii. 16. 'Jesus answered them, and said. *And said* inserted.' The Greek requires it, and so it was printed in 1701.

"1 Cor. iv. 9. 'As it were *appointed*, for *approved* to death.' And yet in 1617 it was *appointed*.

"1 Cor. xv. 41. '*And* another *glory* of the moon. *And* and *glory* inserted.' The change had been made in 1629, and is justified by the structure of the sentence and the words of the original.

"1 Cor. xv. 48. 'Such are they *also* that are earthly. *Also* inserted.' The Greek requires it, and the insertion was made as early as in 1629.

"2 Cor. xi. 32. 'Kept the city *of the Damascenes*. *Of the Damascenes* inserted.' The words are in the Greek, and are to be found in English Bibles in 1629.

"Ephes. vi. 24. '*Amen* inserted. The better MSS. omitting it.' Does Mr. Curtis talk of MSS? The word is wanting in A, but appears in 1617.

"1 Tim. i. 4. 'Rather than *godly* edifying. *Godly* inserted.' The word appears in Bishop Lloyd's Bible of 1701, and the word Θεοῦ ought not to have been left untranslated.

"1 John iii. 16. 'Love *of God*, because he laid down his life. To discard a reading, which implies that Christ was God.' Mr. Curtis here complains that the words *of God* are now printed in italics, although he knows, or ought to know, that they do not appear in the Greek. And afterwards,

"1 John v. 12. 'Son of God, (second time *Son* occurs). *Of God* inserted.' This insertion was made, according to the Greek, at least as early as in 1629. — *Oxford Bibles*, pp. 13 - 15.

There are those in England and in this country, who appear to be more solicitous about the honor and integrity of King James's translation, than about the honor and integrity of the word of God. A distinction ought certainly to be

made between a private and a public version of the Scriptures; the latter being, to all intents and purposes, the property of the public. In regard, therefore, to any attempted emendations of such a version, the only question in which an enlightened Christian can take much interest, is, Will they bring it into greater conformity to the uncorrupted text of the sacred writers?

[We have obtained the author's permission to insert the following Discourse, believing it to contain an able and judicious discussion of a subject, which, however often treated, still possesses great interest, and is exciting, at the present time in some parts of this country, more attention, than at any former period. THE EDITORS.]

ART. VII. — *Popery and its kindred Principles unfriendly to the Improvement of Man.* A Dudleian Lecture, delivered before the University in Cambridge, May 8, 1833. By CONVERS FRANCIS, Minister of the Congregational Society in Watertown.

THE Christian world presents itself to the religious inquirer under the two great divisions of the Catholic church and the Protestant church. A large portion of the record of strife, exhibited by ecclesiastical history, is occupied with the mutual accusations of these leading parties. One side has been bitterly reproached with the rash love of novelty, contempt for ancient and consecrated authority, and all the discordant varieties of bold heresy; the other has been not less sharply reproved for foul abuses, gross corruptions in doctrine and practice, tyranny over the souls of men, and monstrous and unscriptural claims to temporal and spiritual power.

There was a time when this controversy absorbed into itself nearly all the great interests of Europe, or at least gave them a peculiar character and direction. Society was heaved and shaken by it to the very centre. It brought into intense action a power over the minds of men far deeper and more agitating, than any from which preceding parties and rivalries had sprung. The Reformation was a central point, around which rallied the conflicting forces of the European mind, and from which influences went forth,

that reached almost every department of effort and almost every form of thought. For a long time, scarcely an event of any importance occurred in the political world, which was not, either wholly or in its modifications, the result of this religious revolution; and the destiny of states, whether great or small, was more or less subject to its action. The bold Augustinian friar probably anticipated as little, as Leo the Tenth, the consequences of that impulse, which, in its mighty action, broke down, in a great degree, the strength of national distinctions, and so far took the place even of the pride of country, that the Lutheran of one nation felt himself allied by closer ties to the Lutheran of another nation, than to his fellow-subjects at home, and hailed with joy a victory achieved by those who were in arms for the cause of his faith, though it were gained at the expense or by the disgrace of his own land.* Under circumstances like these, it is easy to imagine, how keen and engrossing must have been the interest felt, in every form of the controversy, between Popery and Protestantism, and how much of the usual extravagance of inflamed partisans must have been brought out on both sides.

After the agitation of the contest had retired within narrower bounds, a long and heavy swell of disputation continued to propagate a deep interest in the subject, at least through the religious world. The volumes of Hall, of Chillingworth, of Barrow, and others, testify how large a part of the learning, ability, and zeal of the best minds in English theology, was expended in this direction. That the Puritans should have entered into the warfare with all their hearts, was naturally to be expected of men, who believed that even the established church of their own land still folded within her embrace many of the errors and corruptions of her Papal predecessor. Our history testifies, that the excitement did not die out among our fathers for many years. When the licensers of the press at Cambridge, in 1688, had given permission to print the book *De Imitatione Christi*, ascribed to Thomas à Kempis, so beautiful in its practical and spiritual character, the Court interposed to check the publication, and recommended to the licensers a more full revisal of the book, "it being wrote by a Popish

* See Schiller's *Geschichte des dreissigjährigen Krieges*, Buch. i.

minister and containing some things less safe to be infused among the people." * How much, it might be asked, did the principle of this attempt at constraint upon the press, so far as it went, differ from that of the *Index Expurgatorius* of Rome?

With whatever indifference we may look back from our present situation on this controversy, it would be a mistake to regard it as a waste of strength or zeal. It was the result of a praiseworthy struggle of the mind to throw off its chains and burthens. It was a great and noble impulse in the cause of general improvement, — a large step in the onward course, from which no inthralment, however strongly guarded, can always hold man back. But it was in the nature of the case, that in the progress of such a conflict much injustice should be committed on either hand, that many unworthy prejudices, and no little unchristian asperity, should be embalmed and perpetuated on both sides, and that there should be a disposition to overlook or deny the concessions, modifications, or explanations, by which intelligent men so often satisfy their own consciences in holding what their opponents deem manifest and dangerous errors.

In this case, as in most others, the candid and dispassionate of both parties will freely acknowledge, that each has its faults, that each is open to censure. The Catholic will admit, that corruptions of doctrine and practice, in various forms, have dimmed what he considers the holy light of his church; † and the Protestant will confess, that there are abundant reasons for the prayer, which is said to have been used by some old ministers, "that the Lord would reform the churches called the reformed." On the one hand, the vices, the tyranny, and the profligate ambition of many of those spiritual rulers, who, from the seven hills of Rome, once held resistless sway over Christendom, are neither to be denied nor palliated. On the other, we must value the

* Hutchinson's *History of Massachusetts*, Vol. I. p. 236. Probably no book, except the Bible, has been so often printed as the *Imitation of Christ*. It is said that, including all the translations, it has passed through nearly two thousand editions.

† The church of Rome has not been insensible to the ecclesiastical abuses, with which the testimony of history reproaches her; and even before the time of Luther the necessity of reform, in some respects, was felt and expressed more than once by leading men. See Butler's *Book of the Roman Catholic Church*, p. 187.

support of a cause more than historical accuracy, if we fail to perceive in Luther, and some of his associates, any of the pride of passion and the ambition of leading a new party, though baptized with the name of zeal for truth. The dark shades of that picture, which the most partial hand must draw of the introduction of the Reformation into England, cannot be concealed. "We must reason ourselves out of our ordinary impulses, we must beseech nature to be quiet within us for a while,"* before we can regard coolly transactions like some of those which, in this connexion blacken the reign of Henry the Eighth. On these and similar points there has been a wearisome waste of accusation and apologies, of crimination and defence. It is worse than useless, — it is unfaithfulness to the solemn cause of truth, — to cover up with good words that obliquity of principle or conduct among Protestants, which, when found among Catholics, we hold forth to reproach with all the eloquence of exaggeration.

It has been the favorite but fruitless employment of some theologians, more in the past than at present, to appropriate to Popery or to the Pontiffs of Rome the Scriptural expressions concerning the Man of Sin, Antichrist, &c., and even to show that this application of those terms was a specific object of prophecy. With equal confidence have their opponents found Luther and Calvin distinctly shadowed forth in the fearful visions of the Apocalypse. It would carry me too far, even were it worth the while, to examine the arguments for these various interpretations. It is sufficient to remark, that it would be more true to the meaning of the sacred writers, as well as more edifying, to apply such passages of Scripture to the spirit and principles of which they are descriptive, wherever these appear, rather than to particular classes or bodies of men. The Man of

* Cobbett's *History of the Protestant Reformation*, &c. p. 37. This abusive book is written with all that coarse strength and that violent spirit of vituperation, for which its author is so remarkable. With many gross misrepresentations and sweeping, indiscriminate assertions, it contains a mixture of truth, to which it would be well if more heed were given. One of Cobbett's opponents has justly remarked of Henry the Eighth, that "he never embraced the distinguishing doctrines of the Reformation, but retained to the last the leading dogmas of Popery, which he had been taught in his youth, and which influenced the conduct of his whole life."

Sin, it is to be feared, is often found in other communions than that of Rome. Of Antichrist we may say, in the words of John, "even now are there many antichrists." It signifies a power hostile to the religion of Jesus; and whatever spoils the simplicity, mars the beauty, shackles the freedom, or inthrals the heavenly efficacy of Christianity, deserves the reproachful name. Who will say, that of such influences Protestantism has not its share, as well as Popery? "Dominion over conscience," says a sagacious writer, "is Antichrist any where. At Rome, Antichrist is of age, a sovereign, and wears a crown: at the meanest meeting-house, if the same kind of tyranny be, Antichrist is a beggar's baby at the breast: but as conscience every where is a throne of God, so an usurper of his throne is Antichrist any where." *

The subject prescribed for this lecture may be considered in various aspects of more or less importance, according to the period of time, or the state of society, in which the view is taken. Among these a selection must be made. I shall endeavour to illustrate the position, that the principles of the church of Rome, and all kindred principles, are unfriendly to the advancement of mankind; that they shut out or darken that religious light, in which the Apostle † exhorts Christians to walk; that they throw obstacles of serious magnitude in the way of improvement; that they shackle and restrain the mind in the progress to which it is summoned by the leadings of God's providence, and in which it may be powerfully assisted by the instructions of Scripture.

Religion, if rightly understood, must be regarded not only as the friend, but as the guide of man, in his onward course as an intellectual, moral, and social being. Christianity is peculiarly the great principle of active growth. It has a power of expansion, of which the strongest energies it has yet been permitted to develope are but elementary impulses. It reveals to us the inestimable worth, the incalculable capacities, of our spiritual nature. It helps us to realize, that the culture expended on this spiritual nature is the price, at

* Robert Robinson's *Ecclesiastical Researches*, p. 173. "Though an orthodox divine," says Dr. Parr, "I cannot keep my countenance, when my Protestant guides most gravely find, that John anticipated and described the triple crown of Antichrist."

† Ephes. v. 8.

which the highest and holiest prerogatives of our being are to be gained. It hangs no dead power of fixture on the mind, nor presses it down to the level of one unvarying surface, but acts within, as a quickening principle of vital motion, in all that is elevated, pure, and godlike. It is, as Paul has emphatically said, "light in the Lord." Such being its true character, whatever has a tendency to divest Christianity of this stimulating, fertilizing power, to break down its energy as a principle of spiritual life and growth, to lay it upon the passive mind as an inert substance, instead of incorporating it as a healthful and strengthening principle with the life-blood of the soul, must be adverse to its purposes as the mighty assistant of human improvement.

1. The principles of Popery, so far as their natural operation can have place, whether under their own name or in other forms, must be unfavorable to the spiritual progress of man in whatever direction, because they straiten or paralyze the freedom of the mind. In saying this, I do not mean to imply that every individual, who formally yields submission to the church of Rome, or to any human authority in matters of religion, must necessarily be in a condition of mental slavery. Such is the elasticity of thought, such in many cases the irrepressible tendency to individual independence of speculation, that no outward institution, however strongly guarded, deeply settled, or fearfully sanctioned, can confine every mind within a given range. There is an interior being, nourished by secret and still influences, whose action no appliances of human power can control. The deep strength of opinion, — that work which the soul fashions within itself, — cannot always be kept down. It will break forth, and, even under the most unfavorable circumstances, cases will occur where creeds and authority will stand in its way in vain. We cannot wonder, therefore, that freedom of inquiry and bold speculation have sometimes ventured to appear even within the range of the strong arm of the Church. It would be surprising, had it not been so. But what we have to regard; in questions of this sort, is the natural and characteristic tendency of principles; and this, in the case before us, is decisively hostile to the soul's liberty, and does in fact thwart or crush that liberty.

Wherever belief, or the outward profession of belief, is controlled by human authority, let the submission be modi-

fied or qualified as it may, there must exist one of the elements of mental bondage. I am well aware, that, in large portions of the Catholic church, a tone of thinking on this subject, very different from that of former years, has for some time prevailed. It would be gross injustice to ascribe to the whole body of modern Catholics the absurdities received by their predecessors in ages of darkness and submissive ignorance. There is scarcely a sect in Christendom, which has not, within the last century, been favorably affected by the progress of intellectual light, and by the prevalence of more unembarrassed modes of inquiry; and the Protestant is unfaithful to justice and truth, if he deny or wink out of sight the fact, that the church of Rome has shared in the general enlargement of thought, and in the changes which have modified the other institutions of society. There was a time, when Bellarmine complained with indignation of certain audacious heretics within his own communion, who refused to concede to the Pope any authority in temporal affairs, much less to allow him the power of deposing princes.* Catholic writers now would regard this antiquated charge of heresy with a smile of contempt. The Gallican declaration, so long ago as 1682, maintained, in direct terms, the independence of the secular on the spiritual power in temporal concerns. The Cisalpine divines, as they are called, boldly deny the infallibility of the Roman pontiff, and declare that even in spiritual concerns he must submit to the decisions of general councils, which represent the church. The answers given to Mr. Pitt's

* Bellarmine, as cited in Barrow's *Treatise of the Pope's Supremacy*, p. 17. The manner in which the Popes were wont, in former times, to magnify their office, is curiously illustrated by the following declaration of Innocent the Third, in which he finds the superiority of the pontifical over the regal power, set forth in the first chapter of Genesis: "Ad firmamentum igitur Cœli, hoc est, Universalis Ecclesiæ, fecit Deus duo magna luminaria, id est, duas instituit dignitates, quæ sunt Pontificalis auctoritas et Regalis potestas; sed illa quæ præest diebus, id est, Spiritualibus, major est: quæ vero Carnalibus, minor," &c. — Barrow's *Treatise*, p. 105. See also the speech of Lainez, on the jurisdiction belonging to the bishop of Rome, in Father Paul Sarpi's *History of the Council of Trent*, lib. vii. p. 610, a work, to the power of which Villers bears the following testimony: "Ce concile, qui devait réhabiliter les Papes, produisit le livre de *Sarpi*, lequel leur fit plus de mal que dix conciles ne pouvaient leur faire de bien." — *Essai sur l'Esprit et l'Influence de la Réformation de Luther*, p. 116.

questions to the foreign universities, and the statements and declarations developed in the recent controversy about Catholic emancipation in the British empire, are sufficient to show that the ancient absurdities about pontifical power are very extensively regarded by Catholics as obsolete errors, or are accompanied with such comments as render them nearly or quite nugatory. Even the name borrowed from the head of their church is so odious to many of them, as to be entirely disclaimed, and the application of it is by some regarded as a positive wrong. Dr. Geddes affirms the *Catholic* religion to be a very different thing from the *Popish* religion; * and the anxiety manifested by other writers to insist on this discrimination is certainly a good omen. There is at the most but a very small portion of the world, in which the time has not gone by for an application of Wordsworth's description of Papal dominion.

> "Unless to Peter's Chair the viewless wind
> Must come and ask permission when to blow,
> What further empire would it have?"

But after all the qualifications and concessions that can be made or required, it is still true, that the principle of submission to human authority, in the great concerns of religion, is one of the central principles of the Catholic church. Though its grosser forms may be rejected, the spirit of it, so far as that spirit exerts a pernicious influence over the mind, remains nearly or quite the same. Of this we need no other evidence, than is contained in the celebrated creed of Pius the Fourth, which Charles Butler, an authority on this subject not to be impeached, describes as "an accurate and explicit summary of the Roman Catholic faith." †

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* Good's *Memoirs of the Life and Writings of Alexander Geddes, LL. D.*, p. 229.

† Butler's *Book of the Roman Catholic Church*, p. 5. It is curious to remark, that Mr. Butler seems to think that he has quite satisfactorily vindicated the mental freedom of the Catholics, when he says, "All opinions which the church sanctions, *by propounding them to have been revealed*, we are bound to believe; all other opinions she leaves to our reason." — *Letters to the Rev. George Townsend*, p. 18. Bossuet's *Exposition de la Doctrine de l'Église Catholique sur les Matières de Controverse* is an able and ingenious work, but fails to relieve his system in some of the worst points, notwithstanding the somewhat ambiguous praise bestowed upon it by Gibbon, who says, "In the Exposition, a specious apology, the orator assumes with con-

Now the essential condition, without which religion can never, in any adequate degree, assist or accompany the progress of man, is the entire freedom of the individual mind. If this be refused, society will proceed, but it will proceed without that enlightening and purifying influence, which Christianity was designed to impart to all the forms of human thought and action. No topics are so eminently fitted to kindle the best powers and the purest affections of man, as the truths respecting duty, immortality, and our relations to God, which break forth from the Gospel of Jesus. If, then, all which is to be known or received on such subjects is dealt out by man to his fellow-men, or defined by a human power previously acknowledged to be entitled to passive reverence, where is that healthful and ennobling action of the individual mind on the loftiest interests it can contemplate, without which religion and improvement cannot go hand in hand? When the free operation of our spiritual nature is impeded, whether by direct authority, or by incorporating into the moral constitution, from the earliest dawn of reason, the subtile power of enslaving influences, religion will be received in the servile forms of superstition, or neglected as a thing taken idly on trust, or scoffed at as a childish appendage of society, or honored with the lips while the heart derides the mummery; and surely these are not the modes, in which the divine principle of moral life is to manifest a quickening efficacy, as the herald and the assistant of man's advancement. This usurpation over the soul is facilitated by the poor and pernicious distinction, which leaves the human mind free as to the common topics of secular speculation and of science, but teaches it that the Church has a province within which this liberty must be fettered; that, when religion becomes a subject of fearless discussion, and its old forms are broken to make room for such as are adapted to a higher stage in human progress, a profane hand is on the ark of God, or that the axe of the destroyer is laid to the root of the tree of life. Religion, it is true, may not be compared in importance with other interests; the gold of Ophir may not be compared with the stones of the brook. But the sentiment of reverence for

summate art the tone of candor and simplicity; and the ten-horned monster is transformed at his magic touch into the milk-white hind, who must be loved as soon as she is seen."

this sacred subject should awaken and animate, not repress or stifle, independent inquiry. The human mind is shamefully wronged, when advantage is taken of this sentiment to make it bow down without question before the forms of faith administered for its reception. When the mass of a generation stand thus in relation to religion, they cannot be prepared to do their part in that onward movement of society, in which, under the august providence of God, the successive ages should be so many successive steps. If Christianity is to be a large, efficacious, and vivifying element in human improvement, it must be left to its own heaven-born freedom; men must deal with it as a matter between God and their souls; they must be allowed to employ upon it without restraint the most intense energies of their minds; they must feel that it is a subject which demands the loftiest aspirations, the widest views, of which the soul is susceptible. If they are stopped by strongly guarded enclosures in this province of thought, or driven back by the arm of authority, thenceforth religion and human improvement will either fall asunder, or the former will hang upon the latter, if not as a dead weight, yet as a heavy and irksome incumbrance. When therefore the understanding, in the greatest and best of its concerns, instead of moving onward freely in a path of increasing light, finds its faith already prepared, without its own participation, by the decrees of pontiffs, the decisions of councils, or the authority of a body called the Church, it is necessarily shut out from that most salutary progress which depends on the mutual action of its own powers and the instructions of Heaven. This unhappy consequence can scarcely be avoided by those, whom the Church takes under her watch and cognizance from the cradle to the grave, and even beyond the grave, over whose minds, from the earliest years of childhood, she maintains a resistless dominion, and to whose consciences, by means of confession, she holds the key.

Among the results or aids of the pernicious influence here adverted to, may be reckoned that notion of the unity of the Church, which is advanced with such boastful confidence in books of Catholic theology. This vague and chimerical idea has done no little harm; for, as the phrase has a good sound, and is not at first perceived to be only another term for ecclesiastical domination, it has doubtless captivated

many minds. There is, and there can be, no other unity of the Church, than that which consists in mutual charity, and in the acknowledgment of Jesus Christ as the only lawgiver of Christians. Every attempt which has been made, whether by Catholics or Protestants, to erect unity on other and narrower grounds than these, has done violence to the principles of Christian liberty. The constitution of the Romish church is probably the most skilfully devised scheme for this purpose, that has ever been constructed. It has unquestionably embarrassed the course of free inquiry, and created much mental bondage. Yet how utterly it has failed to produce uniformity of faith, or to shut out division, dissent, and strife among its adherents, is evinced by those frequent, long, and bitter disputes among themselves about questions of faith and ecclesiastical power, which sufficiently prove how vain is his hope, who expects to find in Popery a refuge from controversy. The Holy Mother Church, after all her high pretensions, has vacillated, and wavered, and changed her ground; and we look in vain for the unity and certainty of which she boasts.* It is somewhat singular, that the eloquent and powerful Bossuet should have written a work † to reproach those who had abandoned the Catholic faith, with the varieties of opinion, the divisions and subdivisions of party, into which they wandered, when he must have been aware, that Protestants had only to turn to the pages of ecclesiastical history, in order to throw back upon his church the charge of inconstancy, strife, and controversy. The truth is, that this variety of opinions in itself is no just reproach to either party. It is only the bad spirit in which discordant views may be

* See the work of Joh. Alph. Turretin, entitled "*Pyrrhonismus Pontificius, sive Dissertatio Hist. Theol. de Variationibus Pontificiorum,*" &c. Likewise La Placette, "*De insanabili Romanæ Ecclesiæ Scepticismo,*" and Barrow's *Treatise of the Pope's Supremacy*, Introduction. "Whatever," says the Edinburgh Review, "the Roman Catholics may pretend about unchangeableness, the spiritual and political character of their religion has necessarily varied from age to age. It cannot resist the principle of assimilation which connects it with the state of civilization, and the nature of the institutions under which it is professed. Is there any man living, who believes that the Roman Catholic religion is at this moment the same thing in Paris and in Madrid, at Rome and at Vienna, in Switzerland and in South America?" — No. XCVII. p. 237.

† *Histoire des Variations des Églises Protestantes.*

held or propagated, that is pernicious and lamentable; for, as has been well said, "the true unity of Christians consists not in unity of opinion in the bond of ignorance, nor unity of practice in the bond of hypocrisy, but in the unity of the spirit in the bond of peace."

But the charge of holding back or retarding the progress of man, by placing shackles on the mind's religious developement, lies not against the Catholic church alone. In this respect there has been much of Popery in Protestantism; and let this spirit be found where it may, it should equally be held up to impartial reprobation. That great movement in the religious world, by which the oppressed spirit of Europe, with noble effort, renounced the bondage of ages, has never yet gone forward to all its true and just consequences. The church-establishments, the creeds, and the councils of Protestants have unhappily, in too many cases, hedged the minds of men around with their own strong power, after having displaced the more ancient authority, to which mankind had yielded submissively for centuries; so that Christendom has been darkened by varied forms of the same bad principle, instead of expelling the principle itself. Popish Protestantism deserves at least as severe a rebuke, as the most arrogant Catholic pretensions; for it is false to the profession with which it sets out, and assumes to itself the merit of having delivered Christians from one form of spiritual tyranny, only to bind upon them another scarcely less heavy and enthralling. We must fearlessly admit the full operation of the principles of the Reformation, before the world can justly measure their life-giving power in unbinding and quickening the religious energies of man.

The principles of the Catholic church have proved unfriendly to the advancement of man, because they have given religion almost exclusively a *sacerdotal* character. By this I mean, that their direct tendency has been to throw religion into the hands of the priesthood, as an affair to be managed, applied, and settled by them only, instead of exhibiting it as the great vital concern of each individual, a sanctifying power for the use of which every moral agent is responsible, on his own account, to God. From the history of Christianity, we learn how early false conceptions on this subject were introduced, and how rapidly a wide departure

from the simplicity of the Gospel took place. The ministers of Christianity came to be considered as successors to the character, rights, and privileges of the Jewish priesthood. The bishops corresponded to the high priests of the old dispensation, the presbyters to the common priests, and the deacons to the levites. A broad and deep distinction between the clergy and the laity, such as was unknown at the original institution of the Gospel, became a striking part of the apparatus of Christianity.* It required but a few ages to gather a character of mysterious sanctity around the sacerdotal order. Constantine the Great, we are told, never went on a journey without taking some of the clergy with him, "reckoning that thereby he made himself surer of the propitious and favorable influence of the divine presence;" † and in order to strengthen their authority, and increase the reverence for them among the people, he gave the bishops power to act as a court in civil causes. The peculiarities of prerogative and distinction, ascribed to those who were set apart officially for the service of religion, were swollen by continual accretions of power and influence. A variety of orders, each possessing its appropriate claims, or exercising its appropriate jurisdiction, became inseparable parts of the constitution of the Church. The highest forms of civil authority bowed or quailed before those who discharged the sacerdotal functions. Superstition on the one hand, and policy on the other, guarded the enclosure, which separated the consecrated ministers from the submissive multitude of the faithful; and the effrontery, with which the distinction was maintained, was at length seen in all its extent, when the monarch himself was compelled to take a seat below the rails of the sanctuary, inferior to that of the humblest man of spiritual rank, ‡ and when the cup of the communion was denied to the laity, and reserved for the consecrated lips of the clergy.

The natural consequence of such a state of things was, that religion itself came to be regarded only or chiefly as the official business of its professed ministers, — a sort of possession held in trust by them, to be dispensed in such forms and on such principles, as might seem to them best. The

* Maclaine's Mosheim, Vol. I. p. 176.

† Cave's *Primitive Christianity*, p. 160.

‡ Gibbon's *Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire*, chap. xx.

priests of Christianity became, like those of the Pagan world, the mere managers of the machinery of sacred things; and when the services which they exhibited or required were discharged, the claims of religion were satisfied, and its duties were over.* Under these circumstances, we cannot be surprised that the discourses of the pulpit should have been confined to such subjects as the reports of miracles, precepts of unconditional submission to the church, the duty of endowing monasteries, the wonderful efficacy of relics, the merits of saints and their influence in heaven, the marvellous glory and power of the blessed Virgin. The priesthood constituted a separate and peculiar *caste* in the community. The people gave up religion to them, or rather they took it, as their affair; and, as an unavoidable consequence, it became identified with the interests, purposes, and pursuits of a distinct order of men. I am aware that circumstances have effected a change for the better, in this respect, in some parts of the Catholic world; and the zeal, fidelity, and self-sacrificing kindness with which many of the clergy of that communion, in modern times, have devoted themselves to the temporal and spiritual interests of their flocks, are worthy of all praise. But the spirit and scope of their ecclesiastical institutions are still the same in many places; and their tendency is the same in all, though it may be checked or modified by other influences.

Now it is manifest that if Christianity is to lead and aid in the progress of society, it must have its appropriate place in the thoughts of men as their personal concern, and as the highest personal concern they can have. It must not present itself in the distance, if I may so say, as the employment of one separated class, requiring of others only an outward and nugatory concurrence; nor must men suppose that their relation to it consists in reverencing and supporting its

* It is remarked by Milton, in his usual strong manner, that "doubtless there is a certain attraction and magnetic force betwixt the religion and the ministerial form thereof. If the religion be pure, spiritual, simple, and lowly, as the gospel most truly is, such must the face of the ministry be. And in like manner, if the form of the ministry be grounded in the worldly degrees of authority, honor, temporal jurisdiction, we see with our eyes it will turn the inward power and purity of the gospel into the outward carnality of the law; evaporating and exhaling the internal worship into empty conformities and gay shows." — *The Reason of Church Government, &c.* Book I. chap. iii.

ministers. It must stand forth distinctly the great and absorbing interest of man, as a moral agent, as an immortal being. This is the purpose, for which Christianity was given by God. It was designed to pour light on every mind, and purity into every heart, to give an elevated direction to the energy of each faculty, to ripen the tendencies of each generous and noble affection, to lift man up to a moral position where he can see and appreciate his vast, his intensely interesting relations to God and eternity, and in general to warm, mature, expand, and sanctify his spiritual nature. These noble offices our religion cannot perform for us, unless it be placed before every mind as its personal privilege, employment, and joy, as its friend and guide to heaven, as its principle of ceaseless improvement and of eternal progress. Every man must feel that it comes to him, and demands of him to be the priest and curate of his own soul. Until religion be understood and applied in this character, it cannot be a quick and powerful element in human improvement. Now when it is presented in the exclusively sacerdotal form of which I have spoken, it is for the most part despoiled of this character; and therefore in that form its energy, as the guide and assistant of man's advancement, is necessarily in a great degree crippled and broken down.

The history of the religious sentiment in its various forms proves, that when the sacerdotal power has taken possession of this sentiment, and secured to itself the control of it, an effectual barrier has been raised against improvement. Under such influences, religion assumes a character of leaden immobility, that resists every attempt to incorporate it with the progressive energies of the individual mind. It is transmitted through the priesthood from generation to generation, in all the lifeless uniformity of Oriental indolence. It is fortified with abundance of mysteries, and garnished with marvellous legends, that the profane vulgar may be kept in awe. It legislates on the intercourse between man and his God in such minute and oppressive forms, as to make the service of the mediating priest indispensable to acceptance. No sacrifice may be presented except by his hands, and the offering which comes not through him is inefficacious or sinful. The purposes of the officiating ministers are better answered, as the services demanded of their votaries are more severe and costly. The priesthood becomes a corporate body for carry-

ing on the concerns of religion, with vested rights and unassailable privileges. Experience proves that from such a body goes forth an influence almost fatal to enlightened worship and to elevated moral sentiment; and it cannot be denied, that the reaction of such a state of things on the priesthood itself is of the worst kind. These, in greater or less degrees, have been the fruits of a sacerdotal *caste* in religion all over the world.

The error to which I have here adverted has been found in modified degrees even beyond the bounds, to which the power of the Romish hierarchy extends. I do not mean that Protestants have estimated the clerical office too highly, but that they have not always held it in the right sort of estimation. The minister of Jesus Christ should be regarded as the assistant and coadjutor of his fellow-men in the greatest of their relations, the relation of moral and immortal beings, as one whose time, studies, and efforts are to be used for the purpose of bringing divine truth to bear on the understandings and hearts of mankind, in such a way as to stimulate them to work out their salvation by placing their spiritual nature under the illuminating and sanctifying influences of Christianity. He is not to do the work of religion for them, but to stand by them as a friend to excite and facilitate their efforts to do the work of religion for themselves. Now if instead of this, he be considered merely as an official personage, who stands somehow in a nearer relation and in more familiar favor with God than other men, who has certain duties to perform and a certain power to exercise, as it were in the stead of others, and to the moral efficacy of which others are not expected to contribute their coöperation, — it is plain there will be little probability of engaging the attention of laymen, even of enlightened laymen, in religion as a subject to call forth the activity of their own minds; they will be likely to let it alone, or to throw it aside, as that with which they have nothing to do, as that which belongs to a distinct order of men, who alone are to settle its questions and to have the oversight of its interests. Such views of the clerical office have but too much prevailed even among Protestants. The natural consequence has taken place; religion has been made to speak a technical language, and been dwarfed in technical forms; it has been treated as the profession of its ministers, instead of the profession of every

child of God, as the employment of one separate portion of the community, instead of the principle of growth and improvement to the whole community; and the intellectual powers and the social influence of distinguished laymen have been turned away from its interests in scorn or indifference, instead of swelling the tide that should bear it forth in a free and glorified course.*

3. The spirit of popery and of its kindred principles obstructs the course of man's advancement, by overloading religion with forms and ceremonies, — by placing it in a connexion of dependency with the poor parade of gaudy wonders. The simplicity of the outward guise, in which Christianity appears in the instructions of its Founder, is one of its most beautiful peculiarities, — one of the facts in its original character, which testify that it was designed to raise man above the necessity of depending on his senses for incentives to piety. In this, as well as in other respects, it was far in advance of the age in which it appeared. The consequence was, that it had taken its course among men but a short time, before rites and ceremonies were gathered around it as a centre. In the progress of ages, the appetite for the pomp or the fooleries of religious spectacles increased, till the simple and heavenly beauty of the Gospel was lost behind a splendid or childish array of external institutions, and a vast machinery for operating on the senses. In the fourth century, Augustine complained, that the yoke under which the Jews formerly groaned was more tolerable, than that imposed upon many Christians in his time.† After his day, the evil grew still heavier and more oppressive, insomuch that it requires all our faith in history to believe, that men could have submitted to the endless parade and mummery, which took the place of Christianity. These cumbrous corruptions were introduced partly, perhaps chiefly, to meet and satisfy that diseased taste for religious scenery, which had so long been cherished by the numerous rites of the Jewish and

* It may be said probably with good reason, that the Romish hierarchy, with all its abuses and tyranny, during the middle ages exerted a favorable influence in controlling the rough passions of half-brutal barons and lords, by bringing to bear upon them the only power of which they stood in awe. See Köppen's *Philosophie des Christenthums*, p. 131.—Villers has remarked on the change produced by the Reformation in the position of the clergy relatively to the rest of the community. *Essai*, &c. p. 110.

† Epist. cxix. ad Januarium.

Pagan systems. The charge of atheism, which the early Christians incurred from their heathen adversaries, however absurd it may now seem, was an accusation perhaps naturally enough to be expected from those, who saw a new religious society growing up around and among them, that discarded all images, victims, and visible representations of the Divinity, and worshipped in spirit a spiritual Being. Where the outward signs to which they had been accustomed were wanting, they concluded the reality to be wanting. The reproach was not received without a desire to repel it, and the followers of Jesus yielded to the apprehension, that their religion might appear too bare and unattractive to secure the attention or escape the sneers of the world. In this feeling, probably, originated in a great degree that desire to surround Christianity with adventitious recommendations, which in the course of time, acting in conjunction with other strong causes, drew around the church the imposing array of external pomp and the puerile routine of countless ceremonies. It would seem as if the consecrated fopperies of heathenism were transplanted into Christianity. Indeed Middleton has shown, that the religious rites of modern Rome may well strike the classical traveller as copies of those of her pagan predecessor.*

The charge of multiplying to a pernicious degree those forms and rites, by which religion comes to be an affair of the senses or the imagination, and the shadow is mistaken for the substance, is not indeed confined in its application to the Catholic church. But in that church the evil has grown to a more fearful magnitude, than in any other ; and perhaps nothing has done so much to build up or strengthen her ascendency over the minds of the unenlightened, as these overpowering appeals to the senses. The cross, the image of the Virgin with her child, holy water, incense, and other kindred shows have an efficacy, such as it is, where arguments from reason or Scripture would be powerless or unintelligible.† In proportion as this effect is produced, the dominion of the ecclesiastical order gains all that strength, which is found in swaying the hopes and the fears, the pas-

* *Letter from Rome, &c.* Miscellaneous Works, Vol. V. — See also Penrose's *Attempt to prove the truth of Christianity.* Bampton Lectures for 1808, p. 99.

† See Herder's *Ideen zur Geschichte der Menschheit*, Buch xix. 1.

sions and the imaginations of men. The fascination belonging to the outward pomp of religious services naturally places its officiating ministers in an attitude of superiority not a little imposing. It was a very significant remark of Lord Bolingbroke, when, being present at the elevation of the host in the cathedral at Paris, he expressed to one who stood near him his surprise, that the king of France should commit the performance of such an august and striking ceremony to any of his subjects.

It may be said that, when we consider the ignorance of the mass of mankind and their incapacity for reflection, there is in all this a salutary influence, that it provides for many minds a protection for the religious sentiment which otherwise would be left without a support or guard, and that it creates a sort of Christian mythology, the poetical character of which is favorable to the culture of piety in persons of an imaginative cast of thought. I am not disposed to deny to such considerations whatever value they may justly claim, though I believe strict observation will compel us to acknowledge, that the amount of good gained in this way is much less than is sometimes supposed. But the point, to which I wish to direct attention, is this, — that when Christianity is thus continually enveloped in marvellous scenery and accompanied by long trains of ceremony, its power as a principle of improvement to society, as the best of the forms into which man's intellectual and moral advancement can be cast, is held back or crippled. That spiritual truth, which in its simple greatness should exercise the understanding and warm the heart, is displaced by temporary expedients and superficial excitement. The very fact, that this machinery for the senses maintains a sort of dominion for religion in unthinking or fanciful minds, may serve to show that, if it have a fitness for this purpose, it is a fitness adapted only to the lower stages of human culture. When incorporated into established forms of worship as an esssential and perpetual system of services, it must prolong the childhood of the religious sentiment, or at most allow it but a feeble and stinted growth. The soul must be held in leading-strings, instead of obeying the summons of Christianity to go forth and unfold its powers under the light and warmth of God's truth, that it may understand the deep, the solemn meaning attached to its own existence and destiny. I am aware it is alleg-

ed, that all these modes of affecting the senses and the imagination have a significance for which alone they are valued, that they are symbols of something beyond themselves, and in that character only are held in reverence. The cross, we are told, is venerated but as a memorial of him who suffered upon it, and the images, paintings, and relics of saints are regarded simply as remembrances of their virtues and their exaltation. This plea has a fair appearance, and should be allowed its full weight. But its value will be exceedingly diminished, when we consider the strong disposition in mankind to stop at the sign and forget the thing signified, to be contented with what employs the eyes or hands and leave out of view the spiritual vitality of religion. It cannot be a salutary tendency which confirms and systematizes this disposition. The history of language teaches us, that the most gross conceptions have been introduced into morals and theology by dwelling exclusively on figurative expressions and metaphorical words, till the truth they were intended to embellish or enforce is lost, and the mind is wholly occupied with the bald literal meaning, or with some idea far removed from the simple purity of the first signification. May not a process somewhat similar take place in the mind of the worshipper, who, whenever he approaches his religion, finds himself immersed in ceremonies and surrounded with imposing representations addressed to the senses? Will he not be likely to rest in the symbols, — in the various objects or agents interposed between his mind and the invisible world, and being quite satisfied, perhaps charmed, with the excitement which these supply to the imagination, look for no higher end, no spiritual meaning?

I do not forget the value of forms and of sensible helps even to the most enlightened and rational; nor do I forget the blamable tendency to that theoretical refinement on this subject, which leaves out of its account the actual condition of man's nature. Say what we will about the spirituality of our views, the soul must be more or less disciplined by the aid of means, which act on the senses or stir the feelings. Nature itself is a vast system of symbols and signs, which point forward and upward to the infinite and the spiritual; and we stand amidst the beautiful works of God, not only to record the phenomena, but to interpret, if we may, their hidden meaning. Forms should be to all men something

more than shadows; they are the robe and defence of realities; and he must be constituted differently from his fellow-beings, who can safely trust the religious sentiment to take care of itself without any aid from them. But though there may be times or individuals peculiarly liable to this error of barren abstraction, yet the religious history of man proves that for the most part the danger is wholly on the other side, and that the end is forgotten or lost in superstitious or frivolous devotion to the means. This has been the tendency even when the outward appendages of religion have been few and simple, such as they should be, and such as the character of Christianity requires. Every one may see to what a lamentable degree the evil must be aggravated, when externals are multiplied to an almost countless number, so as to form an impervious shroud around the substance of religion. Not only the feelings of the ignorant will be led blindly captive, but the understandings of the intelligent will be clouded. The mind will be arrested midway, or turned aside before reaching the point of view, where its vision might have been fixed on pure truth. The temple will be reverenced more than the Divinity; the altar and the incense more than He to whom they are nominally consecrated. Men will look for religion solely among its forms and observances; and this will be to look for the living among the dead. They will gaze with reverent devotion on the folds of the garments drawn around the form of Truth; but they will not attend to the loveliness of her features, nor understand the power of the heavenly expression that beams from her countenance. I ask not whether this overweening attachment to externals, this reliance on the imagination and on objects of sense, may be salutary for some minds. But I ask whether these are the characteristics of a religion, which is to lead forth the free spirit of man on an upward and glorified course, which is to disentangle it from all low and slavish alliances to material things, which is to develope and fructify the germ of the infinite in the human soul by unfolding before it the great spiritual meaning of nature and revelation, which is to bring it into free communion with pure truth and with Him in whose image it is formed; — in short, whether these be the characteristics of a religion destined to be the central principle of all human improvement. If any faith may be placed in history, or in what we know of the tendencies of

man's nature, these are the things which must retard, with an oppressive weight, the approach of that time, when, in the words of the sublime declaration of Jesus to the woman of Samaria, mankind "shall worship the Father in spirit and in truth."

It has not been my object, on this occasion, to set forth the arguments from reason and Scripture against the distinguishing doctrines of the Catholic faith. The unanswerable evidence of this sort has been adduced so often, and in so many forms, that the repetition of it now seems unnecessary. I have sought to fix your attention on the fact, that Popery, in all its forms, by its very constitution of doctrine, worship, and practice, and likewise all principles which agree with it in spirit, however different in name, are unfriendly to man's advancement; that they bring a counteracting influence to bear against the great law of human progress. If this be true, it is sufficient to show that they are a wide departure from that religion, which is the power of God for elevating and carrying forward the soul of man. There are doubtless institutions and forms of government, to which these errors are congenial, and to the support of which they lend strong aid.* But wherever the general mind is emancipated, and brought to feel its obligation to stand fast in the liberty wherewith Christ has made us free, it must seek those forms of the religious sentiment, which will encourage and provide for its growth and its self-action. No one can suppose, for instance, that the Catholic faith and worship are suited to the habits of thought among a people like ours. A member of the British House of Commons, in a speech on American affairs at the beginning of the revolution, described the religious profession of the colonies as "the Protestantism of the Protestant religion"; and if this were truly said then, it might much more truly be said now. It is too late to ask whether the minds of men ought to be liberated from restraint; that question has been already settled here; it is approaching to a similar decision in other parts of the world; and we must not leave out of sight the fact, that in order to meet this state of things, Christianity must be permitted to stand forth in the energy of its native freedom, unshackled and unembarrassed.

* Montesquieu, *De l'Esprit des Loix*, liv. xxiv. chap. 5.

There have been periods, in the various transitions of Christendom, when the better forms of Papal authority and worship have probably done good, by filling a place which nothing else could have filled so well at the time; as certain imperfect systems of astronomy, which had their origin in the obvious impressions of sense, were necessary steps in the progress of science, till the true theory of the heavens was established. But there is a manhood of the mind in religion, as well as in natural philosophy; and when that comes, the forms of thought or of ceremony, which were once useful because nothing better could be received, will either be abandoned or fade into powerless shadows.

Whoever reads aright the present indications of the world, must, I think, come to the conclusion, that Popery, whatever might once be claimed for its usefulness, has had its day, and must yield to the new influences that are dawning and brightening over the earth. It is not adapted to the wants of an enlightened age. A state of things is on the way, in which the fundamental principles of Protestantism must lie at the foundation of the forms which religion will take; I say *the fundamental principles* of Protestantism, for these are very different from the actual state in which Protestantism appears in many parts of the world, and as much better as they are different. Doubtless there will always be some, to whom religion will best recommend itself when it comes surrounded with pomp and show, connected with misty but imposing associations, and requiring of reason nothing but unconditional submission. There will be those, whose minds are too imaginative, superstitious, or idle, to have an affinity for Christianity except in the form of an excitement, like that of strong sensation, or when it merely stirs up inexplicable emotions of undefined awe, or relieves them from the obligation of personal inquiry, and from the task of forming opinions for themselves on subjects for which their mental habits have given them no predilection. It must move before their vision as a splendid pageant, or stand apart from all other things as that, before which the soul has only to bow with blind reverence. A religious taste like this, formed by the unexamined impressions of education, or by peculiar habits of thought and turns of feeling, is sometimes found in men, who, on other subjects, are even distinguished by mental power and vigor-

ous conceptions. Dr. Johnson expressed a sentiment sufficiently in accordance with the character of a mind constituted like his, when he said, "A good man of a timorous disposition, in great doubt of his acceptance with God, and pretty credulous, may be glad of a church where there are so many helps to get to heaven. I would be a Papist if I could. I have fear enough; but an obstinate rationality prevents me." * We cease to wonder at the conversion of Frederick Leopold Count Stolberg, which excited some stir in Germany, when we find that this was but an extension to religion of his habitual taste on other subjects, and that "his temperament was of a nature to crave for sensuous and external excitement, such as the ceremonies of the church of Rome supplied him withal." † From Gibbon's account of his temporary adhesion to the Catholic faith, we may readily infer, that his youthful imagination was at least as much beguiled by tales of wonder, as his reason was convinced by the writings of the Bishop of Meaux. But though there are and will be minds so constituted as to be attracted towards religion only when it is made to appear dimly great by being kept in a mist, or when it is attended by the official pomp of ecclesiastical authority, yet Scripture and true philosophy alike testify, that not in this form can Christianity be expected to exercise that high moral tuition over the human race, which shall bear them ever onward in nearer and more quickening acquaintance with the pure and simple manifestations of spiritual truth.

To those who, in this our beloved and honored University, enjoy the advantages of academical education, and es-

* Boswell's *Life of Johnson*, Vol. III. p. 381.

† *Foreign Review*, Vol. V. p. 145. The conversion of Frederick Leopold is ascribed to family connexions and calculations of interest, in Taylor's *Historic Survey of German Poetry*, Vol. II. p. 103. If this be true, it may perhaps confirm the remark which has been made, that skepticism, or indifference to the whole subject of religion, in some cases prepares the way for the nominal reception of the Catholic faith. Burnet, in taking notice of the state of religion in France, under Louis the Fourteenth, says, "The method that carried over the men of the finest parts among them (i. e. the Protestants) to Popery, was this; they brought themselves to doubt of the whole Christian religion: when that was once done, it seemed a more indifferent thing of what side or form they continued to be outwardly." — *History of his Own Time*, year 1683.

pecially to those who are engaged in the studies preparatory to the clerical office, the views which have now been presented will not, I trust, appear unimportant. Amidst the conflict of opinions, by which our community, in its unrestrained freedom, is agitated, there is full opportunity for every form of religious thought or imagination to have its course without check or hindrance. While we prize this liberty as we ought, and consider it as founded on the only true theory of man's intellectual and moral rights, we may not forget the evils for which it leaves open room, when ignorance, fanaticism, or levity tamper with the high interests of religion. For these evils the efficient remedy must be sought, under God's providence, in the just direction and moral activity given to public sentiment by the educated and enlightened friends of truth. Here then is an obligation, which should be felt in all its power by those who pass their early years amidst the studies which open and liberalize the mind. If you would meet well and honorably the claims of the community, to whom you are to go forth, let the great cause of religion engage your best thoughts, your deepest, most permanent and generous affections; and let the spirit gathered from philosophy and classical learning be illumined and sanctified by the spirit of the Gospel. Take Christianity to your own hearts, and carry it forth into society wherever your lots shall be cast, not as the servile subjection of the mind to authority, not as the official business of the ecclesiastic, not as a code of observances, of forms, or of rites, but as the principle, the vital principle, of the intellectual and moral growth of man's nature, the sanctifying power of his spiritual being, the source of that expansion of the soul, which is the bright and beautiful dawn of endless improvement in a better world.

ART. VIII. — *A Statement of Reasons for not believing the Doctrines of Trinitarians, concerning the Nature of God, and the Person of Christ.* By ANDREWS NORTON. 12mo. pp. XL. and 332. Cambridge. Brown, Shattuck, & Co. 1833.

THE germ of this treatise is contained in an article, which was originally published in "The Christian Disciple" for 1819, and which was called forth by Professor Stuart's "Letters to Dr. Channing," to which, however, the Professor, it seems, did not consider it as an "answer"; for, writing to a correspondent in Scotland, under date of 8th September, 1830, he says, "In regard to the *Letters* themselves, they remain unanswered in my country to the present hour"! We know not precisely what Professor Stuart's ideas of an *answer* are; but, for ourselves, we thought the article in question, though not confined to the arguments and illustrations introduced in the Letters, contained a pretty thorough refutation of the doctrine which it was their purpose to establish. "Unitarians," continues the Professor, "build not here on the Bible!" This, we know, is the old reproach, uttered against us from the pulpit and the press, by those who think it criminal to read and hear what we preach and write, and who are satisfied to receive and propagate the vulgar accounts in which our sentiments are caricatured. But Professor Stuart ought to have known better. Such a man is entitled, we conceive, to no indulgence on the score of ignorance. If he is not informed, he knows at least where information is to be had; and he is bound, according to our old-fashioned notions of propriety, to seek it, before he writes, — bound to do so, from a regard to the public, and respect for truth and charity, if not for his own reputation, — and this, whether he indite theological epistles to Mr. Adam of Dundee, or engage in the perilous task of classical *exegesis*.

The present work of Mr. Norton, we think, will satisfy any candid mind, that Unitarians here do make some little pretensions to "build on the Bible;" that it is quite possible, at least, for a person to bring to the examination of it a mind of singular purity, deeply imbued with a love of truth, trained to habits of accurate thought, and possessing all the assistance derived from a familiar acquaintance with the writings of Christian

antiquity, and yet, strange as it may seem to Professor Stuart, not find there his doctrine of three "distinctions" in the Divine nature. We are not accustomed to speak of the living or the dead in terms of extravagant eulogy, certainly not of the living. In the present case our commendation would be superfluous. As a critic and theologian, Mr. Norton has long ranked in the very first class. But the present treatise will not need the aid of his high reputation to give it weight and influence. Those who know any thing of him or his writings will readily credit us when we say, that it exhibits a rare union of good sense, choice learning, discrimination, and sound logic, which will place it among our standard works in theology.

And the publication is timely. Thinking men, it is true, may be inclined, at first view, to regard such a work as unnecessary. It will, no doubt, occur to them as an objection to a publication of this sort, that the doctrine of the Trinity is now to be numbered among exploded errors, — that it is, in truth, altogether an obsolete doctrine, and we may therefore be spared the task of its refutation. Of this fact, and the objection growing out of it, Mr. Norton thus speaks in his Preface.

"The discussion is one in which no scholar or intellectual man can, at the present day, engage with alacrity. To the great body of enlightened individuals in all countries, to the generality of those who on every subject but theology are the guides of public opinion, it would be as incongruous to address an argument against the Trinity, as an argument against transubstantiation, or the imputation of Adam's sin, or the supremacy of the Pope, or the divine right of kings. These doctrines, once subjects of fierce contention, are all, in their view, equally obsolete. To disprove the Trinity will appear to many of whom I speak, a labor, as idle and unprofitable, as the confutation of any of those antiquated errors; and to engage in the task may seem to imply a theologian's ignorance of the opinions of the world, and the preposterous and untimely zeal of a recluse student, believing that the dogmas of his books still rule the minds of men. It would be difficult to find a recognition of the existence of this doctrine in any work of the present day of established reputation, not professedly theological. All mention of it is by common consent excluded from the departments of polite literature, moral science, and natural religion; and from discussions, written or oral, not purely sectarian, intended

to affect men's belief, or conduct. Should an allusion to it occur in any such production, it would be regarded as a trait of fanaticism, or as discovering a mere secular respect for some particular church. It is scarcely adverted to, except in works professedly theological; and theology, the noblest and most important branch of philosophy, has been brought into disrepute, so far, at least, as it treats of the doctrines of revealed religion, by a multitude of writers, who have seized upon this branch of it as their peculiar province, and who have been any thing but philosophers.

"Why, then, argue against a doctrine, which among intelligent men has fallen into neglect and disbelief? I answer, that the neglect and disbelief of this doctrine, and of other doctrines of like character, has extended to Christianity itself. It is from the public professions of nations calling themselves Christian, from the established creeds and liturgies of different churches or sects, and from the writings of those who have been reputed Orthodox in their day, that most men derive their notions of Christianity. But the treaties of European nations still begin with a solemn appeal to the 'Most Holy Trinity'; the doctrine is still the professed faith of every established church, and, as far as I know, of every sect which makes a creed its bond of communion; and if any one should recur to books, he would find it presented as an all-important distinction of Christianity by far the larger portion of divines. It is, in consequence, viewed by most men, more or less distinctly, as a part of Christianity. In connexion with other doctrines, as false and more pernicious, it has been moulded into systems of religious belief, which have been publicly and solemnly substituted in the place of true religion. These systems have counteracted the whole evidence of divine revelation. The proof of the most important fact in the history of mankind, that the truths of religion have not been left to be doubtfully and dimly discerned, but have been made known to us by God himself, has been overborne and rendered ineffectual by the nature of the doctrines ascribed to God. Hence it is, that in many parts of Europe scarcely an intelligent and well-informed Christian is left. It has seemed as idle to inquire into the evidences of those systems which passed under the name of Christianity, as into the proof of the incarnations of Vishnu, or the divine mission of Mahomet. Nothing of the true character of our religion, nothing attesting its descent from Heaven, was to be discovered amid the corruptions of the prevailing faith. On the contrary, they were so marked with falsehood and fraud, they so clearly discovered the baseness of their earthly origin, that when imposed upon men as the peculiar doctrines of

Christianity, those who regarded them as such were fairly relieved from the necessity of inquiring, whether they had been taught by God. The internal evidence of Christianity was annihilated; and all other evidence is wasted when applied to prove, that such doctrines have been revealed from Heaven." — pp. iii. – vii.

Were we to consult our inclination, we should quote the whole Preface, for we have met with nothing of a recent date, which has appeared to us to convey so just a view of the modes of thinking, the errors, the dangers, and tendencies of the times.

The object of the first part of the work is to show that the modern doctrine of the Trinity, taken in connexion with that of the unity of God, is essentially incredible, and no evidence therefore is sufficient to establish it. The same is true, the author argues, of the doctrine of the "hypostatic union, as it is called, or the doctrine of the union of the divine and human natures in Christ, in such a manner that these two natures constitute but one person." These doctrines cannot therefore form parts of a divine revelation, for such a revelation cannot teach what is incredible or absurd.

The evidence from the Scriptures to show that the proposition, that "Christ is God," is false, is then presented. It is shown to be false by the very passages adduced in its support; it contradicts the express and repeated declarations of our Saviour; it is opposed to the whole tenor of the Scriptures, and all the facts in the history of Christ; and finally, "none of those effects were produced, which would necessarily have resulted from its first annunciation by Christ, and its subsequent communication by his Apostles." The next section treats of the origin of the doctrine of the Trinity, in the Platonic philosophy, and the succeeding, of the history of that of the hypostatic union.*

Mr. Norton proceeds to consider the "difficulties that may remain in some minds respecting the passages of Scripture alleged by Trinitarians," difficulties which can be

* In some remarks on this topic in a former number (Vol. VI. p. 39, New Series), we took notice of what we conceived to be an error of Dr. Priestley in supposing that the Fathers who preceded Origen maintained that the *logos* was united in Christ with a *rational*, as well as *animal*, soul. We are happy to find in Mr. Norton's book a confirmation of our opinion. The error in itself is not of much consequence, but still it may be worth correcting.

removed only by establishing correct principles of interpretation, of which he treats at some length, and with great acuteness and felicity of illustration. Then follow explanations of particular passages of the New Testament adduced by Trinitarians, arranged under several classes. This part of the work will be found to possess great interest as exhibiting the application of sound laws of interpretation to a great variety of passages, the meaning of which is generally misunderstood, or very poorly apprehended.

The next Section contains a learned examination of the doctrine of the Logos, as held by Philo, and the early Platonizing Fathers. The following extract will show the result of this examination.

"The illustrations which I have given are far from presenting a full view of the confusion and incoherence of thought that prevailed among the Catholic Fathers. But they are, perhaps, sufficient to establish the fact, that the Logos was regarded by the Fathers both as an attribute of God and a distinct person; corresponding to a mode of conception, or rather an imagination, that has spread widely through different systems of theology; — an imagination so incongruous, that those who have treated of the history of opinions seem often to have recoiled from the notice of it, or shrunk from acknowledging its existence. The words in which it is expressed, conveying in fact no meaning, are apt to pass over the mind of a modern reader without leaving the impression, that what was considered as a very important meaning, was once attached to them. The different aspect which it gives to the theological doctrine of the Trinity, from what that doctrine has assumed in modern times, may alone perhaps sufficiently account for the absence of all mention of it in the writings of most of those who have adverted to the opinions of the Christian Fathers respecting the Logos. That the conception of the same being as an attribute and a person was an object of what may strictly be called belief, is not to be maintained; for we cannot, properly speaking, believe a manifest contradiction. But the case was the same with this as with many other doctrines that have been zealously maintained. One part of it was believed at one time, and another at another. It was assented to successively, not simultaneously. When, of the two contrary propositions embraced in the conception, one rose upon the mind, the other set. In speaking of such doctrines as being believed, we intend, at most, what may be called an alternating belief, ever vibrating between two opposite opinions, and attaching itself, as it is repelled or attracted, first to the one and then to the other.

"We will now pass to another conception concerning the Logos. In the creation of the universe, God was conceived of as having first *manifested* himself. But it was by his Disposing Power, his Logos, that the universe was created. By the same Power, as his vicegerent, God was regarded as governing all things. It was, then, in and by his Logos, that God was *manifested.* Hence the Logos, considered as a person, the agent in the creation and government of the universe, came to be regarded as an *hypostatized manifestation* of God. Thus, also, the Gnostics conceived of their Æons as *hypostatized manifestations* of God. I am aware that I use a term without meaning; but there is no other which will better convey a notion of the unformed imaginations that once prevailed upon this subject." — pp. 281–283.

After some illustration of this latter conception of the Logos, the author proceeds.

"It was from the shapeless, discordant, unintelligible speculations which have been described, *ex tantâ colluvie rerum,* that the doctrine of the Trinity drew its origin. These speculations it is now difficult to present under such an aspect, as may enable a modern reader to apprehend their character. But the doctrine to which they gave birth still subsists, as the professed faith of the greater part of the Christian world. And when we look back through the long ages of its reign, and consider all its relations, and all its direct and indirect effects, we shall perceive that few doctrines have produced more unmixed evil. For any benefits resulting from its belief, it would be in vain to look, except benefits of that kind which the providence of God educes from the follies and errors of man.

"It should be remarked, however, that little blame or discredit attaches to those earlier Fathers by whom the doctrine was introduced. They only philosophized concerning the Logos after the fashion of their age. Their only reproach is, that they were not wiser than their contemporaries. In proceeding from the same principles they stopped far short of the extravagances of the Gnostics. Their speculations, likewise, till after the time of Origen, were obviously considered by them more as a matter of philosophy than of faith. There is sufficient evidence, that before and during his time, these speculations took little hold on the minds of common Christians. 'The great body of those who are considered as believers,' says Origen, '*knowing nothing but Jesus Christ and him crucified,* thinking that the Logos made flesh is the whole of the Logos, are acquainted with Christ only according to the flesh.'" — pp. 287, 288.

Mr. Norton speaks, in conclusion, of the worth of Christianity as received by Unitarians, in reply to the assertions of Trinitarians, that we deprive it of all its value, contemn all its peculiar doctrines, and reject all but its name. We will extract the last two paragraphs.

"Especially at the present time, when, through the discredit and odium cast upon Christianity by the false systems that have assumed its name, its power has been annihilated through a great part of the civilized world, and it has come to be regarded by a very large portion of the educated classes of society as an obsolete superstition, the call is most imperative upon those to whom the welfare of their fellow men is an object of concern, to use all means at their command to reëstablish its true character. If they are indeed engaged in supporting the cause of TRUE RELIGION against irreligion and superstition, then the hopes of mankind are staked upon their success. All efforts to promote the influence of Christianity will be ineffectual, till its real character is understood and acknowledged; for of all the opposition to which it is exposed, that which substitutes in its place any of those false systems that have assumed its name, is at the present day the most pernicious. If the doctrines against which we contend are false, then the worst enemy of Christianity is he who asserts them to have been taught by Christ.

"In concluding this work, I should not speak of myself personally, were it not for the desire which every reader naturally feels to know the probable motives of one who addresses him on any important topic of practical interest. Disconnected, in a great degree, from the common pursuits of the world, and independent of any party or of any man's favor, there is, perhaps, scarcely an individual to whom it can be a matter of less private concern, what opinion others may hold. No one will suppose, that if literary fame were my object, I should have sought it by such a discussion as this in which I have engaged. Even among those who have no prejudices in favor of the errors opposed, much indifference and much disgust to the subject must be overcome, before I can expect this work to find any considerable number of readers. I commenced it not long after one of the severest deprivations of my life, the loss of a most valued and most justly valued friend, and have continued it with sickness and death around me. I have been writing, as it were, on the tombstones of those who were most dear to me, with feelings of the character, purposes, and duties of life, which my own death-bed will not strengthen. I may, then, claim at least that share of unsuspicious attention to which

every one is entitled, who cannot be supposed to have any other motive in maintaining his opinions, than a very serious, earnest, and enduring conviction of their truth and importance." — pp. 293, 294.

In an Appendix, the author offers some remarks on the "expectation of the Apostles concerning the speedy return of their master to earth," notices incidentally other erroneous impressions which retained possession of their minds, and replies to the question why they were not prevented or removed by our Saviour. By many, this will be regarded as not the least interesting portion of the volume. It contains several important and striking views expressed in language of great vigor and beauty. That they will be understood and appreciated by all is not to be expected; for many will read to cavil, and many, from want of due preparation of mind, with a very imperfect conception of the author's meaning. Indeed to apprehend fully the results of his inquiries, and feel the whole force of the evidence on which they rest, demands habits of thought and a degree of familiarity with the subject, of which the great body of Christians are as yet destitute.

Mr. Norton writes for intelligent men, for those who do not shrink from examination and patient thought, who are not disgusted at being required to exercise a manly independence, who seek truth for truth's sake, and are willing to pay the price of its attainment. Such will find in the work before us ample materials for study and reflection. We are much mistaken, if to many of them it do not open new views. Christianity, indeed, is not now made the study of intelligent men, as it ought to be. This is to be deplored as a great misfortune. The cause it is not difficult to explain. The absurdities which have been taught in the name of religion, the superstition and fanaticism with which it has been incorporated, and the gross extravagances which have been exhibited under the garb of it, have gone far to deprive it of the countenance and support of the best understandings, if not to arm them in hostility against it. We say not that they are for this cause justified in its neglect or rejection. Far from it. In a matter of this kind it becomes the duty of every good man, of every one who wishes well to the cause of truth, of human virtue and enjoyment, to read, inquire, and judge, and not hastily to infer that all is hollow and deceptive, the offspring of weakness and imposture, because

some abuses and deformities are visible. The effect however, is a natural one, and, as we have said, greatly to be deplored.

We know of but one remedy to the evil. Well informed men must give their attention to the subject. They must examine the character and claims of Christianity, and endeavour to separate its great truths from that mass of human error under which they have for ages lain buried. They must be careful especially that they do not confound the wild work of enthusiasm, in the form particularly in which it has recently displayed itself in several parts of our own country, with the legitimate influence of Christian doctrines. The times, we conceive, impose on them a most solemn duty. They must stand in the breach, and with a strong arm endeavour to turn back the tide of irreligion, which, as many fear, threatens, at no far distant period, to overspread the land, and unsettle the foundations of public and private virtue. This can be effected only by carrying forward the reformation, which was begun by the early Protestants, but which, we may say, in a manner stopped with them. Religion must undergo a further process of purification before it can be adapted to the wants of an enlightened age. It is idle at this time of day to go about to reëstablish the dominion of the harsh dogmas of Augustine or Edwards. They have had their season, and have sunk to their rest, and the attempt to revive them can serve only to put weapons into the hands of the infidel and scoffer.

We cannot conclude without expressing our very sincere gratitude to Mr. Norton for the successful execution of the task he has prescribed to himself. Such works, we repeat, are particularly needed at the present moment, to excite and guide the inquiries of the more enlightened part of the community, and dispel the dense mists of superstition and error, by which the life-giving truths of Christianity are either obscured, or made to assume an appearance of deformity which exposes them to the danger of rejection.

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